The attached is the theory chapter (Chapter II) to my new book project, in which I seek to assess the relationship between pro-democracy social movement organizations and the state after democratic breakthrough. In the chapter that follows this one, I provide a broad methodological overview, including case selection, data collection and method of analysis. Next, I set the stage for the second part of the book through a discussion of democracy promotion, paying particular attention to the sorts of organizations involved in the pro-democracy social movements in each of the cases studied here (Poland, South Africa and Georgia).

The second part of this book begins with three country chapters (V-VII) in which I test the arguments posed here, first in each individual case and then across cases. My empirical evidence is based on local and international media analyses, and nearly 150 interviews conducted (in Polish, Russian and English) primarily with current and former leaders of pro-democracy organizations. My first country study, Poland, focuses on the fate of Solidarity, the umbrella union movement-turned social movement that pushed the first communist domino down. With the first semi-free elections in 1989, labor and intelligentsia activists entered into power, leaving those organizations they had founded and invested years in. In this chapter I explore the relationship between those anchor organizations and their new state partner.

Within five years after communism began to crumble, nonviolent movements led to democratization in other parts of the world. In Chapter VI, South Africa, the violent apartheid state fell to popular pressures led by an umbrella movement that, similarly to Solidarity, encompassed a range of societal actors. These included formal labor unions, but also local grassroots organizations (known as Civics) and a variety of smaller professional organizations. As in Poland, South Africa’s nongovernmental organization leaders abandoned their apartheid-era roles en masse to participate in the new African National Congress-led government. In this chapter I explore how these various organizations were advantaged or disadvantaged as a result of this reshuffling.

Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2004), the first of three recent ‘color revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space, seemed to many a renewal of democratization processes that began initially in the late 1980s. Unlike in the previous cases, in Georgia the process of mobilization was primarily facilitated by opposition political elites and a number of professional nongovernmental organizations – without the participation of a continuous mass-based movement. As in the previous two cases, democratic breakthrough in Georgia resulted in a large-scale exodus from the nongovernmental sector to the state. In Chapter VII, as in chapters V and VI, I analyze the dynamic affecting relations between state actors and the civil society sector that helped empower them.

In the final two chapters, I conclude with a comparative analysis of the three case studies and discussion of the methodological and practical implications of this study’s findings. I begin with a survey of results from each of my case studies, exploring patterns and divergences, and offering evidence from other states that might provide evidence for or against lessons learned. Finally, I conclude with the methodological lessons and policy implications resulting from this study.
Outstanding Questions

Apart from a general critique, I have a handful of questions that I am hoping this workshop might be able to help me with. Here are some of the most pressing ones:

(1) Literature: Anything big missing? I am new to this area, my previous work being focused especially on human rights and transitional justice. May well have missed things.

(2) Argument 4: The ‘strategic argument’ label reflects a lack of spring/summer creativity. Ideas for a more relevant, informative name?

(3) Methods: Based largely on elite interviews. For identity and personal network arguments, as per theories discussed, I assume these identities and networks should exist. With respect to networks, for example, this is not a network analysis – rather, it is a positional approach, in which I identify key players by the positions they once occupied and/or occupy. Fair? Expect criticism?

(4) Methods: I carried out a media analysis but have largely used it as background (to identify key actors and trends in the state – non-state relations, as well as to inform my questions). My country chapters are based almost exclusively on actor perceptions. This is essentially how I define relationship trajectories and influence – based on actor perceptions. Thoughts?

Chapter II

From Mobilization to Victory: Democratization and the Fate of Social Movement Organizations

In the introduction, I briefly laid out a series of arguments designed to predict how pro-democracy social movement activists in and out of the democratizing state apparatus might co-exist. In this chapter, I explain in more detail these arguments. I begin with an overview of social movement mobilization, highlighting the roles of identity, social networks and political opportunities. Next, I expand on how, given these traits, social movement activists should relate once the pro-democracy movement has achieved its aims and certain members move to the state sector. I then provide a synthesis, “strategic” argument, based on a blend of these three approaches together with an institutionalist rationale. This argument, in a nutshell, acknowledges the important role of previously formed identities and networks, which should create potential new opportunities (access) for movement actors in the new state. The movement from
potential to real opportunities depends on the degree to which actors’ new, institutionally structured preferences conflict. Where the level or salience of these conflicts is relatively low, identities and networks should create access; where it is high, relations should be especially poor.

It is important to emphasize that this chapter does not refute dominant theories related to the phenomena explored here (theories which, to the best of my knowledge, are few and far between). Neither does this chapter include detailed hypotheses. Instead, I use this chapter to develop theoretical arguments, and the next (methodological) chapter to formulate concrete hypotheses. These hypotheses will be tested in subsequent case-based chapters.

Social Movement Mobilization: Identity Formation, Personal Networks and Political Opportunity

In order to understand the place of social movement organizations after their victory, it is helpful to know who participates in these movements and how they are transformed by the process. Three critical aspects of social movement participation include the role of identity and personal networks shared by activists, as well as the political opportunities open to them. Despite the fact that emotions have been largely neglected in the social movement literature (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 22; Gould 2004, 161), partly a backlash to the derogatory use of emotions in the 1960s literature as well as the subsequent downplaying of emotions by activists trying to project the appearance of to movements (Goodwin et al. 2001, 2, 15), the first two phenomena are highly emotive. Since there is a very personal side to state-non-state relations, as will be demonstrated throughout this book, I begin this chapter with an overview of the recent work concerning the strong emotions that accompany the rise and decline of social movements (Eyerman 2005, 50; Goodwin and Jasper 2006; Jasper 1998, 419).

Social movements are, in many ways, rooted in emotion. Feelings of injustice and anger can motivate participation and subsequently encourage identification with the organization and its members (Goodwin and Jasper 2006, 620; Jasper 1998, 409-13). Goodwin et al. describe affective emotions towards fellow activists as powerful “commitments or investments” that structure one’s “orientation toward the world.” (Goodwin et al. 2004, 418) These emotions are responsible for strengthening personal networks, which grow through everyday interactions and collaboration (Goodwin 1997, 55). Reciprocal emotions (between oneself and others in group) and shared emotions (common feelings about people, situations and institutions outside of the group) are mutually reinforcing, promoting powerful feelings of solidarity and identification with the movement (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 43; Andrews 1991, 29; Jasper 1998, 417-8; Klatch 2000; McAdam 1988, 200; McAdam and Paulson 1993). Well-developed organizational cultures promote these emotional personal ties that can intensify commitment to the cause (Taylor 1989, 769).
There are two important, distinguishable aspects of these emotional bonds: personal and interpersonal. Here, I argue that the former involves identity strengthening and/or adaptation, while the latter represents fundamental changes to one’s social network(s). This follows from the (somewhat adapted) Freudian notion, discussed by Goodwin, of a “double type” of libidinal tie, where members internalize “group ideal” (or identity), as well as identify with each other (the network) (Goodwin 1997, 55).

Identity, defined as “sameness in all that constitutes the objective reality of a thing,” (Merian-Webster 2010) is an emotional attachment based on one’s feelings towards a set of principles or persons. In the social movement context, collective identities emerge from “an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution.” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 285)

Collective identities are based on internal commonalities, based on similar norms and values (Lofland 2008, 225), as well as differentiation with external groups (Whittier 2002, 302). The transformative experience of being involved in a movement (and especially a democratic movement), where activists are exposed to new political realities and collectively challenge existing societal rules and boundaries, can create or strengthen these group identities (Cohen 1985, 694; Evans and Boyte 1992, 188).

A common identity, which can raise the cost of free-riding and stimulate a chain of active member participation (Klandermans 2004, 368), is crucial for a social movement’s success (Mizruchi 1990, 22). This identity may be pre-existing, meaning that groups of individuals enter into an organization thanks to similar identities (McAdam and Paulson 1993, 659). The identity quickly coalesces around the movement organization’s common goals and values (Mische 2001, 147), which give individuals a sense of purpose (Andrews 1991, 154), and is gradually strengthened by various group activities, traditions and patterns of behavior particular to the social movement (Goodwin 1997, 55; Lofland 2008, 241; Taylor 1989, 771). Institutions that develop around or within these activist networks reinforce further transform group understandings, as well as solidify new belief systems (Evans and Boyte 1992, 192; Polletta and Jasper 2001, 288). Through a variety of mechanisms, members are socialized (voluntarily) or pressured (involuntarily) into accepting group norms (Mizruchi 1990, 22). This “social absorption” is facilitated by frequent interpersonal contacts that occur in an organization (Eulau and Siegel 1981, 501). Gradually, individual or apolitical identities are replaced with a group identity that serves as a vehicle for collective action (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 37).

While identities are primarily internally generated, they may also be reinforced by external factors, especially state repression towards the group. Confrontation by the opponent (which, in the case of pro-democracy organizations, is the repressive ruling regime) actually reinforce the sense of unity and “intense subcultural solidarity.” (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 30; Levite and Tarrow 1983, 298 (quote); Whittier 2002, 291) Allegiance can be developed over months or years of repression, as like-minded individuals seek within social movements the “free space” to voice their opposition
against the status quo (Couto 1993). It is in this oppositional space that belief systems become institutionalized (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 288). Social movement scholars have found that over time participants can become overwhelmingly oriented towards identities that have formed in social movements (Andrews 1991, 158), their individual identities shaped by “islands of meaning” the movement provides (Passy 2003, 29). As Aminzade and McAdam note, the collective identity becomes “an integral part of the individual's life and self-identity,” raising the stakes of rejection and ostracism from the group, and thus facilitating further collective action (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 38 (quote); Polletta and Jasper 2001, 285).

Collective action can be based solely on shared frames or world understandings (Barker et al. 2001, 5), but the social movement literature strongly suggests that personal networks are another critical determinant of participation (Snow et al. 1997, 130). After all, individual activists do not fear ostracism from an identity, but from a group of colleagues that espouses that identity. Studies have found that activists may come to participate in movements even despite a diversity of prior beliefs, motivated especially by personal ties in (informal) pre-existing social networks (Barker et al. 2001, 13; Munson 2008, 195). Identity and social networks can be mutually reinforcing, but networks can eventually acquire even greater meaning. The act of bonding described in the identity section can be so strong that protest actions are transformed from a means to an end, to a goal in themselves (Goodwin et al. 2001, 18; Melucci et al. 1989, 60). It is most clear at this stage that activists’ motivations for participation have moved from their affinity to movement ideals to their affective ties for fellow movement colleagues (Goodwin et al. 2001, 8).

For network analysts, human behavior is a function of “networks of interpersonal relationships” (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 14) that are independently a source of value (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 15). Social movements are rooted in personal networks that facilitate collective action through the notion of “mutual attraction” (Eulau and Siegel 1981, 501). Frequently ties are generational in nature, formed around particular life experiences (Goldstone and McAdam 2001, 195). By recruiting through pre-existing social networks (friends, colleagues, kin, etc.), organizations spur intra-organizational loyalty and obligation (Chong 1991, 35; Jenkins 1983, 530; Polletta and Jasper 2001, 289-90). Constant linkages between activists’ various life spheres (e.g., family, work), themselves shaped by the movement, can further strengthen commitment (Passy and Giugni 2000, 125). As Gould summarizes from his fascinating account of mobilization in the Paris Commune of 1871, “mobilization does not just depend on social ties; it also creates them.” (Gould 1991, 719).

Gould’s historical study of inter-neighborhood recruitment into insurgent units highlights how overlapping memberships can strengthen a movement by providing a forum where existing organizations can interact (Gould 1991, 726). This is particularly pertinent for leaders of social movement organizations who bring into one group implicit
and explicit identities reflected in other groups to which they also belong (Mische 2001, 141). But Gould’s study also demonstrates how participants, in this case initially angered at inter-neighborhood recruitment, which they felt compromised the intra-neighborhood solidarity that existed (Gould 1991, 719), can quickly become committed to other activists despite a lack of pre-existing ties (Easter 1996, 28). This may result from a voluntary process (after all, participation may emerge from the rational desire by individuals to gain benefits available from the collective (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 290)), or an involuntary one, where recruits are subject to intra-organizational social pressures to conform to group norms (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 40; Klatch 2004, 495; Mizruchi 1990, 22; Polletta and Jasper 2001, 290). Movements have historically relied on “gossip, rumor, ridicule, censorship, and ostracism” to enforce group boundaries (Hunt and Benford 2004, 443), demonstrating the importance that social networks play in maintaining participation (Lofland 2008, 225). These social and psychological incentives may be particularly powerful at the local organization level, where regular interaction is the norm (Chong 1991, 35-7).

There are numerous historical illustrations of the power of personal networks. For example, cohorts and network ties were critical in the 1964 Freedom Summer Project of 1,000 mostly white northern college students who went to Mississippi to teach and help register black voters (Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Goldstone and McAdam 2001, 214). Further east, the Solidarity movement’s success in Poland was made possible thanks to decades of sporadic oppositional activity that left the country with a “dense social network of groups and organizations” upon which leaders could build a unified anti-communist block (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 116). Personal networks similarly facilitated the activities of Russia’s Bolshevik revolutionaries, who functioned in a hostile environment where “survival dictated the observance of certain codes of behavior.” (Easter 1996, 560)

While identities and networks are embedded in emotion, a third important determinant of social movement success is rooted in political opportunity. Political opportunity or political process arguments assume that collective action is a function of available opportunities that are themselves a result of structurally shaped interactions between the political actors and institutions, and the social movement (Koopmans 2004, 63; Tarrow 1988, 422). Political opportunity structures are made up of “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization.” (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002, 24; Jenkins 1983; Kitschelt 1986, 58 (quote)) These structures, including availability of resources, access to political institutions and parties (e.g., regime openness) and the presence of other social movements, can facilitate or hinder social movement activity (Giugni 1998, 381; Kitschelt 1986, 62; Van Dyke 2003, 226). Successful social movement organizations adapt to take advantage of political openings as they arise (Whittier 1997, 760). Organizational shape (e.g., large, grassroots organizations or professional, bureaucratic
ones), which is in part dependent on leadership tactics and identity (Whittier 2002, 296), can be a function of these political opportunity structures (Diani 2006, 140).

The American civil rights movement, which sprouted in the 1950s in local southern organizations such as Black churches and universities (Minkoff 1997, 783), is one (positive) illustration of the political opportunity argument. Political opportunity arguments are complex, however. The same processes that can revitalize one stalled movement can lead to the marginalization of another, where activists are unable to adapt adequately (Kamenitsa 1998, 313-4). For example, high levels of repression can lead to a process of demobilization in one context (Remmer 1980, 293) and facilitate collective action in another (Loveman 1998, 485). And just as social movements can paradoxically wither in the most vibrant and pluralistic states, they can also thrive at the first signs of liberalization. For instance, liberalization in Chile and Spain led to the hasty decline of social movements in those countries (Hipsher 1996, 274). Meanwhile, the Helsinki accords, which in principle bound communist leaders to respect human rights largely ignored in those countries, led to increased domestic demands and changes that some argue played a key part in communism’s downfall (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 197; Foweraker and Landman 1997, 228; Tarrow 1991, 16).

For political opportunity proponents, political context is key to understanding how social movements fight, and win, their battles (Giugni 1998, 380). As is evident from the above examples, political opportunities do not have a uniform influence on collective action, and critics have argued that while political opportunity may represent one important piece of the puzzle, it is too rigid (Goodwin et al. 1999, 51). Explanations of collective action must also integrate other features, such as leadership motivations, the sense of identity created by movements, activists’ emotional investments, values, and the ability of activists to use frames to create new opportunities (Goodwin and Jasper 2006, 616; Gould 2004, 161; Kenney 2005, 146, 51, 56; Koopmans 2004, 65; Oliver and Johnston 2005, 185, 8). As one scholar summarized this critique, “people are much more than rational actors.” (Gould 2004, 161)

*Emerging from Social Movements: Influence of Identities, Networks and Opportunities following Democratic Breakthrough*

Arguments for whether and how collective action takes place can also help us understand the long-term effects of these organizations. In this section, I attempt to transform the identity, social network and political opportunity theories into arguments that shed light on the role of pro-democracy social movements after their battle has been won and portions of their leadership have been absorbed into the new state and political structures. I begin this section by explaining the role of civil society actors in the democratization process and the dilemma of social movement-state merging in the aftermath of democratic breakthrough. Next, I elaborate on the role of identities, networks and political opportunities in the post-breakthrough period, and assess the
strength of each of these arguments. Finally, I propose a strategic argument that synthesizes various aspects of the former three arguments with additional factors.

**Social Movements and Democratization**

Upon achieving democratic breakthrough, activists grappling with difficult questions concerning the future role of the movement and their own fate often engage in a process of demobilization. Some leaders may find it their interest, whether out of political strategy or for tangible and intangible rewards, to maintain their organizations despite apparent victory (Oberschall 1973, 175). But many other high-level activists move to state and political leadership positions, often delegated by the political elites they helped bring to power. Just as lucrative NGOs can create a brain drain from the impoverished public sector in the pre-democracy period (Adamson 2002, 194-5), after democracy is won the reverse process can occur.

There are a variety of reasons newly empowered leaders from Asia and Latin America, to Africa and Central Europe have reached into social movements to staff new state and political positions (Bell and Keenan 2004, 347; Clarke 1998, 188; Gershman 2004, 31; Grugel 2000, 97; Loveman 1995, 131). Fundamental to this process is the understanding that social movements are inherently political animals, struggling to bring excluded groups and disregarded issues into the political sphere (Foweraker 1995, 64).

Political society, defined as the arena in which “various societal interests and claims are aggregated and translated into generalized policy recommendations,” (Ekiert and Kubik 1999, 82) can be formally distinct from civil society, or that “social space or sphere” between family and the state in which social groups mobilize action against an oppressive state (Ekiert and Kubik 1999, 83-4). But in many ways they overlap, in everything from goals to personnel (Goldstone 2003, 8; 2004, 339; Mische 2008, 343).

Often, for example, non-governmental organizations serve as a holding pen for excluded political elites waiting for opportunities to take up state positions (Bratton 1995). In other cases, social movement activists directly create (Goldstone 2003, 3, 5) or engage in alliances with political parties, sometimes viewed as necessary for gaining access to the state (Chalmers et al. 1997, 547). Under these circumstances, the movement can actually help shape political parties from within (Foweraker 1995, 88; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, 227) or field particular candidates under a party’s umbrella (Goldstone 2003, 3). Politicization of social movement organizations can be so thorough that activists decide to transform their entire body into a political party (Avritzer 2009, 44; Bartlett 2000, 441-6; Gershman 2004, 31; Maguire 1995, 201).

The influence of non-state actors in the state may partly be a natural result of the state’s gradual expansion into various aspects of society (Maman 1997, 268), but it can also be a function of earlier formed relationships. Even for those organizations in which activists consider themselves separate from the formal political stage, political elites open up state positions for their former comrades. Sometimes these positions represent a
simple form of payback, as political leaders brought to power remember to share the fruits of their conquest with those who helped make it possible (Bartlett 2000, 446; Loveman 1995, 138-9; see also Patterson 1998, 433). In other cases, political elites install organization leaders to enhance international legitimacy (Clarke 1998, 188) or the representativeness of their government (Segarra 1997, 490). More often, these activists possess leadership and advocacy skills, organizational capabilities and (in some cases) strong constituent relations that the new political leaders need (Bell and Keenan 2004, 347; Bratton 1995, 61-2; Diamond 1999, 246; Gershman 2004, 31). From this perspective, a positive but “unplanned byproduct” of social activism is a new generation of political leaders (Diamond 1992, 11). As one scholar of Latin American social movements commented, “the partial cooptation or ‘institutionalization’ of social movements may be a proper price to pay for the emergence of agile political actors that can negotiate with incumbent regimes.” (Foweraker 1995, 103)

While activists in state positions occasionally continue their activism from within their new institutional homes (Banaszak 2009, 2), the more typical process of abandonment has prompted concern from those who believe civil society is weakened as a result (Dryzek 1996, 485; Foley 1996, 87; Gershman 2004, 31; Grugel 2000, 97; Gyimah-Boadi 1996, 125; Kopecky and Mudde 2003, 1). Just as pro-democracy social movement organizations can play an important role in achieving democratic breakthrough, they can also contribute to democratic consolidation by directly checking and monitoring the state, on the one hand, and stimulating political debate, organizing political participation and fostering public-spiritedness, on the other (Diamond 1999, 242-3; Dryzek 1996, 481; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002, 37; Putnam et al. 1993, 89-90; Zakaria 2003). While there are cases of successful democratic consolidation despite the lack of an active civil society (Encarnacion 2001, 55), civil society advocates argue that ‘third wave’ democracies that lack a strong civil society, despite having adopted democratic institutions, are weakened by this void (Rose and Shin 2001, 332).¹ As one scholar pointed out in the case of post-1989 Eastern Europe, “This migration left behind little or nothing in terms of oppositional public spheres. The gain was a liberal democratic state; the loss was a discursive democratic vitality.” (Dryzek 1996, 485)

Equally worrying for some has been the threat that the nongovernmental sphere becomes co-opted under the new conditions - not merely emptied, but turned into an instrument to reinforce, rather than check, state power. Pro-democracy organizations can become tools for political parties that see them as “new avenues and platforms” for electoral gains (Hachhethu 2007, 8) or as useful for unpopular parties to “establish

networks of influence on political and social reform processes.” (Shin 2003, 702) NGOs functioning after democratization must draw up a new relationship with the state and political sphere that allows them to constructively cooperate without the risk of being co-opted (Bell and Keenan 2004, 335). Inclusion, from this perspective, is based on the best interest of the includer rather than the one being included (Amenta and Caren 2004, 473).

The actual delegation of public functions to organization members, though not a new phenomenon (Pizzorno 1981, 257), can be risky. Incorporation of organizations, like incorporation of political opponents (Hirschman 1963), can be used as an effective means of disarming potential threats, and cooptation is a frequent result (Miszlivetz and Jensen 1998; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Co-optation can be overt, where activists are given lucrative positions and in return tamper down their organization’s activities (Burton-Rose 1998, 9), or de facto, when new political elites bring organization leaders into their government but give them little actual power apart from participation in debates (Dryzek 1996). In the best of cases, critics warn, governmental concessions might be limited to areas where the ruling regime has no particular conflict (Eaton 2003, 482).

Even in advanced democracies, where nongovernmental activists have greater resources than in democratizing states, thus allowing them to back out of their state positions when they are no longer perceived as beneficial (Downes 2000), the outcome can be disappointing. As the former head of one environmental group, co-opted under the Clinton administration, recalled, “What started out like a love affair turned out to be date rape.” (Dryzek 1996, 480)

Yet there is at least some reason to be optimistic that incorporation of pro-democracy organization leaders will have more beneficial outcomes. After all, in newly democratizing states the very political elites who guide the new state are often a product of the social movements that brought them to power. It is they and their activist colleagues, therefore, who are in charge in the new order. Under these circumstances, at least according to the collective identity, social network and (somewhat less so) political opportunity arguments, we should expect to find a strong and positive relationship between activists now in the state and their colleagues back in the organizations.

Collective Identity, Social Networks and Political Opportunities

Just as collective identity has proven critical for keeping movements alive in the long term, allowing activists to suddenly and effectively reactivate apparently idle organizations (Diani 2006, 144), existing evidence suggests that identities formed during the movement’s peak should continue to affect individuals’ decisions long after the social movement has achieved its goals (Klatch 2000, 508). Thus, even after demobilization, which occurs when opposition members find themselves sufficiently represented through other channels (such as the conventional political arena), “the core collective identity continues to shape an individual's sense of self.” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 292,6 (quote))
Several studies have highlighted the long-term impact of collective identities born from social movements, which can increase the political potential of a movement that has apparently gone through demobilization (Foweraker 1995, 112). Whittier, in her analysis of the American feminist movement, refers to the post-movement “political generation,” those activists who remain committed to the cause they collectively fought for long after the movement has been transformed. These activists, according to Whittier, remain politicized in the long term precisely thanks to the collective identity established during the period of movement participation (Whittier 2004, 541). Scholars of other social movements, including that of the political left, have found the same phenomenon, noting that “during their long, accumulated years of engagement, they have come to define themselves through their activism.” (Andrews 1991, 164) Similarly, for America’s civil rights freedom fighters, the years after the struggle demanded accommodation but, according to McAdam, “their first allegiance still seems to have been to the conceptions of politics and self formed in Mississippi.” (McAdam 1988, 200)

Symptoms of this can be seen through political sympathies and occupational trajectories (Giugni 2004, 494; Hunt and Benford 2004, 449; Klatch 2000, 508-12), as well as through former activists’ greater inclination (compared to nonveterans) toward participation in subsequent social movements (McAdam 1988, 216; Whittier 2004, 541). Over time, former activists may struggle to reconcile the ideological values molded by the movement with the constraints imposed by new structures and identities shaped by occupation and family development (Klatch 2000, 507). But feelings of obligation developed during the period of struggle, strengthened by friendship circles discussed below, helps maintain movement-based identifications (Andrews 1991, 157-8; Easter 1996, 28). As Giugni points out, there is a “powerful and enduring impact of participation in movement activities on the biographies of participants.” (Giugni 2004, 494) If, as Chong suggested, “the well-trained conscience is the best policeman,” (Chong 1991, 69) then identity should play an important role in keeping one-time activists in line with the mandate of the organization.

Unlike identity, which focuses on attachment to the ideas and institutions, social networks encompass the web of personal ties that help congeal movement identities but also live their own lives. Years of struggle in a social movement can create powerful personal networks characterized by “a sense of belonging and strong friendships” (Andrews 1991, 157). Though social circles may be non-hierarchical, social movements are frequently differentiated between core mobilizers and followers. Leaders of social movements are especially devoted to realizing the movement’s goals and serve as “the architects of organization, ideology, and mobilization for the movement.” (Oberschall 1973, 146) Persons within these networks become the guardians of established group norms and may use mechanisms described above to pressure their (former) members into conformity over the long term.
While scholars exploring policy networks focus little attention on the pre-existing, personal relationships that may strengthen elite bonds (Howlett 2002; Maman 1997), there is a history of scholarship that has sought to identify the role of broad social ties on decision making processes (Kadushin 1968, 692; Knoke 1994, 277). Previous studies have identified the tendency for political and administrative elites to be recruited from similar backgrounds, thereby creating inter-personal bonds (Heinz et al. 1990, 356; Higley et al. 1991, 43; Putnam 1976, 22, 4, 8). Some scholars focus on the impersonal aspects of networks, where members of a given elite circle know only that portion of the circle’s members with whom they regularly interact, while the circle encompasses a far wider group of individuals linked through common interests, but with little or no formalization (e.g., clear leadership and neatly defined group goals) (Higley et al. 1991, 37; Kadushin 1968, 692). Such “integrative circles” can emerge from a clearly defined social membership (e.g., ethnic or occupational group), but also from common experience (e.g., struggle) (Kadushin 1968, 692). This has prompted scholars to note that elites cognizant of circle members with whom they have regular contact “are only dimly aware of the circle's wider membership.” (Higley et al. 1991, 37)

There is at least some evidence that the influence of those (at least recognized) in one’s circle can be profound. “External affective ties” between actors in separate organizations can prompt intra-organizational cooperation and unilateral assistance in times of need (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 19). In this game of peer pressure, people “perceive friendship networks in organizations as small worlds” (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 25) and place a priority on keeping them intact. The relatively low transaction costs involved in reaching key actors within one’s network also serve to heighten the network’s influence. As Maman found in the Israeli case, communication networks can make network ties of the utmost importance (Maman 1997, 280). Studies have found social movement activist groups maintain these ties over time (Mische 2008, 57). In post-revolutionary Russia, for example, activist networks remained quite clear and instrumental in subsequent political change – from the institutionalization of Bolshevik power (Easter 1996, 562) to its toppling (Goldstone and McAdam 2001, 203-4).

Political opportunity or political process proponents are more likely to highlight the role of new structures, organizations and contexts than those of collective identities and personal bonds in post-breakthrough relations. Such political opportunity structures critical to social movements, according to Tilly, include (Tilly 2006, 187):

(a) the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime
(b) the openness of the regime to new actors
(c) the instability of current political alignments
(d) the availability of influential allies or supporters
(e) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim-making
From a political opportunity perspective, the influence of movement organizations on the new state is not solely dependent on the identities and affiliations of ex-members, but also on how the new organizational leaderships shape their post-breakthrough units. While there is only a scant literature concerning demobilization, the commonplace assumption that social movements simply disappear following victory appears mistaken. Rather, social movement organizations, whose participants have a stake in their continuity, whether or not the original goals can be sustained (Zald and Ash 1966, 327), can persist for years and years.

Given the aforementioned group identity and social network arguments, there are unique political opportunities that are specific to organizations whose leaderships move to the newly freed political space (Banaszak 2009, 3). From a structural perspective, social movements serve as important sources of what Maman refers to as “boundary penetration relations,” inter-elite networks characterized by an overlap of leadership roles in state and non-state entities (Maman 1997, 268). Such structural ties can increase direct and indirect communication opportunities to influence policy (Knoke 1994, 275). Those who adhere to established or evolving rules are given access to mainstream institutions where political exchange takes place (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 21). At the state level, incorporation can involve the creation of structures through which organizations can influence the state, including formal representation in influential advisory institutions or bargaining forums, where they may attain participatory status and/or voting rights (Chalmers et al. 1997, 572; Chong 1991, 32; Loveman 1995, 138-9; Melucci et al. 1989, 79; Pizzorno 1981, 257; Racelis 2000; Silliman and Noble 1998). Organization leaders can also use ties to position themselves to gain contracts from the state to deliver particular fee-based services (Lewis 1990, 92; Rychard 1998, 43; Segarra 1997, 492; Vellinga 2004, 43; Wiarda 2004).

Incorporation can also take place less formally, as social movement organizations may use their ties, common goals or organizational assets (e.g., electoral mobilization) to attend meetings with ministers (Segarra 1997, 491) or win the support of political parties, whether via ad hoc alliances with a given party or permeation of a party with their own members (Goldstone 2003, 4; Hanagan 1998, 4-6; Van Dyke 2003, 226, 31). Movements struggling to maintain their broad coalition identity may create parties of their own (Glenn 2003, 147, 9). Failure to adapt, due to fragmentation, poor performance or inability to find political allies, can mean demobilization for these organizations (Foweraker 1995, 104, 7-8; Kamenitsa 1998, 313-4; Pfaff 1996, 111; Ryan 1999, 40). But adaptation can yield significant influence.

While participation in this newly created political space does not necessarily mean abandoning opposition or all forms of contentious action (Goldstone 2003, 4; Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 23), the expectation of organization moderation can lead to charges of cooptation (Foweraker and Landman 1997, 232; Kubicek 2000, 25; Mische 2008, 56; Robertson 2004, 257). Under conditions of cooptation, incorporated
challengers are forced to alter their demands and tactics so that these “can be pursued without disrupting the normal practice of politics.” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 21) Cooptation can result from organizational dependence on state financing (Carothers 2004, 104), but it can also arise as organizations seek to balance their goals with the perceived political feasibilities. On the opposite end of the spectrum, those organizations that refuse to moderate, choosing instead to reject established or evolving rules, can be excluded from positions of influence in the new system (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 21). Those idealists who remain within civil society are likely to become frustrated as political leaders move ahead on their own, without the once necessary backing of their civil society supporters (Bratton 1995, 62).

Assessing the Arguments

In many ways these arguments overlap, particularly with respect to group identity and social networks. As Hunt and Benford explain, social movements change participants, “not only the way they see themselves, but also the way they view the world, the occupations they pursue, their consumption patterns, and the friends they make.” (Hunt and Benford 2004, 449) Group cohesion can be defined subjectively as a function of members’ perceived identification with a particular group and “their feeling that their individual interests are bound up with the interests of the group.” (Mizruchi 1990, 21). This is not accidental. According to the mutual attraction hypothesis, people naturally seek out similar colleagues resulting in a relatively homogenous social group (Eulau and Siegel 1981, 501). The fact that membership recruitment often occurs on the back of other pre-existing social networks (friends, colleagues, kin, etc.) reinforces feelings of loyalty and obligation (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 289-90). In short, organizations are themselves social networks in which there are strong pressures for participants to agree “with their personal friends concerning important values and ideas.” (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 30)

Just as participation in collective action can encourage feelings of common identity, it also creates lasting (positive) memories and enhances group solidarity, strengthening the network ties between individual members (Della Porta and Caiani 2009, 159-60). Elites incorporate into their own conscience the views, expectations and values of others within this network (Mills 1999, 283), which is created through commitment to particular ideas, but also to personal relationships (Chalmers et al. 1997, 566). This overlap of identity and social networks might fit into the rubric of solidarity, defined by Hunt and Bedford as “the ability of actors to recognize others, and to be recognized, as belonging to the same social unit” (Hunt and Benford 2004, 439) and based on “feelings of devotion and enthusiasm for a group that is shared by its members.” (Hunt and Benford 2004, 439).

One critical aspect of each of these arguments, though often left implicit, is the effect of movement duration and regime repression and exclusion on group cohesion
(Andrews 1991, 157; Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 30; Levite and Tarrow 1983, 298; Whittier 2002, 291). Both personal and interpersonal ties should be strengthened the longer and harder the fight, as movement members are driven into defensive positions in the face of an omnipresent enemy. Just as state repression prompts aggressive collective action in the eyes of (potential) activists (Kitschelt 1986, 62)(Opp and Roehl 1990, 521; Useem 1998, 218; White 1989, 1289, 91), it can also strengthen solidarity and group cohesion (Khawaja 1993, 66).

The political opportunity argument also in some ways complements these two approaches. The degree to (and direction in) which organizations – and their former leaders – change in the new context could be broadly bounded by appropriateness as dictated by previously formed identities and networks. Moreover, the very identities and networks in place create critical opportunities for these organizations. As Maguire notes in the context of revolution, “mass mobilization keeps a movement alive, while political influence gives it some relevance.” (Maguire 1995, 199) Personal and ideological bonds that bridge state and non-state actors and thereby create access to the state should be of enormous benefit according to the political opportunity perspective.

Apart from moderation, important factor that may affect an organization’s new opportunity structure is its degree of representation, a critique frequently targeted at nongovernmental organizations. Critics maintain that these organizations share a limited scope of representation that generally does not exceed the realization of specific, established goals (Melucci et al. 1989, 78-9), and that “success in calling people to the street,” during the struggle for democracy, “does not imply a strong link between these organizations and the grassroots.” (Aiyede 2003, 11) Defenders claim that these organizations do provide some degree of representation “by inserting their interpretation of popular needs, social problems, and methods of addressing those problems into traditionally circumscribed policy arenas.” (Segarra 1997, 494-5) These organizations mediate between the state and grassroots movements and, whether out of social commitment or greed, often pressure the state in the name of underrepresented populations, such as the urban and rural poor (Chalmers et al. 1997, 570). In any case, as another scholar has suggested, “no government rests on universal or unbiased political representation; every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others.” (Moravcsik 1997, 518)

Still, there are grounds to be skeptical of each of these arguments on its own. Perhaps the most obvious question concerns the strength and durability of collective identities in the face of competing collective or individual identities (Barker et al. 2001, 4). Mische, for example, notes that most members of social movements simultaneously belong to a range of other (often overlapping) collectivities, such as families, neighborhoods, schools/workplaces, ethnic groups, regions, etc. (Mische 2008, 38), which may rival or detract from the social movement organization-based identity. Political psychologists have suggested that any particular social identity is often at odds
with an individual’s other personal identities (Howard 2000, 369). Moreover, if identities are formed in part as result of institutions and repeated behavior or established traditions (Goodwin 1997, 55; Mizruchi 1990, 22; Taylor 1989, 771), then once individuals are removed from these structures such identities should be weakened.

This dilemma is exacerbated when post-breakthrough political context is taken into account. A common identity of “the people,” according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, “may, upon reflection or when faced with concrete policy choices, be fragmented by class, status, gender, religion, ethnicity, language, and generation, not to mention ideological belief and partisan allegiance.” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 55) When the ‘us versus them’ factor so key to the mobilization stage (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 43; Andrews 1991, 29) virtually disappears upon social movement success, identities and networks may go with it (Kamenitsa 1998, 322-4). Individuals embedded in an array of networks and individual relationships can be subject to conflicting pressures (Jasper 2006, 67; McAdam and Paulson 1993, 641), and one’s attempt to reconcile these pressures is likely to play out as a zero-sum game, resulting in the marginalization of one network to the benefit of another (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 19). At best, then, explanations based on social interaction appear to operate “probabilistically rather than deterministically,” (Huckfeldt et al. 1993, 367). Skeptics may conclude that personal networks and identities are preserved only insofar as they continue to pay dividends to both sides (Easter 1996, 575).

A second look at the emotional dimensions of social movements also suggests a more bleak vision of identity and network formation than that laid out above. There is some evidence that intense interpersonal relationships can actually serve to drain an individual’s finite source of commitment that would otherwise be directed toward the organization (Goodwin 1997, 55, 60) or, alternatively, can alienate some group members (those who shy away from such deep bonds) (Goodwin and Jasper 2006, 622). Emotions not only bind, but can destroy interpersonal ties and even entire movements, as “jealousies, hatreds, disappointments, and demonization foster schisms within movements.” (Klatch 2004, 489) Emotions, such as stress and burnout, may be to blame for membership turnover over time. Just as participants tend to join a social movement with strong emotions, they leave it with similarly strong – and perhaps negative – responses (Jasper 1998, 419).

Political opportunity arguments are also, in isolation, problematic (Goodwin et al. 1999, 51). Critics have questioned the assumption of rational actors and neglect of emotional influences on actors’ behavior, arguing that this hole may explain the inability of such theories to account for a number of movements that actually arise in the absence of new political opportunities (Gould 2004, 156-8; Kenney 2005, 146). Conversely, an apparent abundance of political opportunities does not always translate into influence, as Uhlin found with respect to the influence of civil society actors in several post-Soviet states (Uhlin 2005, 110, 27). As Koopmans commented, “opportunities alone can never
explain collective action, which at least also requires motivations, capacities to act, and a sense of collective identity.” (Koopmans 2004, 65)

Strategic Argument

It is clear that each of these approaches has both promise and limitations. The identity and social network arguments are excessively rigid, while political opportunity alternatives discount important aspects of human thought and lack true predictive power. But taken together, these arguments create the building blocks for a much more sound theory. In this section, I fit elements of these three approaches into an institutional framework, creating a fourth, strategic argument.

Identities and networks can, and arguably should, have a powerful impact on inter-group relations after democratic breakthrough. Not all organizations are capable of fostering the same level of personal commitment, but particularly in states where the struggle was extended and took place under highly repressive conditions, we should expect to find stronger identities and networks. Social activists (humans who have feelings and care about their ideals, relationships and status) are unlikely to easily abandon the ideas they fought for and the friends they fought with, especially when they fought very hard and for a very long time. From this perspective, non-state actors whose former leaders or other members enter into the state should expect to benefit from new access points in the public sphere.

The bridges that result from leadership transfers to the state are themselves significant new political opportunities. But, as the political process argument above cautions, a new political, social and economic environment alters more than just leadership. Organizations must adapt to new conditions, in the process adopting new shapes that will influence the way in which these bridges are manifested. Grassroots organizations may become professionalized, elite-run groups to make up for a demobilized citizenry, or elite-run groups may even take advantage of the opening political system to engage in more grassroots activism. Just as organizational characteristics matter for organizational leaders without connections to power holders, they also impact how those with such connections relate to their former colleagues. Humans are emotional; they care about their ideals and the opinions of their peers. But they are also rational, and it is clear that changed institutional contexts should create new opportunities and constraints for individuals on both the state and non-state sides of the dividing line.

Just as the social movement itself is shaped by political and institutional context (Foweraker 1995, 64), institutions help determine the possibilities for cooperation and confrontation after the struggle is over. Hall’s groundbreaking study defines institutions as “formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and the economy.” (Hall 1986, 19) According to Hall, institutions affect actors’ power as well as their
interests, a function of responsibilities and relationships with other actors and units (Hall 1986). The study of institutionalism is not uni-dimensional, however, with the most basic difference between various approaches (including historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism) based on the importance of context (Kato 1996, 556) and, more importantly, the nature of rationality and preference formation.

New institutionalists are split between those who take an agency-centered approach, in which institutions are viewed as constructs erected by goal-maximizing individuals, and a structural-centered approach, where institutions are seen as constraining bodies within which individuals are encased (Clark 1998, 245). In both instances, actors may be seen as rational. But while rational choice proponents look at institutions as constraints on self-interested actors, thereby treating preference formation as exogenous, for historical institutionalists these preferences are endogenous; political actors follow institutionally defined rules that become virtually taken for granted, meaning definitions of self-interest are a function of institutional location (Peters et al. 2005, 1280; Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 7-9). Put somewhat differently, March and Olsen argue for the dominance of the logic of appropriateness, where actions (or output) are based more on “roles, routines, rights, obligations, standard operating procedures and practices” (March and Olsen 1996, 249 (quote), 52) than on pure self-interest and goals, or the logic of consequences (March and Olsen 1984, 744). In other words, institutions define “the terms of rational exchange” (March and Olsen 1996, 250) and institutionalists incorporate structures into the “agent preferences and optimizing behavior” so dominant in rational choice (Schepsle 1989, 135).

Institutional configurations not only steer or constrain actors’ preferences, but they also shape the degree to which outside actors have influence on political and administrative elites (Hall 1986; Keohane and Nye 1974). According to the above arguments, social movement actors should expect to be advantaged thanks to their new connections, through former leaders, in state institutions. But through an institutionalist lens, political actors are “flexible, varied, malleable, culture-dependent and socially constructed,” (March and Olsen 1996, 249) reacting to political opportunities and context rather than remaining stubbornly bound to previous ideas and modes of operation. Robnett’s “relational approach,” in which changed political environments actually serve to alter internal collective identities (Robnett 2002, 267), suggests that as social movement leaders are transplanted into the state, their own identities mutate to sync with the “shared meanings and practices” (March and Olsen 1996, 249) fostered by their new institutional home. As March and Olsen note, “institutionalized identities create individuals,” and political elites act based on rules that are derived from these socially constructed identities (March and Olsen 1996, 249-51 (quote on 51)).

The transition to new, and transformation of old, institutions and organizations has a profound impact on individuals’ identities, networks and opportunities to pursue their goals. As both former and ongoing social movement organization leaders are subject
to new organizational missions, peers and operational realities, their one-time solidarity should become strained. In some ways, this strain seems almost unavoidable, with new power disparities causing a jolt in relations between current and former movement officials (Whittier 2002, 300). The depth of the resulting cleavage will be in part a function of how actors in state and non-state organizations adjust in ways that can moderate the conflict level.

To persist, social movement organizations must adapt to a changing internal and external environment. One of the fundamental changes a durable social movement organization must go through, if it has not already, involves institutionalization, defined by Meyer and Tarrow as “creation of a repeatable process that is essentially self-sustaining.” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 21) This process usually involves professionalization, where the organization begins to rely on paid leaders for full-time staffing, relegating broader membership to financing and more occasional or symbolic functions (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 16; Staggenborg 1997, 421). Formalization offers certain advantages, including greater likelihood of outside funding (Staggenborg 1997, 430), but it also pushes these organizations into a new strategic paradigm, characterized by routinized forms of collective action more akin to activities of a moderate interest group than of a stereotypical social movement organization (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002, 37; Gershman 2004, 30-1; Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 19, 21; Staggenborg 1997, 432; Zald and Ash 1966, 327). This strategic shift can be the overt sign that an organization has modified its goals (Whittier 1997, 760; Zald and Ash 1966, 328), or it can be the harbinger for deeper change. As Hanagan notes, “changing strategies entails forging new identities.” (Hanagan 1998, 7)

As incumbent social movement organization leaders struggle to redefine their organizations and themselves, past movement leaders searching for opportunities in the state apparatus also adopt a new self-understanding. Just as structures influence identities in the social movement organizations (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 288), they do the same in other types of organizations and institutions. According to classic bureaucratic arguments, state actors adopt the goals and strategies of their adopted institutional shell. Policy, according to this perspective, is a result not of individual leaders’ identities and outside pressure groups, but of “bargaining among individuals and groups within the government.” (Allison 1969, 710). Individuals' priorities are strictly defined by the institutions in which actors reside and on whose continued support they depend (Allison 1969, 709; Amenta and Caren 2004, 468).

Critics of the bureaucratic approach have articulated alternative ways in which institutions can influence actors’ goals and priorities. Institutions do not have to directly set a leader’s goals (which would ignore the important role of “pre-existing mind-sets” (Art 1973, 471)), but can instead indirectly transform their preferences and give them new perspectives (March and Olsen 1996, 250). By shaping the set of informal and even external contacts leaders must deal with to accomplish their everyday tasks, institutions
can affect policy output more subtly (Keohane and Nye 1974; Semmel 1976, 313), something akin to a positional strategy in social network terms (Emirbayev and Goodwin 1994, 1422). For example, while someone who heads the arms control division of the State Department may be unsympathetic to human rights issues, if she is transferred to the State Department’s Office for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, where her duties include hearing the perspectives of rights organizations, she can be expected to change her priorities significantly.

In part, this is a function of policy inputs, but it is also influenced by the factors described in the institutional approach above. Those responsible for governing face obvious limitations on their scope of action (new and broader constituent pressures, budgetary constraints, the task of balancing ideals with pragmatic considerations) and must move from demanding the ideal to contending with what goals and strategies are feasible and, from an institutional standpoint, acceptable. Just as movements must strategize to determine “how to balance their beliefs about what is possible with their views on what matters, what compromises are acceptable, and who they are (their collective identity),” (Whittier 2002, 299) the same is true – perhaps even more true – for former movement members located in a new political context.

Organizational changes or transfers can have ramifications on social networks, as well. As organizations adopt new strategies, identities and structures, not only do preferences of long-time actors change, but the sorts of individuals drawn to the organizations also shift. These changes in leadership over time result in what sociologists refer to as micro-cohorts, generations of leadership groups, each of which has its own substantive and stylistic differences with the preceding group (Mische 2008, 57; Whittier 1995, 57; 1997, 775). As the baton passes from initiators to founders, joiners to sustainers, newer organization leaders question the political sophistication of their former leaders (Whittier 1995, 67-8). At the same time, older core members, including those who have migrated to the state, can feel alienated from their long-time base organizations (Whittier 1995, 67-8). Relationships are further complicated by the dilemmas of multiple embeddedness discussed earlier; newcomers to the state are inducted into yet another group of peers with whom they must try to seek a balance (Jasper 2006, 67; Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 19; McAdam and Paulson 1993, 641). Frequently, these new institutional homes are a force difficult to counter. “Our goals shift because our group identifications change,” Jasper notes. “We come to feel solidarity with a different group, defecting from an old one.” (Jasper 2006, 66)

Despite all the causes to expect tensions between state actors and their old social movement colleagues, the strategic argument also holds open the possibility for new political opportunities. As Searing notes, “politicians are purposive actors who pursue their individual preferences or goals. They calculate and they compromise as they adapt to the situations.” (Searing 1991, 1241). Institutional identities and networks may trump earlier formed identities and networks, but they do not necessarily destroy them. If
identities and networks from the social movement days are durable, then we can expect that, at best, state actors will face conflicting pressures for action. These conflicts may be both personal, as former movement leaders struggle to reconcile the identities they espoused in their former organization with the missions of their current ones, and inter-personal, as they face demands from old and new networks to perform as expected.

I assume, then, that social movement actors brought into the state are sympathetic to the aims of their former movements and remain personally tied to at least some members of their former organization, providing those organizations a foot in the door to the restructuring state. This might initially be manifested in the handout of formal and informal state openings to organization representatives (see above), a policy option that is consensus-building by nature and creates an atmosphere of inclusion. But I also assume that, when push comes to shove, state leaders will pursue what their new institutional context dictates is appropriate and feasible. Moreover, since both sets of actors were once on the same side, I expect that they each expect loyalty from the other. Where strategies and goals change to reflect new and different circumstances, there is a high likelihood that these expectations will be unfulfilled. It is up to the social movement organizations to modify their behavior if they hope to gain access to the state.

Political opportunities are a result of structurally shaped interactions between the political actors and institutions, and social movement organizations (Koopmans 2004, 63). Moderation on the part of social movement organizations can occur through adjusting missions from the all-or-none demands typical in the social movement days to openness to bargaining and discussions. Alternatively, moderating organizations can redefine their organizations more fundamentally, dropping some or all of their watchdog responsibilities in the name of service provision. For instance, rather than holding mass protests in support of free media as they did under the illiberal regime, organizations might provide technical assistance to media outlets geared at improving their professional standards in the new order. Their broad, struggle-era goals and identities remain barely altered, but their strategies and tactics change with the times.

Most obviously, moderation reduces conflict by eliminating outright tensions, allowing social movement organizations to maintain personal ties with former colleagues. Just as new state leaders rely on trusted nongovernmental colleagues to fill administrative and political posts, a history of positive relations might put social movement organizations in a better position to benefit from formal or informal representational opportunities and various forms of state funding than those organizations without similar ties. To the extent that broad ideologies, goals and personal networks remain intact, they can serve as bridges between social movement organizations and the state, constituting important new political opportunities for the former. Even leaders transplanted into new institutions should retain some loyalty to the ideals for which they long struggled, and even those removed from everyday contact with their colleagues should be, either for personal or pragmatic reasons, sensitive to charges of betrayal. On another level, where
organizations continue to engage in watchdog functions but less vocally than before, state actors have more wiggle room to find a policy middle ground in cases of potential conflict. By keeping the level of open conflict relatively low, organizations create space in which old identities and networks can continue to resonate, creating new access points to the state that organizations without this leadership bridge will lack.

Once state and non-state actors find themselves on a contentious trajectory, these bridges quickly erupt into flames. This can occur when state actors deem a long espoused policy or strategy inappropriate or unfeasible under the new circumstances. Here, constraints override past affinities, as former leaders elaborate on their goals and in the process “reinterpret’ them as altogether new goals” (Jasper 2006, 75) in a step akin to rationalization. This is reflected in new strategies state actors take, and the strength with which they defend them. In her analysis of Chile, for example, Hipsher found that while social movement organizations mobilized around political opposition parties during the struggle, once the democratic transition began one-time opposition allies in power used force against contentious tactics they once condoned (Hipsher 1998, 159). Apparent ideational deviations can result in former colleagues questioning their ex-partners’ “initial, apparent commitment” to the cause (Andrews 1991, 144), which can, in turn, provide more fuel for acrimony.

If network cohesion is enhanced by threats from the outside (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008, 30), then organizations that fight the state in more extreme ways can lose comrades to their new institutional colleagues. Organizations that vocally attack the new state where their old colleagues reside should be doubly disadvantaged: first from the opportunity costs of losing a new access point and, second, from the harsh reaction typical of colleagues facing betrayal. Whereas public criticism from those outside one’s personal network might be ignored or brushed aside, perceived attacks on state actors from their former colleagues, and vice-versa, can create strong resentment.

The risk of dour relations between one-time partners is particularly high in post-democratic breakthrough states. Transforming from contentious political action to institutionalized forms can be especially difficult for groups born in illiberal regimes where their basic function is “resistance and denunciation” (Landim 1996, 211) and whose supporters have long engaged in or supported contentious activity. Institutionalization may be designed to strike a balance between independence and policy-making influence (Diamond 1999, 251-2; Lanegran 1995, 105; Loveman 1995, 141), but the constraints of institutionalization can lead to intra-group tension, withdrawal from political life, and fragmentation (Foweraker 1995, 70; Terry 1993, 336). At just the time that old organizations must demonstrate continued relevance, appealing to old and new constituent bases for support, strategic and tactical moderation can appear suicidal.

Accustomed to contentious tactics and facing internal resistance to moderation, it is unsurprising that some organizations continue along their previous trajectory. In Poland, for instance, social actors who had learned the art of striking during the
opposition period continued to rely on this strategy (far more than those Central European compatriots who had relatively little strike experience) throughout the transition period (Kubik 1998, 142). Others, however, simply grit their teeth, with the knowledge that the state is loathe to partner with critical organizations (Bell and Keenan 2004, 346; Segarra 1997, 493), and hope for the best. As one movement leader in Chile commented: “It is very difficult to walk the line between supporting democracy and fighting for the rights that have not yet been given to us. The regime has changed, and we have to support the democratic process, even if it is not exactly what we had hoped it would be.” (Hipsher 1998, 161) These groups may ultimately have more access to the state, though the outstanding question of how that access strengthens their organization, forced to moderate in order to attain access, remains. As Wiarda questioned, “are these new 'partnerships' merely a new name for an older corporatism?” (Wiarda 2004, 299)

Summary

Much of the social movement literature is, not surprisingly, focused on the ability of activists to create and maintain a social movement organization. The process by which leaders accomplish these goals has bearing on the research question posed here, concerning the influence of social movement organizations once they have attained victory and their members have permeated the state. This book, atypically, looks not at theories that deal directly with this topic, but at the implications of theories that can be logically extended to it. The most optimistic arguments for a social movement organization stem from group identity and personal network arguments, each of which suggests that enduring ties will provide social movement organization leaders significant influence on their former colleagues now in the state. The political opportunity argument suggests that access is one possibility but that political context can also act to undermine organizational strength and influence in the new conditions.

The most dire predictions arise from the strategic argument, fusing elements of the first three and institutional considerations. According to the strategic argument, while there may be new structures and formal walls erected between one-time colleagues, social movement organizations that are willing to adapt may thrive under the new arrangements. If institutions govern preferences, then social networks and social movement-based identities are more likely to be influential under conditions where conflicts are relatively low, but should buckle at those critical junctures where the conflicts are high. This places the burden on outside organizations to strike the delicate balance between moderation and cooption. Where moderation is insufficient to avoid confrontation, the personal dimensions will increase the conflict beyond where they otherwise would be if organizations lacked personal ties to the state, resulting in a vicious circle of charges and counter-charges. While non-state actors without previous ties to new state leaders may find bridges burned after staging attacks on the state, those with
personal ties will continue to face the heat and flames of this smoldering bridge for a long time to come.

In the next chapter, I discuss the methods used in this book to test these arguments, establishing a series of testable hypotheses and considering various aspects of my research design and case selection.


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30


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