April 21, 2011

Dear all,

Thank you in advance for reading my paper, which is actually less of a paper and more of a mash-up of different pieces of my dissertation. This began as a draft theory chapter, and I think some of it will stay here and some of it will move to the introduction. If anyone has suggestions about what to keep here and what to move, I’d love to hear them. I already took out big chunks of the original draft, which will eventually go into my empirical chapters. Is there anything in this draft that strikes you as too empirical for a theory chapter? Do I need to move more of this into other chapters? On the flip side, is there anything missing?

Some parts of this chapter are older and have been edited significantly, and some parts are brand new and have hardly been revised at all. You will probably be able to tell which pieces are which! I would really appreciate any and all feedback on clarity, organization, and persuasiveness. I want to go on the job market in political science, so political scientists are my primary audience. However, not everyone in political science will be familiar with all of the literatures I discuss, so I want to make sure the chapter is clear for a relatively broad audience. Thanks in advance for your feedback!

Best,
Kate
“Many organizations...do not endorse candidates but attempt to maintain friendly relationships with all candidates and all parties...Often it is unwise to back either party; it is better to have friends in both camps, for the group must promote its objectives whatever party is in power.”

- V.O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 1942

The American political system V.O. Key described in 1942 differs dramatically from the one we see today. Along with the “pressure group” bipartisanship described above, Key also notes programmatic similarities between the Democratic and Republican parties. “It is, of course, incorrect to say that American parties have no principles or policies,” he argues. “They have; but their principles tend toward similarity. . . . The programs of both American parties change from time to time in the same direction” (Key 1942: 256). This is by no means a unique view. Indeed, Key’s observations are consistent with those of E. E. Schattschneider (1960), the American Political Science Association’s 1950 Report of the Committee on Political Parties—a committee chaired, incidentally, by Schattschneider—George Wallace’s 1968 campaign claim that “there ain’t a dime’s worth of difference” between the Democratic and Republican parties, and the common characterization of these mid-century parties as “Tweedledee” and “Tweedledum.” Party similarity facilitates special interest bipartisanship; the more alike the parties, the easier it will be for groups to find common ground in both camps. As noted above,
Key sees natural incentives in the American system for balanced relationships between special interests and parties, and he seems to expect them to endure.

It appears, however, they have not. Today, we hear frequent discussions—often lamentations—about the increasingly close relationship between parties and special interests. Though these discussions appear in both popular and academic forums, political science has not yet offered a systematic evaluation of these impressions. Looking across multiple dimensions, have special interest groups truly become more partisan since the middle of the twentieth century? If so, when, how and why did this change occur? These are my dissertation’s central questions.

**What are Special Interest Groups?**

Before examining the relationship between special interests and parties, it is important to clarify the concept of special interest groups. What makes an interest special, and how are special interest groups different from other entities like pressure groups, social movements, and political parties? E.E. Schattschneider defines “special” interests in contrast with “common” interests, as special interests are “shared by only a few people or a fraction of the community; they exclude others and may be adverse to them” (Schattschneider 1960: 23). Though some scholars may take issue with the terms few and fraction—indeed, James Madison famously feared the possibility of majority factions—this definition is relatively uncontroversial.

Disagreement intensifies when we move from a discussion of what constitutes a special interest to what constitutes a special interest group. Different scholars employ different terms, like special interest groups, pressure groups, social movements, professional associations, and political parties, to name a few. Sometimes they use different terms to describe the same concept—it seems, for example, that special interest group represents a modern rebranding of
the more traditional *pressure group*—and sometimes they are describing different kinds of special interest organizations.

Grossman and Helpman (2002) offer a broad and useful definition that can encompass different kinds of organizations:

An interest group may be considered “special” if its members covet policies that would not be considered desirable by the average citizen. Thus, any minority group of citizens that shares identifiable characteristics and similar concerns on some set of issues might be termed a [special interest group] (Grossman and Helpman 2002: 75).

Given the high workload faced by today’s government, we might expand this definition to include groups coveting policies that the average citizen would not especially value. These policies need not be undesirable, but the average citizen would not allocate scarce resources like agenda space to them. By this definition, *special interest group* can serve as an umbrella concept for social movements, professional associations, and industry groups. Diversity need not weaken the definition; indeed, all special interests are not the same, just as all democracies are not the same. It is often useful to distinguish between groups based on levels and features of organization, activity, and membership. Yet, despite their differences, they collectively constitute a distinct and important part of American political life because they are all *private* and *extraconstitutional*.

This leaves us with the tricky task of classifying political parties, which are technically private and unquestionably extraconstitutional. I will argue that political parties are not special interest groups because they are, in practice, only quasi-private. Despite their private financing, parties perform critical functions in American government. Should the Democratic and Republican parties spontaneously evaporate, American government would be left in a state of chaos, at least in the short term. If an entity is so tightly integrated into government so as to
render the government incapable of functioning in its absence, it cannot be considered truly private. Political parties are quasi-private organizations, occupying a gray area between government and traditional special interest groups.

To understand the relationship between special interest groups and political parties, however, we will need more than a definition. Grossman and Helpman’s definition tells us what special interest groups are, but not how to study them. For this, we need to know more about their anatomy. I will argue that we can conceptualize special interests in much the same way that we conceptualize parties. For reasons explained above, I would not go as far as Paul Burstein (1998) to argue that social movement organizations, interest groups, and political parties are all essentially the same; however, they do share similar conceptual structures. As Key himself notes:

The inner core of the party—the machine or the party organization—may be considered in one respect to be on the same plane as the pressure group. The party machine, like the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, wants to obtain certain types of governmental action and to prevent others. It is a compact, well-organized group of individuals with fairly well defined group objectives (Key 1942: 333).

Consequently, I will argue that the most useful and robust conceptualization of political parties, provided first by Key and developed further by John Aldrich (1995), can also apply to special interest groups.

Parties, Key and Aldrich argue, are not one-dimensional entities whose operations we can observe on one plane. To fully understand parties, we must divide the monolith into three parts: party-in-the-electorate, party-as-organization, and party-in-government. Aldrich argues that parties have not declined, but transformed in these arenas from “the ‘party in control’ of its ambitious office seekers and holders to the ‘party in service’ to them” (Aldrich 1995: 7). This change was endogenous, just like the origin of parties, which were created by ambitious
politicians to further their electoral and policy-related goals. As institutions and historical contexts change, politicians adjust the system to serve their interests. Thus, he suggests, parties will continue to change over time. And, as this project will demonstrate, they have.

Like parties, special interest groups are complex organizations attempting to influence the electorate and the policymaking process. Therefore, we can divide them along the same conceptual lines: special-interests-in-the-electorate, special-interests-as-organizations, and special-interests-in-government. Figure 1 provides a simple sketch of this tripartite system whose spheres are distinct but interconnected. To understand special interest groups and measure their strength, we need to investigate all three spheres.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Studying special interest groups as organizations involves examining their infrastructures and general operations. Today, for example, most major organizations have full-time staffs and many have established political action committees (PACs) to represent their interests in the electoral arena. These are organizational choices and developments. Assessing the status of special interest groups in the electorate involves looking at the relationship between special interest groups and the population. Do people identify with the special interest group? Do they support its positions? This is a way of looking at special interest group strength that is distinct from its infrastructure and its role in government. To analyze the last category, we would consider the behavior of elected officials on special interest issues, and the extent to which government processes surrounding these issues involve special interest organizations. Breaking special interest groups into these three categories will help us measure their growth and strength with more precision.
Conceptual Relationship Between Special Interests and Parties

Measuring special interest group strength is not the primary goal of this project; while it does have independent value, it is largely a means to an end. My primary goal is to illuminate and explain changes in the relationship between parties and special interest groups since the mid-twentieth century. Since special interest groups have grown during this time, measuring their strength is an important first step in understanding their relationship to parties. The next step is to consider how parties and special interests relate to each other as organizations, in government, and in the electorate.

Though Key (1942) and Truman (1951) encouraged political scientists to study the relationship between these “interdependent” entities, very little work surfaced in this area. Following the pluralism debates of the 1950s and 1960s, research on special interest groups dwindled. By the 1970s, as Tichenor and Harris note in their Annual Review article, “Like an exiled monarch, the study of interest groups was marginalized by the discipline” (Tichenor and Harris 2005: 252). In the early 1980s, attention picked up slightly as “several scholars lamented that interest group research had essentially lain fallow for more than a decade and noted the irony that political scientists were looking away from organized interests precisely when they were becoming more significant in American politics” (Tichenor and Harris 2005: 252, citing Wilson 1981, Arnold 1982). While research on interest groups has grown since the 1980s, few scholars have answered Key and Truman’s calls to study their relationship to parties. Tichenor and Harris consider this “one of the most glaring lacunae of the discipline” (Tichenor and Harris 2005: 266).

Thankfully, this is beginning to change. Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller (2008) recently asserted a provocative new theory of parties that places special interests in the center of political action. Razing the wall between political insiders and outsiders, these authors argue that activists
do not pressure political parties—they are political parties. That is, they fall within the traditional party umbrella and are not necessarily submissive to party leaders. To the contrary, the authors argue “interest groups, activists, and other policy demanders will be permitted large roles in party decisions” (Cohen et al. 2008: 15). This has major implications for policy, as the authors argue: “Parties try, via the candidates they nominate and elect, to pull policy toward what their interest and activist groups want, even if that is not what most voters want. Thus, our claim about how parties work is also a claim about how democracy works” (Cohen et al. 2008: 6-7).

Though they never cite Frymer (1999), their argument can be placed on one end of a spectrum—opposite Frymer—representing the relationship between parties and special interests. According to Frymer, these entities are not only separate, but can also be relatively hostile to one another. When a group has committed itself to one party and also been rejected by the opposing party, that group is “captured” within its “ally” party (Frymer 1999: 8). The group cannot credibly threaten to defect from its “ally” party because it has nowhere else to go. Consequently, the party lacks strong incentives to act on the group’s behalf. According to Frymer, this has happened to African-Americans, and may also be happening to the religious right and the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender rights movement.

How could Frymer and Cohen et al. reach such different conclusions? While these two books have offered great contributions to an important scholarly void, they also expose social science’s poor understanding of the relationship between special interest groups and parties. Applying Key and Aldrich’s conceptualization of parties to special interest groups is the first step in clarifying the relationship. The second step involves conceptualizing the relationship between the special interest group system (depicted in Figure 1) and the party system. As mentioned earlier, parties and special interests are conceptually parallel to each other in many
ways. We can study both in government, in the electorate, and as organizations. Although they are separate entities, their interests and resources can overlap. Our conceptualization of special interest groups should therefore acknowledge parties, which occupy the same spheres, as Figure 2 illustrates.

A few features deserve special attention. First, these spheres are distinct, but interactive—they influence each other in many ways. Second, the capacities and interests of parties and special interest groups only partially overlap in each sphere. The size of this overlap will vary across time, sphere and issue area. They are all the same size in this diagram, but in reality this kind of consistency probably occurs rarely, if at all. One could draw separate figures for each special interest group at each historical moment, or aggregate them by time period, industry, and/or sector.

This conceptualization helps to explain how Frymer and Cohen et al. could reach such different conclusions about the relationship between parties and special interest groups. These disparate accounts are both accurate—they simply describe different parts of Figure 2. Cohen et al. focus on the overlap, while Frymer engages the areas of the special interest circles lying outside the overlap. My dissertation aims to clarify the multidimensional relationship between parties and special interest groups by placing these works on the same map and filling some of the conceptual space between them.

**The Growth of Special Interest Partisanship**

As the overlaps in Figure 2 grow, parties and special interests become closer. However, special interest partisanship involves more than an intersection between the party system and the special interest system—it also involves balance between the two major parties. We can
measure special interest partisanship on a two-dimensional continuum, like Figure 3, with one axis measuring the magnitude of the overlap, and the other measuring balance between parties. The latter is the definitional key—a group that supports only one party is partisan. However, it will be useful to distinguish between partisan groups lending significant support from those lending less. A strongly partisan group would participate regularly in party politics (ex. by making regular donations to political campaigns) and support only one side (ex. by donating all of its money to one party and/or its candidates). Thus, partisanship has two possible opposites: nonpartisanship and bipartisanship. A completely nonpartisan group would not engage the party system at all, and would probably avoid electoral politics. A completely bipartisan group would engage the party system, but would support both parties equally.

My first hypothesis is that special interest groups have become more partisan since the middle of the twentieth century (H1). I do not expect to find that groups were perfectly partisan at the time of Key, Truman and Schattschneider’s writing, nor do I expect to find that they are perfectly partisan today. My expectation is simply that groups have moved closer to the lower right-hand corner of Figure 3. But what does it mean for a group to be partisan? There is a well-developed literature in political science on individual partisanship, but little on partisanship at higher levels of aggregation. Moving beyond the level of abstraction in Figures 2 and 3, how is partisanship different at the group level?

The most important difference between individual and group partisanship is that the latter moves on a two-way street. Individuals can join one of the two major parties simply by registering. There is no application process, formal or informal—the party does not reject individuals. And because parties have such large memberships, people do not generally expect individual validation or attention from the party. This becomes more complex with groups
because, as Frymer (1999) notes, parties can reject groups from their camps. They may use strict means, by making public statements against the groups or its goals, or soft means, by simply refusing support. This can lead to conflicting measures of partisanship. For example, a group may donate all of its campaign funds to the Democratic Party, but the party may refuse to add a supportive provision to its platform or even acknowledge the group as part of its coalition.

Special interest group partisanship also differs from individual partisanship in its division between two distinct levels: (1) the leaders; and (2) the people they claim to represent. While leaders may believe it is best for the group to affiliate with one of the parties, and may make decisions on behalf of the group to that end, group members will not necessarily change their partisanship or voting behavior. This is a second way in which we may see conflicting measures of partisanship. Parties control some measures of partisanship, special interest group leaders control others, and some are beyond the control of both parties and special interest group leaders, lying—like elections—in the hands of citizens. Both parties and special interest groups can influence special interest partisanship, but neither can control it unilaterally.

This leads to somewhat more complicated expectations about changes in special interest partisanship over time. Because parties and special interests are multidimensional entities, there is no single way to measure special interest group partisanship. To fully evaluate special interest group partisanship, we have to consider measures in government, organizations, and the electorate. We can use a two-dimensional continuum, like Figure 3, for each of these measures, since it will be important to consider volume and magnitude on each measure. I suspect some of these measures may conflict. This leads to my second hypothesis, that this trend was not completely smooth or even \( (H2) \). More specifically, I expect to find stronger special interest partisanship in government and organizations than in the electorate \( (H2a) \). Variation between
parties also seems likely, so I do not expect partisanship of Democratic- and Republican-affiliated group to change at the same pace or to the same degree (H2b).

Special Interest Partisanship v. Political Polarization

By this point, readers may be wondering about the difference between special interest partisanship and political polarization. What I describe as special interest partisanship may sometimes look like polarization by a different name. Though these concepts overlap, they are not the same. Special interest partisanship and polarization are alternative, but complementary conceptualizations and explanations for specific changes in American political life since the mid-twentieth century. Polarization is both an outcome, characterizing these changes, and a process, explaining how we got from point A (non-polarization) to point B (polarization). One might also think of the concept as both a noun (polarization) and a verb (polarize), explaining the noun’s origin. Similarly, the term special interest partisanship describes an outcome, characterizing the same features of American political life that caught the attention of polarization scholars, and a process, theorizing this political change.

What are these features that have caused such a stir, not just in academia, but also mainstream press and popular conversation? I have identified four. The first two relate to the nature of political coalitions. First, we tend to see the same coalitions in government over and over today, whereas they used to change more often. Second, we see far fewer bipartisan coalitions today than we did in the mid-twentieth century. Third, the parties are more internally homogenous and externally differentiated than they were in the mid-twentieth century. Fourth, politics seem more contentious—even brutal—than they used to be. Discourse has become more severe, as people socialize less with members of the opposing party and harbor more negative
feelings toward their political adversaries (Gelman et al. 2008). Overall, there seems to be more vitriol and less compromise.

Scholars noticed, and endeavored to explain these profound changes in American politics. What we saw, they argued, was political polarization. Ideology lies at the heart of this explanation, and this is reflected in the kinds of questions scholars have been asking. Have ideologies changed? If so, why have they changed? Are the parties more ideologically extreme than they used to be? This line of questioning puts a great deal of emphasis on moderateness versus extremity, which might explain why we have come to view polarization as a political evil.

Since the mid 1990s, a large literature has developed to analyze elite and mass polarization. There is a lot of disagreement about polarization at the mass level, with some scholars arguing that the general population has polarized and others arguing that people are not more extreme than they used to be. There is strong evidence on both sides, exposing some of polarization’s limitations as an explanatory concept. We have evidence of changes in behavior at both elite and mass levels, but we do not always find strong evidence of changes in ideology. This has caused a great deal of confusion about whether polarization does or does not exist at the mass level. It also presents a puzzle as to why elites would become more ideologically extreme if their constituents did not, belying Downs’ classic prediction that parties will converge toward the median voter.

Perhaps the correct answer is that behavior has changed at the mass level in ways at least partially consistent with changes at the elite level, but these changes are not necessarily—or at least not exclusively—driven by ideology. Ideology, I will argue, is only part of the story. The polarization literature has been a workhorse in political science over the past two decades, and it has contributed a great deal to the field. However, polarization has become an overburdened
concept. We have been looking to ideology to explain too much, which is somewhat ironic given the strong behavioral tradition in political science.

This project departs from the polarization literature by taking a more institutional approach, treating changes in coalitions and party programs as organizational changes. Special interest partisanship is an alternative characterization of the four features described earlier, privileging behavioral incentives over ideologies. Instead of asking how and why beliefs changed, this line of explanation investigates changes in the context in which lawmakers and party leaders perform their jobs. It takes very seriously the incentives facing these actors, and the historical and institutional forces shaping those incentives. At any one moment, incentives may be relatively fixed; over time, however, contextual changes will alter them. Combining the logic of rational choice with historical institutionalism is not a unique approach, though its application to this subject matter would be new. Gamm and Shepsle (1989) argue that macro and micro-level approaches are “two sides of the same coin,” serving as “complements rather than substitutes.” Aldrich (1995) draws on both traditions for his classic work on parties, and Katznelson (1998) encourages their dual deployment in puzzles of American political development.

Though I will argue that behavioral incentives were the primary force driving special interest partisanship, important ideological changes also occurred. The transformation of American political parties described in this project was a dynamic process—or, perhaps more accurately, a dynamic interaction of two processes. One involved changes in ideologies (polarization), and the other involved changes in incentives regarding the nature of their relationship with special interest groups (special interest partisanship). This interaction generates a positive feedback mechanism, whereby special interest inclusion in a party coalition makes the
parties slightly more different, which facilitates incorporation of other special interest groups. Looking from the groups’ perspective, one group’s decision to affiliate with a party increases the difference between the parties, creating incentives for others to step away from the middle. With each step, polarization and special interest partisanship increase. These processes work together, even if this is not the intention of the actors involved, and neither can explain the transformation of American political parties alone.

This project will also challenge a popular explanation for political polarization. It has become increasingly common in political science to blame activists for polarization (Layman Carsey & Horowitz 2006). This, of course, has implications for special interest partisanship, since the two processes are so closely connected. According to conventional wisdom, activists are more extreme than legislators, they have gotten even more extreme over time, and changes to the Democratic Party’s nomination process in 1968 and 1972 opened the process and allowed activists to pull elites away from the median voter (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006). This caricature of activists as predators and parties as helpless political prey is quite unflattering for both sides. I will argue that it is also inaccurate.

Parties and special interest groups have indeed become closer over the past several decades, but I hypothesize that parties, not activists, drove this trend (H3). Aldrich predicted that the party system would continue to evolve over time, and he was right. Parties gradually transformed the system for many of the same reasons they built it in the first place. As this project will demonstrate, special interest groups help politicians manage “the problem of ambition and elective office seeking,” “the problem of making decisions for the party and for the polity,” and “the problem of collective action” (Aldrich 1995: 22). The transition to special interest partisanship was endogenous, just like the origin of parties. To be clear, I do not mean to
suggest that parties unilaterally drove this change, dragging special interests behind. I suspect this was a relatively cooperative effort, and the change carries costs and benefits for both sides. Ultimately, however, parties in government have the most institutional power. The relationship between parties and special interests will not change unless parties in government have incentives to change it.

Since this project will analyze the role of parties in special interest partisanship, it is important to be clear about what constitutes party action. As discussed earlier, parties are three-dimensional entities whose strength we can study in government, in the electorate, and in the organizational sphere. In discussing party agency, I am only addressing parties-as-organizations and parties-in-government—in other words, parties at the elite level. I will address parties at the mass level, along with special interests at this level, in the project’s penultimate chapter on parties and special interests in the electorate. Action by any member of the party elite, whether it be an officeholder or an employee of the national committee, will be considered party action for purposes of this project because these actions represent and effect the party. Other members of the party may not agree with an action, but this will always be the case in a complex organization. Sometimes different party actions may even conflict. All pieces of a complex entity will not always move in the same direction. However, if we take a step back, these conflicts become less prominent and we can observe a larger trend toward special interest partisanship.

**Key Benefits of Special Interest Partisanship**

This section will offer more detail on what exactly special interests are able to do for parties, which helps to explain why parties would want to strengthen their relationships with—and even internalize—some of these groups. Special interest groups can assist party members in two
very different ways: sometimes they help to build the party, and sometimes they offer alternatives to the party. In the latter case, as Galvin (2010) demonstrates, the President may use special interest groups to evade his party, nurturing his own political fortunes without having to invest in his party. The President may even use this tactic to distance himself from his party. This is especially likely to happen if the party is less popular than the President. Even if the President has a good relationship with his party, he may use special interest groups to compensate for certain party deficiencies. If the party is unable to perform a certain function well, the President (or another party member) may turn to special interest groups for help.

Explaining how special interest groups can build and strengthen parties requires a longer discussion with attention to parties’ goals, strategies, and resources. I will begin by explicating parties’ primary goals: to win elections and enact their preferred policies. To achieve these goals, officeholders advertise themselves, take positions on policies, and claim credit for policies enacted (Mayhew 1974). These broad methods require specific strategies, namely (1) information gathering to build expertise; (2) coalition-building inside government; and (3) campaigning and mobilizing constituents outside government. Because these strategies are not always easily executed—indeed, they are often difficult and costly—officeholders need resources, or means to carry out the strategies that will help them achieve their goals. These fall into three major categories, corresponding to the strategies: informational resources, legislative coalition-building resources, and resources for campaigning and constituent mobilization. The latter two facilitate coalition-building inside and outside government, respectively. Finally, officeholders need sources of these resources. Political scientists have identified several, most notably committees and political machines. I will argue that special interest groups are another one of these sources.
To review, there are four important concepts: goals, strategies to achieve goals, resources to carry out strategies, and sources of resources. While the goals and strategies are fairly constant over time, historical processes can significantly influence the available resources and sources thereof. Historical developments may increase the need for resources, and certain sources may decline or disappear over time, leading rational politicians to search for new ones. This is the story of special interest partisanship.

Goals

It is well known that politicians care about winning elections. Mayhew believes this so strongly that his classic 1974 book begins with the assumption that Congressmen are motivated solely by reelection. Even if they also care about policymaking, he claims, electoral success is a proximate goal. Aldrich echoes this sentiment, arguing that in order to understand parties we must consider the reelection goals of party members. Though few works in political science challenge this conventional wisdom, it remains important to avoid overemphasizing individual elections. As Galvin (2010) demonstrates, minority party presidents tend to care about the party’s electoral prospects generally—not just their own races. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Republican presidents endeavored to build a new electoral majority to destabilize the Democratic leviathan in Congress, dating back to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency. Reelection is both an individual and group prospect, given the value of majority status in Congress.

Despite the unquestionable importance of reelection, many scholars have argued that officeholders maintain other goals as well. Even Mayhew acknowledges that his assumption may be an oversimplification. Key notes that while reelection may be parties’ main concern, they “may have, and often do have, strong convictions about matters of public policy” as well.
These concerns may involve personal or constituent policy preferences. They may be content specific (i.e. legislator wants sugar subsidies) or volume-related (i.e. legislator wants high Congressional productivity). Or, of course, they could be mixed. Galvin (2010) argues that Democratic presidents have tended to care more about policy and less about their party’s electoral fortunes, given the party’s long-standing majority in Congress. According to Galvin, Democratic presidents considered policymaking key to their own reelection.

While reelection and policymaking are the two most well known goals, a few others deserve mentioning, namely institutional reputation and good governance. Members of Congress care about the legislative branch’s reputation, and work to protect it (Mayhew 1974). One might also argue that some officeholders care about governing the country effectively. For this project, I will focus on electioneering and policymaking because they are the two most widely accepted goals in the Congress literature. Moreover, pursuing the goals of good governance and institutional reputation maintenance would require similar strategies and resources as the goals of reelection and policymaking.

**Strategies and Resources**

Mayhew identifies three general methods by which members of Congress attempt to achieve their reelection goals: advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming. Advertising includes “any effort to disseminate one’s name among constituents in such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little or no issue content” (Mayhew 1974). Attending community events and appearing on television constitute advertising. By bolstering name recognition, these kinds of activities can make people more likely to support the officeholder on election day.
The second and third methods, position-taking and credit-claiming, are more substantive. Position-taking involves “public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors” (Mayhew 1974). Politicians can accomplish this in many ways, from speech making to roll-call voting. While this may seem simple, successful position-taking can actually be quite costly. Giving a speech might take less than an hour and registering a roll-call vote may take less than a minute, but researching what should go into the speech and what position one should take on a bill can require significant amounts of time and resources (Gilligan and Krehbeil 1987; Krehbeil 1991). Legislators need to know how their constituents feel about an issue, how much they care about it, and how these preferences map onto the bill in question. This requires information about the legislator’s constituency and the bill, the cost of which will vary by issue.

Credit-claiming is fairly self-explanatory–legislators want to take credit for “particularized benefits” given to their constituents (Mayhew 1974). This requires knowing what benefits will please constituents, passing legislation or securing appropriations to gain these benefits, and notifying constituents that the legislator was responsible for them. The requirements for the first step overlap with the requirements for position-taking. Here, however, the second requirement of securing the benefit is significant. Legislators need ways to get what they want in government in order to please their constituents and win elections. While the incumbency advantage may reduce the intensity of this need, it does not eliminate it.

The difficulty of building legislative coalitions varies by issue. On more controversial issues, an officeholder will need to persuade her colleagues to support a bill. To borrow language from Mancur Olson’s (1965) famous work on collective action dilemmas, the officeholder may also need selective incentives to offer other legislators in exchange for their
support on the bill. This will be especially valuable in trying to recruit the last few votes to secure a legislative victory. Legislative coalition-building can be an intra-branch venture for members of Congress, as well as an intra-branch bargaining challenge for the executive. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, Presidents can recruit special interest groups to help them negotiate with Congress.

In addition to the advertising, position-taking and credit-claiming that Mayhew describes, politicians also engage in rigorous campaigning activities. There is substantial overlap between campaigning and advertising, position-taking and credit claiming, since the first strategy generally involves the other three. However, these activities will intensify in the months leading up to the campaign, and require the additional strategy of mobilization. The officeholder needs her supporters to go to the polls. Campaigning requires money, volunteers, and communications networks to promote the candidate and get out the vote.

Special Interest Groups as Sources

In sum, officeholders need to build expertise, assemble coalitions inside government, and mobilize their supporters outside government. These three strategies help officeholders advertise themselves, take positions on the record, and claim credit for legislation and appropriations. Legislators can draw upon many sources to carry out the strategies necessary to achieve their goals, and different sources have different strengths. Historically, political machines and congressional committees have been two of the most significant sources. Machines have traditionally helped parties—especially the Democratic Party—with mobilization, while Congressional committees have helped both parties build coalitions to pass important legislation and block unfavorable bills (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). Figure 4 lists the resources discussed in the previous section, and the strengths of different
sources in providing each one. I will argue that special interest groups do many of the same
things committees and machines do (or did, in the latter case). In fact, they help politicians and
parties with every item in Figure 4.

**Building Expertise.** Special interest groups’ informational contributions to parties might
not be obvious, but they are important nonetheless. As Grossman and Helpman (2001) note,
“Many special interest groups are well placed to deal in information because their members gain
knowledge about issues of concern to the group in the course of conducting their everyday
business, and because groups frequently collect information that bears on their members’
interests” (Grossman and Helpman 2001: 22). Legislators cannot always completely trust the
information they receive from special interest groups, just as they cannot always completely trust
the information they receive from congressional committees. This does not render the
information useless, however. As long as legislators can estimate the size and direction of the
group’s bias, they can still use the information to make policy decisions. If, as Krehbeil argues,
they are able to do this with respect to congressional committees, then they ought to be able to do
this with special interest groups as well. Since they cannot become experts in every field and
they cannot research the implications of every bill before Congress, this informational assistance
has great value.

**Building Coalitions.** Special interest groups can also help politicians build legislative
coalitions. This is especially true in an age of special interest partisanship. A relatively stable
coalition carries significant efficiency gains, as it obviates the need to build a coalition *de novo*
every time the party wants to pass an important piece of legislation. The same is true for
electioneering. When special interest partisanship is high, parties know they can count on certain
groups for support. This may have certain costs for special interest groups, as Frymer has
shown, and it may leave parties vulnerable to charges of extremism. However, it also streamlines the coalition-building process in both the electoral and legislative arenas.

Special interest groups assist coalition-building efforts in government through two mechanisms: communication and selective incentive provision. The value of communication is vastly underappreciated in the Congress literature. When the president or a member of Congress wants to pass a bill, he often needs to court legislative votes. This can be an arduous process, and special interest groups can help lessen the burden by contacting members of Congress to persuade them to support the bill, and mobilizing their members to do the same. This kind of behavior is often termed lobbying, but it is by no means restricted to traditional lobbying outfits on K Street. Even membership-based social movement organizations perform this service. Special interest groups can also help legislators build coalitions in government by offering selective incentives like campaign resources, rewarding those who join and honor coalitions and withholding resources from those who do not. This is especially valuable in recruiting the last few key votes to push a bill over the edge. These two mechanisms can also help legislators block unfavorable legislation.

Campaigning and Mobilizing Constituents. Special interest groups’ contributions to elections are diverse and well-known. Their most obvious contributions, campaign funds, have increased dramatically since the mid twentieth century. Chapter 3 will discuss the explosion of PACs, and changes in campaign contribution trends over the past few decades. Special interest groups also provide information about candidates and issues to their members through preexisting communications networks. A feminist organization might profile candidates in its newsletter, or a religious organization might encourage ministers to discuss important political issues in their sermons. This kind of communication can be used to promote candidates or rally
people around certain legislative programs. Churches have been particularly successful networks for political mobilization, as we have seen in the civil rights movement (Morris 1981) and the modern religious right (Oldfield 1996).

Special interest groups’ campaign assistance extends beyond the traditional resources of money and volunteers, however; they also help parties select and recruit candidates for public office. This was especially valuable to Republican party-building efforts in the South in the second half of the twentieth century, since running on the Republican ticket in a Democratic stronghold was not especially attractive. Galvin describes Republicans’ struggles to find quality candidates to run in the South, and special interest groups assisted them by providing suggestions and serving as brokers between potential candidates and party officials. Special interest groups have also helped both parties recruit female and minority candidates in all regions of the country.

**Summary.** As Figure 4 illustrates, special interest groups can make important contributions to campaigns even without delivering a unified voting bloc. Both Key (1942) and Schattschneider (1960) doubted special interest groups’ ability to do this well. While delivering a voting bloc will probably increase a group’s leverage, it is not the group’s only source of power. Special interest groups provide many resources and services to parties, which helps to explain why parties would have incentives to build closer relationships with them. The timing requires further inquiry, however. What changed during the second half of the twentieth century to encourage special interest partisanship? And, on the other side of the timeline, if special interest partisanship carries so many benefits, why did it not arise earlier?

**Using Theories of the Firm to Explain Changes in Special Interest-Party Relations**

Drawing on lessons from new institutional economics, this section will hypothesize how and why the evolution of special interest-party relations occurred. Theories of the firm were
designed to explain organizational formation and change, making them excellent theoretical tools for explaining the transformation of American political parties. They can help us to characterize special interest partisanship from a structural standpoint, and also provide hypotheses that might explain the process of organizational change leading to this structural outcome. It seems likely that political party organizations evolved in similar ways and for similar reasons that American businesses underwent widespread changes between 1920 and 1960: to economize on transaction costs, which rose in response to the growth and diversification of the American electorate and economy. After all, economic and social changes affected all of these entities.

After providing a brief introduction to general theories of the firm, I will discuss the changes in corporate organization described above. We can separate these changes into two broad, interrelated categories: form and size. I will discuss these in turn, explaining first how corporations altered their structures, and then how and why they expanded. This is valuable, I will argue, because the process leading to special interest partisanship involved changes in the form and size of political parties. Finally, I will apply these lessons to special interest partisanship, considering how theories of the firm can generate hypotheses about its structure and origins.

*Introduction to Theories of the Firm*

The classic theory of the firm “holds that production and exchange take place through institutions (contractual patterns, organizational forms) that reflect the specific pattern of transaction costs found in trade” (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Institutions and markets are alternatives in this sense, as the firm substitutes administrative mechanisms for traditional price mechanisms because the latter involve many different kinds of transaction costs (Coase 1937). Some, like contract negotiation and writing, appear before a contract is operational while others,
like implementation, surveillance, and problem resolution, appear afterwards. The theory of the firm highlights “how specific organizational or contractual forms reduce these costs” (Weingast and Marshall 1988: 134). We can think of the firm itself as a “a web or nexus of contracts” providing centralized leadership to manage exchange, so as to avoid transaction costs associated with making all exchanges on an open market through the traditional price mechanism (Eggertson 1990: 48; Coase 1937). Centralized leadership can also allow the firm to capitalize on potential economies of scale (Coase 1937: 390, 392).

Though Aldrich (1995) does not use the language of new institutional economics, his argument about party formation is consistent with theories on firm formation. Ceding power to a central authority (party leadership) dramatically reduced the number of formal and informal contracts needed in daily political life, thereby reducing transaction costs. Weingast and Marshall (1988) explicitly use theories of the firm to explain why legislators built the committee system. Application of this literature to political science has important and widely accepted precedent, and it provides compelling hypotheses to explain the growth of special interest partisanship.

Changes in Organizational Form

Classic studies of American business, like Chandler’s (1962) *Strategy and Structure*, offer clues as to what kinds of changes we could expect to see in political parties. American businesses undertook major organizational changes during the twentieth century, transitioning from unidivisional (“U-Form”) structures to multidivisional (“M-Form”) structures. Du Pont and General Motors pioneered this transformation shortly after World War I, and American businesses began adopting M-Form structures en mass between 1945 and 1960. Increasing economic complexity taxed the unidivisional system, producing problems of coordination,
communication and opportunism (Williamson 1981). The M-Form corporation alleviated these problems in several ways.

Whereas traditional U-Forms were organized by function (ex. production, marketing, etc.), M-Forms were organized by product or region. This transition involved a dramatic decentralization of authority and a separation of operational (day-to-day) functions from administrative or entrepreneurial (long-term) functions (Chandler 1962). No longer were executives involved in day-to-day operations. At the top of the M-Form hierarchy is a general office, which “makes the broad strategic or entrepreneurial decisions as to policy and procedures and can do so largely because it has the final say in the allocation of the firm’s resources—men, money, materials—necessary to carry out these administrative decisions and actions and others made with its approval at any level” (Chandler 1962: 11). Under the general office are several quasi-autonomous divisions, each responsible for a particular product or region of the country. While divisions can make some strategic decisions concerning their product or region, they do not control firm-level strategy regarding that product or region. Under these central divisions are departments responsible for different functions (ex. sales, research, manufacturing, etc.), and under these departments are field units. Only at this last level are managers “primarily involved in carrying on or personally supervising day-to-day activities” (Chandler 1962: 11).

Decentralization and separation of administrative and operational duties relieved overburdened executives and smoothed coordination within rapidly growing companies. Separating administrative functions like resource allocation and policy creation from operational functions also helped to control opportunism. Those working on particular products had incentives to maximize productivity within their divisions, but were not authorized to allocate firm resources to those products. Instead, firm executives could look across divisions in an M-
Form corporation, and distribute their resources in a manner most efficient and profitable for the company as a whole.

Applying these lessons to political parties yields a few hypotheses. At the broadest level, I expect that *political parties made structural changes in the area of special interest relations similar to changes made by American businesses after World War I (H4)*. More specifically, I expect to see a *rise of M-Form features, like organization by product or geography (H4a), decentralization (H4b), and separation of administrative from operational duties (H4c) in the area of special interest relations*. If businesses found these structural changes helped them to operate more efficiently in the twentieth century, I suspect political parties would too.

**Changes in Size**

Organizational form was not the only change businesses experienced during this time—they also expanded tremendously. These changes are, of course, related, as growth strained the U-Form structure. There are two categories of explanations relating to internal and external dynamics, respectively. The first category explains how different types of expansion reduce transaction costs, while the second explains the circumstances under which transaction costs need additional control. Just as forming a firm can help to reduce transaction costs, expanding through consolidation, integration, and geographic dispersion can help the firm increase production, take advantage of economies of scale, direct resources efficiently, protect the quality of its products, safeguard its technological investments, and ultimately lower the market price of its products.

Different kinds of expansion provide different benefits. Subunits give up power in forming a consolidated organization because this enables “economies of scale through standardization of processes and standardization in the procurement of materials” and—even
more importantly—“a concentration of production in a few large favorably located factories” (Chandler 1962: 31). In other words, the central office ensures that resources are directed in a manner most favorable to the overall organization, and produces products at a lower cost. Firms may also integrate horizontally with other firms in order to expand their business into new geographic areas.

Horizontal expansions can lead to vertical expansions for several reasons (Chandler 1962). Enhanced production capacity heightens distributional needs; the more product you can produce, the more you need to sell. Under these circumstances, Chandler argues firms were no longer comfortable contracting out product distribution to wholesalers, since these actors also sold their competitors’ products. Their interests were not necessarily conflicting, but neither were they aligned (Chandler 1962: 31).

Even in the absence of incentive problems, coordination between different levels became difficult. This encouraged companies to engage in forward integration, internalizing post-production functions like distribution so the firm’s administration could manage the flow of goods through different levels. In addition to smoothing coordination, this also “provided a more certain cash flow and more rapid payment for services rendered” (Chandler 1977: 7). Internalization also brings informational advantages, since “by linking the administration of producing units with buying and distributing units, costs for information on markets and sources of supply were reduced” (Chandler 1977: 7).

Williamson (1981) argues that forward integration also protects product quality. In a market system, producers rely on wholesalers and retailers to maintain the quality of their products. Since wholesalers and retailers bear only part of the cost of quality deterioration, and “metering” is costly for producers, this reliance can harm producers. Since metering and
enforcement are cheaper to carry out internally than externally, firms have incentives to internalize distribution to protect the quality of their product. Thus, Williamson argues, firms will be more likely to substitute administrative mechanisms for market mechanisms—effectively increasing the size of the firm—when the quality of their particular products could deteriorate in the hands of distributors outside the firm.

They will also be more likely to internalize functions through integration when developing highly specific assets. Williamson argues, “as assets become more fully specialized to a single use or user, hence are less transferable to other uses and users, economies of scale can be as fully realized when a firm operates the asset under its own internal direction as when its services are obtained externally by contract” (Williamson 1981: 1548). When assets are non-transferable, at least not without a substantial loss in value, internalization provides substantial security over contracting.

The previous discussion helps to explain how firms benefit from expanding horizontally, vertically, and geographically. It does not explain the timing of firm expansion, however. Why did so many firms expand in the first half of the twentieth century? To some extent, they were all responding to the same historical changes, as growth provides powerful stimuli for firm expansion. Changes in population, technology and income created “opportunities and needs….to employ existing or expanding resources more profitably” (Chandler 1962: 15). Technological innovation can change the firm’s ability to communicate externally to consumers and internally to other parts of the firm or industry. In one sense, this may relieve stress by making communication easier; in another, however, it may pressure the firm by quickly and vastly expanding the potential market for goods and services. Both positive and negative stimuli are powerful, as Chandler argues, “The prospect of a new market or the threatened loss of a current
one stimulated geographical expansion, vertical integration, and product diversification” (Chandler 1962: 15).

Using Theories of the Firm to Characterize and Explain Special Interest Partisanship

I have argued that special interest partisanship represents an organizational change for political parties. But what does this change look like? Using language from the firm literature, special interest partisanship represents a partial vertical integration of special interest groups by parties. We might also think of this as a kind of internalization, which I suspect did not happen all at once. Rather than going straight to integration, I hypothesize that parties and special interests passed through an intermediary stage involving looser coordination of resources (H5). Thinking back to Figure 2, the first stage involves an increase in the size of the overlap between parties and special interests, and the second stage involves a change in the nature of this overlap. The integration is only partial because special interest groups and parties are still technically separate entities operating under separate brand names, and parties do not completely control special interest operations the way a parent company could control a subsidiary or an executive office could control a field office. However, special interest groups act as party agents in many ways. Today, the operations and fates of special interests and parties are strongly linked in a way they were not forty years ago.

Why did parties internalize special interest groups in this way? My broadest hypothesis is that the explanation centers on changing costs, not beliefs, as the polarization literature would suggest (H6). While there were some ideological changes during this time, I will argue that cost concerns—not ideologies—were the primary force behind the transformation of party politics in the modern era. We can think of this as the general cost hypothesis, under which we have two sub-hypotheses.
The first is that parties drew on special interest groups to help them manage new costs arising in the second half of the twentieth century, which they could not handle alone (H6a). We can think of this as the cost sharing hypothesis, and it helps to explain why parties would build more cooperative relationships with parties—the first stage of the two-stage organizational change described earlier. As this chapter has discussed, special interests can provide a wide range of goods and services to political parties to help them achieve their electoral and legislative goals. We can think of most of these goods and services as ways of paying the costs of electioneering and policymaking. Parties’ ability to handle these costs alone deteriorated after the mid-twentieth century, as Republican party organization reached a nadir in the mid-1970s, and traditional Democratic party resources like political machines and organized labor declined dramatically during this time.

The second cost-related sub-hypothesis is that, like modern corporations, political parties altered their organizations to economize on transaction costs involved with winning elections and governing an increasingly large and diverse nation (H6b). This internalization allowed them to reduce negotiation costs associated with building coalitions to campaign and pass legislation, and align incentives to maximize productivity and protect the quality of their “product” as it passed from production through distribution.

A second broad hypothesis is that this organizational innovation occurred in response to growth (H7). During the latter part of the 20th century, the electorate and economy became increasingly diverse. This had an enormous potential upside for parties, since new groups of voters represented new potential party members and new economic industries represented new potential campaign donors. Having dealt with a relatively homogenous electorate until this time, however, parties were not especially well equipped to figure out how to appeal to these new
voters and industries. Technological innovations offered new ways to communicate with wide audiences, which could potentially help parties reach these new voters and industries; however, they required large start-up investments.

In this context, special interest groups had great potential value for parties. They knew a lot about their members’ preferences, and they also knew how to communicate with those members. Special interest groups could help parties understand how to appeal to new voters, and parties in turn could give special interest groups new access to government. At this stage, these were cooperative relationships. In the language of the firm, parties could draw on special interest groups to assist them with “distribution” of their “product.” Parties also found special interest groups quite willing to share the costs of building relationships with new constituents and adapting to technological advancements.

For a while, parties were able to maintain relationships with a large number of groups—even groups in direct competition with one another. Over time, however, we see a few significant changes. Beginning around the late 1970s, parties started building stronger relationships with certain groups. It became less common to see direct competitors in these cooperative relationships with both parties. Instead, they began working more exclusively with one party or the other.

These changes came with important efficiency gains to the party, thereby decreasing transaction costs associated with campaigning and governing. When parties internalized groups, the fate of the group’s agenda became linked to the electoral fate of its ally party. While the party lost support from the group’s competitor, it enjoyed many efficiency gains from the exclusive relationship. With incentives aligned, the group’s communication with its members became more reliable, both in terms of frequency and favorability. They needed to worry less
about the quality of their “product” deteriorating as it passed from production through
distribution. Internalization also protected parties as they invested in relatively specific
technological assets, which allowed them to target specific voters and also communicate broadly
with co-partisans in the electorate. Moreover, internalization provided parties with more reliable
coalition partners in elections and policymaking. They did not need to build a new coalition *de
novo* every time they wanted to pass a piece of legislation or gear up for an election. In sum,
although simpler cooperative relationships allowed parties to use special interest groups to help
build and distribute their “products,” parties achieved great efficiency gains from internalizing
these relationships.

**Summary and Project Outline**

I have argued that the relationship between special interests and parties has changed
since the middle of the twentieth century, when Key, Truman and others noted strong special
interest bipartisanship. Following this theoretical chapter, four empirical chapters will employ
mixed methods to analyze the relationship between special interests and parties as organizations,
in government, and in the electorate. My qualitative data comes from the archives at the
presidential libraries of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and William Clinton, and my quantitative data comes from various sources.

My first empirical chapter, *Special Interests and Parties as Organizations*, will focus
more than other chapters on special interest groups. I will use data from the Center for
Responsive Politics and the Federal Election Commission to analyze the volume and partisan
balance of campaign contributions from seventy-six industries, ranging from gun control to
pharmaceuticals, from 1975 to the present. This will give me one measure of special interest
partisanship, over which special interests have primary control. I will analyze the extent to
which they have become more partisan since 1975, and the timing of this trend. I will also use secondary sources to describe changes in party and special interest organizations, relying heavily on the work of Theda Skocpol, Daniel Galvin, and Philip Klinkner.

My second and third empirical chapters will analyze *Special Interests and Parties in the Executive Branch* and *Special Interests and Parties in Congress*, respectively. The first will use archival data to follow the executive branch’s institutionalization of relations between the White House and special interest groups through the Office of the Public Liaison. The second will use mostly quantitative data from the Policy Agendas Project to analyze legislative coalitions in different issue areas, evaluating the extent to which special interest partisanship has grown in Congress over time. Looking within special interest industries, I will compare the legislative measure to the campaign finance measure to determine whether one systematically leads the other. I will also compare these two measures across industries to see whether or not more partisan special interest industries have systematically higher special interest partisanship in legislative coalitions.

My last empirical chapter, *Special Interests and Parties in the Electorate*, will use public opinion data from various national surveys to measure special interest partisanship in the general population. The first part of this chapter will look at public opinion on issues relevant to selected industries over time, as well as thermometers gauging support for relevant groups. In the second section, I will break the survey respondents into groups, and analyze the partisanship and voting behavior of people who support and oppose these issues and groups. This will help me determine, for example, whether or not people who support school prayer became more Republican as religious groups became more Republican. I will also analyze relevant
demographic groups to determine, for example, whether women become more Democratic over time as the women’s movement became more entrenched within the party.

The last part of this chapter will analyze representation on issues relevant to a few selected industries, extending work I am currently doing with Jeffrey Lax and Justin Phillips. Following Lax and Phillips (2008), I will use multilevel regression and poststratification to generate issue-specific public opinion estimates at the state and congressional district levels over time. I will then measure the effect of constituent opinion on roll-call voting on bills relevant to the industry. As special interest groups have become more partisan, have members of Congress become more likely to follow their party’s stance on an issue instead of their constituents’ preferences? Recent work on gay rights suggests this may be the case, as it appears congruence with constituent opinion on gay rights issues has declined over time (Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips 2011).

This representation analysis will lead into a conclusion discussing the normative aspects of special interest partisanship. Schattschneider (1948) argued that special interest and party strength are inversely related, and this competitive characterization has become conventional wisdom (Tichenor and Harris 2005: 265; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). As Tichenor and Harris note, however, neither Schattschneider nor his successors attempted to test this assertion empirically, despite its tension with Key and Truman’s arguments about the “interdependence” of parties and special interest groups (Tichenor and Harris 2005: 265). After measuring changes in the relationship between special interests and parties since the mid-twentieth century, my dissertation will revisit Schattschneider’s claims. At the very least, this project will demonstrate that increases in special interest strength do not always lead to decreases in party strength. This is not a zero-sum game; indeed, in many respects, the relationship has been symbiotic. Special
interests serve parties in many ways, so their strength can make parties stronger. Still, whether special interest partisanship does more harm than good for democracy remains to be seen.
Figure 1

Conceptualization of Special Interests

Special Interests in Government

Special Interests as Organizations

Special Interests in the Electorate
Figure 2

Modern Constellation of Special Interests and Political Parties as Organizations, in Government, and in the Electorate

In Government

In the Electorate

As Organizations
Figure 3
The Partisanship Continuum

Balance

High

Nonpartisanship
Bipartisanship

Low

Weak Partisanship
Strong Partisanship

Magnitude
Low
High
## Figure 4
Sources of Key Resources for Parties in Government

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<th>Congressional Committees</th>
<th>Political Machines</th>
<th>Special Interest Groups</th>
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<tr>
<td>Information on bills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selective incentives for key legislators</td>
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