Hi Gang,

This is the very first draft of the first chapter of a book manuscript I’m working on. I have five more chapters in various stages of disarray, and had some trouble figuring out what to show you. I thought this chapter was done about a month ago, but I’ll admit to making some pretty substantial revisions for this viewing. In the end, rather than sending in a narrower discussion of the institutional or elections side of this work, I thought I’d give you the bigger framework, and maybe send in some of the later chapters in the future.

I have some big questions about this work, and maybe you could think about them as you read this. The first is whether or not this notion of disaggregating democratization from the activists’ perspective works. The second is the whole civil society stuff. The big argument that I hope to make on this count is that we should approach civil society actors, and the whole debate, as a problem of political contention—that CSOs need to be viewed as actors in a contentious field, struggling like movements struggle. I don’t want to sink into the swamp of that debate, and from time to time I’ve thought about simply framing this as a “what happens to movements after the transition?” piece. But the civil society discussion is still so much a part of the discussion, particularly the policy side of the discussion, that I thought I had better engage it. But does it work? Is it worth it? Am I delusional?

Of course, I also have the big questions about this as a book length project—would people be interested? Does it fly? Does the empirical puzzle seem study enough to support the theoretical pretensions here?

Thanks for reading this.

Vince
Disaggregating Contention in Democratic Transition: Indonesia and the Philippines Compared.

Vince Boudreau

CCNY Department of Political Science

January 17, 2012

This is a preliminary draft. Please do not…..oh, never mind.
In this book, I examine the role that social forces (civil society, movements and movement organizations, non-governmental organizations, and others) play in post-transition Indonesia and the Philippines to address two separate questions. Thinking specifically about the Indonesian and Philippine cases, I seek to understand the role of social forces in two different post-authoritarian settings, and (as I will shortly explain) their surprisingly divergent relationships to governance. Reflections on these two cases will set up a broader consideration of how social forces (let us, for the moment, call them civil society actors) influence the prospect, depth and stability of democracy after authoritarian rule, and how members of those forces engage new political settings. I consider democracy, when it takes root, as reflective of a certain state of politics producing and reproducing what Charles Tilly called “protected consultation,” rather than as the maturation of a democratic institutional package (Tilly 2001). In many conceptualizations, civil society actors are crucial to demanding and defending the conditions of that protected consultation (Foley and Edwards 1996). I approach the matter as deeply contingent, and so ask how and when, in transitional settings, civil society groups mobilize, support, or undercut one another, seize or miss political opportunities, learn, teach or utterly miss the lessons of past activity—and how all this activity may influence broader post-transitional processes.

In answering these questions, I argue that the participation of democracy activists in democratic consolidation processes can be disaggregated into two elements. The first represents efforts to establish the rules and processes of the new regime, and includes efforts such as constitution making and rule setting and monitoring efforts in, for instance, post-transition elections. The second is an inevitably competitive effort to utilize new processes to select the political leaders who will make policies under the new dispensation. While analysts often view democratic practices like voting as mechanisms that contribute to the further development of democracy (Boudreau 2007; Dahl and NetLibrary Inc. 1971; Manning 2007), democratic competition can also strain CSO, movement or other pro-democracy alliances.

To be clear—I do not assume that these elements are stages in a democratization process, that they coexist, or that they exist in equal measure in all transitions. Nor will we discover the temporal aspect of the relationship between these two elements to most strongly define the process. To the contrary, I think that if we try to figure out the range of relationships that these different political projects may have to transitions processes—how they are sequenced, prioritized or balanced—we will learn more clearly about the character and consequences of civil society influence on democratic consolidation. In later sections of this work, I will discuss how different relationships between these two democratization questions—what I refer to as the “how” and the “who” of democratic governance—come into play, and how disaggregating democratization processes along these lines can help one understand Philippine and Indonesian processes more clearly.

This analytic strategy has a great debt to the political process approach to contention, which depicts movements rising in relationship to political opportunities, and reflecting the institutions, practices and cultures left by past contention (McAdam 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). From this vantage, what we have
often called civil society actors do not themselves constitute social movements, nor do they, by their very existence or structure, produce political effects; they are, rather, among the social formations that contribute to the mobilization of contention and the expression of social power (Walker 2008). Identifying the processes by which society challenges, monitors, or engages governing institutions, and the conditions and strategies that favor these engagements constitutes the core problem at hand.

As cases, both the Philippines and Indonesia possess special significance in their own right. More than a decade after the first third wave transitions on the Iberian Peninsula, the Philippine anti-dictatorship movement (as none before) captured the attention of people rooting for democracy. Television broadcasts depicted what was soon called “people power.” The press also packaged the conjugal dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos as evil in digestible ways—those shoes, the public assassinations, the very fact that the word “salvage” meant political murder. It was easy for a world audience to get on board. (Thompson 1995) Given repeated assertions about democracy’s central role in the war on terror and broader security concerns, Indonesia also deserves a closer look. Following 1998, many deeply discouraging reports emerged from Indonesia: stories of sometimes murderous ethnic and religious conflict—school girls beheaded and left by the roadside, churches and mosques set ablaze, military-sponsored militia sowing terror in East Timor, and terrorist cells setting off bombs in Jakarta and Bali. Particularly after 9/11 the prospect of a less authoritarian and more open Indonesia was as likely to invoke the shadow of chaos and un-governability as ordered democratic participation and political fairness (Aspinall 2008; Aspinall and Berger 2001; Bertrand 2008).

Set in comparative context, however, these cases also strongly reflect on one another, and set up a framing puzzle for the discussion to come. While one might argue, looking at either case in isolation, that civil society played an important role in the democratization process, assessing that role becomes more awkward when one compares the Philippines to Indonesia. In fact, the trajectories of the two post-transition regimes would surprise many who think about how civil society influences government: the undeniable strength and robustness of Philippine civil society has done little to insure democratic governance since Marcos, while Indonesian democracy, despite the utterly emaciated civil society that emerged from Suharto’s New Order, seems in far better shape. The details of this puzzle deserve a little more discussion.1

Emerging from over a decade of highly organized struggle against the Marcos dictatorship, Philippine social organizations -- movement groups, nongovernmental organizations, business associations and the like-- seemed positioned to hold authorities accountable to the public will. Organizations of struggle that included middle class and educated members, stood at the very core of the anti-Marcos movement. Lawyers and members of disbanded representative institutions countered martial law almost at its inception with efforts to defend human rights and civil liberties. As the dictatorship lurched into the early 1980s, business associations, religious orders, and academic

---

1 The discussion in the next several paragraphs summarizes some of the findings in my 2004 book.
faculties joined the movement, and appeared united in their demands for democratic governance, in their revulsion for regime corruption and brutality, and in their commitment to non-violent struggle. Moreover, the movement’s various strands had for some time produced new organizational forms, NGOs, that augmented and operated differently than protest organizations in that they mixed struggle against authorities with the more direct and intensive provision of services, development activity, and education to members. Even as it gathered strength against the dictatorship, that is, the ant-Marcos movement seemed to nurture the institutions and practices of democratic government, and produced institutions that could empower society vis-à-vis government, and so build, deepen and defend democracy.

Exactly the opposite situation emerged in Indonesia. There, over three decades of authoritarian rule worked to virtually insure that no social organization, outside the state’s own corporatist infrastructure, would survive to provide a foundation for a newly democratic society. The dictatorship had played a lopsided cat and mouse game with its critics since the New Order eliminated the competition in the early 1970s. Atop the legacy of horrific inaugural violence, Suharto rolled out a shifting program of proscription against social organizations, consolidating political parties and limiting their activity, banning forms of social organizations that seemed most dangerous, and enacting new bans to counter organizational innovation. Groups that maintained large and active memberships could not pursue political activity, and were eventually compelled to adopt the state’s numbing Pancasila ideology. The largest Islamic organizations recruited millions of members, but state regulations in the early 1980s expressly prevented religious organizations from undertaking social or political activism (or, conversely, those with political interests from forming organizations). A great deal of advocacy shadowed legal aid foundation activity, and important cases inspired protests and community mobilization. But this advocacy moved forward in fits and starts, and neither protest nor community organization usually outlived the case itself. Authorities never permitted broader or more sustaining organizational activity, and so community initiatives faded away as quickly as they emerged. Not surprisingly, the Suharto regime eventually fell under the burden of defections from within his regime and military (often spurred by succession worries) and mass but unorganized social protest in the midst of financial crisis. Unlike the Philippine anti-dictatorship movement, Indonesian activists had briefer, less organized, and less powerful political careers -- and the civil society organizations were in consequence far weaker and more marginal.

Knowing this about the two countries emerging civil societies, what might we expect of their new democracies? Following much of the literature, one would anticipate a robust Philippine democracy and something weaker and less assertive in Indonesia.

---

Indeed, immediate efforts to construct a post transition regime seemed in both cases to lean in the predicted direction. In the Philippines, Corazon Aquino declared a revolutionary government, set a new constitution-making process in motion, and initially reached deep into the activist world to find ideas and people to animate the new government. Those working to reconstruct government drew heavily upon ideas that had animated almost two decades of popular protest: land reform, stronger workers’ and women’s’ rights, more general respect for human rights, and a constrained executive. Policy making, elections, and public debate solicited the attention and participation of an organized and skilled Philippine activist community. A more conservative spirit seemed to animate post-transition politics in Indonesia. Following established constitutional principles, vice president BJ Habibie, assumed executive power when Suharto resigned in the May 1998 crisis. While that crisis began when 14 cabinet ministers resigned from Suharto’s government, the rest of the regime remained largely intact. Early demands to organize a constitutional convention or to rapidly depoliticize the military met staunch resistance from vested interests inside government, and for a time, the transition threatened merely to represent a reorganization of offices at the regime’s apex. Indonesian reform initiatives in 1998 mainly relied on the same bureaucrats and party members who held positions under Suharto, and reforms never opened the same broad opportunities for activist organizations as in the Philippines. Hence, particularly a year or so removed from either transition, one might easily have predicted a far brighter democratic future for the Philippines, and a more uncertain, hybrid regime in Indonesia.

In fact, developments since the two transitions at least partly reverse this expectation. The formal, procedural institutions of Philippine democracy have for almost two decades passed through a series of degrading crises -- unfair elections, illiberal political practices, extra-constitutional régime transitions, and periodic extrajudicial killings. Processes that would help develop some basic democratic institutions and practices--independent political parties, an open and significant policymaking process, significant checks against government corruption, and an independent and active judiciary-- never gained much headway in the Philippines. Perhaps most persistently and tellingly, Philippine post-transition governance has been marked by an almost utter failure to translate the popular will or interest into responsive policy, and the once united activist and non-governmental sector has been drawn into the factional politics that divides political parties and government officials.(Abinales and Amoroso 2006) In Indonesia, elections have gradually grown procedurally more direct and transparent. While the transition never produced anything like the revolutionary moment that swept away the institutions and practices of Suharto's rule, smaller scale reforms and revisions have nevertheless continued to move politics toward some version of democracy. Some of those moves have been little short of stunning, among them the eventual elimination of military-only seats in parliaments, direct presidential elections, and the rise of myriad new oversight bodies. Several years of initial and bloody communal violence eventually gave way to a greater and apparently more stable peace. Mechanisms to document and condemn human rights violations, to identify and attempt to limit graft and corruption, to settle at least some regional conflicts, and to broaden citizen rights, have shown signs of strengthening.(Liddle and Mujani 2007; Webber 2006) By 2009, Freedom House ranked Indonesia (not the Philippines) as Southeast Asia’s only democracy.
Civil Society and Contentious Politics

How can we square these observations with the contrary expectations excited by the literature on democratization and civil society? To address this question, I concentrate on histories and specific legacies of civil society emergence and activity, patterns of contestation and collaboration among civil society groups, and most importantly, arrangements of interactions between civil society and state institutions. The argument I develop here assumes that a great deal of the literature has asked the wrong sorts of questions about the relationship between civil society and democratization, and has particularly neglected to regard civil society organizations as existing in a contentious political field, with social competitors and allies, and a range of possible relationships to the state. More commonly, we read about the character of civil society and the sorts of historical processes that encourage one or another variety of social organization to emerge. (Cormier and Couton 2004; Edwards, Foley, and Diani 2001; Levi 1996) The concern for emergence and typologizing civil society rests on the conviction that how civil society behaves depends on what it is—and that political actors can be expected to play out politically some inherent aspects of their nature or structure. There is, incidentally, a similar school of thought among democracy theorists that I will also take some issue with: in this way of thinking, the story that must be told involves the process of establishing institutions with the power to insure accountability, divided power, participation, and responsiveness (Birch 2005; Legvold 2001; Metcalf 1997; Power and Gasiorowski 1997). Democracy, that is, can be hard wired into a political system’s institutional design, and if the design is significantly strong, it can withstand autocratic pressures. In these accounts, the story for both civil society and for democratic systems unfolds in broadly similar terms, with the scene squarely set in the design shop.

But civil society is surely as much what social actors do as what they are. Social groups and collectivities may have certain core properties, and their histories and structures influence their power and patterns of solidarity or struggle. But social action also depends on the influence of external opportunities, choices made in response to those opportunities, interactions with authorities, rivals, and potential supporters. Memories of success or failure, repertoires of collective action, judgments about opportunities and potential allies all weigh on decisions to act in one way or another. Nor are democratic governments always fixed by their institutional design. Even in established democratic regimes, authorities can broaden or narrow the scope of democratic participation or civil liberties. Such environmental shifts also will influence the activity of social actors, and the activity of those actors can motivate further change in governing institutions. At one level, the cases in this study invite us to weigh the circumstances, contingencies, content and influence of civil society engagement with two separate states against what we might call their inherent differences, differences in size, capacity and structure. Intuitively, and backed by significant theorizing, we would expect Philippine civil society to underpin a

---

3 In this connection, Tilly’s injunction that we should distinguish between “social movement bases and social movements as such,” seems an appropriate reminder. Tilly, Charles. 2008. Contentious performances. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
more democratic arrangement than that in Indonesia; political contingencies in the two cases drove them, however, in different directions. Explaining why this has happened constitutes both a specific explanation for developments in the two countries, and a larger argument about how we should approach civil society and democratization processes.

On the other hand, this may be all an elaborate head fake (as I write this, I have not entirely made up my mind). But my suspicions on the matter have the following roots. In the shadow of civil-society-in-democratic-transitions questions lurks another, focused on how anti-dictatorship activists adjust to their new environment. Do they (or, under what conditions will they…?) demobilize, stick to their guns, adjust strategies, move into abeyance structures, radicalize, institutionalize, or something else? As I first observed Philippine activists struggling to find their bearings in the immediate post-Marcos environment, their decisions seemed to pivot around the contradictory tug of an internally-directed effort to sustain their movement and its power, and an externally directed effort to find new opportunities to advance their agenda. At the start of the transition, virtually everyone involved in the anti-dictatorship movement described themselves as either activists or revolutionaries. A variety of factors—donor preferences, the need to develop activist career paths after years of disruption, and eventually the pull of shifting advocacy conventions—prompted many activists to develop direct service organizations (NGOs) inside the protest-oriented movements (Carothers 1999; Quigley 1997). At first, they discussed these agencies as tactical innovations, designed to draw resources to the movement or to incentivize mass participation in the struggle. Nevertheless, eventually, predictably, members of non-governmental organizations began to express interests that diverged from primarily protest-driven movement groups. And, at about that same time, the theoretical discourse on civil society and its role in democratic governance, made the leap into the practical politics of dissent, social advocacy and international development work.

Self-designated “civil society” actors under these conditions were both experimenting with new organizations forms they thought more suited to the post-authoritarian setting, and making a claim about themselves and their appropriate role in democratic governance. Like most such claims, it was double edged: self described civil society actors were both suited for democratic engagement, and more suited than competitors from other formations or ideological currents. This dual claim, however, should raise suspicions, particularly in a political setting moving between collective efforts to build a democratic system and the competitive effort to engage and compete within that system. It is difficult to view this self-described civil society as the same associational layer we might observe in more prosperous or stable societies. In places like the Philippines and Indonesia, civil society actors are more particular, more mobilized than in other places. They often form around advocacy agendas and demands—more like interest groups and movement organizations than the kind of pre-mobilization networks that grow out of routine social life and figures prominently in western theorizing. The move to a civil society posture in the Philippines can therefore be viewed as a phase (a later phase) in a social movement cycle. In important respects, this sequencing reverses the causal arrows in many theories arguing that levels of social connection predate more activist politics.
What about in Indonesia? The story varies, because the politics of the Indonesian dictatorship varied from that of the Philippines. Nevertheless, it is a story rooted in the dictatorship because authoritarian rule—in Indonesia and generally—reworks the structure of associational relations and often places even pre-political associations into the hands of activists. Against this political backdrop, the more conscious deployment of civil society as an organizational form and tactic seems a distinct thing, worthy of explicitly different theorizing. One element of this theorizing should be the location of these civil society formations in the larger question of what happens to anti-dictatorship movements in the transition. In this theorizing, questions of what the anti-dictatorship movement looked like entering the transition and how it evolved structurally and politically deserve pride of place. In order to ask these questions clearly, we need to disaggregate the transitional process from the vantage point of its social advocates.

Democracy in the Post-Transitional Environment

A misconception (at best, a metaphor taken too seriously) has guided much thinking around democratization, particularly as it has influenced foreign policy and democracy assistance programs. Many describe transitions credulously, as if their key objective is progress toward a democracy described primarily in procedural terms (Roberts 1998; Markoff, 1996 #38). It is not merely that international democracy assistance programs have emphasized things like elections and governmental transparency; activists seeking to broaden the anti-dictatorship movement have also emphasized the broadest procedural aspects of democracy (Thompson 1995). Many who look at democracy movements have too easily assumed that democracy is itself the movement’s main political goal, and neglected to think about democracy as a framework for struggle about a whole host of other things. From this standpoint it was possible to believe that democracy’s main challengers would be those directly opposed to democracy itself. Analysts feared dictatorial resurgence, the rise of money politics and corruption, or the ire of military officers facing transitional justice, but imagined that democratic procedures, properly organized, would cool passions and resolve conflict (Crescenzi 1999; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Sanchez 2003)

But even these considerations fail to tally the true weight of the danger precisely because they present threats to democracy as exogenous to the democratization process. Key elements of the problem are endogenous to democracy and democratization. Democratization necessarily moves between broad based demands for a new political process to the engagement of that process to promote particularistic interests. We perhaps imagine that a genuine reform process will move from system design to policy making, and in that latter aspect, correct inequities in the distribution of resources or opportunities, skewed by dictatorship. But even in the best of conditions, elections and

---

4 I have here deleted several pages that talk about how the contentious politics literature informs the particular reading of social connections that I will use here. One element of the discussion is a concept of “rootedness” that I use here, comparing Southeast Asia with Latin America, and focusing on the shorter duration of ISI and labor movement formation in the former as compared to the latter. This influences the kinds of social formations that get mobilized in political contention.
policy making processes are competitive; in moments of transition, how can they not exert a chilling effect on the mobilized unities of the democracy movement? How much of an effect, and at what cost to democracy, will depend on the politics of activist and civil society engagement with one another and with the new system.

Procedural democracy (Huber and Rueschemeyer 1997), that is, remains an exceptionally limited foundation for political unities, with a short shelf life once the dictatorship’s most egregious violations of democratic procedural norms pass away. In the shadow of authoritarian rule, the right to free expression or assembly may seem luminous and politically sufficient. But even in transitions that predate the 1990s, procedural questions soon gave way to substantive matters, and populations move from expecting democracy to produce material benefits to more directly demanding those benefits. Soon, that is, pro-democracy coalitions begin to divide into blocs concerned with the content of politics. Distributional conflicts may enflame communal tensions (Manning and Antic 2003). Policy disagreements on tax policy, social spending, or the protection of labor rights create new coalitions, and undermine old ones. Conflict breaks out among different aspirants to political office. Even among reformers and civil society activists, agreement on general reform positions does not always lead to unity or agreement on who should take the lead in articulating reforms. Electoral competition can, therefore, often rupture principled advocacy alliances, or at least make that advocacy seem merely a resource in somebody’s quest for power. As these arguments emerge, the key questions cease to involve what the system will be, and start to address what it will do, for whom, and under who’s leadership. Actors of all sorts learn how the institutions work, where they can be stretched, and where the surest roads to power lie (Manning 2007; Watanabe 2009). For some time, perhaps a long time, the language of reform may attach to these efforts, but without generating unity of purpose that may have gathered behind procedural reforms. These developments reveal patterns of politics that, while channeled into institutions, are not defined by them—and, in turn, sharply challenge those that seek consolidation mainly via the implementation of appropriately engineered political institutions.

As political systems emerge from such precarious periods of transitions, therefore, democracy’s advocates must balance general and encompassing demands for a better, fairer system with particularistic inclinations to promote some set of outcomes. Importantly, particularism in this sense is not antithetical to democracy—it is the very grist for the democratic mill. Nevertheless, the proximity—sometimes simultaneity—of the system’s design and its use in partisan selections of political leaders, ushers in a host of risks. In those moments, the balance between efforts to strengthen a democratic systems and competitive politics is unclear. Institutional constraints can help patrol the boundary between pluralism and authoritarianism, but they never entirely lock things up. Democracy can grow stronger if people trust the system, or in the famous formulation, regard democracy as “the only game in town.” But people learn new games all the time (Watanabe 2009), or come to believe that shifting conditions may demand or explain a process that reorders priorities away from democracy and toward something else. As we learn more about hybrid regimes and so-called “defective democracies,” moreover,
the ways in which democratic institutions can be subverted in practice have become increasingly clear.

Democratization processes, that is to say, are varied and involve participatory and procedural demands, substantive reform, and efforts to compete for office and power. Transitions in the 1970s and 1980s mainly unseated dictators who had survived atop more or less narrow social bases because of strong external support. In such contexts, the democracy movement could be conceived in terms of a broad coalition to give voice and participatory rights to largely excluded populations. Beginning in the early 1990s, particularly as cold war antagonists ceased to provide resources to dictators, we began more frequently to see political transitions emerge from conditions of conflict and ethnic and national division (Horowitz 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996; Reilly 2002), in which concerns for fair participation mingled with or took a backseat to concerns about community security concerns and resource distribution. Moreover, where it was once possible to link dictatorship and corruption to particular kinds of cold war autocrats, the repeated slide of “new democrats” toward autocracy or corruption created broader support for systematic constraints on government power. Both empirically and in the imagination of those working in new regimes, democratization has largely ceased to be a matter of giving voice to the voiceless, or merely electing the right kinds of leaders.

Two important questions, then, rest at the heart of any regime transition: who will hold power and by what procedures will they rule? We can, working in typology mode, imagine different situations in which the interplay between these two tasks may be more or less damaging to the prospects of democracy. It is plausible, for instance, to expect the most tumultuous transitions where both questions are clearly distinct and simultaneously contested: the competitive implementation of emergent democratic processes and institutions may skew the system design and promote less than democratic practice. Less tumultuous transitions may be more likely when system design and political competition does not work at cross-purposes. Gradual transitions that do not immediately displace incumbents may allow questions of procedural reform to take precedence over distributional issues or questions of who should rule (but also risk halting patterns of change). Uprisings against corrupt or patrimonial dictators may focus on who should rule without opening complicating questions about how the rules of politics should change. Absent sharp communal or factional conflict exists or under the influence of broadly incorporating democracy movements, people may concentrate on system design in the hopes that subsequent distributional disagreements will be manageable within that system’s routines.

Still, the literature is filled with accounts documenting the disappointment of that hope (Roberts 1998). Even when question of who shall rule and how are segregated and manageable, the imprint of specific and particular interests, perhaps initially obscured, often worm their way into the heart of the system. In many cases, democracy advocates

---

are displaced from their proximity to power during the transition. Sometimes they are
absorbed into the system. Sometimes, the new rules of politics encourage them to set
upon one another, provoking conflict even among former movement allies. In post-
transitional settings, the relationship between system design and distributional politics is
particularly tricky because coalitions that demanded democracy can be volatile and
protean, particularly when the discussion narrows to substantive questions. Democratic
system design leads by explicit intent to competition under the new rules. There are many
ways that civil society actors and social movements can be displaced and disempowered
in the post-transitional setting, despite a general agreement on their significance in
constructing and defending democracy.

Hence, while democracy may face initial challenges from those who wish a return
to the old regime, its deeper tests may lie in how the system handles particularistic
assertions, mediates conflict among citizens, and manages the expression of the popular
interest in public policy. From this optic three kinds of danger await emerging
democratic systems. The first and most basic is that democratic institutions, always
designed to manage rather than eliminate conflict, will not be up to the task, will not be
able to contain conflict or inspire respect for the rule of law. Sharp conflict may
convince people to opt out of the system, and pursue their own, more direct and often
violent remedies. Second, particularism may strain the rules and basic fairness of
participatory politics: vote buying and rent seeking may make governmental processes
seem like window dressing on a structure driven by influence peddling and racketeering.
Finally, the system may work to disaggregate popular voices, leaving poor people most in
need of a just and efficient set of government systems vulnerable to the predatory whims
of those with more power and more money. Such circumstances may be consistent with
the most limited procedural definitions of democracy, but thwart the development of
anything with ambitions to deeper social fairness. And, to the extent that these ambitions
remained frustrated, the system jeopardizes the continued participation of the
underserved. Most of the writing on democratic consolidation has concentrated on the
first two of these issues; those concerned with the role of social movements and civil
society actors should attend more closely to the third.

As politics turns partisan in the years following regime transition, is there any
reason to expect civil society to remain primarily an arbiter of process? The social
capital literature, with its reliance on trust, regards civil society as structured mainly by
its own internal institutional and normative characteristics. Responding to these internal
cues, civil society can be expected to work (with different degrees of success) toward a
politics of compromise, critical vigilance of government activity, and an inclusive view
of social and community interests. Where things turn out differently, analysts seek
explanations in the character of civil society(Berman 1997; Hunter 1998; Levi 1996), or
save the hypothesis by reading backward from poor democratic performance to the
(harder to measure, and so more indeterminate) weakness of civil society. But the context
of political activity--when and how social forces turned their attention toward stronger
competition, how emerging political institutions shape that competition--surely
influences the character and impact of civil society activity. At minimum, one needs to
evaluate how that politics interacts with, and is shaped by, the institutional environment.
Advocacy Politics after Democracy

I approach these issues by examining the fine grain of post-transition movement and civil society politics in Indonesia and the Philippines. In each case, social movements and civil society groups played a role in toppling a dictatorship and establishing a new, more democratic political order (which is not to say, of course, democracy itself). Each entered the final struggle against dictatorship with set patterns of organizational structuring, modes of engaging authority and recruiting members, and some agenda for activity in and after the anti-dictatorship movement. Movements and civil society actors both engaged and were changed by the politics of the transition, and by the politics that followed. Broad unity and an initially successful effort to establish broad coalitions to push through comprehensive labor, land and human rights reform programs in the Philippines did not last past 1992 presidential election; immediately followed a mainly unified left effort to elect an ideologically appropriate candidate, unities began to fray. Future electoral alliances would never again have that level of ideological coherence or unity, and policy advocacy shifted from demands for universal reforms to the representation of concrete constituency grievance. Particularistic forms of advocacy overwhelmed encompassing movement politics. Indonesian civil society actors entered their democratic period with a divided record: advocacy concentrated on the particularistic representation of small scale community demands, and advocacy for national reform, typically limited to matters of governmental process, was weaker and more sporadic than in the Philippines. Where Philippine activists embraced electoral politics, Indonesian regarded elections as more corrupting and remained aloof. Policy reform eluded Indonesian activists, and ten years after the transition, they were only beginning to figure out how to engage the policy process and to formulate demands for social change—demands that Filipinos brought into the transition. Still, by 2006, Indonesian civil society actors and movement organizations were assembling the pieces of a more encompassing and powerful style of politics, including engaging elections and developing substantive reform proposals.

The arc of movement and CSO activity, looked at from this angle, reveals shifting balances between solidarity and competition, advocacy for broad reform and the promotion of particular interests. In large part, that balance reflects differences in the movements’ initial focuses on systemic versus substantive reform. But it also reflects orientations toward encompassing and particular advocacy strategies (as well as the ways in which particularism can slide from advocacy to garden variety politics) ideas about securing government positions versus building community organizations, for building electoral parties or concentrating on social engagement of electoral processes. It is, I believe, key to making sense of large chunks of movement activity and of consequential strategic and orientational shifts in that activity. Moreover, this line of inquiry draws attention to how the institutions and practices of an emerging post-dictatorship order influence advocacy politics, and ultimately, the impact of civil society on democracy. It will alert us to strains on movement alliances, or the dilemmas of running for office or collaborating with government. It underscores the extent to which the evolution of social politics depends on complex interactions between movement histories, the political
reshuffling produced by the transition, and the engagement of a new institutional framework of politics. None of these factors, in themselves, explain how social forces interact with the new democratic system. Rather, they interact in complex and sometimes surprising ways, and deserve grounded empirical analysis.

The analysis that follows unfolds in several sections, each corresponding to what I regard as the major influences on the politics of advocacy in democratic transitions. The first section examines important differences in movement engagement with transitions. In this section, I concentrate less on explaining the role movements played in toppling the dictatorship, and more on the how legacies of movement politics navigate the transition and inform subsequent advocacy politics. In considering these legacies, I concentrate on three elements of movement history. The first is the organizational and ideological resources established during the anti-dictatorship movement. The second is the place of movement formations in relationship to anti-dictatorship elites. Finally, I examine the transitions itself, to see if movement and civil society power grew or was diminished in that transition. In respect to each question, strong contrasts exist between Indonesian and Philippine experiences, and these contrasts help us construct a dynamic picture of how movements and movement practices, stood in relationship to new systems of power and politics.

The second section examines contrasts in the emergent, post-dictatorship institutional environment, including the processes by which these institutions were developed and brought into play. In this section, I undertake two discussions. The first examines electoral structures in both settings. In virtually every respect, the strength of party organizations, the emphasis on local and national contests, the Philippine and Indonesian electoral systems contrast with one another. These different structures also followed different evolutionary trajectories over the years that followed the dictatorship, and CSOs and social movements engaged them in very different ways. Similarly, the politics of policy advocacy and reform campaigns, as well as related patterns for consultation between government officials and social actors varied as well. Philippine activists had immediate and broad representation in government-sponsored policy reform efforts, which the entire process in Indonesia began as a more closed enterprise, with less direct public consultation, and at most, the selective appointment of commissioners from movement circles. In both cases, patterns of policy making have changed—growing more particularistic in the Philippines, and moving toward the articulation (slowly to be sure) or more encompassing policy perspectives, but also locally empowered advocacy circles, in Indonesia.

Part of this institutional discussion will, to be sure, involve an analysis of how movement and CSO actors engaged electoral and policy making processes. Nevertheless, movement strategies, especially as they synthesize electoral, policy-based and protest strategies, deserve consideration in their own right. In section three, I synthesize the considerations from these three realms to develop a picture of an evolving style of activism in the two cases. While differences between Indonesian and Philippine advocacy politics are myriad, one important divergence stands out. In important ways, the ideologically politics of Philippine movements—coherent that is, in terms of
movement alliances and coalitions, in electoral positions, and in advocacy programs, eroded in the context of Philippine democracy, eventually giving way to a politics of more opportunistic positioning. Indonesians entered the post-Suharto period with far less in the way of ideological or organizational resources. From this starting point, in a fairly slow process, they have begun to build stronger and broader organizations, and to begin something new: the development of the most basic elements of an ideological program: conceptions of how the short term political perspectives of diverse people can be combined in a more strategic approach to politics. The contours of this political approach are varied, and experiments are underway to position religion, nationalism, and class at the foundation of these broader and more strategic political orientations. But the development of this new politics is also influencing basic elements of social approaches to organizing, to elections, and to policy advocacy.

The final section of this work undertakes a broader reflection on the role of civil society in democratic transitions and consolidations. It is always difficult to generalize from narrow, or narrowly comparative case studies. Nevertheless, I'll use the Philippine and Indonesian cases to pose more general questions about what social forces can do to advance and strengthen democracy. In these considerations, I rely neither exclusively on examining the institutional apparatus of democracy, nor the social structure of civil society. Rather, I argue for an approach that looks at the legacies of struggle (political, ideological, tactic and organizations) as they interact with the new institutional environment. This interaction provides a backdrop for understanding the constraints that activists faced, and the decisions that they made. It is in understanding these interactions and orientations, I argue, that we can most fully appreciate the role that civil society plays in democratization processes.
References

Baltimore, Md.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Distributed by John Hopkins University Press.
