Hi Everyone,

Thanks for taking the time to look at this essay, which is going to the Annual Review of Sociology. As such it should be useful for people trying to get an overview of this field, especially graduate students looking for topics.

It is pretty rough, especially toward the end, but it is not due for months, so feel free to make any kind of suggestion. (As if I really need to say that.)

You’ll notice that the subtitle has already changed from Fifteen Years of Theory and Research to Twenty Years… I guess I should have sat down and read that literature years ago. Never too late.

Jim
Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research

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Twenty years ago, emotions were almost entirely absent from scholarly accounts of politics, protest, and social movements. One searched in vain for even a single mention or index entry (Goodwin, 1997:53). In the years since, emotions of every sort have reappeared in research on social movements, in a still-growing flow of articles and books. This essay recaps what we have learned from that research and theory in order to see where we might go next.

Emotions are present in every phase and every aspect of protest. They motivate individuals, are generated in crowds, are expressed rhetorically, and sometimes represent stated and unstated goals of social movements. Emotions are both means and ends, and sometimes both. They can help or hinder mobilization efforts, ongoing strategies, and the success of social movements. Older debates over cultural versus biological sources, over evolution versus learned emotions, over individual/psychological versus social have fortunately faded, and we are left with an emerging picture of human action rooted in both the body and the social, in which both cognitive beliefs and pre-conscious feelings shape our decisions and actions. Cooperation and collective action have always offered an opportunity to think about social action more generally, and the return of emotions is the latest inspiration for doing this.

Part I: Sources.

Until the 1960s observers used the obvious emotions of protest to dismiss protestors as irrational; from the 1960s to the 1990s analysts denied any and all emotions in an effort to demonstrate that protestors are rational (Goodwin et al., 2000). In the 1990s the intellectual pendulum began to swing back, with the “return of the repressed.” Scholars of protest drew eclectically on a variety of theories of emotions.

A distinct sociology of emotions had matured in the 1980s. The Managed Heart (Hochschild, 1983) drew on diverse sources to portray the management of emotional expressions according to culturally informed feeling rules, including those imposed by employers in a form of exploitation. This book eclipsed the other main strands of the emerging sociology of emotions, Kemper’s (1978) systematic linkage of emotional reactions to an individual’s position in hierarchies of status and power, and Heise’s (1979) affect control theory of how we react to disrupted expectations. None of these influential works was directly concerned with politics, although one of Hochschild’s earliest discussions of emotion (1975), concerning women and anger, appeared in a feminist volume. Even today, these three traditions have not been applied to political action in a thorough and systematic way (cf. Kemper, 2001).
Another influence, untapped at the time, was Collins’ (1975) discussion of the emotional energy generated in collective rituals, labeled collective effervescence by Durkheim. As part of his conflict theory, emotions and attention are values that people compete for. Although Hochschild (1983:208) rejected Collins’ “push-button model” of emotions as inadequately cultural, Kemper would later collaborate with Collins in drawing out the micro-level implications of their two approaches. Later, once emotions had returned to the study of social movements, Collins (2001, 2004) and Kemper (2001) both worked out some of the implications of their theories for political action.

Several scholars, working from different theoretical perspectives, began to analyze the emotions of protest in the 1990s. Critiques of rational-choice models were one source, since that tradition’s restricted definition of rationality as calculated maximization assumed that individuals tend to be rational and yet left the suspicion that there were few rational grounds for participating as opposed to free riding (Olson, 1965). Flam (1990) offered an “emotional man” model to complement both self-interested rational models of economics and the moral models of altruism often presented as their opposite. Ferree (1992:32) also criticized the rational-choice tradition for rendering “ambivalence, altruism, and emotional experience” “invisible and irrelevant.” Although a useful exercise in brush-clearing, critiques of rational-choice theory had some limits as a starting point for the analysis of emotions: critics had to accept much of the language and individualism of their target in order to carry on a dialogue; and interesting theorizing about emotions soon emerged from the rational-choice tradition itself, especially Elster’s work (1999a, b).

Feminism inspired a broader critique, not merely of academic models, but of western thought more generally, for ignoring and denying the role of emotions in social and political life. Jaggar (1989) and others challenged a number of dichotomies used to denigrate women: mind versus body, thinking versus feeling, public versus private, and so on (Calhoun, 2001). The association of women with emotions is unfair and damaging as a practice but (for that very reason) accurate as a description. Hochschild insisted that women are exploited by being called upon to do more emotion work. “Lacking other resources,” she observed (1983:163), “women make a resource out of feeling,” thanks in part to the emotion-management skills they are pressed to develop through childhood gender socialization. The dichotomies attacked by feminists were sometimes straw targets, since there are a number of emotions women are discouraged from feeling, especially anger. Taylor (1996) and Hercus (1999) brought a feminist analysis of anger suppression to the study of social movements.

For decades psychoanalysis offered one of the only serious toolkits for talking about emotions in politics (e.g. Lasswell, 1948; Smelser, 1968). Although its promise faded as cognitive psychology developed as an alternative in the 1970s and 1980s (Jasper, 2004b), Goodwin (1997) applied it usefully to the tensions of dyads in the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. Internal Huk documents show how leaders struggled to prevent members from leaving to be with their spouses and children – to the extent of allowing men to take “forest
wives” in the armed camps. Goodwin’s broader theory relied on Freud’s hydraulic imagery of libidinal flows, first through the individual (either sublimated or released sexually), then out into social networks, as well as on metaphors such as libidinal constitution, a structure, and an “economy” of affectual ties. These constructs have proven less fruitful.

*Cultural constructionism* offered other useful tools for understanding the emotions of politics, especially by suggesting that emotions are a part of culture alongside cognition and morality (Jasper, 1997). Emotional mechanisms could be detected lurking beneath a number of processes otherwise taken as cognitive, such as frame alignment and collective identity, or taken as structural, such as political opportunities and networks (Jasper, 1998). The cultural approach tended to highlight the rhetorical and performative work that organizers do to construct sensibilities and generate moral shocks that draw people into participation (Alexander et al., 2006; Tilly, 2008).

To be sure, emotions had not been entirely eliminated from scholars’ vocabularies in the 1970s. Lofland (1982) wrote eloquently of the joys of crowds, Gamson et al. (1982:123) about the suspicion, hostility, and anger that contribute to an injustice frame. Missing was a way to incorporate these insights into a broader theory of action. Even Gamson (1992), in calling for a social-psychological approach, overlooked his own work on emotions. A cultural approach promised a view of political action that would acknowledge emotions in a variety of forms and settings (Jasper, 1997), but there remained debates over evolutionary, biological, social-structural, and cultural approaches (e.g. Kemper, 2001). The new approaches seemed to have little in common, as definitional squabbles crowded out empirical application.

Although these debates have not altogether disappeared, a definition of emotions has emerged in the past decade that social scientists can put to use in empirical research. According to Nussbaum (2001:23), “emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or evaluation.” They are, furthermore, salient or important “to the person’s own flourishing” (30). She steers between the treacherous images of emotions as automatic bodily disturbances or as an overly calculating, reflexive awareness. Emotions are a form of information processing, often faster than our conscious minds operate (Leventhal, 1980, 1982; Leventhal and Tomarken, 1986). They run through various parts of the brain, just as what we call “cognitions” do. They can be observed in fMRI scans, just as more formal thoughts can. They help humans negotiate the world around them. Although I believe there are some limits to this view – it has trouble with moods that are not directly “about” objects and with affective loyalties that persist over time – it is a fine starting point (and compatible with other theorists, such as Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, and Marcus, 2002). Among other things, it allows us to relate emotions to a series of human goals.

Part 2: Goals of Political Action
Many scholars either ignore the multiple goals humans pursue, or assume they know the most important ones. Positing a single goal enables mathematical models, but we lose the realism of being able to observe people wrestling with conflicts among goals. In a work on strategic engagement I categorized human goals roughly as reputation, sensuality and connection, impact on the world, and curiosity (Jasper, 2006c). We see all these at work in social movements, sometimes driving them forward and sometimes pulling them apart (although curiosity is more important for artistic and intellectual than for political movements, so I shall ignore it here). We can observe distinct emotions related to how well we are doing in our struggle for these various goals.

**Reputation.** This is one of the most common human motives: a concern for due honor, pride, recognition of one’s basic humanity (Honneth, 1995). Many movements that appear instrumentally interested in power or material benefits are motivated at least as much by a concern for the human dignity that political rights imply (Woods, 2003).

For years Scheff (e.g. 1990) has detailed the impact of pride (and its opposite, shame) in different institutional arenas. “Pride generates and signals a secure bond, just as shame generates and signals a threatened bond” (Scheff, 1994:3). Unacknowledged shame, in particular, “leads directly to anger, insult, and aggression,” as he demonstrates in explaining the origins of World War I and World War II (Scheff, 1994:5). He accounts for Hitler’s appeal to Germans of the 1930s by tracing his expressions of shame, and provides a useful list of verbal and visual cues by which we can observe expressions of shame and anger. When both sides in an interaction harbor unacknowledged shame, polarization and escalation are more likely. If pride for one’s group is a central goal, humiliation of one’s enemies is another.

Several authors have found protest movements to revolve around efforts to transform shame into pride. Stein (2001) found signs of shame, especially bypassed shame, in her interviews with Christian anti-gay crusaders, albeit with a small sample. In an essay on gay liberation, Britt and Heise (2000) trace the emergence of pride from shame via affect-control processes involving fear and then anger. Gould (2009) elaborates on unacknowledged shame and the emergence of pride in the radicalization of gay and lesbian activism in the late 1980s. Movements by stigmatized groups face a strategic dilemma: They are trying to remove the group stereotypes, or even the very categories, that shame them, yet they use these same identities to mobilize supporters; they are fighting to undermine their own sources (Jasper, 2010).

If punishing enemies has historically been a male obsession, driven by unacknowledged shame, the women’s movement and its offspring show a different way that emotions are a goal of collective action. Because one of the premises of this movement is that women have been oppressed and injured, a variety of women’s self-help movements have attempted to undo that damage by repairing women’s emotional experience. Faced with the Janus Dilemma (Jasper, 2006:125; Mansbridge, 1986), these movements have often specialized in reaching in to attend to the needs of their own members rather than reaching out to fix the world – or so many critics
have claimed (Brown, 1995; Echols, 1990). Too much internal focus, they say, creates a victim mentality and a politics of resentment.

Others have defended the emotional repair work accomplished in self-help and related movements. Analyzing post-partum depression, Verta Taylor (1996) showed how women who did not feel the “right” things have battled American society’s cheery norms about the emotions of motherhood. Her student Nancy Whittier (2009) has traced several decades of contention over child sexual abuse. Far from an exclusive focus on internal repair, she found efforts to balance the Janus tradeoff. “The shame that victims felt about having been abused was not simply a psychological artifact, but a product of social forces. Thus, challenging that shame by undertaking emotional work in self-help groups and speaking publicly about one’s experiences was not simply psychological change, but social change” (2009:68). If shame is the central emotion that needs to be fixed, some public effort seems necessary, since shame entails imagining one’s image in others’ eyes, one’s place in the community. Struggles over identities must unfold on two fronts, both internal and external to a group.

**Connection.** If issues of reputation frequently motivate participation, a feeling of belonging to a group often keeps people there. A sense of belonging is a basic human need, involving emotions of love (Berezin, 1997), pride (Scheff, 1994), and emotional excitement (Collins, 2004). This sense of identification with a group goes beyond Lofland’s crowd joys, providing affective commitments that tend to persist. “Collective identity” has been a fashionable topic in recent years because of this, exerting its causal impact because of the affective loyalties it generates (Jasper, 1998; Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Group loyalties expand an individual’s list of goals to include benefits for the group, beyond any benefits the individual receives as a member of that group. Such goals are not quite self-interest and not quite altruism.

Other kinds of connections can draw people out of collective efforts. Goodwin, we saw, maps the ways in which attachments to families and sexual partners can interfere with loyalty and the fulfillment of duties to the collective. These tensions between attachment to the nuclear family and to the rebellion are a special case of what I term the Band of Brothers Dilemma in strategic interaction: a large group tries to arouse an individual’s affective loyalty, but that loyalty often focuses on a sub-unit of the large group, just as soldiers are often most loyal to the members of their immediate fighting unit (Jasper, 2004a:13). The same friendship or sexual attraction that might draw someone into a movement may also prevent them from broadening their loyalty to the entire group.

**Impact.** The desire to have an effect on the world is a third great family of motivations, along with the attendant emotions. In social movements, this desire often comes from a moral vision or ideology which suggests that the world should be different from the way it is. I have a shelf of books titled *Making History*, clearly a popular way to understand what social movements are all about. In their pleas for support, activists must temper the pleasures of having an impact with a continued sense of fear, anger, and threat that demand continued action. Ideologies too must
portray the movement as having history on its side – but only in the end, some day. The emotions that maintain emotional energy and confidence cannot be undermined by too great a sense of accomplishment. Hopeful anticipation of an impact is perhaps the greatest spur to action.

The frustration of not having an impact, or sometimes not being heard, shows why protesters often shift their targets to the governmental procedures that have failed to protect or aid them (on “procedural rhetoric” see Gordon and Jasper, 1996). At the extreme is the outrage over state repression, which, far from curtailling protest, can sometimes ignite it (best cite on this?). One of the deepest satisfactions of collective action is a sense of confidence and agency, an end that in turn becomes a means to further action. We already begin to see a complex emotional interplay between means and ends: attaining some of your goals can demobilize your side and mobilize your opponents (Jasper and Poulsen, 1993).

Part 3: Means of Action

Organizers use emotional displays and arouse emotions in several ways, especially attracting new recruits, sustaining the commitment and the discipline of those already in a movement, and persuading others. The first task facing organizers is to nudge a person from the category of bystander to that of participant. If most emotions represent a way of monitoring and evaluating the world around us, they should help us understand those rare but important moments when people question or abandon routine action in favor of new ways of acting and thinking. These strategic engagements are less frequent than habitual action, but more important (Jasper, 2006).

Focusing attention. Since Freud pointed out that emotions send us signals about what is important, observers have reflected on the ways in which emotions help to focus an actor’s attention on one part of the world around her. Political scientist George Marcus and his collaborators (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000:138) formulate this idea as anxiety, “generated when norms are violated; the more they are violated, and the more strategically central those norms are to people, then the greater the anxiety.” When people face novel threats, they pay attention, flipping from preconscious routines to more thoughtful information gathering. In addition to a “disposition system” which helps us develop useful habits to which we no longer need pay much attention, we are equipped with a “surveillance system” that “acts to scan the environment for novelty and sudden intrusion of threat” (Marcus et al., 2000:10). In these cases we set aside our normal routines and pay greater attention due to the urgency. Political scientists have tested the theory with voting patterns, finding that when voters feel threatened they seek additional information and process it more thoroughly. (Emotions, especially affective loyalties, also operate in the disposition system.)

One way that activists try to recruit others is by creating or taking advantage of moral shocks, information or events that (much like the breeching experiments of ethnomethodology or the “deflections” of affect control theory) suggest to people that the world is not as they had
thought. Their visceral unease may on occasion lead to political action as a form of redress (Jasper, 1997). Authors have found moral shocks part of recruitment to the animal rights movement (Jasper and Poulsen, 1995), the movement for peace in Central America (Nepstad, 2004; Nepstad and Smith, 2001), and anti-racist movements (Warren, 2010).

Emotional tradeoffs abound, though. Using nonactivist focus groups, Mika (2006) points out that the strong rhetoric and imagery that may shock a few into activism is likely to deter or even annoy the majority – another case of the Janus Dilemma of reaching in versus reaching out. PETA ads, shown to focus groups, often conflicted with participants’ basic views of nation or religion, especially since PETA referred to these other values in a glib way.

Scheff (n.d.), analyzing a memorial against the Iraq invasion, argues that moral shocks depend on surprise, emotional “attunement” with others (Scheff’s pride), and the acknowledgement of a previously hidden emotion (grief, in his example). But some who see the memorial are only driven further into denial of attunement, of the social bond with our “enemy.” Conversation with those tending the memorial, especially with Scheff himself, often makes the difference, as well as how the memorial is framed (is it about the dead, or about the war?). Moral shocks are most often part of a flow of action toward political activism, not a single great leap (Gamson, 1992:73). They do not change people’s underlying values or ideologies.

Radicalization. Gould (2009) suggests another role for moral shocks: they often come to those already participating in a social movement, with the effect of radicalizing them or reinforcing their commitment. In 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick had this effect on the gay and lesbian rights movements (Gould, 2009:chap. 2). Roe v. Wade had had a similar impact on an attentive – and already anti-abortion – portion of the public in 1973 (Luker, 1984?). Moral shocks can redirect or revivify existing efforts, not change people’s underlying values or ideologies. Roe informed an attentive public how common abortion actually was; Hardwick told the lesbian and gay community that their own government supported their oppression. Indignation at one’s own government can be especially moving, as it involves a sense of betrayal. Violent repression of peaceful protest is thus a frequent source of moral shock, dubbed “backlash” by Hess and Martin (2006), who also describe techniques used by authorities and protestors to battle over the emotional understanding of the backlash (Martin, 2006).

Rhetorical Display. Emotional shocks are hardly the only kind of rhetoric activists use. As well as recruiting new members, they must appeal to other players as well as to a bystander public. Some of these appeals deploy emotional displays, others try to downplay emotions. If feminists often challenge the assignment of emotions by gender, in the animal rights movement in rural North Carolina, Julian Groves (1995, 1997, 2001) found groups exploiting those same emotional norms as part of their rhetorical package. Here activists, trying to downplay the emotions of the movement in order to emphasize their rational, professional, even scientific grounding, favored men as spokespersons even though the movement was heavily female. “Being emotional becomes legitimate when men do it, and women can point to men’s participation in the movement to justify the legitimacy of their own feelings about animal cruelty” (Groves,
(Kleinman [1996] also discusses the different rewards and sanctions men and women get for emotional expression and manipulation, in the setting of an alternative-health organization.) In the self-help and in the animal-protection groups, we see groups making different choices when faced with the *Dilemma of Cultural Innovation*, over whether to challenge or to exploit existing views and sensibilities (Jasper, 2004:13). The same women may challenge gendered feeling rules as feminists and exploit them as animal protectionists.

Emotional displays can be used to send either threatening or reassuring signals to audiences. A group praying or singing seems under control; a shouting group does not. The two kinds of displays are useful for different purposes, as part of what I call the *Naughty or Nice Dilemma*: opponents and authorities may capitulate under threat, or they may redouble their efforts at containment and repression (Jasper, 2004).

In addition to focusing attention, breaking us out of our routines, and persuading others, emotions help explain our continuing participation in collective action. To be sustained, participation must provide some satisfactions along the way. Here are several emotional mechanisms for this.

**Collective solidarities.** Libraries have been written about collective identities and politics, ranging from nationalism (e.g. Calhoun, 1997) to American identity politics since the 1960s (Gitlin, 1995) to the emergence of LGBTQ movements since the 1990s (e.g. Gamson, 1995). Once viewed primarily as an exercise in collective memory (Anderson, 1983) or the drawing of cognitive boundaries (Taylor and Whittier, 1995), recent work has examined the emotions involved: the love of the group (Berezin, 1997, 2001), the hatred for outsiders (Scheff, 1994; le Cour Grandmaison, 2002), the nostalgic mood of melancholy (Jasper, 1999). Research into the arousal of these emotions promises to better explain the emergence and effects of collective identities (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).

**Interaction Rituals.** In a synthesis of Durkheim and Goffman, Collins (2004) offers a theory of emotional energy generated in face-to-face situations that give people consciousness of groups and motivation to participate in collective endeavors. Those at the center of interactions gain the most attention and most energy, reinforcing their position as leaders and symbols of the group, while those who are excluded or pushed to the margin lose emotional energy and enthusiasm. His ritual model “explains the relative intensities of the movement commitments,” and might also help account for “how social movements periodically gather, in smaller or larger collective occasions, sometimes to recreate the effervescence that launched the movement, and sometimes to infuse new emotions, one of the most effective ways being confrontation with targets or enemies” (Collins, 2001:31). If any interaction can generate emotional energy, and if that energy translates into the confidence that aids strategic engagement (Jasper, 2006), then this is a general and important theory of emotions.

What remains to be seen is how many specific emotions can be linked to this important mood. Drawing on Kemper (1978, 2001), Collins distinguishes ongoing positions in hierarchies that generate distinctive levels of long-term emotional energy from interactions that change those levels in the short term, linking the two by positing that those who are dominant arrange ritual
interactions that reinforce their positions. Those with sinking levels of emotional energy get depressed, although those with some level remaining (and hence some capacity for resistance and agency) may also feel afraid (Collins, 2004:129). Moods interact with events to generate short-run reflex emotions.

Collins’ use of Durkheim also suggests some of the mechanisms that generate the joys of crowds. Collective locomotion and music have unusual capacities to make people melt into a group in feelings of satisfaction, perhaps because so many parts of the brain are involved at once. Music’s contribution to social movements has often been analyzed as though it were primarily about the cognitive messages contained in the lyrics, full of catchy, memorable ideological slogans. But music has as much of an emotional impact on participants who sing, dance, and move together (McNeill, 1995). Traîni (2008:60) lists twelve contributions music makes to protest. Only the first two are explicitly emotional (creating feelings favorable to conversion and helpful emotional postures), although two more (reinforcement of group identity and demonization of opponents) certainly also have emotional bases. These need further exploration.

**Discipline.** As with any form of collective action, individuals must be controlled so that they do what others expect of them. Organizers must anticipate, block, or allow for urges such as thirst or the need to urinate. One source of disruption is fear, which can paralyze or panic – it was the paradigm emotion for much crowd theory. Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) found a number of “encouragement mechanisms” that organizers used to mitigate or manage fear in both the U.S. and the East German civil rights movements: intimate social ties and support; emotional mass meetings; identification with the movement; faith in their ultimate victory; shaming; formal training in civil disobedience; and mass-media coverage. They found two additional mechanisms in the U.S. movement: the possession of firearms and faith in divine protection. Broqua and Fillieule (2009:164) point out that activists work to suppress emotions as much as to express them, mentioning as an example the two hundred years that it took to tame and institutionalize street demonstrations.

**Group Dynamics.** Internal group dynamics, crucial to sustaining any movement, are still poorly understood. Both Goodwin (1997) and Janja Lalich (2004) show how group leaders try to minimize affective loyalties to anyone outside the group and maximize them to the group or its leaders. Goodwin emphasized family ties, especially erotic attractions. In a book-length treatment, Lalich compared the group Heaven’s Gate, which expected to be transported up to Halley’s comet to start new incorporeal existences, to the Democratic Workers Party, a Marxist-Leninist cellule in the San Francisco Bay Area in the 1970s and 1980s. Both required members to take new names, cut outside ties, and remain silent about prior affective commitments. (Interestingly, both groups discouraged any talk of feelings.) Berman (2009) gets at similar dynamics of group loyalty through the costs and benefits of defection, a monetary account that is compatible with Lalich’s but offering non-emotional mechanisms. We are reminded that the emotions that are useful means for group leaders may be damaging to the rank-and-file.

The emotional dynamics of leaders and followers are poorly understood, part of a broad inattention to leaders in sociology. Even a cultural analyst like Alberto Melucci (1996) views leadership as a series of exchanges between leaders and followers. Scheff suggests the role of leaders as symbols of feelings in his analysis of Hitler’s appeal, but he provides little sense of the internal structure of groups and their dynamics. Even a nation, in his model, is relatively
undifferentiated. Describing his method as part/whole analysis, he jumps between the two rather than showing the organizational and strategic work that links them – the stuff of resource mobilization, political alliances, frame alignment and other organizing work. Emotions are key potential building blocks for moving from the micro to the macro level.

Part 4: The Fusion of Ends and Means

Despite the many ways that emotions are intimately tied to means and to ends, they also frequently blur the very distinction of means and ends. Any flow of action throws up a constant stream of emotions, and the more positive they are – or the more emotional energy and excitement generated – the more likely participants are to continue. The satisfactions of action, from the joy of fusion to the assertion of dignity – become a motivation every bit as important as a movement’s stated goals. Many authors have pointed out the pleasures and pains of protest, without explicitly acknowledging the emotions that comprise them. Means become goals, and goals – once attained – become the means for further action. Means and ends often fuse. (This is the reason that Weber placed affective action in a category of its own, especially in contrast to means- and ends-rationalities.)

For example many movements aim to transform the rules of emotional displays. Perhaps the most documented case is feminist efforts to make it acceptable for women to express negative emotions, especially anger. As early as 1975 Hochschild cited Paul Ekman’s finding that women are more likely to suppress anger, while men are more likely to mask fear; anger is aimed downward in hierarchies (Kemper, 1978). The reason is that anger, as Aristotle insisted, is a useful means for asserting one’s rights and status. Calling self-help “the taproot of feminism,” Taylor (1996:175) later argued that “women’s self-help plays a major role in challenging the emotion norms surrounding love and anger and is contributing to an historical shift in American society toward free expression, individualism, and self-development.” A decade later, Whittier (2009) made a similar point about the movement against child sexual abuse, which insisted that “‘speaking out’ and telling the story of one’s experience of child sexual abuse was central to both individual recovery and social change.”

These sorts of changes in emotional displays, making them less gendered and thus changing gender roles, have been a central goal of the women’s movement. But the ability to express anger is also a means for challenging other injustices, a normal part of most protest movements. As gender restrictions are relaxed, women gain new ways to act in their own interests. Again, this is a common pattern in social movements (and all strategic engagement): attaining one objective helps in attaining future ones. For this reason, there has been some confusion about the goals of movements: is mobilization itself an end, or merely a means? It is both.

We can grasp this fusion of means and ends by returning to Sen’s Nussbaum’s concept of human capabilities, those qualities that make for a full human life, in part because they enable people to do other things (even though they are also satisfaction in themselves, which we miss sorely). Nussbaum (2006:76ff) lists life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, relationships with other species, play, and control over one’s
political and material environments. These are, in a very full sense, both means and ends. Almost all of them entail rich emotions.

Emotions help us understand the interpenetration of means and ends. Each victory, even a small one, yields confidence, attention, and emotional energy, all of which are advantages for further action (Jasper, 2006:108-113). Collins (2004) observes that emotional energy generated in one interaction gives people confident moods they can take to their next interaction, especially when they have symbols to remind them. These mechanisms can help us make sense of many of the “opportunities” of political process theory, for instance. An event like Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 was less a signal of the weakness of racist government than a source of hope that victories were possible (Jasper, 1997:118). Combined with the subsequent threat from angry white supremacists, this hope operated as the positive pole of a moral battery.

Anger, outrage, and other aggressive emotions are not always a winning approach. They embroil protestors in the Naughty or Nice strategic dilemma (Jasper, 2006c:106). But protestors are certainly better off facing this dilemma than having their choices constrained because naughty emotional expressions are precluded from the start. That can only make them more predictable to opponents. (Holmes [2004:211] criticizes approaches which “assume that the political outcome of anger is determinable in advance,” but instead of recognizing the strategic dilemmas and the contingency of strategic interaction she labels anger as “ambivalent.”)

The kind of anger nurtured by the women’s movement is not the same anger you feel when your cat claws its way up your leg. The latter is a quick reflex, which subsides when you remind yourself that the cat was in turn startled by the dog. Women’s anger is instead a form of righteous indignation, a moral sensibility based on an analysis of injustice as well as a gut feeling of oppression. Women had to learn to turn their blame outwards, to see themselves as victims, but also as strong enough to resist. We don’t do so much cognitive work when we kick the cat.

If the feeling of agency feeds collective endeavors, so does a sense of loyalty to one’s collective. We saw that collective identification is both an end in itself, a basic human satisfaction, and also a means. Pride in one’s group, especially its moral worth, unanimity, size (numbers), and commitment (Charles Tilly’s (2004) WUNC displays, which he primarily took as oriented toward external audiences but which also has internal audiences), enhances commitment to collective action. Collective identities are a complex fusion of ends and means. To the extent I identify with a group, its goals become mine. But that same identification also aids collective action by giving me the attention and energy to participate. And my ends are an organizer’s means.

Finally, we can circle back to moral sensibilities. Just as they form the background conditions for emotional reactions (“background emotions,” Nussbaum calls them), they are also one of the most lasting accomplishments of social movements. Just as one movement may leave for future movements such advantages as know-how, social networks, frames and other rhetoric, songs and other carriers of meaning, it may also leave a way of seeing and feeling about the world that later movements can build upon (Jenkins, 1992; Nepstad and Smith, 2001). In nineteenth-century Britain and America, compassion for animals was borrowed to help create movements to aid poor or abused children; in the following century the same styles of compassion could be applied to distant suffering across the globe.
In sum, the routines of protest must offer satisfactions along the way, especially considering how remote many movement goals are. The pleasures of conversation, the excitement of interaction, the ability to articulate moral intuitions, a sense of making history and others: these keep participants going, regardless of the likelihood of obtaining stated goals. Conversely, the attainment of interim goals is one of the most energizing of these pleasures of participation.

Part 5: Toward Better Distinctions

The word “emotions,” like its counterpart in many other languages, covers a great number of expressions, interactions, feelings, and labels. Although a number of scholars have suggested that we develop subcategories that correspond better to the different kinds of things termed emotions (Griffiths, 1997; Jasper, 1998; Gould, 2009), most scholars continue to observe and theorize one such subcategory while continuing to apply the term “emotions” to it. When their models are misapplied to other kinds of emotion, confusion results.

I have elsewhere (Jasper, 2004b) presented a crude typology of emotions based on how long they typically last and how they are expressed. Urges are strong bodily impulses, hard to ignore, such as lust, substance addiction, or the need to sleep or defecate. Their impact on politics is often to interfere with promised coordinated action, so that organizers try to control them (just as torturers use them to break people down). Reflex emotions are reactions to our immediate physical and social environment, usually quick to appear and to subside, and normally accompanied by a package of facial expressions and bodily changes (as described by Ekman, 1972). The most salient is anger, which can lead us to do things we later regret – the reason that strategic players try to goad their opponents into anger. Moods last somewhat longer, so that we can carry a mood from one setting to another for a while. Collins’ emotional energy, and aspects of Scheff’s pride and shame, seem to be moods. Affective loyalties or orientations are relatively long-term attachments or aversions: love, hate, respect, trust, admiration. They are less tied to short-term assessments of how we are doing in the world, and more to cognitive appraisals of others (although the objects need not be humans). Finally, moral emotions involve satisfactions that we feel when we do the right thing, a kind of deontological pride, but also when we feel the right thing, such as compassion for the unfortunate or indignation over injustice.

Many general models of emotion are based on one of these categories as an exemplar, and apply poorly to others. And in other cases, the same word covers different feelings from different categories. Anger, for example, can be a gut surge of panicky fear over something in the shadows or a kind of indignation over the insensitivity of our government. Shame too seems to have at least two different forms. One (observed in non-humans) is based on physical humiliation, a kind of “cowing”; the other on a shared moral code that has been violated. Few statements about “emotions” as a category hold up, for example feminists’ attack on cultural dichotomies that assigned emotions to women: this is true for some emotions and not others.
Emotions interact with each other constantly. Perhaps the most interesting interaction is between long-standing affective commitments, or background emotions, such as love for one’s country or fear of science, and short-run triggers that tap into the background emotions. This is the key to a moral shock.

Emotions also come in combinations. Anger tinged with shame differs from anger tinged with indignation, with different implications for action. A combination of a negative and a positive emotion operates as a kind of moral battery driving action forward. Hope for change combined with outrage over an existing condition, or efforts to transform shame into pride, are examples. We also have emotions about our emotions, especially when we are ashamed of having felt a certain way that we consider inappropriate (Elster, 1999b).

Emotions are a core part of action and decisions, which we analysts ignore at our peril. Actions, whether consciously made as choices or not, come with long lists of risks, costs, and potential benefits. We need to include the emotional risks, costs, and benefits, since these guide actions and choices. These were excluded from rationalistic traditions as too hard to reckon with, but surely they guide decisions. If we are to understand the actions undertaken, we need to understand the emotions that guide, accompany, and result from them. If political actors care about them, analysts must too.

To a surprising degree, the analysis of emotions remains – like many emotions – women’s work. Just as figures like Flam, Taylor, and Kleinman helped start the study of emotions in movements, so women like Whittier, Gould, and Summers-Effler are continuing it. Sensitivity to emotions, once forced on women as part of their oppression, has proven a useful analytic skill in understanding social action quite generally (Archer, 2002; Nussbaum, 2001). Empathy for those we study is not the endpoint of research, but a necessary starting point.

Emotions, freed from the pejorative overtones of the past, promise to advance our comprehension of agents and their motivation. A number of recent overviews of social movements, in the United States and abroad, have pointed to emotions as a key ingredient in any theoretical advancement (e.g. Cefaï, 2007; Jasper, 2007; Jaoul and Blom, 2009). They promise a theory of action to balance the theories of structure that dominated social-movement theory and research until recently. Just as the interpretive turn in social science has allowed us to re-envision the mechanisms behind earlier concepts (Jasper, 2007), so an emotional vision is helping us find hidden causal mechanisms beneath many of the concepts we have taken for granted for so long.

References


Jaoul, Nicolas, and Amélie Blom, eds. 2009. Outrage Communities: The Politicisation of Emotions in South Asia, special issue of SAMAJ.


