Abstract: Why motivates transnational activism? Some previous works portray the groups that choose to invest in overcoming the significant costs of working transnationally as normatively motivated actors, guided by solidarity with activists abroad. Others describe these organizations as pragmatic actors, valuing their survival over their mission. This paper develops and tests a theory of the motivations behind transnational activism, proposing that they change over time and follow a cycle from solidarity to survival. The paper argues that transnational movements emerge around a core of solidarity-motivated actors, but over time, organizational survival becomes a leading motivation for many of the movement’s activities. Thus, while both principled and pragmatic motivations drive transnational activism, the overall importance of these two types of motivation to individual movements changes over time. The paper illustrates and tests this theorization by explaining the activism of the Eastern European movements supporting democracy and human rights abroad.

Keywords: transnational cooperation, social movements, democracy, human rights, Eastern Europe

Word count: 10970
From Solidarity to Survival: 
The Motivational Life Cycle of Transnational Activism

What motivates transnational activism? While some find that transnational actors are guided by solidarity with activists abroad, others describe these organizations as valuing their survival over their mission. This paper proposes a solution to this debate: it argues that the motivations behind transnational activism follow a cycle from solidarity to organizational survival. The argument is that transnational movements emerge around a core of solidarity-motivated actors, but over time more pragmatic considerations related to organizational survival become a leading motivation for the majority of movement efforts. While both principled and pragmatic motivations drive transnational activism throughout a movement’s lifecycle, the overall importance of these two types of motivations to each movement changes over time.

This paper illustrates and tests this theorization by explaining the activism of the Eastern European movements supporting democracy and human rights abroad. Transnational democracy and human rights activism is a crucial case for both the solidarity- and the survival-oriented accounts of transnational activism, while the Eastern European countries represent new cases against which to test and refine previous theories of transnational activism. These cases also correct a bias in this literature that regards non-Western societies primarily as recipients of such activism.

This study contributes to the literature non-state actors in international affairs both theoretically and empirically. If previous studies have overlooked the dynamic nature of the principled and pragmatic drivers behind transnational activism—treating them primarily as competing and mostly mutually exclusive—this paper examines how their importance changes during the life of individual movements as they become embedded in the global governance system. This paper also adds nuance to previous investigations into how the global governance system has shaped the transnational movements that have both benefited from and contributed to its development. Lastly, this paper addresses the general neglect of the normative leadership of non-Western/Eastern European societies and of their motivations for participating in the diffusion of the norms and values underlying the contemporary international liberal order.

Theorizing the Motivations Behind Transnational Activism

What motivates transnational activism? Much of the literature emphasizes “the centrality of principled ideas and values in motivating the formation” of transnational networks (quote by Keck and Sikkink, 1998:1; Clark, 2001; Risse-Kappan et al, 1999). Some find that activists interested in addressing an injustice often reach out for help to others abroad; they thus set in motion transnational “solidarity” and “rights” activism (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:13-15), the participants in which are “bound by shared values” (Sikkink, 1993: 415, Florini 2000). These activists and their organizations are seen as responding to aggrieved populations and as promoting “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their [domestic and international] communities” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 74). The principled nature of this activism is sometimes explicitly underscored: it is “motivated mainly by ideals, not profits” (Mendelson, 2001: 71).

Yet, a growing literature documents pragmatic, and in some cases even opportunistic, behavior on the part of many contemporary groups working across borders. This literature emphasizes the organizational insecurity, competitive pressures, and fiscal uncertainty that have
characterized the transnational sector since the 1990s (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Barnett 2005; Simeant, 2005; Hertel, 2006; Bush, 2013). These authors paint a global governance system, populated by a growing number of transnational actors, which are increasingly subject to market pressures, as many donors and intentional organizations rely on non-state actors to implement their objectives, often on a competitive-tender basis (Princen and Finger, 1994; Smillie, 1997). Responding to this “lucrative, crowded, and marketized” (Cooley and Ron, 2002:12) environment and dependent on donor generosity, many organizations active transnationally prioritize their survival over their mission and align their goals with those of their donors, at times to the exclusion of responding to their constituents (Fisher, 1994; Smillie, 1995; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Luong & Weinthal, 1999). The embeddedness of transnational activism in the contemporary global governance system has thus reinforced and amplified the pragmatic, survival-oriented, behavior of many transnational actors.

This latter group of studies hints at, but does not explore, the dynamic nature of the motivations behind transnational activism. There is further some work that documents but does not explain or theorize this dynamism. Some find that, in the 1990s, connections to activists abroad “facilitated” transnational activism, whereas, by the 2000s, state participation in international organizations and treaties became “more predictive” of participation in transnational movements (Wiest and Smith, 2007; Smith and Wiest, 2005). This paper builds on these studies and suggests that, like many aspects of social movement activism (Tarrow, 1994, McAdam, 1995, and Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), the motivations behind transnational activism evolve during the lifecycle of a movement. The argument is that transnational movements emerge with the solidarity efforts of normatively-motivated actors, but organizational survival becomes the leading driver of some of the latest programs of movements as they grow and become increasingly embedded in the global governance system.

Solidarity as a Motivation Behind Transnational Activism

In the early stages of a transnational movement’s development, solidarity with activists abroad is an especially important motivator because it mitigates the high costs of working across borders. Organizations working transnationally face many challenges: distance, cultural diversity, the influence of nationalism, varying political contexts, and economic strain and complexity (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Tarrow, 2005, Bandy and Smith, 2005). Such obstacles make transnational activism costly, not just financially, but also in terms of the difficulty of the work and its opportunity costs. Social-movement scholars studying costly/risky domestic participation attest to the causal importance of solidarity—that is, salient shared identity and values— in drawing individuals and their civic groups into a movement (Durkheim, 1965; 1

---

1 “Movement” is defined as a loose network of mobilized individuals, grass-roots, or professionalized groups engaged in sustained, but not necessarily continuous, contentious interactions with an international/multinational actor or with power-holders in at least one state other than their own or on behalf of constituents in at least one state other than their own (based on Tarrow, 2001). Intermittent cross-border interactions by informal actors are thus not covered by this paper.

2 Because of these costs, the organizations that engage in strong and sustained transnational activism are those that have not only strong motivations but also high capacity (Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Smith and Weist, 2005; Stark et al, 2006). Still, while capacity is more than resources, even resource-poor groups are sometimes able to engage in sustained transnational activism (Smith at al, 1997).

3 “Solidarity” is defined as “identification of and identification with: the identification of a collective entity [around a set of shared values] and participants identification with a body of affiliated actors” (Hunt and Benford 2004, 439). Solidarity implies a sense of loyalty and emotional interest in the collectivity (Taylor and Whittier, 1992).
such solidarity facilitates commitment to the cause, leadership, and network through the affective loyalties it generates (Gould, 1995; Passy and Giugni 2000; Polletta & Jasper 2001). Solidarity creates a sense of obligation and responsibility toward and a perceived stake in the fate the collectivity, which is argued to draw individuals and their groups into the movement; likewise, solidarity felt by existing movement members ensures their continued involvement. In sum, a strong identification with a collectivity makes participation on behalf of that collectivity more likely even when participation is costly (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993: 659; Klandermans, 2004).

Transnational networks are similarly held together by commonalities: a common language (figuratively and literally), common values, and shared injustice or identity among leaders, if not members, of a movement (Routledge and Cumbers, 2009). This construction of commonalities or “attribution of similarity” (McAdam and Rucht, 1993) bridges the perceived differences between activists across borders and creates a sense of shared struggle. This eases the perceived uncertainty of international work and further creates a sense of obligation towards other members of the community; both facilitate transnational cooperation (della Porta et al., 1999).

Solidarity could develop in several ways. It does not require, but is usually produced within and reinforced by, direct ties, relevant to the cause (McAdam, 1982; Snow et al, 1980; Passy and Giugni, 2000; Diani and McAdam, 2003). Not all ties, however, produce solidarity or motivate transnational activism—only the ones that result in the attribution of similarity and that are highly salient (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). Additionally, pleas for assistance from fellow-activists can sometimes also facilitate the attribution of similarity and heighten its salience, thus creating or strengthening solidarity between activists across borders. Solidarity could further be kindled through the intentional or unintended activities of “brokers,” such as shared patrons or the media, who inform activists in different countries, understood to share an identity, values, and a cause, about each other.

Lastly, it should be noted that solidarity is constructed within civic groups through the perceptions and leadership of individual member activists, so that their organizations can “perceive” and act on this solidarity. This paper examines this organization-level solidarity to explain resultant movement-level motivations for transnational activism.

---

Organizational Survival as a Motivation Behind Transnational Activism

While crucial for the emergence of a transnational movement, solidarity’s importance changes as the movement grows and it and its cause become increasingly embedded in the global governance system. As the number of cross-border programs by a certain country or in a particular beneficiary-state increases, the perceived costs of related transnational cooperation diminish because the relevant cultural and political differences have already been constructed as surmountable and have actually been overcome. Also, the development of transnational movements frequently benefits from and contributes to the embeddedness of the movement and its cause in the global governance system (Tarrow, 2005; Smith, 2008). Defined here to include other movements, international institutions, and the various government agencies and private donors working on solving cross-border problems, the global governance system provides focal points and opportunities for transnational mobilization. As the movement seeks to take

---

4 On the factors underpinning the success of such pleas, see Bob (2005).
5 The attributes of the groups around whose transnational work a movement develops are not consequential as long as they not perceived by others as unique in their ability to surmount the costs of transnational activism.
advantage of them, it becomes embedded (after Granovetter, 1992) in the global governance system, that is, its significant exchanges with and interdependence on global governance actors grows, making the movement both sensitive and vulnerable (after Keohane and Nye, 1977) to their influence (on the “political embeddedness” and interplay of changing political opportunities at the domestic and international levels, see von Bulow, 2010). At the same time, as movement activists pressure and persuade these actors to take action on issues related to their cause, support for it and for transnational activism organized around it grows (Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004). This support comes in the form of different types of resources: moral (such as, legitimacy); material (such as, money); informational (such as, know how); and human (such as, personnel time) (Cress and Snow, 1996; also, Edwards and McCarthy, 2004).

Accordingly, as more and more global governance actors place the movement’s cause on their agenda, the financial and physical obstacles to related transnational activism become more surmountable. Resources often become not only available, but also increasingly attractive (Smillie, 1997; Simmons, 1998). As a result, activists might strive to win the social and institutional backing (Klandermans, 1984; Opp, 1989) of relevant global governance actors. Vying for such support, the movement becomes increasingly anchored in and dependent on the global governance system. This embeddedness serves to “open up” the movement environment (Barnett, 2005; also, on open/restrictive environments, Minkoff, 1999; Zald and Ash, 1966), creating opportunities and resources for mobilization as well as competition for them. Such an environment compounds activists’ preoccupation with accumulating economic and socio-political resources to ensure their organizations’ survival (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Hertel, 2006; Hopgood, 2006; Bush, 2012).

Like many domestic social movements today (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), most transnational movements are populated primarily by professional organizations (Smith et al., 1997; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Barnett, 2005; Stroup, 2012), which mobilize resources from external donors and strive to speak for, rather than mobilize, beneficiaries. Some have found that the goals and actions of such resource-dependent organizations are often likely to be oriented mostly towards organizational development and financial management (Piven and Cloward, 1997; Haines, 1984; Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). Indeed, some have documented that many of the organizations embedded in today’s lucrative but competitive and marketized transnational sector are driven by these goals (Edwards and Hulme, 1997; Smillie, 1995; Barnett, 2005). Because they need to meet the accounting, reporting, and auditing requirements of their patrons, many of these groups are corporate-like entities (Smith and Gronbjerg 2006; Verbruggen et al. 2011; Prakash and Gugerty 2010), accountable firstly to these patrons and only secondly to their constituencies (Fisher, 1994; Smillie, 1995; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Luong & Weinthal, 1999).

In sum, when working abroad, social movement organizations are usually motivated by some combination of solidarity and survival considerations, with some groups being motivated more by one than by the other. In general, however, the overall aggregate importance of these two motivations for each movement changes over time. Groups driven primarily by solidarity are likely to be in the majority in the early years of a movement, because solidarity helps to offset some of the costs of working abroad, which are particularly high in the beginning. However, as their environment opens up over time, some of these groups respond to its competitiveness by ceasing their (transnational) work; others take advantage of the increasing legitimacy and profitability of their work to ensure their organizational survival; and lastly, new organizations join the movement, primarily to collect some of the various economic, political,
and social resources available to it. In other words, the evolving environment might both transform the goals of movement organizations and attract certain types of organizations to join the movement (on the second mechanism, see also Weinstein, 2007). These organization-level changes produce a movement-level shift in the motivations for transnational activism.

How quickly this movement-level shift from solidarity to survival occurs depends in part on the leadership and individual circumstances of participating organizations, but even more importantly, on the domestic and international environment in which they operate (on the organization-level variation, see Barnett, 2005). The more embedded a movement and its agenda in the global governance system, and therefore, the more support for related activism and competition for this support, the more pronounced the shift to organizational-survival motivations.

Finally, this shift to activism driven by organizational survival does not necessarily imply that the values of the movement are ignored or compromised. Some of these groups might be pursuing support opportunities that allow them to “pay the bills,” while also continuing to promote the movement’s values. Other organizations might be more opportunistic, chasing funding or building their reputation even at the expense of their mission and beneficiaries. In both cases, these groups might build on their ties with colleagues from abroad or look for new partners to win a tender. However, in both cases, the activism of such organizations differs from solidarity-driven activism: survival-driven activism is structured primarily by the concerns and priorities of patrons whereas solidarity-driven activism is rather structured by the objectives and needs of beneficiary-constituents. In other words, distinguishing between these two ideal types of goals and assessing their overall importance in motivating transnational activism are critical for both theoretical and practical reasons.

A Cycle from Solidary to Survival?: Research Agenda and Design

To illustrate and test this theorization of the motivations behind transnational activism, this paper examines the transnational human rights and democracy activism of the Eastern European countries-members of the European Union (EECs). This activism provides a crucial case for both solidarity and organizational-survival accounts. Human rights and democracy are central to the liberal consensus some identify as the main principled driver behind the proliferation of transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). On the other hand, the notion that individuals possess human rights and a right to democracy has already gained some expression in international law (Franck, 1992 and Rich, 2001); this embeddedness of the human rights and democracy agenda in the global governance system has engendered the conditions that compound activists’ preoccupation with organizational survival.

Studying the EECs serves to correct a bias in the literature, which regards non-Western societies primarily as beneficiary-recipients of human rights and democracy activism. This is not only an empirical but also potentially a theoretical oversight. Transnational human rights and democracy movements originating in these countries represent new cases against which existing theories can be re-examined and refined. The EECs are crucial cases. These movements were born in a region with a very strong regional identity (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011), which creates a favorable environment for the development of regional solidarity. At the same time, as priority recipients of Western aid, these movements have become well-embedded in the global

---

6 Crucial cases are ones that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity (Gerring, 2007).
human rights and democracy movement and are heavily support/resource-dependent on the global governance system.

Some EECs have produced active movements working to support human rights and democracy abroad. These movements include some of the largest, most influential, and most recognized civic groups in these countries. These movements are not unique: they represent a loose network of bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations, grassroots groups, and other organizations in between. These groups cooperate mostly with each other but also with other Western groups towards supporting human rights and democracy abroad. They work directly with beneficiary democracy and human rights groups abroad; monitor, name and shame, and sometimes educate/train foreign governments, which violate human rights and democratic practices; and advise and advocate their own governments and other global governance actors, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe. These movements’ efforts have been embedded in the foreign policy framework of their states: the movements not only advise on the strategy but also participate in the implementation of EEC foreign policy and are often guided by shared, national values, experiences, and interests.

To explain the motivations behind EEC activism, this paper conducts a paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010), which combines the qualitative comparative method with process tracing. The comparison focuses on the Polish and Slovak movements supporting democracy and human rights abroad. Both movements are typical within the EEC group (Jonavicius, 2008) and build on the work of two of the most active civil societies in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Poland and Slovakia differ on the two theoretically important dimensions of interest in this paper. Poland was a democratization leader in Eastern Europe, so the organizers of the Polish democratic breakthrough are believed by many in the West and in the post-socialist space to have a “special responsibility” to support human rights and democracy in their region (Jonavicius, 2008). There is no such expectation of Slovakia, which for much of the 1990s was among the democratization laggards in Eastern Europe. Therefore, if both the Polish and the Slovak movements emerged around solidarity-driven groups, that would be evidence in support of the solidarity-to-survival motivations cycle. Also, the Polish movement arose in the early 1990s whereas the Slovak one emerged in the late 1990s. The democracy agenda became embedded in the global governance system as a “business” over the course of the 1990s. The Slovak movement became anchored in a more resource-rich global governance system more quickly. Therefore, if the Slovak movement became more survival-driven more quickly than the Polish one, this would be evidence in support of the solidarity-to-survival cycle. In addition to this comparative logic, the paper leverages process-tracing evidence to understand and document how movement motivations change over time.

The null hypothesis in this study is that the motivations behind both the Polish and the Slovak movements are either primarily principled or pragmatic. Given Poland’s role as a post-communist democratization leader, and since democracy promotion was already a business when the Slovak movement emerged, evidence that the Polish movement is motivated by solidarity and that the Slovak movement is mostly survival-driven would support the null hypothesis.

Most of these movements emerged shortly after their country’s democratic breakthrough; still, it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate whether there is a relationship between a country’s democratization stage and the transition from national to transnational activities of democracy and human rights organizations.
The case studies of the Polish and Slovak movements are based on interviews with representatives and the archives of the organizations that make up each movement—a total of 29 Polish groups and 15 Slovak organizations. These totals include organizations, which joined the movement in its mature stage. Also, included are groups, which were active in the movement’s early years but then died or transition to working primarily on domestic projects. This avoids biasing the paper’s analysis by documenting the motivations of “founding” or “survivor” organizations. To provide some context for the work of each movement, 8 additional international-development organizations and 5 domestic human rights and democracy groups were interviewed. All interviews were conducted with the lead activist(s) managing international cooperation or with the founder of the domestic groups.

To classify the motivations of the organizations that make up the Polish and Slovak movements, this paper relies on an observable implication of these motivations: solidarity-driven activism is designed around the needs of beneficiary-populations whereas activism driven by organizational survival follows first and foremost the priorities of the movement’s patrons. The interviewed activists were asked to describe how they began work on each relevant program or project. They were also asked a series of clarifying questions about the sequencing of (1) coming up with the idea for each project and (2) searching for financial or political support for each project. The interviewed activists reported that some of their projects began when they saw a call for proposals or an opportunity to work with a particular global governance actor. The activists also reported that other projects started when there was an opportunity to help “kindred” activists or when fellow-activists asked for help, prompting the Poles/Slovaks to go look for support to realize the project. These reports were made without much pride or shame, which would have indicated possible under- and over-reporting of certain type of motivations. For most projects and to the extent possible, the sequencing of program design and implementation support was also double-checked against the organizational archives of the Poles/Slovaks groups.

This sequencing matters because it documents whose goals ended up structuring the project—the recipients’ or patrons’. This paper thus relies on this sequencing to cut through the ambiguities of these strategic decisions. Social movement groups often wrestle with internal divisions and tensions surrounding such decisions. Irrespective of such activist-level differences in motivations, however, whether the project’s principal was the group’s patrons or beneficiary-recipients matters a great deal for the project’s reception and impact.

For each organization, each project was labeled either “solidarity-driven” or “survival-driven”. If the group became aware of a funding or patronship opportunity and then designed a project to take advantage of it, the project was coded as survival-driven. Alternatively, if the organization devised a project responding to perceived beneficiary needs and then sought support to realize it, the project was coded as solidarity-driven. The project was still coded survival-driven, however, if it changed substantially as a result of patron input or conditionality. Each organization’s projects were divided in two groups – those that began in the early movement period and those that started in the mature movement period. This paper covers the period of the first two decades after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe (1989-2009); for Poland, the early movement period was 1989-1999 and the mature movement period was 1999-2009, whereas for Slovakia, the early movement period was 1998-2002 and the mature movement period was 2002-2009. These time periods were defined by the participating activists to reflect the movements’ changing environment. For each movement period, each organization’s projects were aggregated, such that if more than half of them were survival-
driven, the organization was labeled as doing primarily survival-driven work. If more than half of a group’s projects were solidarity-driven, it was labeled as doing primarily solidarity-driven work. To account for the size of each project in the aggregation, weighing was used on the basis of the project’s budget.

**Explaining Eastern European Human Rights and Democracy Activism**

The development of the Polish and Slovak movements is consistent with the solidarity-to-survival motivations cycle. Both movements emerged primarily in solidarity with other peoples struggling for democracy. Over time, however, both movements were increasingly motivated by organizational survival, with the Slovak movement becoming more survival-driven faster (as it became embedded in a more resource-rich global governance system more quickly). [For this evolution of the motivations behind the Polish and Slovak transnational democracy and human rights activism, see Table 1.]

[Table 1]

**Poland**  
*The Origins of the Polish Movement*

The transnational democracy and human rights activism of the Polish civil society has built on the international solidarity of the opposition movement, which in 1989 brought down the country’s communist regime. Leading Polish anti-communist activists wanted to support and ally with other activists fighting against the Soviet system (Snyder, 2003). Since its first congress in 1981, the Solidarity labor union, around which the Polish opposition movement grew, began directly and openly encouraging other dissident groups in the Soviet bloc to fight for freedom and representation (Kenney 2002). Soon thereafter, the Polish opposition initiated dialogue with other dissident groups, especially in Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Russia (Kenney 2002). While the international community, and especially the US, came together in support of Solidarity, the Polish opposition in turn supported other Eastern European oppositions (Kenney 2002).

After 1989, some of the groups that had operated either underground or semi-officially during the communist era legalized their activities at home and continued their support for democracy and human rights abroad. In the mid-1990s, despite attractive funding opportunities for their domestic work, a growing number of organizations previously working on democracy and human rights issues in Poland also became active in the post-communist region and beyond. By the end of the 1990s, more than two dozens of Poland’s largest democracy and human rights groups were active transnationally, and four times as many civic groups had implemented an occasional international democracy and human rights project.

This international work grew out of the personal and professional transnational ties and the resultant international solidarity of their activists. Most of the internationally active Polish groups were founded and/or led by former Solidarity activists. Building on Solidarity’s international activism and the networks of their Western patrons and partners, these Polish activists fostered, maintained, and further developed formal or informal relations with pro-democratic activists from other countries. Such transnational contacts created solidarity, reaffirmed it, and moved the Polish activists to action. Many Polish activists learned, were

---

9 Interview with G.G., October 13, 2008.
reminded, and recognized that their counterparts abroad share similar democratization goals and challenges.\textsuperscript{10} Polish activists report that such similarities created a strongly felt normative “obligation,” a “sense of responsibility,” and a “duty” to assist their pro-democratic colleagues abroad.\textsuperscript{11} One Polish activist articulates how this similarity motivates his organization’s efforts: “Poland has chosen freedom but with freedom comes responsibility. Having gone abroad [to the former Soviet Union], we saw that people there also want freedom as Poland did in the 1980s.”\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, many other activists report that they “have suffered under communism and know how painful living under a dictatorship can be”—an experience they claim compelled them to support democracy and human rights abroad.\textsuperscript{13}

In addition to underscoring shared democracy and human rights aspirations, transnational interactions also highlight the concrete opportunities for cooperation. Understanding how their experience and expertise might be “helpful” and “useful” to other nations further eases the perceived uncertainty of transnational cooperation.\textsuperscript{14} For instance, when visiting Ukraine to see relatives in the mid-1990s, a Polish activist working on promoting democratic values among the Polish youth learned of a Ukrainian civic group struggling to civically engage the local youth. The Polish activist explained, “We, Poles, have many contacts with Ukrainians, so we can not pretend not to see that Ukraine has similar problems. We, Poles, feel that sharing our experience is a duty. We just can’t not share our experience with them.”\textsuperscript{15} The Polish activist convinced his NGO to train the Ukrainian organization, and to send a staff member to assist the implementation of three consecutive Ukrainian youth projects. The Polish activists are also frequently asked for help with problems seen as resolved in Poland. For instance, Organization-L, a group promoting local governance and democracy, reported that a few Ukrainian and some Belarusian local government leaders and fellow USAID grantees were impressed with the results of the Polish decentralization reforms, and asked Organization-L for assistance with a number of local governance issues.\textsuperscript{16}

In sum, the early transnational democracy and human rights activism of the Polish civil society was primarily solidarity-driven. 93\% of the organizations working internationally in the early and mid-1990s were motivated mostly by solidarity. [See Table 1.] There were three principal communities/identities that have formed the foundations of this solidarity: receiving Western democracy support; belonging to the communist and post-communist world; and sharing a history in the Northeastern European historic-political space. A majority of the studied Polish groups share the belief that “Poland has received aid for many years and it is now time to pay off this assistance debt.”\textsuperscript{17} The duty to assist aspirants to democracy has been felt primarily towards other countries in the post-communist space. Many Polish activists reported: “We see that people are interested in freedom and we have solidarity for them, so we are helping them and encouraging them. We believe in freedom because it ensures respectful treatment of individuals. So we want that not just for Poland but for our region because we feel solidarity

\textsuperscript{12} Interview with A.K., October 21, 2008.
\textsuperscript{15} Interview with A.M., October 8, 2008.
\textsuperscript{16} Interview with K.M., October 7, 2008.
with those in our region struggling for freedom.”  

Finally, almost all Polish groups understand their work “as a kind of solidarity between us [Poles] and our neighbors [Ukraine, Belarus, and to a lesser degree, Russia].” Their common history created multiple salient ties between Poland and these three nations—ties that produced and reinforced solidarity.

The solidarity, which allowed the Polish movement to emerge, also shaped and found expression in the movement’s scope. [For the recipient countries in which the Polish groups have worked, see Table 2.] The Polish groups studied here have focused predominantly on Ukraine (93%), Belarus (78%), and Russia (70%). Ukraine and Belarus were also the first recipients of a majority of the Polish organizations. In contrast, less than a quarter of these Polish groups work in the developing world because they perceive fewer and less salient similarities with activists and populations there and despite abundant available funding for doing democracy and human rights work in developing countries.

**The Evolution of the Polish Movement**

Over time, the importance of solidarity in motivating Polish transnational activism diminished. In the early and mid-1990s, many of the transnationally-active Polish groups were themselves primarily beneficiary-recipients of transnational democracy and human rights activism; these Polish organizations, thus, competed amongst each other for resources earmarked for Poland. These Polish groups were thus linked to and targets of some global governance actors but not embedded with them in the system these actors constitute. As democracy began “consolidating” in Poland in the late 1990s, most American and Western European patrons supporting democracy and human rights groups in the country began gradually pulling out of the country. This trend and Poland’s anticipated membership in the EU prompted many of the Polish organizations working abroad to begin integrating in the relevant global and especially European regional networks and to begin transitioning from being mostly recipients to becoming primarily contributors. Similarly, a couple of organizations, which had previously mobilized resources mostly from domestic constituents and patrons, were now stepping up their international work. Responding to democracy and human rights crises abroad at a time of perceived consolidation of democracy in Poland, these groups were also becoming more integrated in the global governance system. By the early 2000s, thus, the organizations participating in the Polish movement supporting democracy and human rights abroad had changed the nature and/or increased significantly the number and diversity of their exchanges with and interdependence on global governance actors. Since democracy and human rights promotion had become a business, these Polish groups were now competing with other movements for the support of various such actors. Such support, however, was not only lucrative but also prestigious for the Polish organizations, whose society understood Euro-Atlantic reintegration as a national priority. Due to this new environment, available funding and patronage became a leading motivation for many of the efforts of the Polish movement.

---

18 Interview with O.S., October 28, 2008.
19 Interview with G.B., October 13, 2008.
Three organization-level trends contributed to this movement-level outcome. First, a number of solidarity-driven organizations were increasingly motivated by organizational survival. Consider the following typical example of the evolving motivations behind some Polish groups: Organization-L, which began its transnational work at the request of colleagues in Ukraine and Belarus in the 1990s, moved to the former Yugoslavia in the early 2000s. Despite some member objections, Organization-L’s leadership grew the group’s international program because other “countries had started working on decentralization reforms and there was a lot of European funding for such projects.” Organization-L subsequently continued leveraging its expanding network of Western European partners and patrons involved in the Western Balkans and the former USSR to continue its domestic work and to expand its presence abroad.24

Second, struggling to compete at the global level, a couple of the solidarity-driven organizations participating in the Polish movement ceased their transnational work and re-focused on mobilizing resources for their domestic work domestically. For instance, Organization-M, which is a community-organizing group, had supported fellow activists in the post-communist space in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, however, Organization-M was struggling to find support and found it increasingly difficult and time consuming to find sponsors for its international efforts. After “some soul searching”, Organization-M chose not to sustain its transnational civil-society program beyond the occasional, ad hoc project and to begin providing paid services to members in addition to applying for grants for its domestic programs.

Third, in the 2000s, several new Polish civic groups joined the movement supporting democracy and human rights abroad. About half of them began doing international work because of the money and prestige it brought (compared to only 7% of the organizations who began working transnationally in the early 1990s mainly for these same reasons). In the mid-2000s, Organization-P’s leadership unanimously threw its support behind the founder’s plan of organizing trainings and conferences on democracy issues for neighboring elites as a way to work with the Council of Europe (a sponsor of such programs in these neighboring countries).25 The organization thought that it had “expertise to sell,” and wanted to accrue a reputational benefit from being associated with the Council. As Organization-P became more and more involved in the Western European network of democracy and human rights actors, it continued to leverage its expertise to secure the sponsorship of other Western European “heavy-weight” patrons. Consider also, another example: some internal divisions notwithstanding, Organization-K began working internationally in the early 2000s by joining some of its Western partners’ projects for financial reasons. Calculating that the Polish government and the EU provide funding for international work, Organization-K began developing projects at the intersection of its expertise or ties with beneficiaries abroad and what those sponsors consider “important” issues or countries. This strategy has most recently taken Organization-K to Africa for a women’s rights project.26

Overall, 27% of the SMOs studied for this paper and working internationally as the Polish movement was maturing in the late 1990s and especially the 2000s were driven by organizational survival. [See Table 1.] In other words, there is an almost four-fold increase in the share of such groups compared to the early years of the movement’s development. Previous

24 Interview with K.M., October 7, 2008.
25 Interview with Z.P., October 9, 2008.
26 Interview with P.P., October 22, 2008.
social movement studies have found that as certain themes, countries, or populations fall in and out of “fashion” with global governance actors, the social movement organizations competing for their support usually follow suit (Hertel, 2006). Many Polish groups reported that they did not have the capacity and expertise to compete for and win projects on new themes but that their patrons were willing and sometimes even eager to support the “export” of successful Polish domestic projects to new beneficiary countries.

The diminishing importance of solidarity had a three-fold impact. First, in catering to their patrons rather than to recipient beneficiaries, a number of Polish organizations have opted for “recycling” their domestic work, thus stifling innovation (see also Simeant, 2005). Second, survival-driven activism has expanded the scope and geographical reach of the Polish movement while sometimes reducing its “usefulness” as it ventured into less familiar countries. Third, as some of the examples above suggested, survival-driven activism has tended to be more ad hoc and less sustained than solidarity-motivated international work. At the same time, however, it has tended to include bigger programs with more funding used not just for organizational maintenance but also assisting more recipient beneficiaries abroad.

[Table 2]

**Slovakia**  
*The Early Years of the Slovak Movement*

As in Poland, the transnational democracy and human rights work of Slovakia’s civil society built on the international solidarity of the activists who prepared the country’s democratic breakthrough. In 1989, Slovakia began transitioning away from communism as part of Czechoslovakia, which dissolved peacefully in 1993. By the mid-1990s, Slovakia’s democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration had already been arrested by the illiberal, nationalist, and populist elites who negotiated Slovakia’s independence and subsequently assumed power. Civil society, however, not only continued to develop with foreign, and especially US, support but also organized a democratic breakthrough in 1998 (Forbrig and Demes, 2007). The potential of the Slovak breakthrough to serve as a model for defeating illiberal incumbents reigning over “electoral democracies” was immediately recognized by its organizers, by other pro-democracy activists in the region, and by a few US donors (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). A US donor encouraged several of the Slovak breakthrough organizers to share their campaign experience with interested representatives from Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. At the request of oppositions throughout the post-communist region, prominent Slovak activists subsequently led a number of additional exchanges and seminars.

Around the turn of the century, despite available foreign funding for democracy and human rights work in Slovakia, a number of Slovak organizations began turning these consultancies into full-fledged transnational democracy and human rights programs. By the mid-2000s, a number of additional organizations, which had previously worked primarily at home, also began doing democracy work abroad. About a dozen of Slovakia’s largest civil

---

27 Interview with P.P., October 22, 2008.
society groups were supporting democratization abroad, and about a dozen more had had at least one international democracy project.\textsuperscript{31}

This work grew out of the personal contacts and professional ties of the Slovak activists to other Western grantees in the post-communist space. The solidarity that developed within such regional networks motivated participating Slovak organizations with the necessary capacity to begin supporting democracy abroad. Much as in the Polish context, the similarities constructed within such regional networks created demand for and a strongly felt responsibility by many Slovak activists to assist activists abroad. Although democracy and human rights promotion became a “business” during the 1990s, the vast majority of organizations around which the Slovak movement developed in the late 1990s were motivated by solidarity. 89\% of the Slovak groups participating in the movement in its early years were driven primarily by solidarity. [See Table 1.]

A number of these Slovak organizations report that they began, and continue, working abroad because “there are still some similar countries, which are still authoritarian.”\textsuperscript{32} Many Slovak activists reported that: “It’s necessary, it is our obligation, to share our experience with people who need it and ask for it.”\textsuperscript{33} There were three principal communities/identities that formed the foundations of this solidarity: receiving Western democracy support; belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies; and sharing a history of communism and post-communism. A leading civic activist succinctly expresses the responsibility felt by many Slovak activists: “There is not only a sense of constitutional obligation and a civic obligation [to support democracy abroad], but also a moral obligation because when we were going through our transition, we were also helped by other countries.”\textsuperscript{34} Additionally, several Slovak activists further emphasized the values around which the European community is organized: “We are part of the European community and I think this [support for democracy abroad] is our moral duty and our people [Slovak constituents] want us to do this and judging from the emails we receive, their people [recipient countries] want us to do this.”\textsuperscript{35}

Finally, the Slovak organizations often referenced the demands and needs of recipients from countries “close and similar” to Slovakia.\textsuperscript{36} These are most frequently defined to be communist and post-communist nations that used to be part of larger empires and that are now struggling for democracy or with nationalism and international isolation. For instance, most Slovak activists consider the Western Balkans countries kindred peoples—“small nations” with “close mentality” but still struggling with nationalism, arrested transitions, and setbacks on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration.\textsuperscript{37} The Slovak activists have also developed solidarity with pro-democratic activists in Ukraine and Belarus. While these two countries are both very big and traditionally part of the Northeastern European historic-political space, they also are—much like Slovakia—new European states, which emerged at the end of the Cold War and initially


\textsuperscript{33} Interview with L.B., November 11, 2008.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with M.J., November 18, 2008.

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with G.S., November 6, 2008.


made hesitant progress towards democracy and EU integration.\textsuperscript{38} These similarities between Slovakia in the one hand and Ukraine and Belarus on the other hand were articulated by some US donors and by opposition groups working in these countries and were quickly embraced by a number of Slovak groups.\textsuperscript{39}

This solidarity motivating the emergence of the transnational democracy and human rights work of the Slovak civil society can also be gleaned from the geography of this activism. [For the recipient countries in which the Slovak civil groups have worked, see Table 2.] Many Slovak groups started their work and have been most active in Serbia as the “closest” of the Western Balkans countries, where 86% of the Slovak organizations have worked. Additionally, 71% and 57% of the Slovak groups have worked in Ukraine and in Belarus respectively. Similarly to Poland, only a third of the Slovak organizations work in the developing world. As many Slovak activists explained, there are abundant available resources for doing democracy and human rights work there but there are also fewer “important”/perceived similarities between Slovakia and these countries.\textsuperscript{40}

\textit{The Mature Period of the Slovak Movement}

By the early to mid-2000s, pursuing available funding and the prestige of certain partnerships had already become a leading motivation for some of the latest programs of the Slovak movement. It developed around a group of organizations whose solidarity with pro-democracy activists abroad usually preceded and motivated the search for patrons. One activist bluntly stated what the program histories of most other organizations suggest: “As we benefited from outside help, it’s important to give back. So we try to find donors who would cover our work abroad.”\textsuperscript{41} Yet, as the Slovak movement was emerging, its cause was already on the agenda of numerous global governance actors. Like the Polish movement, the Slovak one was initially linked to and target of some of these actors. As the country secured EU membership and moved into a period of perceived democratic consolidation, many of these actors began pulling out of Slovakia and looking. Also at the same time, a couple of groups that had mobilized domestic resources for their transnational projects became more involved abroad and thus started looking for foreign sponsors. Again, as with the Polish movement, the Slovak one shifted the nature and built up the number and diversity of their exchanges with and interdependence on global governance actors. The Slovak movement, however, became anchored in a more resource-rich global governance system more quickly, which in turn sped up and amplified the changes in the movement’s motivations.

As in Poland, three organization-level trends contributed to this movement-level outcome. A number of solidarity-driven organizations were increasingly motivated by organizational survival. Consider the following typical example:\textsuperscript{42} Following its key role in the Slovak democratic breakthrough, election-monitoring Organization-E was asked for help by sister organizations in Ukraine and Croatia. Organization-E’s leaders united behind a plan to send 20 observers to Ukraine and approached one of its patrons to finance a mission to Croatia.

\textsuperscript{39} Interview with J.M., November 26, 2008, B.S., November 28, 2008.
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with B.S., November 28, 2008, P.D., November 26, 2008.
\textsuperscript{42} This case study is based on the organizational archives of this group and an interview with P.N., November 11, 2008.
and later the Slovak government to co-sponsor missions for the upcoming elections in Bosnia and Kosovo. At about the same time, a US donor introduced Organization-E’s director to a group of Belarusian activists. The Slovak activist felt it was his duty to assist these activists, so he secured funding for a few small projects in Belarus. Again, what Organization-E defined as “solidarity” motivated its leadership to seek funding to train election observers in, and to send monitors to, Serbia for what would become Serbia’s electoral breakthrough. Given its expertise and reputation, by the early 2000s, Organization-E had become embedded in the global election-monitoring regime and began receiving project/subcontracting invitations from a number of European and American organizations. Organization-E’s leadership did not hesitate much before accepting many of them and reported doing so increasingly in order to survive financially and to maintain its legitimacy and visibility. As a result, Organization-E expanded its presence in former Yugoslavia and USSR, and also began doing work in Central Asia and eventually in the developing world. Some of these latter projects neither benefited from previous direct ties, nor resulted in sustained transnational cooperation. Similarly, the ad hoc presence of some Slovak groups in the Middle East was, according to their own accounts, mostly opportunistic.  

Additionally, in the early 2000s, some organizations, known for their domestic work and high capacity, recognized that they could convert this “capital” into funding and prestigious partnerships by joining the Slovak movement for supporting democracy and human rights abroad. For instance, after seeing a SlovakAid call for projects in Serbia, Organization-T decided to develop a proposal with a sister-group from Belgrade. Organization-T then began looking for similar opportunities with other Western actors it got to meet. In general, about two thirds of these organizations, which joined the Slovak movement in the mid-2000s, began doing international work because of the funding and prestige it brought. This level of survival-driven activism is about 6 times higher than the 11% of similarly motivated Slovak activism at the end of the 1990s. 

Lastly, a couple of solidarity-driven organizations, which initially participated in the Slovak movement returned to their domestic work in the mid-2000s. Organization-N did civic and rights trainings in Ukraine because of a perceived “duty” to help Slovakia’s neighbor. As the Organization’s domestic programs grew and securing support for them became harder in the mid-2000s, Organization-N’s divided leadership failed to find sponsors for its international program, which eventually died down. 

Overall, 38% of the Slovak organizations working in mid- and late 2000s were driven by organizational survival. [See Table 1.] As with the Polish movement, there is a four-fold increase in the share of such groups compared to the early years of the Slovak movement. Given the embeddedness of their cause in the global governance system even as the Slovak movement was emerging, the share of survival-driven Slovak groups grew faster and higher than the share of these Polish groups. Survival-driven activism had a similar impact on the Slovak movement, however: allowing mostly high capacity organizations to ensure their survival through winning international tenders in the highly competitive democracy and human rights projects market in the 2000s; encouraging the recycling of successful domestic programming in recipient beneficiaries which are patron priorities; and frequently reducing the sustainability and the relevance of the movement’s efforts. 

---

44 Interview with E.B., November 28, 2008.
Discussion and Alternative Explanations

Both Polish and Slovak transnational democracy and human rights activism grew out of the international solidarity efforts of the activists who prepared these countries’ democratic breakthroughs. Through their contacts with other pro-democratic activists abroad and in conversations with patrons, these Polish and Slovak activists discovered and recognized similarities and shared aspirations with fellow-activists abroad, which created a sense of obligation towards such nations, especially in the post-communist space. This solidarity motivated the Polish and Slovak organizations with the necessary capacity to begin doing democracy work abroad.

Yet, as these movements grew and became increasingly involved with and interdependent on global governance actors, which had prioritized democracy and human rights promotion, the motivations behind both the Polish and the Slovak movement began to change. Available funding, and the prestige of and legitimacy from certain partnerships, became the leading motivation for some of the latest programs of both movements. Organizational survival became an increasingly important driver of the Polish and Slovak groups as they were more and more embedded in the lucrative and prestigious but also marketized and highly competitive global governance regime in the field of democracy and human rights.

These survival-driven activities of the Polish and Slovak movements have included many large but episodic initiatives, unlike the majority of the sustained, yet smaller, solidarity-driven programs. It could be expected, however, that this motivational shift from solidarity to organizational survival would become even more pronounced in the future. In Slovakia, the share of such activism became larger more quickly than in Poland because when the Slovak movement was emerging in the late 1990s, its goals were already well embedded in the global governance system. The Slovak movement was thus shaped much more by the global governance system—a situation that especially influenced the scope and direction of the Slovak transnational networks. At the same time, the Slovak movement has also been driven more by recipient demand and by the desire to project the values of this global regime and its transatlantic core.

By providing democracy assistance to Eastern Europe, the West set an example of democratic societies aiding democratizing ones, and encouraged, funded, and legitimized the efforts of the EEC movements supporting human rights and democracy abroad. Nonetheless, the West has primarily facilitated rather than spurred these movements. The activist-core, around whom the Polish movement developed, began working on democracy and human rights issues at home and abroad in the early 1980s, that is, before there was any external support for their efforts; the Polish case, thus, demonstrates that there are no strong endogeneity effects (i.e. activists choosing fundable issues). Consider also the US introduction of several Slovak groups to Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Iraqi activists. This US brokerage led to the blossoming of Slovak work in Ukraine and Belarus; yet, despite abundant funding made available for work in Iraq, no Slovak group sustained its activities there beyond the end of the occasional project. To take the difference in regional context between these Slovak beneficiary-recipients out of the equation, it should be noted that some of the same Slovak groups have eagerly looked for funding to assist fellow activists in other third world countries like Cuba. Similarly, while the EEC movements are at times guided by shared national values and interests, their activism is not derivative of their states’ foreign policies. In fact, these movements’ advocacy preceded and was formative for these foreign policies. Also, despite some important overlaps, there are important
differences in the recipient beneficiaries of the EEC state and non-state efforts in support of democracy and human rights abroad.

Unlike the global embeddedness this paper theorizes as the primary explanation of the motivations cycle behind transnational activism, alternative explanations might focus instead on the internal culture and/or material incentives shaping transnational activism. For instance, some have suggested that as a new generation of activists replaces those who organized the Eastern European democratic breakthroughs, the internal culture of the EEC movements might shift away from solidarity with fellow-activists abroad toward more organizational-maintenance concerns. Such a new generation entered Polish civic life in the mid-2000s; yet, the Polish movement is still less survival-driven than the Slovak one and both follow a similar motivations cycle.

Similarly, some have argued that internal organizational politics shape the goals of social movements groups. Building on Michels’ “Iron law of oligarchy,” they claim that such organizations have a tendency towards oligarchical leadership and conservative goals and prioritizing organizational maintenance (Michels, 1999; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Jenkins, 1977). If such changes were occurring, they should be observable and similar in both the Polish and the Slovak movement. The shift from solidarity to organizational survival in the Slovak movement, however, was much faster and more pronounced than in the Polish movement. This suggests that (additional) factors other than internal material imperatives are behind these transnational movements’ evolving motivations. In fact, this Polish-Slovak difference is in line with the global embeddedness account put forth by this paper.

Conclusions and Caveats

Understanding the motivations behind transnational activism is important for both theoretical and empirical reasons. It is a question about the foundations of the transnational sector: whether it is founded on principles, shared liberal values and cross-border solidarity or primarily driven by the material interests, organizational insecurity, and competitive pressures generated by the global governance system. This debate is about the principals who structure transnational activism—movements’ recipient beneficiaries or patrons. This paper contributes to the literature on social movements and international relations by moving beyond previous understandings of these motivations as static and as primarily principled or pragmatic. The argument here is that both types of motivations coexist drive transnational activism throughout a movement’s lifecycle but that their overall importance changes with the movement’s embeddedness in the global governance system. Moreover, this paper illustrates and tests this theorization through previously overlooked cases from the non-Western/Eastern European world, thereby correcting a bias in the literature on transnational activism, which neglected the normative leadership of these societies and their contribution to maintaining the international liberal order.

Still, when thinking about the generalizability of this paper’s findings, some caveats are in order. First, this paper proposed that the embeddedness of the movement and its cause in the global governance system serves to open up the movement environment. How movements might react to a closing of the movement environment, however, is a question that deserves

---

45 Conversation with Sarah Bouchat, National Endowment for Democracy.
47 For critiques and exceptions, see Useem and Zald (1987); Voss and Sherman (2000).
further attention. Some scholars working on domestic social movements have argued that restrictive environments might make movements even more vulnerable and sensitive to environmental pressures (Minkoff, 1999); however, these scholars have also pointed out that the potential influence of resource availability might be mixed, in that it can produce either more or less competitive environments (Minkoff, 1999). Further work is thus necessary to identify and study cases, in which movements do not outpace available support as they and their cause become embedded in the global governance system and in which movements grow and become increasingly engaged with and interdependent on global governance actors, which have de-prioritized the movement’s cause and provide little support for it (see also von Bulow, 2010).

Second, the EEC movements supporting democracy and human rights abroad have subsumed organizations working in the area of women’s rights. Similar to the motivations of other groups in these movements, the motivations of these women’s rights groups have followed a cycle from solidarity to survival. Movements centered on the grievances of an oppressed social group (rather than pursuing collective goods for the general public) might however foster transnational solidarity and mobilize resource differently (Zald and Ash, 1966). For example, certain regional/North-South divisions in women’s rights activism (Smith and Johnston, 2002) as well as higher levels of resource mobilization from constituents rather than patrons have been documented (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). This possibly differential impact of different types of movement causes on the motivations behind transnational activism begs further examination.

Third, the cases presented above cannot provide empirically a definitive test of the paper’s theorization. Future work is necessary to document, if global governance regimes in the past were as “lucrative, crowded, and marketized” as current ones. Similarly, the EECs received a lot of Western support in their struggle for democracy and human rights at home and abroad; the EEC movements that further these issues abroad eventually became anchored in the most elaborate and institutionalized democracy and human rights regime in the world (Wiest and Smith, 2007). Future work is thus necessary to study the extent to which this paper’s findings travel to other regions.

---

48 The openness of the domestic political system might further shape the capacity of participating organizations to engage in transnational activism since most transnational relationships are filtered through the domestic context (Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Smith and Weist, 2005).
References


Tables

**Table 1. Share of Groups Driven Primarily by Solidarity Out of All Groups Participating in the Polish and Slovak Movements Assisting Democracy And Human Rights Abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Movement Period</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mature Movement Period</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Data from author calculations based on interviews with and the archives of these organizations.*

**Table 2. Percent Organizations with Projects in Target Countries Out of All Organizations Participating in the Polish and Slovak Movements Assisting Democracy And Human Rights Abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Partner Country</th>
<th>Percent of Polish Democracy Promoters with Projects</th>
<th>Percent of Slovak Democracy Promoters with Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America/Cuba</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Priority recipients for the Polish and Slovak movements are highlighted. Data from author calculations based on interviews with and the archives of these organizations.*