To members of the Politics and Protest Workshop,

Attached is the second chapter of my dissertation. The project itself examines how French bishops during the Holocaust in France deviated from their support for Vichy to help save Jews despite the high personal and institutional costs associated with defection (http://www.alizaluft.com/dissertation.php). Chapter one explains how bishops decided to endorse the Vichy regime’s anti-Semitic legislation in the first place. Chapter two, which you will read, explains how the resulting alignment between political and religious authorities in France helped legitimate the Vichy regime & its policy of "National Revolution" in a time when such legitimacy was not guaranteed. Significantly, I am attempting in this chapter to develop a Bourdieusian argument about political authority and how political legitimacy is obtained, and I would be especially grateful for your feedback on this effort.

Finally, the chapter is incomplete – I have not yet written the conclusion and am still working through some theoretical ideas, but this is why I look forward to your comments.

Thank you so much!

Best,

Aliza
A New Commotion:  
The Catholic Hierarchy and the French Vichy Government, Together

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April 7, 2016  

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A New Commotion:  
The Catholic Hierarchy and the French Vichy Government, Together

Introduction

Once the Vichy regime came to power, the new government undertook a massive effort to reorganize French social life. The “National Revolution” was central to this effort. Its principles of work, family, and fatherland represented a shift from Republicanism (with its civic virtues of liberty, equality, and fraternity) to an ethnic nationalism that privileged ancestry, tradition, and religion as if biologically transmitted. In turn, the regime’s first targets were perceived “others” considered external to the national, and natural, community; primarily, these were foreigners and Jews. The historian Phillipe Burrin explains how, three days after the armistice was signed, on 25 June, “Pétain addressed his compatriots to inform them of the implementation of the armistice and in the very same breath, he announced the beginning of a new order and bade them help him to set up a ‘new France’” (1996, p. 14). This “new order” — the National Revolution — was among Pétain’s chief priorities, and the exclusion and limitation of “non-French” individuals’ rights were central to its philosophy.

Pétain, for his part, never spoke publicly about the “Jewish Problem.” He did, however, help to prepare the Statut des Juifs, even broadening its initial provisions (as articulated by Minister of Justice Raphaël Alibert) to increase its severity. Pétain regularly spoke in coded discourse, framing Jews as national outsiders, such as when he proclaimed that “true fraternity” in France was “possible only in natural groups such as the family, the ancient towns, the nation” (Marrus & Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 17). Further, according to several historians (e.g., Adler 1987; Bartov 1998; Bédarida 1998; Burrin 1996; Le Moigne 2013; Marrus & Paxton 1995 [1981]; Paxton 1972; Rousso 1991; Vinen 1995), as well as the perspective taken here, whether state anti-Semitism was overtly promulgated or covertly advanced, Pétain’s Vichy National Revolution was concomitant with political violence against Jews from its very beginnings.

1 Ironically, the classic distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is of France with Germany, as neatly laid out in Brubaker’s (1992) sophisticated analysis of the immigration policies of both countries. Hence, I argue that one of the Vichy regime’s main goals through its program of National Revolution was to transform France’s political culture for thinking about national belonging.

2 discuss distinction between foreign and non-foreign Jews here, and between Vichy and german laws.


4 The original copy of this discourse can be found in Le Temps, 20 September 1940.

5 It is worth noting than in justifying the first Statut des Juifs, an official statement published by the regime the day before, on 17 October 1940, read as follows: “The government in its task of national reconstruction has, from the very first day, studied the problem of the Jews and of certain foreigners, who, having abused our hospitality, have contributed to a significant degree to that defeat. Although there are some notable exceptions, in the administration and everywhere else, the influence of the Jews has been undeniably corruptive and finally decaying.” (As translated in Adler 1987, p. 16; original document published in Le Temps, 17 October 1940.)
And yet, despite (or perhaps because of) the crisis of summer 1940, it was not a given that Vichy would be able to reorganize social life in France as it wished. In fact, its ability to do so — to secure, more or less, adherence from a wide swath of a population in disarray to a new national ideology that involved restrictions against fellow citizens and recently arrived foreigners who had enjoyed more lenient policies just a few years prior — requires explanation. As a result, this chapter draws on Bourdieu’s theories of state violence and state legitimacy and traces transformations in the relational dynamics between religious and political authorities in France to explain how the Vichy government obtained its legitimacy in the first two years of the war. I introduce four relational measures, two objective and two subjective, to analyze this process. The first two build on Bourdieusian theories of political capital to explain how the French Vichy government was able to extend its authority, and the latter two build on Bourdieusian theories of symbolic capital to explain how the French Vichy government was able to naturalize its existence and its ideology. In the conclusion, I argue that French Catholic bishop’s alliance with Pétain and his National Revolution philosophy played a central role in its embrace, while their simultaneous silence concerning state anti-Semitism legitimized the Vichy regime’s violence against Jews in turn.

State Violence, State Legitimacy, the Church hierarchy, and the Vichy government

By mid-fall 1940, the issue of the Statut des Juifs had already been settled: the Church had decided to endorse it in August, and the law was published as official state policy on 18 October. From early October, when the first Statut des Juifs was promulgated, to 14 May 1941, when the first roundup of Jews by French police occurred, Vichy passed 26 more laws and 24 decrees concerning Jews (Jackson 2003, p. 356). Of course, it can be argued that none of these laws, including that which permitted prefects to intern foreign Jews at their own discretion and that which eliminated the Cremieux Decree and stripped Jews from Algeria of their citizenship, constituted state violence compared to the extreme brutality of what was yet to come. Yet, it is my contention that there is nothing “small” and certainly nothing meaningless about the “drip, drip, drip” of these decrees (Rosbottom 2014, p. 244). Indeed, Jews were subject to a slow but steady violence, forced to register themselves and their property in a mandatory census in September 1940 (Occupied France) and June 1941 (Unoccupied France), then...

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6 In chapter one, from pages 11 to 13, I explain what I mean by the term “crisis” and how the defeat of France and its subsequent division and occupation was perceived as a crisis both by bishops in the Catholic Church and by the general French population.

7 “Law on Aliens of the Jewish Race.” *Journal officiel de la République française* (or, *de l’Etat français*), 18 October, 1940.

8 Ibid., 27 September, 1940.

9 Ibid., 14 June, 1941.

10 Ibid., 16 June, 1941.
experiencing the sudden loss of employment, citizenship, possessions, and more – altogether, extremely violent indeed. How did this new order of affairs emerge from the crisis of summer 1940? Adaptation to the idea that there was a “Jewish Problem” in France that needed to be solved, as well as the implementation of strategies to “solve” this problem, was an accomplishment.

This chapter, seeking to explain that accomplishment, extends the definition of state violence to include symbolic violence. The approach is explicitly Bourdieusian: one of the most distinguishing aspects of Bourdieu’s theory is his definition of the state as an institution that “successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population” (1994, p. 3; emphasis added). Bourdieu’s attention to symbolic violence separates his view from Weber’s (1978, p. 54) oft-cited definition, which references only physical violence. This matters, because especially during the years from 1940 to 1942, the Vichy National Revolution was an effort at cultural (or symbolic) revolution, not least in who it classified as rightful citizens and beneficiaries of government protection. The conception of Jews as not belonging to this category — to classify and then naturalize them as “others” deserving of special treatment — paved the way for the violence to come.

However, there is another aspect of Bourdieu’s definition (and here, he replicates Weber), and that is its focus on legitimacy. According to Weber (1978, p. 215), three kinds of political authority legitimate domination: charismatic, traditional, and rational. Bourdieu, on the other hand, argues that legitimate political domination depends on political capital accumulation and symbolic capital accumulation (Swartz 2013, pp. 106-111). The state is the end result of struggles in the political field to obtain positions of authority, and of struggles by those authorities to impose and naturalize their visions of the world as legitimate (Bourdieu 2000, pp. 63-64). Swartz (2013) explains further: “the struggle for political capital is the struggle for a reputational power resource that mobilizes support among citizens” (p. 137). The struggle for symbolic capital is the struggle to legitimize other forms of power — here, I focus on political power — through misrecognition, a point to which I will return momentarily (pp. 85, 104, 110).

That legitimate political authority depends on successful accumulation of political and symbolic capital leads to the question of how it is that political authorities accumulate political and symbolic capital in the first place — how do they “[incarnate themselves] in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception of thought” (Bourdieu 1994, pp. 3-4)? This chapter aims to clarify these processes, focusing specifically on how objective and subjective relational dynamics between Catholic authorities, Jewish authorities, and the French Vichy government facilitated the accumulation of political and symbolic capital by the “new” French state.

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13 Discuss long and ongoing history of opposition to racial and religious classification in French census; what happened when census from Vichy was found by Klarsfeld in 1991.

14 Explain

In what follows, I identify two objective and two subjective relational measures to analyze processes of political and symbolic capital accumulation in France from 1940-1942: the first two serve as proxies for political capital accumulation, the latter two as proxies for symbolic capital accumulation. Arguments of past historians have not been wrong to emphasize the role of the French Catholic Church in their assertions that the National Revolution was concomitant with political violence against Jews from its very beginnings.\textsuperscript{16} This chapter specifies precisely how Catholic religious authorities in France facilitated the legitimization of the Vichy regime and, in simultaneously remaining publicly silent concerning violence against Jews, helped to naturalize the idea that there was a “Jewish Problem” in France and justify the Vichy regime’s “drip, drip, drip” of “solutions” to it. Capital that Vichy obtained through its alliance with the Church provided legitimacy for the Vichy government and its various policies, including its policies of violence against Jews during this time-period. To understand how the Vichy regime was able to secure and naturalize its authority as it enacted violence against a subset of the French population, it is crucial we uncover how its legitimacy was obtained.

\textit{Political Capital and Objective Relational Dynamics}

According to Bourdieu, political capital is a subtype of social capital (Swartz 2013, p. 37, 58; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119). Social capital is the ability to mobilize support through acquaintances and networks (Bourdieu 1986, pp. 21-24), and political capital is the objectification of this support in the form of institutionalized positions and alliances (Bourdieu 1991, p. 196-197). Political capital is a “reputational capital… linked to the manner of being perceived” (Bourdieu 2000, pp. 64, 65) and it “takes on objectified forms when it becomes institutionalized” for example as patronage jobs. It can thus be argued that a state accumulates legitimacy to the extent that it is able to grow its political capital via the institutionalization of acquaintance and network support.

I propose two measures for evaluating processes of political capital accumulation. First, \textit{the process of political capital accumulation can be evaluated by analyzing whether there has been an increase in public endorsements among actors who did not speak out on the state’s behalf with similar frequency prior to the time-period of interest.} This is a proxy for support through acquaintances and networks. Second, \textit{political capital accumulation can be evaluated by analyzing whether acquaintances and networks have become embedded in formal state structures.} This is a proxy for support through institutionalized positions and alliances. Each of these measures is an indicator of changing relational dynamics that can be used to assess levels of support and the institutionalization of this support. To the extent that both become “incarnated in objectivity,” we can claim that the state has obtained legitimacy via the accumulation of political capital (Bourdieu 1994, p. 3).

\textit{Symbolic Capital and Subjective Relational Dynamics}

\textsuperscript{16} explain…
Somewhat different from political capital, symbolic capital, according to Bourdieu, is the authority to legitimately impose symbolic meanings — values, beliefs, and ideology. Further, symbolic capital is unique in its emphasis on misrecognition; that is, in how the values, beliefs, and ideals imposed by those with authority are perceived as natural, eternal, and self-evident. In other words, symbolic capital doesn’t just legitimate authority (which is more like Weber’s three forms of domination), it also naturalizes it and by deflecting attention away from the power dynamics that it entails (Loveman 2005, p. 1655; Swartz 2013, p. 80).

Take, for example, race. Race is a “collective fiction” (Wacquant 1997) that works in and through categories, schemas, common-sense knowledge, symbols, discourse, institutional forms, and the like (Brubaker 2004, 2006, 2009). Race is a human creation and a social phenomenon (Bonilla-Silva 1999), frequently created for political intentions and with political consequences (Fields 1990). Yet often, race is misperceived as biological, immutable, innate, natural, and essential (Desmond and Emirbayer 2010). The ability to create race is a result of symbolic capital; this capital may be derived from other forms of capital (i.e. political or economic), but the misrecognition of race as natural is what makes it symbolic. Swartz (2013) explains, symbolic capital is unique in how it “deflect(s) attention from the interested character of practices and thereby contribute(s) to their enactment as disinterested pursuits” (p. 102). He then clarifies further: “Symbolic capital is a form of power that is not perceived as power but as demands for recognition, deference, obedience, or the services of others” (p. 103; see also Bourdieu 1990, p. 118). How, then, might a state interested in imposing symbolic meanings on a population increase its symbolic capital?

I suggest that religion is an especially good “resource” for states and state authorities interested in accumulating symbolic capital in an effort to legitimately impose symbolic meanings. This is because religion qua religion is a form of misrecognition par excellence. Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition is akin to Marx’s idea of “false consciousness,” which the latter uses to describe religion’s effect on concealing economic and political power dynamics (Swartz 1996, pp. 73, 77, 2013, p. 120; Verter 2003). For Marx, it is precisely the symbolic systems and symbolic practices of religion that are responsible for producing individual’s misrecognition of their material interests. Bourdieu likewise conceives of misrecognition as the process by which people fail to see and act on their best interests, material or otherwise (Swartz 1996, p. 73).

However, Bourdieu does not stop there. His work on the role that “symbolic producers” (including clergy) play in “legitimating the social order by producing symbolic capital” also draws on Weber’s work on religion and power. Here, Bourdieu asserts that “religious specialists” perform “religious labor” to create “religious understandings” of social conditions of power dynamics, which in turns transforms them into “disinterested meanings” (Swartz 1996, p. 77, referencing Weber 1978, pp. 1177-1181). Bourdieu also writes that cultural capital, of which we can consider religion a part (Verter 2003), is more likely than any other kind of capital to be valuable for enabling the accumulation of symbolic capital. This is because the “social conditions of [cultural capital’s] transmutation and acquisition are more disguised” than others (Bourdieu 1986, p. 245; as referenced in Swartz 2013, p. 113). Putting it all together, we can thus see how religion and religious authorities are especially well-situated to facilitate symbolic capital accumulation. Loveman (2005) explains:
To the extent that state actors could harness existing organizational and symbolic resources of local and religious authorities and gradually incorporate them into the state, the administrative capacity and symbolic power of the state would be enhanced (p. 1667).

But of course, the legitimation of political power via religious resources that facilitate symbolic capital accumulation depends on whether political authorities are interested in working with religious authorities to legitimize their domination and vice versa.

Building, then, on the above, in this chapter I propose two measures for evaluating “religious” processes of symbolic capital accumulation. First, the process of symbolic capital accumulation can be evaluated by analyzing whether there has been conflation of religious and political worldviews. This is a proxy for naturalizing politically-motivated values, beliefs, and ideology through ties to divinity and the eternal. Second, the process of symbolic capital accumulation can be evaluated by analyzing whether there has been conflation of religious and political symbols. This is a proxy for naturalizing politically-motivated values, beliefs, and ideology through ties to ritual. Combined, I argue, both the expression by religious and political authorities of common a worldview and the use of shared symbols serve to legitimize and naturalize political systems and agendas through misrecognition. In turn, both processes enable the accumulation of symbolic capital.

**Figure 1: Measures for evaluating the accumulation of political legitimacy**

![Diagram of Political Legitimacy](image)

**Methods**

This chapter draws on a variety of sources on the French Catholic episcopate and the Vichy government. Among these are private notes and correspondences among bishops, with the
Papal Nuncio Valerio Valeri, and with various representatives of Vichy, including Marshal Pétain. I also include sermon notes, mass announcements, and publications in official diocesan weekly newsletters, *La Semaine Religieuse* (there is one specific to each diocese), as well as other local publications that gave voice to the Catholic Church in France during this period. Finally, the chapter makes use of primary documents from chief rabbis in the French Rabbinate. A majority of the data comes from diocesan archives, the National Center for Church Archives of France, and the archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. These documents were collected from 2011 to 2013 in Paris and Lyon. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Secondary sources are specified in parentheses.

In analyzing these documents, I focus chiefly on processes that involve or indicate shifting configurations of relations among Vichy governmental authorities, the Catholic hierarchy, and the Jewish rabbinate. In other words, I take an explicitly relational approach, borrowing heavily from Desmond’s (2014) call for “relational ethnography.” However, I adjust the framework of his argument to make it applicable for sociohistorical analysis.

In proposing a “relational ethnography,” Desmond suggests that scholars ought to give “ontological primacy, not to groups or places, but to configurations of relations” (p. 554). Rather than examining individuals or groups as entities — whether they be “the Church,” “the Government,” “the Jews,” et cetera — I focus explicitly on the relationships between them, particularly between religious and political authorities in France. This stands in contrast to several books on France during World War II, generally divided into chapters and sections according to categories such as “The Regime” and “The Resistance” (as in Jackson 2003) or “The Church and the Associations,” “Business Leaders,” “Captains of Industry,” and “Money Manipulators” (Burrin 1996). These authors privilege “groups” as primary units of analysis. I privilege the study of relational dynamics within and across groups that help constitute political positions and social practices. Thus throughout this chapter, I do not seek to understand the characteristics of the Church as an organization nor the Vichy government nor “Jews in France.” Rather, I am interested in the changing patterns of relations between religious authorities and political authorities in France during this time-period.

To summarize before moving forward (and as mentioned previously): there was no guarantee that Pétain’s government would be able to re-organize French social life as it wished. To do this, it needed legitimacy. Thus in what follows, I first briefly review the background of Church-State relations in France prior to the rise of Vichy France, then I turn to trace transformations in this relationship from 1940-1942. The goal is to explain how religious authorities enabled the Vichy government to obtain its legitimacy while the government itself was engaged in increasing violence against a subset of the population — Jews — from 1940-1942.

**Background**

Prior to examining changing relations between religious and political authorities in France, it is necessary first to explain what these relationships were like before the war and the rise of the Vichy regime. The boundaries between religion and politics in France have had a long and contested history. Below, I summarize a few key moments and details.
The French Law on the Separation of Church and State was passed on 9 December 1905 by the Chamber of Deputies, establishing state secularism in France. Catholic Church buildings were declared property of the state and almost all Church schools were closed as well. The law followed a series of changes that had already been taking place in France since the French Revolution in 1789. Among these was the proclamation of religious liberty in Article 10 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which eventually led to full emancipation for Jews in 1791. This was the first time Jews were granted full equality anywhere in Europe. Yet at the same time that the new National Assembly was debating this policy, they also promulgated the Civic Constitution of Clergy (1790), which required catholic clergy to swear an oath of loyalty to the nation. The majority of clergy refused; only five bishops signed it.

In response, Pope Pius VI repudiated the regime and the few clergy who signed the oath, and he recalled the ambassador to the Vatican while the papal nuncio was recalled to Paris. Shortly after, the Reign of Terror, from 1793-1794, targeted “nonjuring priests” — those who still refused to sign the oath — and they were liable to death on sight often by the guillotine or mass execution by drowning (such as the Noyades de Nantes). Policies were implemented to remove all influence of Christian religiosity in the state, including Sundays, Holy Days, saints, ceremonies, public prayer, and ritual.

In 1801, a Concordat between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII was signed; its intention was to reconcile Church-State relations and restore much of the civil status of the Church. Catholic lands that had been seized during the revolution were not returned, but the Church was free to exercise its worship in public so long as it followed local government regulations. Sundays were returned as “festival” days and Catholicism was declared “the religion of the great majority of the French.” Finally, clergy were still required to sign an oath of allegiance to the state, but the state in turn would at least be responsible for clerical salaries. The 1801 concordat restored some power to the Church. However, the majority was still tipped in favor of the state.

Under the Third Republic, which began in 1870, further national secularization programs were implemented by the French government. This included the removal of priests from hospital and charity boards (1879) and the replacement of nuns with lay women in hospitals (1880). Jules Ferry Laws of 1881-1882 forbid religious instruction in all schools. Civil marriage became compulsory; divorce was made legal. During this period, Pope Leo XII embarked on a major effort to calm Church-State relations in France, also known as the “first ralliement” — the term itself originating in the encyclical Au Milieu des Solicitudes (1892). This encyclical encouraged French Catholics to rally to the Republic, but Leo XII’s efforts failed. Conservative and royalists claimed that the Republican regime and the French Revolution that birthed it were hostile to the values of Christian social order.

The Dreyfus Affair, which took place from 1894-1906, further served to deepen the schism between reformed France on the left and conservative France on the right. The latter was pro-monarchy, pro-Church, and seized the opportunity provided by the Affair to publicize its anti-Republican and anti-Semitic values. La Croix often took the lead in these attacks and
declared Dreyfus a traitor even after he was pardoned. In response, the French government closed the paper and the Roman Catholic Assumption Order that ran it.

The Dreyfus Affair also gave birth to *Action Française*, a social and political movement with its own journal that further nourished counter-revolutionary ideology among Catholics. Founded by Charles Maurras, *Action Française*, in addition to being monarchist and anti-democratic, was also explicitly anti-Semitic and called for a return to Catholic domination over France. It was remarkably popular.

When the law on the Separation of Church and State formally abrogated the 1801 Napoleonic Concordat in 1905, the cleavage dividing politics from religion in France couldn’t be greater. All remaining Church property was confiscated, religious personnel were removed from any state positions they might have held, and government funding of religious groups in any capacity was stopped. The 1905 law was the final severance of institutionalized Church-State relations.

*Pope Pius XI*

Historical consensus is that with the nomination of Pope Pius XI in 1922, a “second ralliement” in France began. Pius XI’s first encyclical, *Ubi arcane Dei consilio* (1922) declared his goal of Christianizing secular societies through Catholic Action — social groups organized by bishops and priests for Catholic youth and their families. Catholic Action was intentionally geared *away* from political action and *towards* the re-evangelization of Christian society. Marking a dramatic break with the past, clergy were encouraged to avoid politics and to work instead towards involving the laity in social organizations that would spread Catholic values throughout France. Youth movements especially became a key focus of the Church.

Concerning conservative Catholics who favored a return to the monarchy and national Catholicism, Pope Pius XI was radical here, too. On 29 December 1926, only four years into his papacy, Pope Pius XI condemned *Action Française*. Three weeks later, on 9 January 1927, *Action Française* became the first newspaper to be placed on the Catholic Church’s list of banned books. It would not be revived until Pope Pius XII decided to end the condemnation in 1939. In rejecting Maurras’ strategy of “politique d’abord,” Pius XI once again stressed to Catholics the importance of spiritual regeneration over political activism.

*The French Episcopate*

Pope Pius XI’s desire to promote social catholicism and to do away with movements like *Action Française* influenced how he approached episcopal nominations during his tenure. In fact, according to Le Moigne (2005), it is possible to distinguish within the French episcopate at this time a clear division between bishops nominated *prior* to the condemnation of *Action Française* under Pius X and Benoît XV, and bishops nominated *after* the condemnation by nuncio Luigi Maglione and Valerio Valeri under Pius XI (p. 19). The latter intentionally sought to purge the episcopate of the old guard, who were chosen during a time when fighting against secular

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17 “Politics first.”
republicanism was a top priority of the Church, and to replace them with bishops who would make social catholicism their primary focus — bishops who would reject political involvement by the church and disavow of any Maurassian or similarly nationalist tendencies (pp. 19, 25). Le Moigne describes this “new guard” as “the first generation [of bishops] to have truly ‘digested’ and accepted the Separation” (p. 33).

Due to their assignments and also their individual desires to serve “among the people,” bishops nominated under Pope Pius XI would become very well-known in France. Catholic associations pioneered by these bishops enabled the creation of widespread social networks and organizations, including Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française (ACJF), Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC), Jeunesse Agricole Catholique (JAC), Jeunesse Indépendante Chrétienne (JIC), and Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne (JEC), among others (See Appendix A). These movements’ constituents refused to engage in political activism throughout the 1920s and 1930s, encouraged by Pius XI’s encyclicals and the new cohort of bishops that stressed, especially with the rise of Communism, Socialism, and authoritarian anti-parliamentary leagues in France such as the Croix de Feu (which had actually incorporated some former supporters of Action Française), the need for Catholics to abstain from interacting with political groups. Catholic Action was remarkably successful in refocusing French Catholic life away from politics and toward social change. Jackson (2003, p. 25) describes how social catholicism during this time-period extended “into almost every crevice of French associational life” and Le Moigne writes how, as a result of Catholic Action, bishops nominated post-1926 had a “recognition without equivalent in the twentieth century” (Le Moigne 2005, p. 24).

Unfortunately, as we will see below, the events of 1940 would dramatically alter the social catholic focus on this episcopate. Their abstention from politics throughout Pius XI’s reign meant that, despite their acceptance of the Third Republic, the hierarchy did not have significant personal or institutional ties with the interwar French governments, nor did they share common worldviews given the Church’s emphasis on social catholicism and the Republic’s emphasis on secularism. Finally, politics and religion were firmly separated in the realm of the symbolic as well: political authorities of the Third Republic did not engage in religious ceremonies or prayer at public events; they did not praise God or otherwise make public displays of deference to the Church. The antagonism of the past had dissipated, but the present was founded on acceptance, not integration.

Turning, then, to the rise of the Vichy regime — where the next section begins — we can understand what Maurras meant when he described the new Vichy government as a “divine surprise.” This new cohort of bishops, as chapter one demonstrated, were far from the anti-Semitic, anti-Republican proponents of Action Française from the past. They were chosen specifically to oppose its values. But they also hadn’t expected for there to ever be a return of the Church to the central stage of French politics.

In what follows, I trace what this “reconciling” of the political and religious boundary looked like in France from 1940-1942. I also explain how this shift in relations enabled the Vichy

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18 Note: The leaders of JOC, JAC, JEC, JIC, and JMC all served on the General Committee of the ACJF. I will return to the importance of these youth organizations in chapter three.

government to obtain legitimacy via the accumulation of political and symbolic capital. For an episcopate selected intentionally to avoid religious nationalism and political compromise, the objective and subjective transformations in their relationships with the State were dramatic. Public endorsements from one to the other and vice versa, structural embeddedness of religious authorities in state institutions, the consistent expression of common religious and political worldviews, and the joining together of religious and political symbolism: all this would have been unfathomable three decades prior.

**Analysis**

1. Public endorsements

There was no shortage of public claims of support from authorities in the Church for the Vichy government and vice versa. Best-known among these declarations is Cardinal Gerlier’s famous declaration, on 19 November 1940, that “Pétain is France, and France today is Pétain.”

As noted in the previous chapter, this statement by the official spokesperson of the Church was not representative of all individual beliefs in the episcopate during the summer and prior to the bishops’ decisions to support the Statut des Juifs in late August. Research that looks to this statement for an explanation of why the episcopate endorsed the statute misses the important process of decision-making that led to this result, detailed in chapter one.

However, historians have not been wrong to emphasize the significance of this statement altogether. It is simply that the timing matters. From 1933 to late August 1940, many in the Catholic hierarchy openly allied with Jews. When Germany invaded France, resulting in the eventual signing of the armistice that begot the German Occupation, bishops were unsure of how to respond. Choosing to support the Statut des Juifs was an outcome of chaos, selective repression, and processes of tacit alignment. Yet once the episcopate had consolidated its stance, and once the regime’s positions toward the Church became clearer in the fall (especially with the Charte de Travail promulgated on 4 October 1941), the Church rallied to the new regime and would not speak out on behalf of Jews again until August 1942. When Gerlier openly praised Pétain in front of a crowd of hundreds, the episcopate’s position concerning Vichy’s legislated anti-Semitism was already established.

It is therefore notable that only one month after the first Statut des Juifs was passed, Gerlier openly praised Pétain in front of a crowd of hundreds, adding to his famous sermon, “France needed a chief who would lead her to her eternal destiny, God has allowed for you to be here.” Gerlier’s public statement facilitated the legitimization of the new head of state and his

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20 Archives de l’Archidiocèse de Lyon, Semaine religieuse du diocèse de Lyon, 29 November 1940.

21 For a detailed analysis of this famous speech, see Georges (2003).

22 This is detailed in chapter one, pp. ____.

23 explain.

24 This protest is the subject of chapter four.
government in front of the many who filled the pews of the Fourvière basilica. Furthermore, in a shift over only a few short months, he was no longer alone in his praise for the Marshal. Cardinal Suhard in Paris and Monsignor Jean Delay, the bishop of Marseille, expressed their veneration for France’s new leader, with the latter declaring in his cathedral on 2 December 1940, “God is using you, monsieur le maréchal, to awaken France.”

To allay concerns that these words of praise might have been naive and confined only to the beginnings of Pétain’s reign, one need only to look at similar declarations of support for the Vichy government throughout 1941. In May, bishop Piguet of Clermont-Ferrand claimed, “[Pétain alleviates our misery and seeks to eradicate, through… himself and his glory of yesteryear, the costs of our misery.”

In October, bishop Mennechet of Soissons wrote, in a letter to Pétain, that his congregation prayers for “the admirable chef that providence has bestowed upon France in your august person.” Likewise, Paldiel (2006) describes how the bishops of Poitiers, Reims, Amens, Nantes, Nancy, La Rochelle, and others also called upon the laity throughout 1941 to support the marshal in his “work of restoration” by adhering to the three principles of the National Revolution: work, family, and fatherland (p. 73). Yet at the same time, Jews were losing their rights to work and being stripped of their ability to claim an allegiance to France as their “fatherland.” Already on 22 July 1940, the Vichy government had set up a Commission for the Revision of Naturalizations to review all grants of French Citizenship since 1927. Jews were disproportionately affected by these proceedings and deported from France (1995 [1981], p. 4).

In July 1941, one month after the first major roundup of Jews in Paris had transpired, the Association of Cardinals and Archbishops in the occupied zone (but with Gerlier in attendance) proclaimed, “we venerate the head of state.” Although their statement called for Catholics to remain loyal “without enthrallment to the public order,” a phrase several historians have highlighted as evidence of a call for moderation by French bishops, others have critiqued this assessment, arguing first, that this message was so subtle that it could hardly be construed as meaningful tempering by the episcopate vis-à-vis the government, and second, that it did not even stop bishops from continuing to publicly revere the government. As Jackson (2008) explains, “in practice the qualification ‘without enthrallment’ did not prevent delirious effusions of devotion to Pétain from individual prelates” (p. 268) throughout the summer and onwards.

Prominent declarations of support for the state from the Church were even evident as late as 1 September 1941, only slightly past a week after 4,232 French and foreign Jews were arrested in Paris and taken to Drancy internment camp, northeast of the city and where Jews would frequently be detained during the war prior to their deportation to death camps in Poland. On this day, the secretary of the Catholic episcopate, Monsignor Jean Chollet, exhorted the faithful to follow the Marshal’s plan for France:

25 _L’Écho de Notre-Dame-de-la-Garde_, 14 December 1940.

26 _La Croix d’Auvergne_, 4 May 1941.

We have no right to criticize the leader himself or his orders. The subordinate obeys without question or inquiry…. in the name of our own religious conscious we will be the most united and the most disciplined of citizens. (in Pury 1978, p. 31)

Last but not least, in October 1941, synagogues in Paris, Marseille, and Vichy were attacked and destroyed. In response, the Council of the Association of French Rabbis adopted a declaration for Chief Rabbi Isaïe Schwartz to transmit to Cardinal Gerlier. The document describes the council’s anguish and desperation for some kind of public support from non-Jewish religious authorities. The rabbis wrote: “As with human victims, the stones, sanctified by piety; the tabernacles, that cover our sacred scrolls; we… are anguished. When will this sacrilegious fury end?” They concluded with a plea to their “colleagues who stand on guard around the Lord’s sanctuary”:

How comforting for us and for our anguished brothers it would be if we were to hear our sentiments echoed… invoked in the synagogues, the churches, the mosques, and if the faithful of other religions and their spiritual leaders showed their reprobation of these ungodly crimes?

At the end of the letter, the president of the rabbinical council asked all in attendance to communicate this message to ecclesiastical authorities in their communities. Gerlier, in response to Schwartz, expressed compassion for the rabbi’s plight and promised to share the letter with the ACA in the free zone during his next meeting with the hierarchy. It is clear in Gerlier’s reply that he was beginning to feel anxious about the Church’s silence concerning Jews, a point to which I will return in chapter three. However, at this time, Gerlier declined to make a public declaration on Jews’ behalf. When compared with Autumn 1933, when Jewish buildings were first ransacked, the shift in relations is glaring. Less than a decade prior, the Grand Rabbi Israël Levi invited all Christians to form a “front of defense for the bible,” and bishops from the biggest cities throughout France, including Paris, Nice, Marseille, and Toulouse, responded,


29 ibid.

30 ibid.

31 ibid.

32 Of note, this was not the only letter the Cardinal received in December 1941 requesting that he speak on behalf of Jews. In addition to the correspondence and meeting with Helbronner, Gerlier received a letter from P. Dillard on 12 December 1941 asking that an official letter from the Church on racism and anti-Semitism be published in the free zone (de Lubac 1990, p. 113).

33 Archives de l’Archidiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier, Interventions of Gerlier on Behalf of Jews. 5 December, 1941.

34 Gerlier explains his rationale, as discussed in the previous section, in a letter to Chappoulie, found in CNAEF 3CE_23, Correspondence Gerlier_Chappoulie. 14 December, 1941.
while those in Lyon, Bordeaux, Lille, and Tours sent ecclesiastics as representatives (Bernay 2012, p. 64-66).

2. Structural embeddedness

Once the new regime consolidated power, the Vatican officially appointed Archbishop Valerio Valeri to serve as the Papal Nuncio to Vichy. In return, Vichy France appointed its own ambassador, Léon Bérard, to serve as its representative to the Holy See. This confirmation of official positions validated the new regime, as did the introduction of over 200 clerics into communal leadership positions and departmental committees throughout France (Curtis 2002, p. 326; Jackson 2008, p. 268; Cointet 1996, p. 140). In the highest levels of government, prominent Catholics came to serve in powerful roles.35 Fouilloux (1997, pp. 194-196) notes how this was the first time since 1879 that so many Catholics had been appointed to high government office.36

Additionally, in an exemplary series of letters between Cardinal Gerlier of Lyon with Valeri in late February 1941, the cardinal weighed whether to accept an offer from Joseph Barthélemy, the Vichy minister of Justice, to serve on the council of ministers as an advisor (especially on religious issues).37 Gerlier ultimately declined the invitation, but not because of any hesitation over whether the Church should partake in political affairs. In fact, Gerlier even offered the names of similarly ranked clergy who might serve in his place, including Cardinal Liénart in Lille.38

In Occupied France, Suhard, who had already been nominated to the national council in January,39 would eventually decline the nomination in March 194140,41 but not without sending his chief aide, Monsignor Roger Beaussart, in his stead. A devoted collaborationist,42 Beaussart represented Suhard at the formal welcoming reception when Hermann Göring visited Paris in

35 For example, devout Catholics in the Vichy government included General Maxime Weygand, Minister of Defense; Raphaël Alibert, Minister of Justice (until January 1941), Pierre Caziot (Minister of Agriculture until April 1942); and André Lavagne, Pétain’s Chef de Cabinet. The first four ministers of education were also religious Catholics, especially the last of this group, Jacques Chevalier (he was replaced but the more moderate Carcopino in February 1941), and so was Xavier Vallat, Commissioner-General for Jewish Questions until May 1942.

36 These officials were not members of the French episcopate, but there were efforts from 1940-1942 to incorporate the higher clergy into the political administration.

37 Archives diocésaines de Lyon, fonds Gerlier, Correspondence Cardinal Gerlier avec La Nonciature, 26 February 1941; 28 February 1941; 1 March 1941.

38 ibid.

39 See Suhard’s Diary, January 15th-27th, p. 59, on being nominated to Pétain’s national council.

40 explain.

41 Suhard, on his decision to decline the nomination, details how he told Pétain that he had “great confidence in him” and would “love” to join the national council, but he worried that doing so would “reduce his influence in religious affairs to 80%” and he would better serve the Marshal by staying “on the religious plan.” Archevêché Paris, 1D_14_18, Journal Suhard, p. 61. Elsewhere referred to as “Suhard’s Diary.”

42 On November 1941, Beaussart stated, “Collaboration [is] the only reasonable course for France and for the Church.”
December (Burrin 1996, p. 221). In the same month, Cardinal Suhard assured German ambassador Otto Abetz that “the clergy is fully disposed to make its influence felt in favor of collaboration.”

Furthermore, even the protestant leadership, as represented by Pastor Marc Boegner, was embedded in the machinery of the new French state. Boegner, president of the Protestant Federation of France and National Council of Reformed Churches of France, was appointed to the National Council in January 1941. The same month, he wrote a letter to Pétain assuring him of “his deferential admiration and his gratitude.” Similarly, in September 1941, Boegner gave a speech at the Grand Temple in Nîmes on the need for protestants to play a role in remaking the new France.

Finally, in the magazine *Informations Catholiques Français*, the episcopate summarized its “national role” in political affairs and described how, throughout the country, civil authorities and religious authorities were working together in a common effort. Jackson (2008) summarizes this aspect of the Catholic religious and French political relationship neatly: “prelates were present on most official occasions and bishops were frequent guests at Pétain’s table” (p. 268). Rather quickly, the Vichy government was able to increase its political capital by embedding religious authorities into the administrative structures of the state.

By contrast, in the same period, French rabbinical authorities sought to affirm (but could not) their pre-war relationships with Catholic authorities by solidifying institutional alliances. In October 1940, Rabbi Julian Weill went to Cardinal Suhard hoping to join both religious organizations together in solidarity, as before the German invasion, and against what Weill perceived as German pressures that could strike them both. Yet Suhard had rapidly overcome his initial resistance and discomfort with collaboration, and he was confident by as early as mid-September that making common cause with the German authorities would bolster the Church’s status. In an entry recorded between 16 and 19 September, Suhard wrote:

43 cite.


45 Zaretsky 1994, p. 119, ff. 127. Boegner, as will be discussed further in chapter 3, also denounced Vichy’s racist legislation and state anti-Semitism in two letters in late March 1941, the first to Rabbi Isaïe Schwartz, the second to Admiral Darlan. Unintentionally, Boegner’s letter — which was meant to be private — was found by *Au Pillori*, a French collaborationist journal, that then printed and circulated the letter throughout the unoccupied zone. *Au Pillori*’s goal was to embarrass Boegner, but instead they embarrassed the regime (ff 128; see also Bolle 1979, p. 294). As a result, Boegner’s letter would become the first public protest against anti-Semitism by a religious authority in France during this time-period. The “Pomeyrol Theses,” written by a small group of protestants that clarified the relationship between church and state and protested Vichy’s anti-Semitic laws and violence, was published several months later, but Boegner was not a part of this group.

46 3CE_90, CNAEF. See, for example, edition of August 1940, no. 103.

47 cite
The occupying power proves correct, and even very correct, with me. What will it be tomorrow? I think the Catholic Church can emerge from this ordeal magnified and glorified by the position she held during this ordeal.\textsuperscript{48}

Subsequently, when Rabbi Weill met with Cardinal Suhard in occupied France two weeks later, Weill expressed his concerns about rising political anti-Semitism and his desire for the Church and the rabbinate to continue fighting Nazism together, but Suhard had no interest in working alongside him. Suhard was already convinced the Church could benefit from allying with Nazi occupation authorities. Weill was playing a fool’s game.

Similarly, in December 1941, Jacques Helbronner, president of the Consistoire Central des Israelites de France (CCIF) and the most important Jewish personality in France at the time, wrote to Marshal Pétain, with a copy of the letter delivered to Cardinal Gerlier, deploiring the terrible conditions of French Jews in the occupied zone.\textsuperscript{49} Helbronner pleaded for support and begged the Marshal to “stop this campaign of hate”\textsuperscript{50} in which Jews are “deprived of their rights as citizens, spoiled of the fruits of their labor, chased from the institutions that they and their families have created; these persecutions, will they ever end?”\textsuperscript{51} Helbronner was obsequious: “you are, with his eminence Cardinal Gerlier… the only comfort, the only support that I can find.”\textsuperscript{52} He implored, “can we receive from you a word of hope?”

Helbronner would write to Pétain 26 times in 1941 on behalf of his coreligionnaires. He often noted his ties to Cardinal Gerlier (also the subject of his many requests for intervention on behalf of Jews) in an effort to demonstrate his social capital. Unfortunately, these efforts had no real impact, possibly because at this time, Gerlier was frequently praising the regime and Pétain in his sermons, and he often encouraged the laity to work towards the government’s National Revolution. Like Schwartz with Suhard, Helbronner’s efforts to recruit Gerlier to publicly ally with Jews was futile. Likewise, his “name-dropping” of Gerlier in numerous letters to Pétain was to no avail. Pétain, when he did reply to Helbronner, wrote only curt and formal letters.\textsuperscript{53} In Marrus and Paxton’s words, “Pétain’s replies were polite but inconsequential” (1995 [1981], p. 86).

3. Common Religious and Political Worldviews

Chapter one exposed the fact that many in the Catholic hierarchy were hesitant at first to rally around Pétain, and they were especially unclear on what position to take regarding state

\textsuperscript{48} Archevêché Paris, 1D_14_18, Journal Suhard, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{49} Archives de l’Archidiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier_Affaire Helbronner. 8 December 1941.

\textsuperscript{50} ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} In this case, a following letter from Gerlier to Chappoulie, located in a separate folder, mentions that one of Helbronner’s friends told Gerlier that Pétain replied to Helbronner with a “firm letter” saying he refused to accept Helbronner’s complaints, adding that he was “bruised” by his protests in the press. [cite]
anti-Semitism. It was only later, as mentioned above, that bishops in the French episcopate began to proclaim that Church and State were engaged in a common mission to restore France. Jackson (2003) writes, “In the autumn of 1940, when the government’s political orientation became clearer, the Church succumbed totally to the cult of the providential leader” (p. 268). The analysis below does not disagree with this argument but modifies it slightly: for a majority of bishops, the French government’s expressed worldview reflected key ideals of Catholicism. As a result, bishops did not “succumb” to the government but rather they perceived that the new regime’s values mirrored those of the Church and they regularly expressed this to the laity. In turn, religious and political systems in France became conflated to the extent that bishops in the Catholic hierarchy expressed the government’s cultural agenda and belief systems as their own.

On 19 November 1940, Cardinal Gerlier declared in his famous speech, “Work, family, fatherland — these words are ours.” A month later, Gerlier praised Pétain’s National Revolution philosophy in the Journal des Débats, a French weekly, stating: “The Marshal said one day: ‘our fatherland must recover the beauty of its roots.’ What is then the most beautiful of all the roots if not Christianity, which gave it birth?” In doing so, he echoed not only Pétain’s speeches but also the Marshal’s essays which described a worldview in which Jews were not a part of the natural French community. Other bishops during this time-period also imitated the regime’s ideas about the social world and repeated them as the Church’s own. In doing so, they helped legitimize the government’s exclusionary philosophy to the Church’s membership.

Many in the Church hierarchy were also quick to praise the Vichy regime because they believed the groups shared common ideological enemies (Bartov 1998; Burrin 1996; Jackson 2008). Not least among these was the laïcité of the past. In September 1940, Monsignor Florent Du Bois de Villerabel, archbishop of Aix, described the old republic’s secularism as a “cancer” that had disfigured France. The bishop of Viviers, Monsignor Couderc, similarly exclaimed that among all the reasons for France’s defeat, the greatest, perhaps, was the former republic’s “official ignorance of religion.” A belief that God was punishing France for her abandonment of Christian values predominated many bishops speeches and appeared regularly in La Croix — “the semi-official organ of [French] Catholicism” (Halls 1995, p. 170):

La Croix offered readers a full menu of dissipating factors that had helped lead La Belle France down the road to perdition. These included the obvious Catholic complaints of laïcité and dénatalité, as well as an unsparing critique of

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54 Again, in chapter three, I discuss dissent within the Church and the few bishops who were not in total agreement during this time-period with the Catholic hierarchy’s formal stance of support for the Church and silence concerning violence against Jews.

55 Archives de l’Archidiocèse de Lyon, Semaine religieuse du diocèse de Lyon, 29 November 1940.


57 La Semaine Religieuse de l’Archidiocèse d’Aix, 15 September 1940, no. 37, p. 37.

58 La Semaine Religieuse de l’Archidiocèse de Viviers, 28 February 1941, no. 9, p. 78.
“Modernism’s other errors,” from women’s liberation to rural flight, as well as the overconsumption of alcohol. (pp. 51-52)

The message couldn’t be clearer: Catholics must flock to Pétain who promised to reverse trends the Church blamed for France’s ruin. Redemption for past sins could only be achieved through the installation of a political system that promised to reverse them.

Significantly, not only did Catholic authorities turn to the government in support of their perceived common values, but also, the Vichy government actively courted the episcopate in its effort to align Catholics with its political goals. Political officials regularly imitated religious discourse by chastising France for her moral decline and called for a return to the social values of the Church. For example, a lengthy memo on Church-State relations authored by the Director of Cults and Associations at the Ministry of the Interior, Pierre Sauret, argued that it was necessary for the state to work with the Church in rebuilding France, because an absence or abandonment of spiritual values had been an important factor in her defeat.\(^{59}\) Also, although Pétain himself was not personally religious, he regularly spoke of the need for self-chastisement — a constant value of the Church, according to Drapac (1998, p. 131). Jackson (2008, p. 268) writes that the Marshal was “was happy to embrace the Church as a bastion of social order whose objectives dovetailed with the national revolution.” Not all efforts to enmesh politics with religion stemmed from the Church; the Vichy government, too, saw in Catholicism opportunities to further its agenda.

In this vein, perhaps no single issue was of greater importance to the Catholic hierarchy than the republic’s institutionalized secularism of state education. Within the first month after the armistice was signed, bishops Gerlier, Suhard, and Liénart had met twice to prepare a list of demands from the Church to Pétain. The issue of Catholic education was at the top.\(^{60}\) The regime, in turn, made an early homage to this priority of the Church by appointing to its ministry of education Albert Rivaud, Emile Mineaux, and Georges Ripert, who served in succession from 17 June to 13 December 1940. Each was an ardent, anti-republican, Maurassian Catholic, eager to dismiss the secular education program that came before them (Halls 1981, pp. 16-20). Jacques Chevalier, the fourth minister of education in the Vichy government, was deeply religious as well, and he organized numerous concessions to the Church before being replaced by Jerome Carcopino, a more moderate figure, in February 1941.\(^{61}\)

The episcopate’s belief that Pétain would save France from *laićité* by returning authority to the Church in the realm of education was powerfully validated when, in a famous article of 15 August 1940, the Marshal explained that a national regeneration of France would hinge on improving youth education.\(^{62}\) Pétain wrote that he anticipated re-introducing French traditional

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\(^{59}\) A copy can be found in 3CE_31, CNAEF, Relations de Mgr. Chappoulie aver Monsieur B. Ménétrel, secrétaire particulier du maréchal Pétain.

\(^{60}\) cite.

\(^{61}\) explain.

values of “god, work, and family” into state schools. General Weygand declared in fall of 1940 that “France deserved her defeat; she was beaten because her governments for half a century have chased god from school.” Putting words into action, on 3 September 1940, the Vichy government rescinded the 1901 law that had banned religious orders from teaching (Duquesne 1966, p. 42). In October, the écoles normales were abolished; Suhard during this same month remarked in his diary how pleased he was about the changing laws on education. In December, a law was passed that instructed “duties toward God” to be taught in public schools. From its very beginnings, Vichy was prepared to work with the Church, motivated by common values and beliefs about how best to reconstruct the nation. Restoring the status of the Church (and especially Catholic religious education) was an early priority for both that sprang from their shared worldview.

Further indicators of conflation between the Vichy political agenda and the Catholic Church’s own expressed values is how, many times in fall 1940 and throughout 1941, Church authorities expressed their agreement with State officials that there was a “Jewish Problem” that needed to be dealt with. Political leaders would then use the Church’s support to justify their anti-Semitic policies. For example, we know from the first chapter that the when episcopate decided to endorse the first Statut des Juifs, Jews were described as “not your ordinary foreigner welcomed in a country, but an unassimilable one.” On 25 October 1940, three weeks after the Statut was promulgated, Baudouin parroted the exact discourse provided by the church in response to a group of American newsmen: “we have decided to limit the action of a spiritual community that, whatever its qualities, has always remained outside the French intellectual community.... [no longer could the Jews] constitute an empire within an empire.” The modern “soundbite” was on display.

Later, as persecution against Jews in France intensified, Gerlier would remind ministers in the Vichy government of the episcopate’s decided position toward Jews. In October 1941, he told Commissioner General for Jewish Questions, Xavier Vallat, that the “law is not unjust… but it lacks justice and charity in its enforcement.” According to Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981]), Vallat also reported that Gerlier had told him, “the Jewish problem exists... it is indeed inescapable, and I approve [of the anti-Jewish measures] within the framework of justice and freedom” (p. 200). Even when religious authorities were growing concerned about anti-Semitic

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63 ibid.

64 cite.

65 cite.

66 Zaretsky, p. 91; see also Duquesne (1966), pp. 91-96.

67 Archive de diocèse de Cambrai, fonds Monsignor Chollet, 47-2B-1076, 1é Conférence Épiscopale de Lyon, 31 Août 1940, Procès-Verbal.


69 As cited in Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981], p. XX); CDJC:CIX-106.
violence, they still maintained that they were ideologically aligned with the notion that there was a Jewish problem. In other words, the issue was how to address the “Jewish Problem,” not whether there was one.

This “harmonization” of the episcopate and the state’s categories of perception is striking when considering how, numerous times, Jewish leaders sought to establish an alliance with the Church by calling attention to their presumed-to-be-common worldview. For example, after the first Statut des Juifs was passed, on 22 October, Rabbi Schwartz denounced the new laws in both occupied and unoccupied France in a letter to Pétain, writing with fervor that they were a form of “racial legislation, [with] principles born outside our borders, repudiated by Judaism, denied by consciousness and sentenced ex cathedra by the head of the Catholic Church and other Christian churches.”

Rabbi Weill followed suit one day later. That the rabbis could write such letters indicates how misguided they were on the Church’s “new” worldview. Rabbis Schwartz and Weill tried to appeal to Catholic values as a form of symbolic capital that could sway the Marshal’s stance. Sadly, their letters instead revealed a growing schism between the episcopate with the rabbinate: neither rabbi knew the statute had been passed with Catholic authorities’ moral justification.

In a later attempt to remind the Church of their religions’ shared worldviews, Rabbi Schwartz’s October 1941 letter to Gerlier included a comparison between attacks on synagogues in France and the ruins of Galilee, where Jesus prayed and preached. According to scripture, Galilee was destroyed by the Romans during the Great Revolt. In referencing this site, Schwartz aimed to remind Gerlier of the habitual and ancient connection of Catholics with Jews. Gerlier, in response, sought to comfort Schwartz, but considering that Gerlier told Vallat in the same month that he agreed on the existence of a “Jewish Problem,” clearly, this comfort could only go so far.

Finally, even when Pétain became concerned about the legitimacy of his regime’s anti-Semitic policies, he was able to secure the Church’s guarantee that there was nothing amiss in how his regime classified Jews and sought to deal with the Jewish problem. In a report prepared

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70 Recall this is after the roundups of summer 1941, after the second Statut was passed, and after the destruction of synagogues in Paris, Marseille, and Vichy, which prompted the rabbi’s declarations and Gerlier’s increasing anxiety, discussed earlier (p. X).

71 In Gerlier’s private collections, there is a letter from 16 July 1941 addressed to “Mon cher depute.” In it Pierre Masse, a former senator, jurist, and cabinet minister who was Jewish, requests the reader to recognize “there is no ‘Jewish Question’ in France.” He blames propaganda for promoting ideas that Jews as inherently different and internally threatening. Masse concludes “there is no ‘solution’ for [the Jews] other than to return to them their common rights… any other solution is persecution.” Archives de l’Archidiocèse de Lyon, fongs Gerlier, Interventions of Gerlier on Behalf of Jews. 16 July 1941. (15.48.06). On 30 September 1942, Masse was deported to Auschwitz and gassed upon arrival (Klarsfeld 1983, p. 326).

72 Archives de Consistoire israélite de France, fongs Moch, bobine 3, correspondence between Jacques Helbronner and Isaïe Schwartz, letter of protest from the Grand Rabbi of France to Maréchal Pétain, 22 October 1940.


74 Archives de l’Archidiocèse de Lyon, fongs Gerlier, Interventions of Gerlier on Behalf of Jews. Date: 26 November, 1941.

75 cite.
by Ambassador Léon Bérard after a meeting with Pope Pius XI in September 1941, the pope affirmed that although Catholicism was opposed to theories of race and to racism, the Jews had certain “ethnic particularities” that legitimized restricting “their activity in society and their influence.” Specifically concerning the French statutes against Jews, Bérard’s report specified “there is nothing in these measures which can give rise to criticism from the viewpoint of the Holy See.” While regurgitating the same phrase that episcopal authorities in France had repeated many times before — that “the dignity and respect of the human person” is central to the Church’s values — the report confirmed its moral support and shared belief that France’s anti-Semitic actions were legitimate.

4. Shared Religious and Political Symbols

Last but not least, the change in how religious and political authorities related to each other in France from 1940-1942 was manifest in the many symbols commonly expressed or displayed by both. This shared symbolism between Church and the State helped establish the legitimacy of the Vichy regime from 1940-1942, nowhere perhaps more profoundly than the classification of Pétain as a savior. The Marshal identified himself with Christ’s sacrifice and regularly framed his leadership position as that of a redeemer, prepared to deliver France from her sinful past into a glorious present and future. Remarking on how Pétain used religious symbolism to establish his authority and attract the support of the Church, Le Moigne (2005) explains:

In his own manner, Pétain could also be considered as the first bishop of the nation, who built his “acceptance speech” on a personal identification with Christ’s sacrifice…. This appeal was understood by the Catholic hierarchy. (p. 92)

More to the point, in a radio message to the French people three days after signing the armistice with Germany, Pétain declared that he was prepared to give France “the gift of my person.” Gerlier, welcoming Pétain to Lyon, exclaimed, “France needed a chief who would lead her to her eternal destiny. God has allowed for you to be here.” Nearly one year later, on 12 August 1941, the marshal declared to the French people, “In 1940, I put an end to the rout. Today, it is from yourselves that I wish to save you.” In November 1941, Cardinal Suhard in Paris sent a letter to Pétain in which he wrote of his “profound conviction, that God in your

76 This report is referenced in many places, including: __________. It can be accessed at CDJC XLII-10.

77 ibid.

78 ibid.

79 ibid.

80 discuss issues

81 Archives de l’Archidiocèse de Lyon, Semaine religieuse du diocèse de Lyon, 29 November 1940.

person, will always protect France and renew her.”83 In December, at Christmas Mass in Notre Dame, Suhard similarly spoke of the present as a “time of joy and hope” despite suffering, a time of “salvation,” brought to France by a “unique savior,” before turning to extend his Christmas greetings — in front of a crowd of hundreds — to Pétain.84

The Pétain as savior symbolism was profound. However, it was also through the co-optation of religious practices that that the Vichy regime could draw on symbolism from the Church to naturalize its authority. Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981]) note how “no Vichy public ceremony was complete without some form of religious service” (p. 198).

**Figure 2: Joan of Arc, “who personifies the French race and who kicked the foreigner out of France.”**

Additionally, the regime frequently adopted religious emblems in calling for the public to support its political agenda. One such figure was Joan of Arc, often enlisted to propagate anti-British, anti-Republican, and even anti-Semitic national values. Pinto (2012) describes a propaganda poster used by the Vichy government that borrowed vocabulary and imagery from Joan of Arc to make a direct connection between her image and Pétain’s (p. 18). In the poster,

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83 CNAEF, 3CE_22. (include full citation)

Pétain is seen in the likeness of Joan of Arc, fighting the Légionnaires’ “crusade” against “the bolshevik peril.” The poster links contemporary France to religious crusaders of the past, solidifying the connection between Vichy France and the Catholic Church at the same time that it promotes anti-Semitism (p. 18; referencing Tumarkin 1982, p. 46).

Likewise, in a propagandist stained-glass window in Orléans (see figure 2, above), there was an image of Joan of Arc alongside an image of “Orléans aux Juifs.” The latter depicts Jews dominating French civil society — in the army, the legal professions, and in parliament, and states, “[the Jews] wrote the first page in the decadence of our history.” The Joan of Arc window, in contrast, “proclaims that the figure that would embody France would be the one who would rid the country of foreigners such as the English and, especially, the Jews” (pp. 16-17). Finally, there were frequent comparisons between Joan of Arc and Pétain heard on Vichy radio, such as in May 1941, when on the 510th anniversary of Joan of Arc, the Vichy radio described Pétain as “cast [like Joan of Arc] in the role to lead France” (Drapac 1998, p. 265). The contortion of Joan of Arc as religious and national symbolism was but one of the ways in which the state co-opted religious emblems to legitimize its goals and make them appear as legitimate features of the French social landscape.

Finally, through the involvement of religious authorities in practices once reserved only for members of the government, the Church also helped to constitute the Vichy regime as the natural French authority, as when parishioners in the tenth arrondissement of Paris were urged to pray with the marshal for all workers and for the unity of France (Drapac 1998, p. 96). In Le Puy, the prayer for Pétain read:

Glorious leader of our country,
Father great of heart, we love you,
Your children’s soul has been shattered,
Yet only command, and we will follow you. 85

These prayers, developed and promoted by religious authorities, of course also mirrored the “prayer to Le Maréchal,” that the Vichy government itself exhorted the public to declare — a twist on the Catholic “Our Father” that ended with the injunction, “and deliver us from evil, oh Marshal!” By contrast, Grand Rabbi Isaïe Schwartz was ejected from an official ceremony of those killed in the war from 1939-1940, while patriotic commemorations of 14 July 1940 that took place in the Vichy synagogue were shunned by Vichy government representatives (cite). No one would pray for Jews; Jewish authorities weren’t even allowed to partake in joint political and religious ceremonies.

Finally, members of the hierarchy also furthered the state’s legitimacy — especially its collaboration with Germany — when they attended the inaugurations of German institutes and officiated at the funerals of known collaborationists (Burrin 1996, p. 220), but carefully avoided such ceremonies involving members of the resistance. When Pétain went on his tour of the South in November 1940, his stop at the Cathedral of Notre-Dame-de-l’Assomption in Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-Dôme) included a service in which he walked “like a youth” up the steps of the

stage, decorated with a simple military medal and matched by none other than the bishop, Monsignor Piguet, who likewise wore a military medal and the *Croix de Guerre*\(^\text{86}\) (Le Moigne 2005, p. 96). [were often repeated in Churches throughout France when Pétain came to visit]. These are but a few examples of the ways in which the episcopate’s rhetoric, symbolic practices, and incorporation of government officials and duties into religious ceremonies reinforced Vichy’s legitimacy.

**Conclusion**

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\(^{86}\) explain, will come back to this.
## APPENDIX A

*Catholic Action's Specialized Youth Movements, 1927-1967*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Date founded</th>
<th>Members (date)</th>
<th>Sections affiliated</th>
<th>Publications &amp; Circulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACJF</td>
<td>1886-1956</td>
<td>100,000 (1925)</td>
<td>100 (1900)</td>
<td><em>La Vie nouvelle</em> (1901)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200,000 (1936)</td>
<td>3,000 (1914)</td>
<td><em>Annales de la Jeunesse Catholique</em> (1925-1939)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>600-700,000 (1941)</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Cahiers de Notre Jeunesse</em> (1941-1943)</td>
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<td><em>Positions ACJF</em> (1946-1956)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Confrontations</em> (1956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>22,000 adherents (1933)</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td><em>Jeunesse ouvrière</em> 100,000 (1937)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000 militants (1939)</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 (1953)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45,000 adherents (1943)</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>JOC Calendar</em> 180,000 (1937)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000 (1943)</td>
<td></td>
<td>220,000 (1942)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000 adherents (1950)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000 adherents (1956)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOCF</td>
<td>1928-1968</td>
<td>50,000 adherents (1939)</td>
<td>1,250 (1939)</td>
<td><em>Jeunesse ouvrière féminine</em> 100,000 (1937)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 militants (1939)</td>
<td></td>
<td>190,000 (1939)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000 JOC-JOCF MERGER</td>
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<td><em>Sillage</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>JEC</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>20,000 (1956)</td>
<td>50 (1930)</td>
<td><em>Messages</em> 1,000 (1934)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150 (1934)</td>
<td>7,000 (1938)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>250 (1936)</td>
<td>(suspended by Vichy - 1943)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>480 (1938)</td>
<td><em>Messages Étudiant</em> 3,000 (1950)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>500 (1939)</td>
<td><em>Messages</em> 4,600</td>
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<td>(1958)</td>
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<td><em>Rallye-Jeunesse</em> (1959-65) 264,000</td>
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<td>(1964)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JECF</td>
<td>1930-1965</td>
<td>40,000 (1962)</td>
<td>216 lycées (1936)</td>
<td><em>Jeunesse Agricole</em> 8,000 (1931)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JEC-JECF MERGER</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000 (1934)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>35,000 (1935)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000 (1938)</td>
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<td><em>Jeunes Forces Rurales</em> 85,000 (1948)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>70,000 (1956)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAC</td>
<td>1929-1965</td>
<td>1,250 (1931)</td>
<td>80 (1931)</td>
<td><em>JAC-JACF Calendar</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>6,216 (1934)</td>
<td>345 (1934)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>11,864 (1935)</td>
<td>878 (1935)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>28,000 (1938)</td>
<td>1,485 (1938)</td>
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<td>29,000 (1939)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>200,000 (1950)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JACF</td>
<td>1933-1965</td>
<td>12,000 (1938)</td>
<td>900 (1939)</td>
<td><em>Jeunesse agricole féminine</em> 86,000 (1939)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>