The Rise and Fall of the Reds: 
Leadership and Dilemma-Solving in Social Movements 
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Abstract 
This article reconsiders how the leaders’ strategies shape the life courses of social movements. I argue that existing studies do not link the structure and agency when they analyze the relation between strategy-making and the life courses of social movements. I propose a reiterative dilemma-solving model and modify this flaw by applying this model to the Reds, an impeachment movement in Taiwan 2006. Social movements face numerous dilemmas during their life courses. This model suggests that leaders have to create strategies to solve these dilemmas. However, every solution to the dilemma not only bring positive effect but also generates trade-offs to the movements. The effects of these trade-offs are not isolated but interactive. The solutions for the dilemmas not only bring new dilemmas to social movements but also reshape the strategic arenas and capacity of social movements. I argue that the lock-in effect of the trade-offs is a critical factor that influences the rise and fall of social movements. I also suggest the paradox of bridging frames in cycles of social movements: although bridging frames benefit recruitment and maintain the legitimacy of social movements in the rising phase, bridging frames may result in the fractionalization of social movements, decreasing the participants’ commitment to movements, and frame-breaking in later stages. I suggest that the typology among social movements and sequences of dilemma-solving is necessary to build a middle-range theory about the life course of social movements.
The study of strategy-making has become a growing focus in the field of social movements. Partly, this is because studying strategy-making allows scholars to balance the structural bias (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra 1999; Khattra, Jasper and Goodwin 1999) and the reification problem (Benford, 1997) in existing studies by bringing agency back. After shedding light on the strategies that leaders adopt, these scholars argue that we can understand more about the interaction between structure and agency and how this interaction shapes the life courses and diverse paths of different social movements (Koopmans, 1997).

Following this advocacy, scholars have examined how a leader’s strategy influences the resource mobilization of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), the relationship between strategy and the outcome of social movements (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Ennis, 1988; Ganz, 2000; Nepstad and Bob, 2006), how authority demobilizes social movements strategically (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1998) and how a leader reorganizes the social movement through communication skills (Mische, 2003). Although these studies on strategy-making enlarge the understanding about the role of strategy in social movements, the studies do not bridge the dualism of structure and agency. The reason is that they usually treat strategy-making of a social movement as a one shot without treating it as a sequence and considering the interaction between social movements and environments. These studies ignore that the leaders of social movements face diverse challenges and make multiple strategies to deal with these challenges during the life courses of social movements. Moreover, these studies neglect the lock-in effect between strategies: the former strategies may generate either intended or unintended effects that reshape the following strategic dilemmas and arenas (Jasper, 2004) of the social movement and therefore constrain the possibilities of the strategies that follow. As a result, when the leader creates the next strategies, his or her decisions are shaped by the previous strategies. Without defining strategy-making as a continuous process, it is hard to capture the interaction between structure and agency and understand how this process influences the life courses of social movements. Moreover, when we consider the connection between the strategies, it helps us understand the logic behind the strategy-making. Leaders’ decisions are not just improvised or invented but shaped by the strategies the leaders previously adopted.

In this article, I propose a “reiterative dilemma-solving model” to capture the interaction between structure and agency and how the linkage of strategies influences the rise and fall of social movements. This model integrates three concepts: strategic capacity (Ganz, 2000), strategic dilemmas and arenas (Jasper, 2004, 2006), and social movements as reiterated problem-solving processes (Haydu, 1998). I argue that this model shows the full story of life courses of social movements.
by considering the lock-in effect between strategies and dilemmas in different stages. My approach thus balances the tendency of previous studies to neglect the interaction between social structures and human agency and illustrates how leaders’ decisions and structures interactively construct the life course of social movements.

In the article, I use the movement of the “Reds” that occurred from August to October 2006 in Taipei, Taiwan, as a case to illustrate my model. The Reds were a movement to impeach President Chen Shui-Bian in reaction to his family’s scandals over alleged misuse of the Presidential Office’s special state fund and insider trading on the stock market. The main leader of this impeachment movement, Shih Ming-Teh, asked participants to wear red clothes to show their discontent and participate in the campaign. This is why this movement is called the Reds. During this period, the Reds encountered several dilemmas and adopted different strategies to cope with these dilemmas. One the one hand, these strategies benefited the Reds taking advantage of this political opportunity to launch a powerful movement; on the other hand, they also resulted in the decline of the Reds. Next I will describe what dilemmas did the Reds face? How did the Reds solve these dilemmas? What consequences did these solutions generate? How did the choices and strategies shape the decline of the Reds? By considering these questions, we can enlarge the understanding of how the interaction between structure and agency shapes the life courses of social movement. In the sections of discussion, I will discuss the paradox of the bridging frames for social movements as an example to show that the way in which the leaders of that movement tried to create a frame that bridged disparate segments of the Taiwanese population eventually backfired and led to the movement’s cooptation and decline. I will generalize my argument by comparing the stories of the Reds and Student for a Democratic Society (SDS), the leading organization of the New Left which has similar path with the Reds. In conclusion, I suggest a typology between the types of social movements and sequences of dilemma-solving can be the direction of future research.

1 Some have called Shih the "Nelson Mandela of Taiwan" as he spent 25 years in prison for his pro-democracy activism.

2 In Taiwanese culture, people care more about politicians’ ritual and moral performances than other issues. It is what Zhao (2000) calls “performance legitimacy”. Zhao notes that “performance legitimacy means a state’s right to rule rests on its continuing economic development, its observance of certain moral and ritual practices, or its maintenance of national defense” (p. 1607). In this sense, politicians, especially national leaders, are national icons for people. People put higher moral responsibility and standards on politicians. Politicians are not ordinary people but role models for the nation. Chen’s scandal did not only break people’s expectation for a national leader but also ignited people’s anger toward him. In other words, the scandal challenged the Chen government’s legitimacy, and creating an opportunity for activists to impeach President Chen.
Theoretical Background

Research on leadership in social movements can be traced to Lenin (1969). Lenin argues that the hope for revolution is not the proletariat, because workers act only according to narrow particular interests. He indicates that social movements need leaders to help workers invoke their self-consciousness, acknowledge their shared interests, and motivate them participate in social movements (Lenin, 1969). Using the terms of social movement research, what Lenin notes is a process of “cognitive liberation” (McAdam, 1982), “hot cognition” (Gamson, 1995), “moral shock” (Jasper and Poulsen, 1995) or “frame alignment” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford, 1997) that induce people to participate in social movements. Following this legacy, scholars of social movements focus on the roles, types, characteristics and strategies of leaders in the mobilization and maintenance of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Aminzades, Goldstone and Perry, 2001; Nepstad and Bob, 2006; Mische, 2003). Although these studies help us understand the relation between leadership and social movements, questions about how leaders make decisions, why they use some strategies rather than others, how do former strategies influence later strategies and interaction between agency and structure are unmentioned in their research. To supplement this gap, I propose a “reiterative dilemma-solving model” which integrate the studies of Ganz (2000), Jasper (2004, 2006) and Haydu(1998) on the strategizing processes.

Ganz: the strategic capacity and the consequences of social movements

Ganz asks what strategies leaders of social movements adopt and why they adopt different strategies. To illustrate these questions, Ganz (2000) proposes a concept of “strategic capacity.” According to Ganz, leaders’ strategic capacity shapes the strategies leaders take and how efficient these strategies are. He argues that leaders who have sufficient salient knowledge, with high motivation, and who make decisions by deliberation are more likely to adopt efficient strategies. Ganz provides two sources of strategic capacity: leadership and organization. The former source includes leaders’ biography, social networks, and knowledge of collective action repertoires; the latter source includes deliberative structure, resource flows, and the accountability of the organization. In other words, social movements’ strategy-making is shaped by leaders’ backgrounds and the forms of decision-making mechanisms. Ganz’s insight reminds researchers that strategy-making is not random and without any pattern. Leaders’ background and the institutions (formal and informal) of the organization are two crucial shapers of leaders’ strategic capacity.

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3 Strategic capacity includes three elements: salient information (the action repertoires that the leaders are familiar with), heuristic processes (the leaders use their repertoires creatively in order to deal with new or changing environment), and motivation.
Although Ganz’ work helps us to understand the process of strategy-making and the relation between strategies and consequences of social movements, his argument stresses the positive impact of strategy and neglects that strategies may bring backfires for social movements. Moreover, Ganz fails to treat the processes of strategy-making as an interlocking sequence. Although he indicates that leaders’ strategies generate outcomes that reshape environments and leaders’ strategic capacity, which configure subsequent strategies, he does not demonstrate this point in his analysis. His analysis of agricultural worker movements in California treats each strategy-making as a one-shot action rather than linking them by time sequence. The failure to bring attention to the lock-in effect among strategies means that scholars of social movements cannot catch full story of a social movement but bring only a fragile episode.

Jasper: Strategic dilemmas and strategic arenas

Unlike Ganz neglecting the negative effects that strategies may bring to social movements, Jasper (2004, 2006) indicates that the problems that the leaders of social movements face are “strategic dilemmas”. According to Jasper, there is no perfect solution for these strategic dilemmas. Any solution for strategic dilemmas generates trade-off to social movements. Existing studies have demonstrated the affinity among the tactical repertoires of social movements (Ennis, 1988): social movements that use supporting candidates and lobby as strategies are less likely to choose violent methods to achieve their goals (Ennis, 1988); when social movements are institutionalized, it is difficult for the leaders to choose disruptive tactics as the means to achieve their goals (Piven and Cloward, 1979); and “centralized organizations may be able to act in a more coordinated fashion, but at the cost of cutting grassroots members out of decision making” (Jasper, 2004:7). Jasper (2004, 2006) also argues that leaders’ strategy-making does not happen in a vacuum but in the “strategic arenas”. Jasper notes that “strategic choices are made within a complex set of cultural and institutional contexts that shape the players themselves, the options perceived, the choices made from among them, and the outcomes” (2004:5). To Jasper, the relation between leaders’ strategy and the strategic arenas are not a fixed but a reflexive and dynamic process. Leaders’ solution may change the strategy arenas that social movements are located in and reshape the strategic capacity that leaders own.

However, as Ganz, Jasper does not focus on the connection among the strategic dilemmas. During the life courses of social movements, the leaders do not only encounter one strategic dilemma. The interaction between the dilemmas and strategies are not Jasper’s main focus. Nevertheless, if we want to understand how
leaders’ choices shape life courses of social movements, we have to shed light on the lock-in effect between strategies and dilemmas.

**Haydu: Reiterated problem-solving processes**

To supplement the Ganz’s and Jasper’s omissions of sequencing strategy-making and the lock-in effect among strategies and dilemmas, I use Haydu’s (1998) concept that human developments are reiterated problem-solving processes. From the Haydu’s perspective, the dilemmas and strategies of social movements are not isolated events but occur in a sequence. Hence, what solutions that a social movement adopts in former stages would shape what dilemmas and strategies that this movement encounters and take in latter stages. This connection between events is so-called “path dependency” (North, 1990). Although path-dependency helps us find casual relations between separate events and identify the mechanisms behind the causal relations, Haydu argues that path-dependency depends too much on exogenous factors such as historical contingency and dramatic accidents to explain historical turning points. Agency is usually lost in the approach of path-dependency. To bring agency back, Haydu (1998) suggests a problem-solving approach that “attends to the ways in which outcomes at a given switch point are themselves products of the past rather than historical accidents” (p.354). Heydu’s concept indicates that social movements face multiple dilemmas during their life courses and that the strategies they use to deal with these dilemmas do not always benefit them. Leaders’ choices may create later crises, structure available options, and shape the choices made at historical junctures. To understand the relation between agency and life courses of social movements, we should focus on the solutions for different dilemmas in different stages and examine the lock-in effect of these solutions for the paths of social movements.4

**The reiterative dilemma-solving model**

By integrating the insights of Ganz, Jasper and Haydu to the strategizing process

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4 The study by Slez and Martin (2007) that focuses on the building of the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787 is a good example demonstrates Haydu’s idea. Slez and Martin argue that the Constitution was not simply the result of material or ideological interest but the outcome of the state delegations’ decisions sequence. The researchers note “as each subsequent within the Convention fixed a previous point of contention, it also indirectly determined which issues would become viable points of conflict in the future” (p. 42). In their study, for example, Georgia and South Carolina were a coalition because both states wanted to maintain the slavery system. However, when the state delegations decided that both states were allowed to continue importing slaves until 1808, the coalition between Georgia and South Carolina was broken. In the next conflict between the Federalists and Republicans, Georgia and South Carolina took different positions. The case of Georgia and South Carolina indicates that “each decision changed the meaning of future issues, and hence how actors understood where their commonalities of interest lay” (p. 42).
and the lock-in effect among movement leaders’ decisions, I establish the “reiterative dilemma-solving model” to illustrate how movement leaders’ strategies shape the rise and fall of social movements.\(^5\) Figure 1 demonstrates this model:

**Figure 1. Strategic capacity, strategic arenas, and dilemma-solving processes**

According to this model, the leaders of social movements face strategic dilemma 1 in time 1. The leaders’ strategic capacity (leaders’ background and the form of decision-making) and strategic arenas (the elements include mobilization structures, participants’ reactions, opponents’ counter strategies and political institutions) shape what strategies leaders would use to deal with this dilemma. The leaders’ strategies generate outcome 1, which reshapes the leaders’ strategic capacity and strategic arenas. Outcome 1 may also generate dilemmas that the movement faces in time 2. Leaders face the second dilemma in time 2 use the strategic capacity and strategic arenas that are shaped by outcome 1, leaders adopt the strategies to solve this dilemma. The same processes reoccur in later time points. In the case of the rise and fall of social movements, the time sequence leads to demobilization. Since most students focus on how leaders make mobilization success rather than how their strategic actions bring about the failure of the social movements, one of my goals is

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\(^5\) Tilly (2008) also suggests the campaign-to-campaign impact in cycles of social movements. He argues that a social movement shapes the repertoires of the next movement by changing the political opportunity structure, available models of performances and connections among potential actors. However, Tilly’s model still focuses on structural factors and the interaction of different social movements. Therefore, his model is inappropriate to illustrate the relation between leaders’ choices and the life course of a social movement.
to clarify the role of leaders’ strategic actions in the decline of social movements.

**Data and Analysis**

The main data I use here are newspaper reports of the Reds from May to November 2006. I collected these reports from two of main newspapers in Taiwan—the *China Times* and the *Liberty Times*. Since both newspapers are newspapers that have large audiences in Taiwan, their reports in both are more complete and reliable than other information sources. Further, when I analyze these reports, I focus on the reports of the “facts” about the Reds rather than emotional or ideological reviews and comments. In addition to the *China Times* and the *Liberty Times*, I also refer to English-language newspapers published in Taiwan such as the *Taipei Times*. These English-language newspapers provide a tool to translate the vocabulary of the Reds from Chinese to English.

Since this case study focuses on the sequence of recurrent strategic choices made by the leaders of the Reds, the most important tasks are discerning the dilemmas encountered, locating these dilemmas in the sequence, showing the strategies that the Reds took, demonstrating the trade-off of these strategies and clarifying the relationship between these strategies. To achieve these goals, first I select the key issues according to the frequency of reports in these newspapers. Because the leaders need to adopt strategies to solve these issues, the existence of these issues implies the presence of the dilemmas. I use “day” as the counting unit to sort the dilemmas: how many days a particular issue was reported in these two newspapers. There are three reasons why I sort the dilemmas in this way. First, it helps me reveal which dilemma influences the social movement the most. Since a social movement faces numerous dilemmas during its life course and not all dilemmas have the same influence on the trajectory of this movement, it is necessary to find the dilemmas that are most salient to the activists of the movement and audiences. Using the frequency of reports on the issues as a filter helps me to distinguish the major dilemmas for the Reds. Second, I locate the reporting dates of the issues in a time sequence to confirm the order of these dilemmas. The reports of these major dilemmas may be concentrated in different periods. Therefore, I can create a time sequence for these dilemmas. Third, it helps me to trace the trade-off of these dilemmas and how the trade-off shapes the paths of social movements. Although most of the reports about each dilemma are concentrated in different periods, some reports may be sparsely distributed in the sequence after the concentration periods, meaning that, even after the peak of the major dilemmas, the dilemmas still play an important role in later stages. In other
words, these sparse reports reflect the connections between strategies. After sorting the most influential dilemmas, I examine, using the two newspapers, what factors create these dilemmas, how the Reds deal with them, the trade-off of the Reds’ strategies and how the trade-off shapes the following dilemmas and strategies that the Reds faced and adopted. I will illustrate the relationship among dilemmas, strategies, trade-off and the life course of the Reds by applying my reiterative dilemma-solving model.

According to this criteria, I identify four dilemmas that the Reds faced in its life course: the boundary-drawing dilemma (Who should and who should not participate?), the strategy-making dilemma (What kind of strategy should be adopted?), the goal-shifting dilemma (Who is the target?), and a form of decline dilemma (Which form of decline should be adopted after the movement loses mobilization capacity?). These four dilemmas are like anchors that shape the trajectory of the Reds. I will demonstrate how the interactions of these dilemmas and strategies create the unique path of the Reds.

The Mobilization Structure in Taiwan: Either Blue or Green

National identity is the most salient social cleavage in Taiwan, and political parties usually mobilize people by this cleavage. There are two political camps, the blue and green (Schubert, 2004). These camps not only represent political cleavage but also refer to different images of national identity. The blue camp is composed of the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist party), the People First Party (PFP), and the New Party (NP). They argue that Taiwanese are also Chinese, and Taiwan should be reunified with China in the future. The other is the green camp. The green camp is composed of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) and the Taiwanese Solidarity Union (TSU). The green camp argues that Taiwanese are not Chinese, and Taiwan is already an independent country and will not be reunified with China in the future. Before 2000, the ruling party was the KMT (1945-1980s, under an authoritarian regime). After 2000, the ruling party has been the DPP. However, the majority party in the legislative sector is still the blue.

“Blue” and “green” not only provide the social base for mobilization but also shape how Taiwanese recognize, interpret, and evaluate public issues. If you are a blue constituent, you probably oppose, disagree with, or have a low opinion of the proposals, policies, and public construction of the green camp. By the same token, a green constituent seldom supports anything that is labeled “blue”. Even people who are not adherents of these two camps still judge public issues from the “either blue or green” lense. Neutral people, when public issues link to blue or green, identify...
these issues as political soapboxes, which decrease people’s motivation to participate. The “blue” or “green” lenses are what Goffman (1974:21) called a “frame” that “allows its user to locate, perceive, identify and label” what social actors see in the world. Moreover, the “either blue or green” frame is also what Benford and Snow (2000) called “master frames” that “function as a kind of master algorithm that color and constrains the orientation and activities of other movements” (p. 618). “Either blue or green” is a restricted and exclusive master frame (Snow and Benford, 1992): people can stand on only one color, blue or green. When leaders mobilize by this frame, they actually lose half of the people’s support. In other words, this master frame is both an opportunity and a constraint in the mobilization of social movements. If the leaders of social movements identify that they are a certain color or they oppose a certain color, they can easily gather groups of people. However, when they identify their color or oppose a certain color, they have difficulty in mobilizing people to support the other color. In the case of the Reds, the target of the Reds, President Chen, was from the green camp. Under the “either blue or green” logic, the blue politicians and constituents were more likely to participate in this movement.

The strategic dilemmas of the Reds

The boundary-drawing dilemma: a civic or partisan movement?

Most protest movements start from nothing except anger at the current regime (Jasper, 1997), the Reds was too. However, only anger cannot tell people who the target is, what the goals are and what strategies are appropriate to achieve the goal. To channel people’s anger to practical actions, a social movement needs to establish its collective identity. The mobilization structure in Taiwan brings the first dilemma to the Reds, that is, determining what its collective identity would be: should it be a civic movement that focused on all people in Taiwan or a partisan movement that mirrored the “either blue or green” cleavage? To solve this dilemma, the leaders of the Reds decided to create a bridging frame to link people with different political positions in order to obtain more legitimacy. As the leaders’ expectation, this strategy brought a successful mobilization. Nevertheless, it also generated an unintended consequence to the Reds: this strategy created a loose boundary which resulted in the reorganization of the leadership team and the criticisms to the neutrality of the

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6 Jasper (2006) expresses a similar idea in his universalism dilemma and extension dilemma. Both dilemmas concern how when a social movement expands its scale or alliances, the increasing diversity of participants may blur its initial purposes and decrease the solidarity of the movement. I use the “boundary-drawing dilemma” because I focus on how Reds dealt with the problem of multiple identities. Making alliances was not the Reds’ goal. Instead, they wanted to create a boundary that obtained the support of most Taiwanese and increased the legitimacy this movement.
On August 11, Shih claimed he would launch an impeachment movement called “A Million People Step Up” against President Chen. Shih and his partners also held a press conference in Taipei’s 228 Peace Memorial Park to announce their plan on August 12. According to his speech, Shih wanted to define this movement as anti-corruption rather than a conflict between ethnic groups (the mainlanders and the Taiwanese), political parties (the KMT and the DPP), or colors (blue and green). Shih delivered a message to audiences that the Reds was not a partisan movement, but a civic movement that opposed a corrupt president.

To achieve this goal, the leaders tried to create a collective identity that could be accepted by most Taiwanese. The strategy the leaders adopted was the creation of a bridging frame to connect people in different camps. By creating a bridging frame, the Reds could cross the constraints of the “either blue or green” master frame and frame itself as a civic movement. Therefore, patriotism, social justice, and a unitary Taiwan were the main focuses of Shih’s speech. These values targeted all people in Taiwan. To keep the Reds from the contamination of the colors, Shih deliberatively isolated the Reds from other anti-Chen organizations. For example, Shih refused to cooperate with the Democratic Action Alliance, which had strong mainland and blue backgrounds and has shown deep hatred to President Chen for a long time. To Shih, a civic movement should be based on common values of Taiwanese rather than the hatred to a specific person. If the Reds showed too much hatred to President Chen, the Reds took a risk to being seen as a part of the blue camp. Shih also claimed that the Reds did not want any political party involved because such participation might allow the Taiwanese to interpret the Reds as another conflict between blue and green.

Another example of keeping partisan identity from the Reds was the fundraising activity. One goal of the fundraising was establish an independent financial position. The leaders claimed to raise one hundred million Taiwanese dollars (NTD, roughly equal to 3 US dollars). After the amount of donations exceeded this number, they declared, the Reds would start a long term sit-in movement. “One man, one hundred” was the rule for donations. Under this rule, when the fundraising yielded more than one hundred million NTD, it meant that more than one million people supported the movement. The Reds announced that after it received one million people’s donations, they would start an around-the-clock sit-in.

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7 *Taipei Times*, 8/13/2006  
9 To Shih and his leader team, this fundraising had three functions. First, it allowed them to test public opinion. Shih mentioned that if the fundraising did not include more than one million people, it meant that the social conditions were too weak to launch the movement. Second, the donations would
Other actors in the strategic arenas also sensed that maintaining the neutrality of the Reds was the source of its power. Take the response of the blue leaders for example. The chairmen of the KMT and the FPF, Ma Ying-Jeou and James Song, respectively, claimed that neither of the political parties would be involved in the operation of the Reds.\(^\text{10}\) Ma even mentioned, “If the KMT helps Shih, people may think that it’s the KMT again.”\(^\text{11}\) Although the blue camp tried to maintain the neutrality of the Reds, the green camp worked hard to demonstrate a connection between the Reds and the blue camp. The green politicians indicated that Shih had left the green camp long before and did not understand the current core values of the pro-independence. Some also implied that Shih was the vanguard of the blue camp. President Chen even mentioned publicly that the Reds were the product of conflicts between different political parties and national identities.\(^\text{12}\) In other words, all players in this field recognized the power source of the Reds, but adopted different strategies to interpret the color of the Reds to serve their interests.

In the early days of the Reds, their leaders strategically created a categorization that bridged members of the blue and green camps. The anti-corruption frame did help the Reds neutralized the countermovement from the green camp, encouraged more participants to join, and generated audiences who were compassionate toward the Reds. However, this strategic choice came with a trade-off: the “anti-corruption frame” turned the Reds into a highly open movement.

A highly open movement has two negative influences to the Reds. First, it makes the Reds hard to maintain the image of a neutral movement. Although the Reds did not welcome people who enact blue or green identity to join the movement, they could not prevent people who claimed to support anti-corruption from joining the movement’s activities. The problem for the Reds was people might change their identity in order to participate in the anti-Chen campaign. This problem occurred frequently between the Reds and the blue camp, since President Chen was a highest icon of the green camp and thus the blue politicians and supporters were more likely to participate in this movement. When blue politicians claimed, “we hate corruption,”

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provide the funding that the Reds needed. With one hundred million NTD, the Reds would not need other organizations’ involvement. As the spokesman of the Reds, Ho De-Fan said, “The money will be used to pay for food and drinks and cleaning at the proposed sit-in site...it would signify an individual citizen’s commitment and authorization in support of the campaign.” (China Times, 8/11/2006) This funding kept the Reds’ neutral image and helped maintain its positioning as an anti-corruption movement. Third, the fundraising drive enhanced people’s motivation and confidence in the Reds. Once one million participants stepped up, other people might recognize that it was a real opportunity to impeach President Chen. This strategy echoed Kuzman’s (1997) finding in the 1980 revolution in Iran wherein the protest activities, having reached critical mass, created a political opportunity for people to join in the movement because it seemed to be successful.

\(^{10}\) China Times, 8/11/2006.

\(^{11}\) China Times, 8/13/2006; Liberty Times, 8/13/2006.

\(^{12}\) Taipei Times, 8/13/2006.
the Reds had no reason to refuse their participation. But once they were present in
the activities of the Reds, the Reds might be interpreted as a blue movement. This
tension was reflected in the public speeches of the Reds’ leaders. Even the leaders
tried to deal with this situation, the neutrality of the Reds had been harmed. The
media did not refer to them as “Mr.” Ma and Song but still referred to them as “the
KMT and PFP chairmen” in their reports. Although Ma and Song hoped that people
could see their participation in the activities of the Reds through an “anti-corruption”
frame, people may still interpreted the Reds through the “either blue or green”
frame.

Second, the loose boundaries between the Reds and the blue camp increased
the possibility for the blue politicians to transform this anti-corruption movement to
an anti-Chen movement. Since the Reds was a highly open movement, the leadership
team was more easily to be challenged. In other words, the anti-corruption frame
also increased the possibility of internal conflicts between old and new leaders. We
can see this consequence in the next dilemma.

Strategy-making dilemma: traditional or innovative tactics?

On August 14 the Reds announced its Seven Leaders Committee, and this
committee was their highest ranking unit. To convince audiences that they were not
a partisan movement, none of these seven leaders had deep connections with the
blue camp. Most of them were Taiwanese and former green politicians or supporters.
This composition conveyed two messages to the people in Taiwan. First, it was not a
political struggle between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders because most leaders
in the initial stage were Taiwanese. Second, it was not a political conflict between
blue and green. Because most leaders had deeper relationships with the green camp,
it was hard to conclude that the Reds had been launched by the blue camp.

Because most of these leaders were members of the green camp and the
green camp was the main force that pushed for the democratic transition of Taiwan
through social movements, these leaders shared similar backgrounds and political
experiences. These similar backgrounds and experiences resulted in similar strategic

13 Examples include Mayor Ma and KMT mayoral candidate, Hau Lung-Bin, brought 1,200 breakfasts
to the sit-in on September 14; The FPF chairman, Song even came to the sit-in every day; Taichung
City Mayor Hu was the first blue politician to make a donation. He also pointed out that his donation
was based on the anti-corruption value, not his KMT partisanship (China Times, 8/12/2006).
14 For example, Shih said, “Mr. Ma and Song are welcome to donate, but chairmen Ma and Song are
not. If the KMT and the PFP mobilize their constituents, the anti-corruption movement will give rise to
conflicts between blue and green, reunified and independent” (China Times, 8/13/2006). Jerry Fan,
one of the leaders, repeated this line later. He mentioned, “The campaign would not welcome people
with specific political goals to participate, but it would welcome anyone whose intention was to make
Taiwan a better country” (Taipei Times, 8/28/2006). Shih also announced that all political symbols
such as flags, slogans, and vests with politicians’ names were forbidden in the Reds’ activities.
capacities and a consensus on the appropriate tactics for an anti-corruption movement. The tactical repertoires they used, such as daily sit-ins, protection of democracy, and the love of Taiwan, were conventional tactics of Taiwan’s democratic movement. Also, in the initial period, there were no reports of internal conflicts within the leader team because these leaders had consensus on the selection of strategy. In other words, the similar strategic capacity of the initial leaders not only brought the Reds tactic repertoires but also created a consistent and harmonious leadership.

However, since the Reds was a highly open movement, it was possible for people who were not the initial members of the Seven Leaders Committee to participate in the decision-making of the Reds in later stages. After the “One man, one hundred” fundraising obtained a huge success, more and more people wanted to join in the decision-making process of the Reds. These newcomers did not want to follow the traditional ways when it came to organizing the Reds. Instead, they had a different image of social movements and wanted to introduce innovative strategies. Because the initial leaders and newcomers had different backgrounds and therefore different positions on the strategies the Reds should adopt, several conflicts arose with the initial leaders and the newcomers. For example, determining what color should be used to symbolize Reds resulted in a debate between the initial leaders and the newcomers. Jerry Fan, a newcomer and owner of an advertising agency, suggested that this anti-corruption movement use red as its symbolic color and asked supporters to wear red clothes to show people’s anger towards President Chen. This suggestion was opposed by some initial leaders. Ho De-Fen, who was a member of the Seven Leaders Committee and official spokesman of the Reds, argued that using red as the symbol might lead the Taiwanese to link the movement to the blue camp and the Chinese Communist Party, the official enemy for last sixty years. This connection would hinder the focus of this movement, because the Taiwanese might interpret this movement as another struggle between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese. However, Fan’s suggestion won the debate and the movement was officially named the Reds.

Another example of a disagreement between the Ho and Fan was related to the Reds’ mode of operation. The initial leaders argued that the activities of the Reds should follow the traditional model. Ho suggested that the main theme of the Reds

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15 After President Chen won office for the first time, the blue camp had started to established intensive relations with China’s government. The green camp usually defined the cooperation between the blue camp and the Chinese government as an attempt at betrayal. Therefore, using red as a symbolic color might remind people of the relation between this anti-corruption movement and the blue camp, even with the Chinese government, and provide the green camp an opportunity to distort the intention of this movement.

16 China Times, 8/31/1006.
should be to duplicate the past experiences of social movements in Taiwan. In the traditional model, social movements were supposed to be serious and somber activities and the participants were expected to show their resolution that they would continue the protest until President Chen resigned. However, newcomers such as Fan had a different idea about the Reds. Fan suggested a festival model: the Reds should not be composed of serious and somber participants. On the contrary, they should generate a happy and passionate environment. In Fan’s estimation, social movements should attract more students, business owners, housewives, and members of the middle class: in short, those who seldom care about participating in politics. To achieve this goal, the Reds should show more creativity and do something different from the traditional social movements. On this issue, Fan’s suggestion once again won the debate and became the main theme of the Reds. When Fan’s idea was adopted by the Reds, Ho resigned from the position of spokesman and announced that she would no longer be involved in decision-making.

Ho was not the only case. The initial leaders James Jian and Chuang Yen also debated with Fan. Around September 15, Jian and Chuang proposed to launch a national strike to force President Chen to negotiate with the Reds. Their logic was very similar to Piven and Cloward’s argument (1979): disruptive tactics are the only way for powerless groups to achieve goals. Disruptive tactics such as national strikes can disrupt the realization of the dominant groups’ interest and force them to make concessions. This proposal was rejected by Fan and other newcomers because they argued that a national strike would hurt Taiwan’s economy. After the Reds rejected the strike proposal, Jian and Chuang left the center of decision-making.

The conflicts between the initial leaders and newcomers resulted from their different strategic capacities. The initial leaders wanted to create a sober style movement like the democratic movements they were involved in; On the contrary, newcomers such as Fan wanted the Reds movement to be a creative festival which is consistent with his background in advertising and his lack of deep ties with previous democratic movements. Before Fan participated in the decision-making, there was no dissonance with the leader team. However, when Fan participated in the decision-making, conflicts between him and the initial leaders were unavoidable. When Fan won the victory and the initial leaders withdrew from the core of the Reds, it also meant the transformation of the Reds’ strategic capacity.

To some extent, Fan’s innovative strategies achieved his goals. These strategies saved the participants’ energy and extended the life course of the Reds.17 However,
these strategies also generated side effects that were not Fan’s intention. First, taking these innovative strategies worsened the tension between the initial leaders and newcomers even the fragmentation of the movement. The cases of Ho, Jian and Chuang illustrate this trade-off. The reorganization of the leadership team also changed the strategic capacity of the Reds. Second, the adoption of these innovative strategies also disappointed some general participants who indicated that Fan’s strategies moved the Reds away from an impeachment movement. Like the initial leaders, these adherents had expectations that differed from those of the newcomers. In other words, the innovative strategies not only resulted in the withdrawal of the initial leaders but also made some general participants leave the activities of the Reds. More seriously, all these initial leaders and disappointed participants had an association with the green camp. When the green participants gradually left, the Reds were more liable to be identified as a blue movement.

In addition, Fan’s strategies resulted in the bystanders’ antipathy because the activities of the Reds were gradually full of hatred toward the green camp and the Chinese identity. These examples reflect what Jasper (2006) calls the “audience segregation dilemma”. Although these blue voices benefited the cooperation of the blue participants, they resulted in the antipathy of the green and neutral participants. This situation also provided the green camp with an opportunity to “bluelize” the Reds in order to decrease their legitimacy and recalled the audiences’ memory about the past conflicts between blue and green.

As Jasper (working paper) suggests that innovative strategies are not only benefits but also generate backfire to social movements. The backfires of the innovative strategies to the Reds resulted from the conflicts and segmentation between old and new leaders as well as the antipathy of the neutral and green supporters. Studies have shown when social movements last for a period or experience significant success, more and more outsiders tend to participate in later stages. Because the newcomers of a social movement usually have different backgrounds from the veterans and do not understand the existing unspoken norms in the movement, conflicts between the newcomers and veterans are unavoidable. After the newcomers replace the veterans and dominate the decision-making of the participants were needed to continue the life of the Reds.

18 Take the participants’ performances in the public forum; one pupil declaimed this doggerel on the forum: “Corruptive Chen Shui-Bian doesn’t set down and is shameless, he disregards the people’s voice, we will send him to the scaffold” (Taipei Times, 9/13/2006). Although this bitter doggerel won the participants’ applause, it suggested the other people, through a live TV broadcast, that it was not a “real” anti-corruption movement but an anti-Chen movement launched by the blue camp. Another vivid example is that the Taiwanese identity was a forbidden term for the Reds. When the leader Wang Li-Ping mentioned, “For Taiwan this country,” the participants asked her stop and leave the forum. On the contrary, when one participant said “Viva the KMT,” the participants were fine with it (China Times, 9/15/2006).
social movements, the goals, means and culture of the social movements also change (Whittier, 1997; Polleta, 2002). The story of the Reds echoes this process.

*Goal-Shifting dilemma: an anti-Chen or anti-corruption movement?*

In order to counter the Reds, the green politicians accused Ma Ying-Jeou, the Chairman of KMT and the Taipei City mayor during that period, of being involved in the misuse of the Mayor’s Office Special City Fund. This accusation brought the Reds another dilemma: should the Reds expand their objectives to include Ma? Since the Reds claimed it was an anti-corruption movement, they should use the same standard and ask Ma to resign. However, because the solution for the boundary-drawing dilemma made the Reds a highly open movement, and the solutions for the strategy-making dilemma resulted in the loss of some initial leaders and participants who were “green,” the leader team had gradually become controlled by blue politicians. Since the Reds depended more and more on the blue camp, if they decided to impeach Ma, they could stand to lose their social base. The strategy that the Reds adopted to solve this dilemma was to keep the focus on the President Chen and downplay Ma’s scandal. Although the Reds condemned Ma verbally, they never launched protests or sit-ins in response to Ma’s scandal. This decision reflected that the leaders of the Reds started to make choices according to the “either blue or green” frame again. Below are examples to show the Reds was closer and closer to the blue camp in the middle stage.

Although the Reds wanted to be a neutral and inclusive movement that focused on the common good of the Taiwanese rather than the interests of any political party, the solutions for the strategy-making dilemmas forced them to rely more on the blue camp. Take the around-the-clock sit-in for example. According to the Assembly and Parade Law, any organization that plans to launch protests must apply a week in advance, and local governments have the authority to approve or refuse these applications. Therefore, the decisions of the Taipei City government were critical to the Reds. When they applied to the Taipei City government for their around-the-clock sit-in, most people believed that the application would be rejected because the normal period for past protests had been 8:00 am to 10:00 pm, and a legal around-the-clock sit-in which lasted over one month had never happened. However, the Taipei City government conditionally approved the Reds’ application. Although Ma tried to keep a boundary between the Reds and the blue camp,19 this

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19 To keep the Reds from becoming the “blues,” Mayor Ma appealed to the public for acceptance. First, he noted the decision had been made by the Public Works Bureau and the Police Department, not by him. It reveals that Ma avoided being labeled as Reds’ supporter. Second, Ma indicated that the Assembly and Parade Law did not set any time limit on protest activities. The 8:00 am to 10:00 pm limit was just an unwritten convention. Ma also mentioned that a democratic country should allow
approval attracted complaints from the green camp. The green politicians pointed out that this approval was a special “Shih Ming-Teh Clause” and interpreted this permission as support from Ma. With the approval of this abnormal application, the green camp had more sufficient evidence to convince the Taiwanese that the Reds were a blue movement.

As discussed above, the Reds’ solution for the boundary-drawing dilemma was the creation of an inclusive movement-specific frame, which provided the blue politicians with an opportunity to take over the Reds. One piece of evidence to show the “bluelization” of the Reds is the shift in composition of the leader team. Since some initial leaders had left the leader team and the Reds needed more leaders to coordinate their huge activities, they had to recruit new leaders in order to fill these jobs. However, most candidates were blue politicians, though they claimed to be joining because they opposed corruption. The “siege” on October 10 can be seen as a crucial example about the bluelization of the Reds. October 10 is the National Day of Taiwan and the Reds launched another large protest on this date. The Reds planned to mobilize 1 million participants in order to hinder the National Day Ceremony. To coordinate such a huge crowd, the Reds had to recruit a number of new leaders. On October 9, the Reds announced forty-nine commanders for the siege. Almost all these commanders were legislators and city councilors of the blue camp. Although they wore red shirts and scarves when they were introduced, they act like the blue politicians. The initial leader, Chuang Yen directly indicated the “bluelization” of the movement in an interview. He said, “After September 15, the campaign became a stage for politicians of the KMT and PFP to perform. It changed the nature of the campaign and hurt the campaign a lot. Another problem was Ma. Most of the time, Shih cooperated with Ma...It hurt the campaign a lot.”

After the initial leaders left the leader team, the blue politicians dominated the processes of strategy-making and the goal of the Reds was no longer to be an anti-corruption movement, but an anti-Chen or anti-green movement. The shift of the Reds’ logic was reflected in the “siege” on October 10. Some blue politicians tried to disrupt President Chen’s speech and had a physical fight with the green politicians during the National Day Ceremony. Some commanders asked the participants to block the entrances and did not let representatives of other countries enter the

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20 There are two reasons to explain the “bluelization” of the leader team. First, the green camp prohibited its politicians from appearing in any activity of the Reds in order to frame the Reds as a blue movement. This made it hard for the Reds to recruit green participants as commanders. Second, the blue politicians had high motivation and pressure from blue constituents to appear with the Reds, and the Reds had no reason to refuse their requests to participate in the movement when they asserted an “anti-corruption” identity.

21 Central News Agency, 10/13/2006
ceremony. The goal for these commanders was to humiliate President Chen, but their activities also brought shame to the country, the very thing that they had claimed to protect in the beginning. All these scenes were broadcast live to TV audiences and caused viewers to think that the Reds were a part of the struggle between the blue and green. As a result, the green camp’s counter-strategy of framing the Reds as a vanguard of the blue camp became more convincing to the audiences.

Although the Reds originally claimed to be an anti-corruption movement and not a duplication of the political struggle between the blue and green camps, they use different standards to deal with Ma’s scandal. Since Ma was the brightest star in the blue camp, it was reasonable that the Reds did not take any practical actions against Ma after they were bluelized. Undoubtedly, concentrating on President Chen gave the Reds the opportunity to recruit the leaders and general participants it needed to launch such a large-scale protest as the “siege.” However, when the Reds downplayed Ma’s scandal, they went back to the “either blue or green” frame. The trade-off was that the Reds lost the power to bridge people from different political camps. This trade-off provided an advantage for the green camp’s counter-strategy.

The “bowing out” dilemma: an abeyance structure or a vanishing?

Soon after the successful “siege,” the leaders of the Reds announced a temporary scaling down of operations. When social movements cannot achieve their goals and encounter strong counter-movements or unfavorable political and social climate, some develop what scholars call an abeyance structure by which the movement can continue its life and influence during a difficult time and wait for opportunities to achieve its goal (Taylor, 1997). For example, on the institutional dimension, a declining social movement can transform itself from a mass movement to an exclusive cadre group or establish a centralized organization in order to maintain participants’ commitment and the initial ideals while waiting for the resurgence of the movement. On the ideological dimension, a social movement may create a “fortifying myth” that enhances participants’ confidence about the future of the movement (Voss, 1996). However, the Reds just chose to stop most of their activities. Although they rented an office near the presidential offices and claimed that they would continue to fight until President Chen resigned, they seemed to almost be vanishing.

According to Fan, the Reds made this decision because of “considering the hardships endured by the police and the press over the past month, our financial situation and the people’s anxiety, we have decided to scale down the protest.” It is clear that these plights of the Reds resulted from the strategies such as

22 Taipei Times, 10/14/2006
around-the-clock sit-in and a festival style movement. However, Fan’s words could not illustrate, first, why the Reds did not propose any plan to deal with these plights. The leaders of the Reds were creative and vigorous in the initial and middle stages, so why did they not repeat their successful experiences? Second, not all participants were exhausted or had run out of money or lost the motivation to join this movement. Some participants went to the office of the Reds and asked permission to continue the sit-in or launch more disruptive activities. Third, although the Reds faced some problems and had to curtail their activities, they could choose other solutions which would have contributed to the achievement of their goal rather than just terminate most of their activities.

I suggest that once we consider the “bluelization” of the leader team and the decision-making mechanism of the Reds, the reasons for this choice become clearer. Because most of the leaders of the Reds after October 10 were from the blue camp, the logic of the Reds had been transformed from an anti-corruption movement to an anti-Chen movement. The goal for the Reds was no longer to eradicate corruption in Taiwan, but to obtain more political interest for the blue camp. When Ma was also involved in a similar scandal, continuing the Reds’ original idea and goal would likely risk Ma and the blue camp. Turning their arrow on Ma would especially hurt the blue politicians’ collective interest of winning the Presidential election of 2008. Due to the logic of the Reds being replaced by the blue logic, it was hardly surprising that the Reds did not consider other solutions which could help them achieve their goal.

Another reason that the Reds made this decision is related to their decision-making mechanism. Studies have demonstrated that social movements that make decisions through public deliberation are more likely to choose flexible and efficient strategies (Ganz, 2000) and maintain the participants’ commitment even when the movements are defeated (Schwartz and Paul, 1995). In both situations, social movements are more likely to maintain their influences when they face difficult time. Making decision through public deliberation has two advantages to maintain social movements. First, leaders can receive diverse information that is critical for making better decisions. Second, the processes of public deliberation can enhance the solidarity within social movements. However, the Reds’ decision-making was controlled by the leaders and the ordinary participants did not have an opportunity to contribute their ideas. It means that the Reds lacked common channels between the leaders and the general participants. This decision-making mechanism limited the information the leaders could obtain and failed to create a strong bond among the participants. Therefore, once the leader team was dominated by the blue camp, leaders made decisions that violated the initial purpose of the Reds. When the leaders did not want to continue this movement and most
participants lacked a strong connection to the movement, it was hard for the Reds to develop themselves into an abeyance structure, either institutionally or ideologically.

Discussion

The rise and fall of the Reds: the lock-in effect of strategies

Table 1 summarizes the dilemmas that the Reds encountered, the solutions for these dilemmas, the trade-offs of these solutions, and how these trade-offs locked the Reds in a trajectory of decline. From Table 1, the first dilemma the Reds faced was the boundary-drawing dilemma. To solve this dilemma, they identified it as a civic movement rather than a partisan movement. The Reds achieved this goal by creating a bridging movement-specific frame, namely, “anti-corruption.” This bridging movement-specific frame helped the Reds to transcend the restrictive master frame, “either blue or green” and enhanced the Reds’ social base and legitimacy. This solution shaped the relations between the Reds and audiences, including the competitors, potential participants and indifferent bystanders. By adopting the “anti-corruption” positioning and packaging it as civic movement, the Reds neutralized the counter-strategy of the green camp, who wanted to connect the Reds to the blue camp in order to degrade them as another political conflict between blue and green. They recruited more participants, and won the sympathy of bystanders who did not care about politics. The trade-off for this solution was that it was hard for the Reds to maintain their boundaries. Many blue politicians oscillated between the Reds and the blue camp. This trade-off increased the possibility of the “bluelization” of the Reds as well as internal conflicts between leaders, since the openness of the Reds allowed disputes between veterans and new comers.

(insert table 1 here)

For the strategy-making dilemma, the bridging frame created an opportunity for the newcomers to challenge initial leaders’ strategies. The newcomers and initial leaders had different ideas about the Reds. The initial leaders wanted traditional repertoires, but the newcomers preferred a festival style movement. These different expectations of the Reds resulted in internal conflicts between the initial leaders and newcomers. The newcomers won the debate and the initial leaders left the movement. The departure of the initial leaders also caused the withdrawal of some other participants, especially the green participants. In order to launch the siege of October 10, the Reds had to recruit new leaders to facilitate the coordination. However, since the blue politicians had stronger motivation than the green politicians to participate in the Reds’ activities, and the Reds could not maintain the
boundary between blue politicians and anti-corruption citizens, the leader team was dominated by the blue camp.

The “bluelized” leader team influenced how the Reds dealt with next two dilemmas, the goal-shifting and “bowing out” dilemmas. Since the leader team was controlled by the blue camp, the Reds started to work like a blue movement. When Ma’s scandal erupted, the Reds did not ask Ma to resign by the same standard as President Chen. When the Reds declined in power, they did not come up with strategies to help them while they waited for a better political climate and opportunity, but instead, stopped their activities. Although the solutions for these two dilemmas corresponded to the blue camp’s political interests, they also broke the “anti-corruption” frame that had previously been maintained carefully by the Reds. Blue politicians and blue repertoires made people interpret the Reds as a product of conventional political conflicts. In other words, the “anti-corruption” bridging frame had been replaced by the restricted frame, “either blue or green.” Without the “anti-corruption” frame, the Reds could not resist the green camp’s counter-movement. In the end, the Reds decided to terminate its activities after a successful “siege” in order to avoid hurting the blue camp’s interest. The case of the Reds suggests that we can illustrate why social movements have different trajectories even they face similar political opportunity structure only after consider strategy and sequence of dilemmas-solving in social movements.

The paradox of the bridging frames: An example of the backfire of the strategy

The case of the Reds also provides some insights into the relation between the bridging movement-specific frame and the decline of social movements. Although studies (Snow and Benford, 1992; Noonan, 1997) argue that bridging frames benefit social movements, the rise and fall of the Reds indicates that this frame is a paradox for social movements. On the one hand, bridging frames may benefit recruitment and increase the scale and the power of social movements in initial phases by creating an inclusive identity, enhancing participants’ motivation and increasing legitimacy of the movement. On the other hand, bridging frames may lock social movements into a path of demobilization after they obtain some degree of success.

From the story of the Reds, it becomes evident that the bridging frame may result in demobilization through three stages. In the first stage, adopting a bridging frame may result in the fractionalization of social movements because it creates loose boundaries and recruit diverse participants. Studies have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of participants increases the possibility of conflict within social movements. Internal conflicts may be based on different cohort experiences (Whittier, 1997), different backgrounds and stocks of tactical repertoires (Ganz, 2000),
and different understandings of the unspoken norms (Polletta, 2002) between the veterans and newcomers. In some situations, these participants may avoid conflicts by putting these differences into brackets and focusing on the common interest. However, when the participants face an emergent dilemma and have to make a decision, the differences between different sub-groups cannot be ignored, and battles are inevitable. The consequence of the battles is that some participants may leave the movement.

In the second stage, following the fractionalization of the movements and the withdrawal of some leaders, the shift in the leader team reduced some participants’ commitment to the movement. Although people may participate in a movement because rational choice reason (Friedman and McAdam, 1995), the fractionalization of the movement may result in exclusive sub-group identities. Since the collective identity is not a natural and fixed property but a temporal product of social process (Melluci, 1995), fractionalization may cue the participants to enact other identities. When fractionalization occurs, it means that the bridging frame and inclusive identity are challenged by the exclusive identities of sub-groups. In this situation, people who belong to a particular sub-group do not participate in the movement not because of the calculation of the cost and benefit but because of normative expectations of their performances. To maintain a collective identity, people have to struggle in everyday life in order to show the distinction between them and others (Whittier and Taylor, 1995; Whittier, 1997). Once the Reds was transformed to a blue movement gradually, in order to keep their identity, the green participants have to avoid participating in a blue movement even though he knows his participation is an efficient manner to impeach President Chen. The role of conflict and the normative expectation of a collective identity explain that, when the internal conflicts occurred and the green leaders withdrew from the core of the Reds, many green general participants also left even though they were still dissatisfied with Chen.

In the third stage, the fractionalization of the leader team and the withdrawal of a particular sub-group may finally result in the breaking of the bridging frame. This frame-breaking leads social movements to complete demobilization. For example, after the Reds were controlled by the blue camp and most participants on the ground were blue, the blue discourse dominated the movement. The activities of the Reds started to sound full of blue voices: the leaders focused only on President Chen’s scandal and ignored Ma’s; the leaders’ speeches and acts encouraged a Chinese identity while disdaining the Taiwanese identity; and they used “the Republic of China” rather than “Taiwan” to describe Taiwan, this political entity. These political practices not only replicate the theme of the conventional political conflicts in Taiwan but also rekey the meaning of the Reds (Goffman, 1974; McLean,
1998). Since the blue discourse is against the green discourse, a social movement that depends only on the blue discourse fails to provide a common ground for people with different political positions. When rekeying occurs, people still perform identical conventional patterns, but the whole setting has a different meaning. In the case of the Reds, these rekeying practices activate the restricted frame (“either blue or green”) and deactivate the bridging frame (“anti-corruption”). In other words, the bridging frame “anti-corruption” was broken and the Reds moved back to the conventionally political struggles in people’s minds. When this “anti-corruption” frame was broken, it meant that half of the participants might not support the movement, and the legitimacy of the Reds was hard to maintain. In the end, the Reds could not maintain its scale and influence as it did before.

For conflict movements such as the Reds focus on changing social structure, existing policies or extant power relation in society (McCarthy and Wolfson, 1992), the boundary-drawing is the “master dilemma”. The “master dilemma” is one that leaders encounter in the early stage of the social movement, and the solution (“master solution”) for this dilemma deeply locks the fate of the social movement. In the story of the Reds, it is clear that the solution for the boundary-drawing dilemma generated new dilemmas and constrained the solutions that leaders could adopt.

A Corresponding Case to the Reds: Student for a Democratic Society (SDS)

The lock-in effect of strategies and the paradox of the bridging frame not only occur in the Reds. We can observe these two tendencies in other significant movements. Consider the Student for a Democratic Society (SDS), so-called the New Left, which was composed of the youth lefties and performed an important role in the civil right and anti-war movement during 1960s. SDS started in 1960 with 250 members. Accompanying with the success of the SDS in some demonstrations, the peak of the membership of SDS was 100,000 on 1968’s presidential election. Yet, after eight months SDS split and finally lost its significant status by the end of 1969 (Barber, 2008). One reason that SDS expanded so quickly and failed so dramatically is the bridging frame that SDS adopted to solve the boundary-drawing dilemma: “participatory democracy.” Since participatory democracy means that no one should be excluded from the decision-making process, SDS abandoned the anti-communist clause that was usually adopted by traditional socialists. Taking this opportunity, the student Maoists, called the Progressive Labor Party (PL), disciplined infiltrated SDS organizations. PL was noted for its cadre style, pro-revolution position and strong connection to the working class. Because some SDS factions worried that these tendencies might polarize this movement, they formed the Revolution Youth Movement (RYM) to compete with the Worker Students Alliance (WSA) which had
been formed by PL. These two competing factions generated a spiral of mutual exclusion which peaked at the 1969 national convention. WSA occupied the leadership at the beginning of the convention and RYM fought back and claimed to have excluded PL from SDS. Finally, the competition between RYM and WSA split SDS into SDS-RYM and SDS-WSA (later called the Weathermen). Similar to the story of the Reds, the principle of participatory democracy opened a window for infiltration of PL and resulted in the internal conflicts of SDS. In the end, SDS declined because of the split and the breaking of the “participatory democracy” frame (Berman, 1997; Zakrzewski, 2001).

Conclusion

In this article, I argue that we should treat the course of social movements as a sequence of dilemma-solving. In the course of social movements, the leaders of movements are faced with a series of dilemmas that do not have perfect answers. When the leaders try to solve these dilemmas, their solutions are always accompanied by trade-offs. These trade-offs reconstruct the environment, transform the relations between social movements and their audiences and competitors, result in conflicts among the leaders, and alter the composition of the leader team. In other words, each solution transforms the strategic capacity and strategic arenas of social movements. The solutions for later dilemmas are, in turn, reshaped or constrained by former solutions.

Moreover, the sequence of dilemma-solving of a social movement is not arbitrary but logical. Who a movement has on the leader team will determine its strategic capacity and arenas and thus constrain strategic choices. Further, both the composition of the leader team and its choices will in turn affect what dilemmas this movement faces next, available solutions for these dilemmas and the path of this movement. By examining the dilemma-solving processes of social movements, we can connect the fragile snapshots of the life course of a particular social movement to obtain a more complete story.

This article also reconsiders the role of agency in social movements. Agency is the medium between the social structure and the consequences of social movements. Social structure does not determine the path of social movements. Instead, the environment of social movements shapes the strategies that the leaders can adopt, which influences the outcome of social movements. Agency is not free will, but situated in spatial and temporal intersections. Movement leaders’ strategic capacity is not only constrained by the arena in which they are located but also transformed by their solutions. Agency is not completely beneficial to social movements. Instead, movement leaders’ strategies may bring new dilemmas and
reshape the strategies available with them. To establish a more complete theory about the life courses of social movements, we have to focus on how social structure and human agency construct the rise and fall of social movements interactively.

Since the sequence of dilemma-solving is logical, future research can focus on the clarification and categorization of the patterns of this linkage in different types of social movements. Types of social movements confine goals, objects and repertoires that leaders can adopt (Piven and Cloward, 1979): workers may protest to their employer in order to raise their salary by striking; students may protest to a university administration in order to decrease the tuition by occupying a university building. These connections among goals, objects and repertoires result in typical responses from strategic arenas, respectively: ignorance, concession, negotiation and repression are available counter-strategies for the objects. Different counter-strategies may, in turn, bring other dilemmas to these movements, and they may take other conventional ways to deal with these new dilemmas. Future studies can reveal these different patterns in the sequence of dilemma-solving in different types of social movements. This analytic strategy also helps us understand the modular relation between strategy and outcomes of social movements. For example, we may find that some sequences may lead the movement to achieve goals, but some may not. Or, we may find that social movements with some sequences are more likely to be professionalized when they are demobilized, but movements with other sequences may just vanish. Whether social movement research should pursue a universal theory or seek the most suitable explanation is a controversial issue in such research. I suggest that this typology between types of social movements and sequences of dilemma-solving can balance this tension by providing a mid-range analytic tool to demonstrate the integrated impact of agency and social structure on life courses of social movements.
References


