

**Organizing Oppression:
Government and the Preemptive Repression of Human Rights**

Why do governments violate human rights? A prevailing view within existing research contends that decisions to commit political repression occur following the escalation of collective action challenging the government. Using unique data coded from the confidential records of the Guatemalan National Police, this project evaluates the validity of this claim. Analysis of the police data reveals that decisions to violate human rights are often based on prospective anticipation of future dissident behaviors. States commit preemptive repression to curb dissident mobilization and limit future challenges to political order. The analysis has a number of implications for how we understand as well as study human rights violations. Comparing two sets of models—those estimated using the confidential police data and another set replicating the analysis using newspaper data—reveals how popular misconceptions result at least in part from the sources commonly used to analyze repressive action. The newspaper data reproduce the narrative in which state agents violate human rights only in response to preexisting challenges. By contrast the police records reveal a state willing to act preemptively to repress its own citizens.

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In the aftermath of the Kent State shooting on May 4, 1970, *The New York Times* ran a front-page story detailing the killing of four students by members of the National Guard. After providing details on the incident, including the timing and location of the shooting and the number killed and injured, the *Times* quoted then U.S. President Richard Nixon. “This should remind us all once again,” Nixon proclaimed, “that when dissent turns to violence it invites tragedy” (Kifner 1970). Further down the article, the *Times* provided accounts from two Guard Officers who claimed the shooting occurred after a sniper from the protest camp first opened fire on the Guard (ibid).

In the wake of the shooting, this narrative came to dominate discourse surrounding the incident. A Gallup Poll showed that only 11% of Americans questioned the Guard, while a large majority believed campus demonstrators were responsible for the shooting (Gallup/Newsweek 1970). But we now know that the protests were largely peaceful and that the Guardsmen fired on an unarmed crowd, leaving four dead in Ohio. We know also that the shooting was not an isolated incident of state repression, but was instead part of a repressive campaign designed to undermine activism on college campuses across the U.S. (Goldstein 1978, pp 518-523). An investigation of the internal records of the FBI reveals the extensive efforts taken to forestall student mobilization, including the widespread surveillance, harassment and indictment of non-violent organizers occurring prior to the Kent State shooting (Cunningham 2003, pp 64-66, 134-145).

Why do governments violate human rights? The prevailing view within existing research corresponds closely to the narrative dictated in the *Times* report. It contends that governments want to stay in power and they commit human rights violations in

response to dissident challenges to political order (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007b). Political repression is committed as state elites react to dissent and take actions to protect the regime from emerging challengers (Pion-Berlin 1988; Gibson 1988; Davenport 1995, 1996; 2007a; Earl et al. 2003; Valentino et al. 2004; Carey 2010).

But as the above example illustrates, there are reasons to question the validity of the contention that repressive action results from state responses to popular collective action. Rational governments seeking to remain in power have an interest in anticipating dissent so that they might take action to repress dissidents even before they have the opportunity to commit collective action.

This paper makes two claims challenging the prevailing conventions on political repression. The first claim is that decisions regarding when and where to commit political repression are based on expectations for how dissidents are likely to behave in the future (Moore 1995; 2000; Pierskalla 2009; Danneman and Ritter 2011). As a result, states do not wait for dissident collective action to occur before committing repressive action. Instead, states commit repression to forestall collective action from taking place by targeting the mobilization activities of the dissidents. Though these mobilization activities tend to be small, private and nonconflictual in nature, states choose to repress mobilization in order to prevent challengers from committing more threatening activities later on.

The second claim is that perceptions of a defensive state derive at least in part from the media sources commonly employed to study repressive behavior. Though newspaper bias is widely recognized (e.g., Snyder and Kelly 1977; Mueller 1997;

Oliver and Myers 1999; Baranco and Wisler 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000; Myers 2000; Bagdikian 2000; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Drakos 2006; Davenport 2010), few researchers have drawn the implication that the empirical study of events data drawn from news report can systematically bias our understanding of government coercion. I argue below that the patterns of support found in existing research are derived from an overreliance on data generated through the media and that analyzing government records will reveal alternative causes for political repression.

To evaluate these claims, the study employs unique data on both dissident activity and political repression coded from the confidential records of the Guatemalan National Police. The records provide an unprecedented look at the inner workings of a repressive organization, including never before seen details on the decision-making processes that ultimately lead to repressive action. Micro-level analysis of the police data reveals how the state engages in preemptive repression against dissident mobilization. When these analyses are replicated using local newspaper reports, however, the images of preemptive repression disappear.

The study has significant implications for our understandings of contentious politics, media bias and the functioning of civil society. First, the confidential government records reveal state efforts to preemptively repress non-violent mobilization that should inspire scholars to rethink prevailing explanations for why states violate human rights. Second, newspaper data are shown to generate biased conclusions reproducing the preferred narrative of the government, in which state agents respond to disorder with violence to protect the public interest. Finally, if states

are taking action to repress dissent before it is even mobilized then we will have to rethink social movement emergence in the face of preemptive repression.

The rest of this article proceeds as follows: First, I review the academic literature on the causes of political repression the sources of data used to analyze repression. Second, I present a theory of preemptive repressive action that distinguishes the repression of mobilization from the repression of collective action. I then present the data, research design and analysis, which estimates the causes of political repression using both the police records and newspaper reports. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the study for future research on repression and dissent.

The Repression of Dissent: Theories and Evidence

Despite an emerging consensus around the significance of human rights, political repression remains an ever-present reality.¹ Over the past few decades a scientific research program has developed to explain why states commit acts of political repression (e.g., political imprisonment, torture, disappearances and mass killing) and to generate ideas about what constraints should be applied to limit such behavior (Tilly 1978; Stohl and Lopez 1984; 1986; Gurr 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 2007a; 2007b; Gartner and Regan 1996; Moore 2000; Regan and Henderson 2002; Valentino et al. 2004; Carey 2006; 2009; Shellman 2006; Pierskalla 2009; Fjelde and de Soysa 2009; Conrad and Moore 2010). A dominant model of how states decide to violate human rights has emerged (Davenport 2007b). The model contends (a) that

¹ By political repression I refer to “actions taken by authorities against individuals and/or groups within their territorial jurisdiction that either restrict the behavior and/or beliefs of citizens through the imposition of negative sanctions (e.g., applying curfews, conducting mass arrests, and banning political organizations) or that physically damage or eliminate citizens through the violation of personal integrity (e.g., using torture, disappearances, and mass killing)” (Davenport 2005, p 122). Throughout this paper the terms political repression and human rights violations are used interchangeably.

states respond to increases in dissent with increases in repression in a tit-for-tat fashion (e.g. Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002; Valentino et al. 2004; Carey 2010), and (b) that institutional constraints such as constitutional veto points and elections can limit the application of repression in settings where they are present (e.g., Davenport 1999; 2007a; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Conrad 2010).² States commit more human rights abuses following collective action challenging the government, but they commit fewer abuses when governed by democratic regimes (Davenport 2007b).

Holding institutional constraints constant for the time being, this review focuses on the construction of the first half of the model. Often referred to as “threat-response theory” (Earl et al. 2003), but alternatively referenced as the “nobody-moves-nobody-gets-hurt thesis” (Davenport 2010, 17), the theory expects states to employ higher levels of repression following increased dissident threats to political order.³ In other words, threat-response theory has as its underlying foundation a reactionary theory of state policy making (e.g., Davenport 2007a; 1995; Poe et al. 2000; 1999; Poe and Tate 1994). States respond to collective challenges to the regime by engaging in repression to eliminate the source of the threat—dissidents (e.g., Poe 2004; Earl et al. 2003; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 1995; Poe and Tate 1994; Pion-Berlin 1989; Gurr 1986; Tilly 1978).

² Other notable findings exist in the literature as well: levels of repression tend to remain relatively stable over time (Davenport 1996), economic development has been shown to reduce political repression (Fjelde and de Soysa 2009), as have elections (Davenport 1997) and international institutions can limit levels of political repression under certain domestic contexts (Conrad 2010; Conrad and Moore 2010). None of these findings, however, have been studied as extensively and received as robust support as threat-response and democratic restraint.

³ Not all scholars agree that states respond to threats in a linear fashion. Gartner and Regan (1996) argue that the relationship has a non-monotonic, inverted-U shape, in which the highest levels of repression occur in response to middle range threat values.

Despite early work pushing scholars towards definitional clarity (e.g., Davenport 1995), the concept of threat remains imprecisely defined in the literature (e.g., Poe et al. 1999, 293; Earl et al. 2003, 586; Carey 2006, 3). Most often scholars conceptualize threats to the state as a function of the scope of collective action challenging the regime (e.g., Earl et al. 2003, 583; Valentino et al. 2004, 386;) or the tactics of violence employed (e.g., Poe et al. 1999, 293; Valentino et al. 2004, 386; Carey 2010, 171; Sullivan 2011a). Specific forms of collective action and violence that have come to signify threats to the state include protests (Earl et al. 2003), riots (Carey 2010), terrorism (Carey 2010), civil war and insurgency (Poe et al. 1999; Valentino et al. 2004). As these measures of threat increase, the expectation is that states will subsequently escalate levels of repression.

Threat-response theory has been tested extensively in the literature and remains a dominant model of repressive action (see review in Davenport 2007b). Despite the robustness of these results, there are reasons to question the validity of the theory. Nearly all existing examinations of threat-response theory (and political repression more generally) employ some form of newspaper data when conducting their analyses (see Davenport 2007b; Davenport 2010). Notwithstanding their many advantages, newspaper data have long been the subject of criticism within the academic community (e.g., Danzger 1975; Brockett 1992; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Drakos 2006; Woolley 2006). Here I focus on two forms of potential bias in newspaper reporting—selection bias and description bias—and the ways in which newspaper bias has influenced the construction and analysis of the threat-response theory of political repression.

Selection bias refers to the selection processes identifying which events are recorded by newspapers. As Almeida and Lichbach (2003; 253) note, “news media sources have higher probabilities of reporting protest events with intensive characteristics—events that are spectacular, violent, large and long-lasting.” Dissident activities that are small, distant, commonplace and non-violent tend to be underreported (Snyder and Kelly 1977; Mueller 1997; Oliver and Myers 1999; Baranco and Wisler 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000; Myers 2000; Almeida and Lichbach 2003; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Davenport 2010).⁴ Description bias refers to the ways in which newspapers cover the events that are selected for publication. As in the *Times* story mentioned in the introduction, governmental sources are more frequently sought for comment than social movement organizations (Smith et al. 2001; Davenport 2010). As a result, news stories are more likely to portray repressive action as legitimate and occurring self-defense (Davenport 2010). Protest events tend to be portrayed as episodic and removed from routinized politics (Smith et al. 2001), while the dissident groups are identified as “radical” and “existing on the fringes of society” (Bagdikian 2000).⁵

To understand how biases in newspaper coverage can influence research on political repression it is necessary to acknowledge that the reporting of contentious politics also functions as part of processes of political control (Foucault 1979).⁶ As Davenport (2010, 11) writes, “What is generally ignored...is the fact that identifying,

⁴ For example, in a notable study on selection bias conducted by McCarthy et al. (1996), less than 3% of protest events in the smallest size category were reported by the five media sources they reviewed.

⁵ Both forms of bias may be further extended by the influences of repression on media outlets (e.g., Drakos 2006).

⁶ This does not necessarily mean that such processes are a conscious part of organized conspiracy. It just means that the selection and description biases in newspaper reporting have effects on perceptions of the application, utility and function of political repression.

retaining, and distributing information about repression and dissent is done not to reflect events as they occur in the real world but rather to create a story about authorities and their interaction with dissidents in the unreal created world—a story about order and disorder intended for distribution to authorities, dissidents, and citizens.”⁷

If we are more aware of the larger acts of dissident activity, then when it comes time to articulate where and when repressive activity can be expected to occur, larger and more intense incidents of collective action will be more easily conceptualized as catalysts for repressive activity. And when newspaper data are used to evaluate the validity of theoretical claims, the omission of smaller, non-violent events from events databases can result in spurious correlations confirming such theories. At the same time, description bias in newspaper coverage of contentious politics can lead to the assumption that states respond to claims makers only in self-defense. Dissidents come to be seen as more radical, more dangerous and farther from the mainstream than they actually are, while states are often incorrectly portrayed as more willing to compromise and less inclined towards offensive violence than they actually are.

Repression, Mobilization and Collective Action

The prospective theory of repressive decision-making developed in this section is akin to the rational expectations theory expounded by Williams and McGinnis (1988; McGinnis and Williams 1989) and extended by Moore (1995; 2000). Prospective

⁷ Numerous studies have noted how coverage of specific events has significant implications for the perception of those events by the larger public and for the framing battles that can catalyze mobilization or demobilization (e.g., Gamson et al. 1992; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Almeida and Lichbach 2002). Fewer have noted how biases in newspaper coverage can influence the generation and evaluation of theories of repression and dissent (e.g., Danzger 1975; Drakos 2006; Reeves et al. 2011).

theories of state decision making argue that states generate rational expectations of how their actions are likely to influence future behavior before choosing to act. Applied to the repression of dissent, prospective decision-making argues that states will contemplate how dissent will materialize if it is or is not repressed and choose to take action when they believe that repression will limit subsequent dissident activity (Moore 1995; Pierskalla 2010). While threat-response theory is often described as a cost-benefit trade off, truly rational states take into account not simply how much collective action dissidents have committed in the recent past but also expectations of how dissidents are likely to behave in the future. As a result, while a majority of existing research assumes a reactive decision-making model in articulating why states abuse human rights (see Davenport 2007a; 2007b), scholars are increasingly turning to models of government decision-making that contend that states are forward thinking (i.e., prospective) when deciding to repress their citizens (e.g., Moore 1995; Herreros and Criado 2009, Pierskalla 2009; Danneman and Ritter 2011). Within this framework, states forecast the development of dissent by forming and updating expectations of dissident behavior based on the information available to them about dissident behavior. They then commit repression when they believe repressive action will limit future threats to the regime.⁸ Despite the articulation of similar lines of theorizing in the recent work cited above, the micro-foundational mechanisms that link prospective decision-making theory to clear hypotheses for when we can expect to observe repressive activity have yet to be well articulated and the theory has so far only been subjected to a limited number of tests, most of which rely on the same biased newspaper data as threat-response theories.

⁸ This does not mean that states always succeed in limiting dissent. Rational expectations are still limited by the imperfect information available to state elites and by the strategic adaptation of dissidents. Consequentially, states often fail in their attempts to curb dissent.

There are strong strategic incentives to motivate political elites concerned with political survival into taking coercive action in anticipation of dissident challenges. To articulate the causal mechanisms linking prospective decision-making processes to the preemptive application of political repression, it is necessary to first separate the processes of dissident mobilization from dissident collective action. Protests, demonstrations, civil-disobedience campaigns, and terrorist tactics may constitute some of the actions that come to mind most readily when we think of dissent. These are also the actions that feature most prominently in existing work identifying the causes of political repression (e.g., Davenport 1995; 2007a; Earl et al. 2003; Carey 2010). But these events, which can be referenced jointly as collective action, are actually only the second part of the two- stage process of dissent (Klandermans 1984; Klandermans and Omega, 1987; Tilly 1978).⁹

Before dissidents can successfully participate in collective action, they must begin by first organizing collective control over some joint resources, a process referred to as mobilization (Tilly 1978). According to Tilly (*ibid.*, 54), mobilization is, “the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.” Mobilization involves the transfer of resources from individuals to a collective organization in order to provide the utilitarian, normative, and social incentives that can be used to inspire participation in collective action. Examples of mobilized resources include disseminated skills, shared identities, caches of military equipment or pooled funds. Examples of mobilizing activities include

⁹ Generally speaking, collective action is joint action in pursuit of a common goal (Tilly 1978, 84; Olsen 1965). More specifically with reference to dissent, we can define collective action following Volkmann (1975, p33) as “any collective disturbance of public order on behalf of common objectives.”

actions such as organizing meetings, distributing information, campaigning for funds, training members and recruiting new participants.

Mobilization is necessary because individual willingness to participate in collective action is assumed to be a function of the perceived costs and benefits of participation (Olsen 1965; McCarty and Zald 1976; Klandermans 1984; Lichbach 1995). Mobilization helps bring together a group of highly committed activists and generate the resources necessary to incentivize other into participating in collective action. Mobilization contributes to collective action either by reducing costs (e.g., generating organizations to provide movement maintenance or shielding members from the opportunity costs of participation) or by increasing benefits (e.g., reframing the probability of obtaining collective goods or providing selective incentives to participants). In most scenarios collective action is prohibitively costly and cannot be initiated until some threshold of mobilization has first been reached (Tilly 1978; Marwell and Oliver 1993).

Once the critical level of mobilization has been, dissident collective action can be initiated. The onset of collective action has the potential to set in motion cascades of participation leading to ever larger sources of dissent (Shelling 1978, Granovetter 1978, Kuran 1989, Lohmann 1993). Collective action is generally described as having an accelerating production function so that each successive contribution to collective action yields greater marginal returns than the one that preceded it (Schelling 1978; Kuran 1989; Marwell and Oliver 1993). As collective action grows, individuals seeking to maximize their benefit-cost ratio face ever-greater incentives to participate. As a result, dissent has the capacity to emerge seemingly out of nowhere and escalate rapidly

to from insignificant levels to levels that can threaten the regime (Kuran 1989, Lohmann 1993).

But before cascades of contributions to collective action can proceed, dissidents must first engage in a critical level of mobilization (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Tilly 1978). Mobilization is difficult and requires extensive contributions from a small number of individuals. In many cases, mobilization has a decelerating production function such that each successive contribution to the group has decreasing marginal returns (Marwell and Oliver 1993). Early contributions have the largest effects on the group's capacity to mobilize sufficient resources to generate collective action and successive contributions are often difficult to obtain because individuals recognize that they must expend ever larger shares of personal investment to generate the same benefit to the group.

Rational governments seeking to remain in power should come to recognize how significant mobilization is for achieving successful collective action and translate beliefs about dissident mobilization into expectations for future challenges to political order. Pressures for maintaining order in the face of emerging challengers incentivize states to collect information on dissident behavior so that they can best anticipate the future actions of their adversaries. To do so they commit considerable resources to preparatory measures, such as the initiation of investigation, direct surveillance of their adversaries, positioning *agents provocateur* and processing information from one unit of the repressive apparatus to another. These preparatory measures, like the dissident's

mobilization activities, help the state identify and commit resources. And like mobilization, preparatory measures often go unreported in media sources.¹⁰

When dissident mobilization can be identified, state forces looking to protect the regime from future challenges face strong strategic incentives to take repressive action. This is true even in cases where mobilization is itself non-threatening. Repressing mobilization can deplete the resources available to inspire collective action and drain dissident organizations of critical individuals willing to put the time and effort into mobilization.¹¹ Several studies have shown that while participation in collective violence is generally dictated by the participation of others, but that there exist a core group of organizers for whom participation is driven by personal characteristics rather than social influence (e.g., McDoom 2011; Oliver 1984). Repressing mobilization allows state forces to target the core group and remove individuals who are often difficult to replace. The selective repression of more influential members is likely to have a greater effect on subsequent decisions to mobilize resources or contribute to collective action than the repressing of individuals within a protest group at random (Siegel 2011). By repressing individuals participating in mobilization, the state aims to eliminate those individuals contributing most significantly to overturning political order.

Repressing dissident mobilization can also deplete the resources available to the

¹⁰ Because dissidents are engaged in similar processes of information collection designed to anticipate the actions of the authorities, the competitive pressures of state-dissident interactions often motivate states to keep their preparatory actions hidden from public view.

¹¹ In selecting where and when to commit repressive action, governments often face a tradeoff between minimizing violence and minimizing the prospects for revolution (Lichbhach 1984). This tradeoff will have to be explored in future work identifying when governments engage in preemptive repression and when they devote resources to reactionary repression.

organization, which in turn reduces the capacity for organizations to reach the critical barrier necessary to generate collective action. Targeting the dissident's mobilizing institutions can deter participation in collective action not only through intimidation but also by reducing popular perceptions that dissident organizations can successfully convert the popular participation into public or private benefits (Mason 1996). Decreasing mobilization can also potentially force dissidents to switch to less resource intensive tactics that pose more limited threats to the stability of the regime (Bueno de Mesquita 2011). By preemptively repressing dissident mobilization, states take actions to push the organization below the critical threshold necessary to generate popular participation in collective action. They thereby reduce the uncertainty surrounding future challenges to their rule and help to secure regime stability over the long-term.

Summarizing, dissent can be characterized by a two-stage process of mobilization and collective action. Where dissidents can mobilize sufficient resources they possess the capacity to engage in collective challenges to the regime. Forward-looking states concerned with maintaining political order seek to minimize future collective threats. To protect the regime from future challenges, they monitor and repress dissident mobilization.

The Historical Context of Repression and Dissent in Guatemala, 1975-1985

Civil conflict waxed and waned in Guatemala between 1975 and 1985. Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1977, the country experienced sporadic protests organized by student groups and the unions operating in the capital, as well as the reformation of the nascent insurgent organizations in the rural highlands (Quigley 1999). When the

protests were met with repressive action (Brocket 2005), the state's coercive force unintentionally inspired many urban protestors to flee the capital and align themselves with the insurgents (Stoll 1993).

Political repression during the initial period was limited to targeting individuals identified with the various protest organizations as well as espoused communists (Brocket 2005). State forces committed widespread surveillance of social activity, arrested suspected dissident leaders without charge and committed torture with impunity (Schirmer 2000). But it was when state forces moved into the highlands that levels of repression became reached their peak. Under the leadership of the military regime ruled by Rios Montt, who came to power through a coup in 1982, repression became increasingly indiscriminate and violent (Ball et al. 1999; Stoll 1993). Rios Montt trained elite killing squads who moved through the highlands in search of areas of presumed insurgent support (Schirmer 2000). Under the banner of the *Frijoles y Fusiles* (beans and bullets) campaign, villages linked to the insurgents were subjected to wonton violence, while those that were willing to cooperate with state forces were organized under the military regime (Kobrak 1997; Stoll 1993). Human rights violations were rampant; tens of thousands were killed and many more displaced from their homes (CEH 1999). The campaign was largely successful, however. Insurgent troop strength dropped rapidly and state forces reestablished control throughout the country. Levels of repression dropped steadily in the 1983 and 1984 (Ball et al. 1999). The imposition of constitutional rule in 1985 further helped bring a country exhausted from the massive toll of violence towards a peaceful settlement (Schirmer 2000).

Though the peace agreement was not firmly signed until 1996, the majority of political violence had ended (Ball et al. 1999).

Spatial and temporal variation in repressive activity covered the entire spectrum of repressive tactics from selective tactics targeting labor leaders (Brockert 2005) through the military occupation (Koback 1994) or complete extermination (Falla 1994) of entire villages. At the same time, certain areas of the country experienced relatively little repressive activity (Sullivan 2011a; Gulden 2002) and there were phases of the conflict during which the state perpetrated limited measures of violence (Ball et al. 1999).

Understanding why the Guatemalan government chose to repress its citizens can help to illuminate why states in other revolutionary settings continue to engage in widespread human rights abuses. The articulation is that the case under review is an emblematic case of repression and dissent during civil war and other periods of heightened conflict. The number of battle deaths were commensurate with other civil wars, while the number of deaths from one-sided violence (the murder of civilians) was slightly higher than average (Lacina 2006; Eck and Hultman 2007). The case also looks to be representative in terms of some known structural causes of conflict. For example, the country's level of democracy and per capita GDP correspond with the average among countries involved in civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In typical case research, the aim is to identify a case consistent with the existing model of political violence and examine variation within the case to more directly probe the causal mechanisms at work (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Here the aim is to take a case that is broadly consistent with patterns of repression and dissent found elsewhere but where

there was significant internal variation and probe the subnational distribution of repressive activity to pinpoint the causes of human rights violations. However, further research will remain necessary to confirm whether the conclusions reached in this study hold outside of the Guatemalan context.

Data

To evaluate the theory of preemptive repression alongside threat-response theory I employ an events database using records found in a unique archive of documents produced by the Guatemalan National Police between 1975 and 1985. Following the signing of the peace accord and the disbanding of the national police in 1996, millions of documents related to the inner workings of the police bureaucracy were stashed away in an abandoned warehouse near Guatemala City. There they lingered for approximately ten years before being discovered by the human rights ombudsman in 2006 (Doyle 2007). Following a lengthy legal struggle, the decision was made to clean and index the documents into the newly formed *Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional* (AHPN). Because the records were released without oversight by the agency responsible for producing the documents, the *Archivo* contains the most comprehensive and unbiased collection of information on the inner workings of the state's repressive apparatus identified to date (Ball 2006). The digitization and archiving process have recently been completed and this study is one of the first to have been granted access to the Archive's full 1975-1985 collection.

The AHPN contains all records produced by the Guatemalan National Police between 1975 and 1985 and preserved in their warehouse archive. The National Police

had jurisdiction over the entire country and were divided into eight *cuerpos* or divisions based on geographic location. Three additional divisions handled administrative tasks, major criminal investigations and joint operations with the military. Each of the divisions fed into the Director General's office, which is located in Guatemala City not far from the *Archivo*. Records in the AHPN cover the full spectrum of police activities. On one end lie the most intensive acts of political repression, such as a directive to capture a list of suspected subversives with their last known whereabouts, to the most mundane, such as the hundreds of thousands of orders for officers to appear before the court at a given time and place.

The AHPN records were used to identify the types of dissent documented by the Guatemalan state during the conflict, as well as when, where and how the state took action. A purposefully selected sub-set of the Archive's collection was coded as an events database of state and dissident actions. The sub-set is based on the records from two offices—the Director General of the Police, and the Commissioner for Coordinating Joint Military Operations. A pilot study of the *Archivo*'s full collection revealed that more than 95% of all relevant dissident and state activity was contained within the files of these two offices. The resulting dataset was constructed by reading all 120,000+ records sent to the two offices and preserved in the AHPN. All forms of dissident activity during the ten years under review were coded, as well as every repressive and non-repressive action taken by the state.¹² Nearly 5,000 acts of repression and dissent were coded. The next section describes the distribution of these events alongside the newspaper data.

¹² Inter-coder reliability checks consistently demonstrated reliability rates between 85% and 90%. Specific details on the coding protocol can be found at www.nd.edu/~csulli16/research/

In many cases, police record can be expected to have a more complete inventory of political activity occurring in a country than data coded from newspapers. Because states have significantly more resources than news organizations and because they have extensive networks designed to identify information relating to political activity within their territory, states are able to collect information on political activity that is less biased by the selection events present in newspaper records. And because they are not intended for public dissemination, the records are less prejudiced by the description biases that plague newspaper studies. Indeed, because they contain a more extensive list of political events and in many cases present a more factual narrative of what took place, government records have been used widely to help identify the form and extent of bias in newspaper coverage (e.g., McCarthy, et al. 1996; 1998; Oliver and Myers 1999; Baranranco and Wisler 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000; Smith et al. 2001; McCarthy, et al. 2008).¹³

Of course data taken from police records are not without problems as well. For starters, it is not always easy to gain access to such records. But even where such access is provided, it is often provided through a freedom of information process in which the most sensitive records relating to repression and dissent are withheld. And police do not have a full set of information. As Hug and Wisler (1998) note, “police registers are the product of a social practice and are expected to show some systematic bias themselves.” For example, Maney and Oliver (1998) show how in Madison the events covered by the newspapers but not identified by police tended to be non-disruptive and

¹³ While such studies have concerned themselves with empirically documenting the scope and correlates of biases in newspaper data and shown how governmental records provide a more complete sample of such activity, none has so far gone so far as to compare separate models estimated using newspaper data and governmental records to identify the significance of these biases for existing research.

occur in private homes. This does not appear to be true for Guatemala, where the police appear to have significantly more information on non-disruptive private gatherings than the newspapers (see Figure III below). However, the parochial interests of the bureaucrats who record state records may inspire biases in the description of the events themselves. In addition, psychological conditioning may lead agents of the state's security forces from reporting atrocities from the police or military in the same manner they report abuses by dissidents.

It is important to recognize that all sources of conflict data are likely to be incomplete and present biased representations of political events. Still, analyzing government data, such as records of the AHPN, has the potential to reveal dynamics of protest and repression missed by other sources of data. As Trisko and Stefla (2011, 30) note in a recent review of different data sources on civilian targeting and civil war violence, "To date, the data on civilian casualties with the highest degree of attention to modes of violence comes from official government sources which have greater access to on-the-ground developments."

In addition to helping to provide a more accurate analysis of the causes of political repression, the AHPN data can be used to evaluate the contention made above that biases in the news sources used to study repression and dissent helped contribute to the widespread confirmation of threat-response hypotheses. To evaluate this contention, the results from the AHPN analyses will be replicated using an events dataset constructed from the records of Guatemalan newspapers. Newspaper data are taken from Brocket's (2005) study of contentious politics in Guatemala. Brocket's database was constructed by hand coding the largest local and national daily newspapers in

Guatemala for instances of dissident activity, third party insolvent and government actions (2005, 31). Based on these records, Brocket identified more than a thousand events between 1975 and 1985 corresponding to the activities the dissidents state forces. Though the newspaper data were collected for another purpose, they are sufficiently rich to allow for comparison to the AHPN data. The system of measuring repression and dissent, which is discussed in the next section, was consistent for both datasets.

Measurement

The AHPN data and the newspaper data both record the timing and location of political events engaged in by state and non-state actors. The events catalogs were transformed into a cross-sectional time-series of repression and dissent. For each of Guatemala's 22 departments the time series identifies monthly counts of each specific form of activity occurring between January 1975 and December 1985. Departments are the second smallest administrative units in Guatemala and are akin to counties in the United States.

For the purposes of this study, repression may be defined as efforts by the state directed against the civil liberties or physical integrity of its citizens (Davenport 2007b). Repression is divided into two categories—preparatory actions and repressive actions. For the state, repressive actions include death threats, torture, disappearances, shootings, raids, protest policing and politically motivated arrests. Preparatory actions are actions taken in anticipation of further acts of political repression and include

surveillance, informing other officers, initiating an investigation and drafting security plans.

While all of the repressive actions identified in the AHPN and newspaper data could occur either in response to or to preempt dissident actions, some types of behavior lend themselves to being more useful for preemptive actions than repressive actions. And these actions are those that are precisely those actions that feature more prominently in the AHPN data. In terms of sheer numbers, the two sources report similar quantities of repressive actions, but the AHPN reports a much larger number of preparatory actions. Preparatory actions make up about 90% of the events identified in the AHPN records, compared to about a quarter of the newspaper records. Engaging in surveillance, searching suspected hideouts, planning future security actions and informing superiors all indicate that repressive forces were not responding to easily observable, large scale dissident actions. Instead, preparatory actions are indicative of a force that is trying to gather intelligence on the less observable actions of the dissidents, potentially in order to anticipate future dissident actions and take preemptive repressive action.

Dissent is operationalized as episodic actions in which non-state actors make claims challenging state authority (Tilly 1978). It is measured as counts of two distinct forms of activity—mobilization and collective action. Mobilization activities are small, generally clandestine efforts to influence individuals affiliated or unaffiliated with a social movement to participate in collective action. They include the distribution of information, organized training programs, recruitment efforts and private meetings. Collective action activities are public demonstrations of popular strength targeted at

political authorities and include strikes, demonstrations, marches, roadblocks, targeted killings, acts of terrorism, arson, kidnapping and the taking of hostages.

Both the AHPN and the newspapers appear highly interested in identifying acts of dissident collective action (i.e., collective violence and protests), which makes up more than 50% of the dissident events recorded by the AHPN and more than 75% of the dissident events recorded by the press. However, the AHPN still records a much larger number of acts of collective action than the newspapers. Comparing the identification of mobilization activities between the two sources reveals even starker differences. Nearly 50% of the AHPN records (more than 1,500 individual events) record mobilizing activities by the dissidents. Newspapers showed far less interest in recording these actions, and documented just over 300 of them. Mobilizing activities make less than a quarter of the events documented by the newspapers.

Analysis

Before moving on to more sophisticated econometric analyses, it is first illustrative to examine the coverage of the different data sources. Newspaper coverage appears to be temporally over distributed in the first five years of the conflict. Following consistent coverage during the early years there is a sharp drop off in coverage beginning in January 1981. The AHPN records take almost the exact opposite distribution. For the first five years under review, coverage appears episodic. Then beginning at the same time as the rapid decline in newspaper coverage there is a rapid uptick in the number of events recorded by the AHPN. From 1981 through 1985

coverage by the AHPN remains high, while there is very little political activity reported in the press.

These two shifts, the decline in newspaper coverage and the increase in AHPN coverage that took place in early 1981, correspond with trends identified in repressive activity identified by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH 1998), an intensive NGO study of human rights abuses in the country (Ball et al. 1999) and by a truth and reconciliation effort organized by the Catholic Church (Never Again 1999). The rapid escalation of political repression documented by outside sources corresponds closely to both the increase repressive activity recorded by the AHPN and the decrease in similar activity recorded by the newspapers. The drop off in newspaper records occurring in 1981 is likely related to the intensification of attacks on the press documented by Brocket (2005) and others. Just as repressive action was beginning to take off, newspaper reports become almost nonexistent.

Examining the spatial distribution of the data across Guatemala's departments, both the AHPN and the newspapers recorded the highest number of event in the capital department of Guatemala. Beyond that, there appears to be better spatial representation by the AHPN data, which records more events than the newspapers in 15 of the 22 departments. Most notably, the AHPN does a better job recording violence in Quiche and Solola, the departments experiencing the worst acts of state repression and dissident violence during the war (CEH 1998). The AHPN also captures appreciably more events in Peten, which was a principal mobilizing site for the insurgency (Stohl 1993). One of the reasons why violence was so severe in Quiche and Solola and why the dissidents mobilized in Peten is because these departments are areas with high

elevation, dense jungle and sparse population settlements. Such evidence is consistent with arguments predicting undercounts of political activity from the newspapers in places far from urban settings with little state presence. All of this suggests that analysis of the AHPN data should provide a more representative assessment of political conflict in Guatemala.

Statistical Tests

I turn now to the statistical analysis. The methods most commonly employed to identify the causes of political repression are cross-sectional time-series models (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 2000; Davenport 1995; 2007). These methods test threat-response theory by examining correlations between lagged measures dissent and subsequent levels of repressive activity.

A similar method is employed here to evaluate the reactive or preemptive motivations for engaging in repressive activity. The units of analysis are department-months. As noted above, departments are akin to counties in the United States. For each month, the departments are measured for how many actions were committed by the state or the dissidents and what form those actions took. Dissident actions are divided into mobilization and collective action using the criteria reviewed above. Lagged counts of each form of dissent are used to predict measures of political repression at time t .¹⁴ If threat response theory is correct, then dissident collective action should be a stronger, more robust predictor of political repression than mobilizing activities. However, if the theory of preemptive repression is valid then we

¹⁴ The functional form for the model is specified as negative binomial due to the nature of the dependent variable, which is measured as a count and displays overdispersion (King 1988).

should observe correlations between mobilizing activities and subsequent repression that are as strong and robust as the observed correlations between more objectively threatening dissident behavior and subsequent repression. Two forms of repressive activity are reviewed—preparatory actions and repressive actions. Each is measured as a count of the number of repressive actions in that category that occur in a department month. Finally, the models include a number of controls, out of concern that they might influence both lagged dissent and ensuing repression. These include a log of the population of the department, the percentage of indigenous persons living in the department, the occurrence of electoral campaigns, democratic institutions and twice-lagged measures of political repression.¹⁵

Each model is examined using both the AHPN data and the newspaper data. This is done to evaluate the contention that the prejudices in existing research result in part from the sources used to study political repression. If this contention is correct than we should observe the results derived using the newspaper data to be consistent with threat response theory, while the results derived using the AHPN data should be commensurate with the expectations of preemptive repressive action.

Table I Here

The results of these analyses are displayed in Table I. For each variable in the model, the table presents the coefficient, standard error and level of statistical of significance. To aid in interpretation, the table also presents the incident rate ratio (IRR) for significant coefficients. The IRR is calculated as the rate of predicted counts of

¹⁵ Population and ethnic composition come from census data (Sullivan 2011a; 2011b), campaign data come from a list of campaign registries found in the AHPN, and democracy is measured using Vreeland's (2008) X-Polity scores.

repressive actions when a variable is increased one standard deviation above zero over the rate of predicted counts when that variable is held at zero.¹⁶

Models 1 and 2 present the results of the models estimated using data from the AHPN. For the model of preparatory action (Model 1), both dissident mobilization and dissident collective action are shown to correlate strongly with an increase in preparatory actions by the state. As expected, mobilizing activities prove to be equally good predictors of repressive action as more easily observable and violent actions by the dissidents. Increasing the number of mobilizing activities in a department one month is predicted number to increase the amount of preparatory actions committed in the department the next month by 10%. This figure is smaller than the expected increase in preparatory state actions expected following occurrences of collective action (+28%), which suggests that the state was also concerned with dissident collective action when deciding where to engage in preemptive actions such as engaging in surveillance or informing other units of the security forces.

Differences between the two effects sizes all but disappear when we look at the effects of mobilization and collective action on repressive activities. Both mobilization and collective action appear strongly and significantly related to subsequent repressive actions, such as political arrests, torture and disappearances. As shown in Model 2, increasing mobilizing activities by one standard deviation increases the predicted number of repressive actions committed by 13%. This figure is comparable to the corresponding figure for the effects collective action (+14%). These results conform to the expectations generated by a theory of preemptive repressive action and challenge

¹⁶ As far as I am aware, this is the first effort to quantitatively estimate the substantive effects of the causes of political repression. As a result it is not easy to compare these coefficients to other work to evaluate whether these results appear consistent with other findings.

the validity of threat-response theory. If threat-response theory is correct, then dissident violence and protests should do better at predicting ensuing repressive action than mobilizing activities. Because these activities do not directly threaten the state, the state is not directly threatened by these activities threat-response theory argues that we should not observe repression. But if state elites are equally concerned with future challenges to their rule, as argued by preemptive response theory, then mobilizing activities should do equally well at predicting repressive action. This is exactly what is shown in the first two models displayed in Table I.

Models 3 and 4 in Table I replicate the analysis using the newspaper data. Results diverge sharply from those generated using the AHPN data. In the newspaper data, dissident collective action is highly related to the subsequent application of repression by the state, while dissident mobilizing activities are not. Collective action committed by the dissidents is expected to increase the subsequent application of preparatory actions by 17% and the number of repressive actions by committed by 3%. Dissident mobilization is not significantly correlated with changes in the expected number of preparatory actions or repressive actions. This suggests that the preparatory actions and repressive actions committed by the state and identified in the newspapers were apparently unrelated to the mobilizing behavior of the dissidents.

This suggests that much of the evidence supporting threat-response theory may derive from the samples used to evaluate the theory. As argued above, newspaper samples are biased both in the events they cover and in how they cover those events. Comparing the results derived using the AHPN Data to those generated using the

newspaper data reveals how relying on these records to evaluate the causes of political repression can subsequently bias our observed results.

Robustness Checks

At least two critical challenges can be made against the above results. The first charges that repression and dissent are so intricately connected that the models are simply identifying the endogenous processes the repression-dissent interaction, rather than an the exogenous influence of dissident mobilization on repressive activity. The second charges that the models above are essentially retrospective in orientation and fail to directly test propositions of prospective decision making articulated in the theoretical arguments.

To test the validity of the results against such claims, two sets of robustness checks are examined. The first employs instrumental variables (IV) regression to identify exogenous variation in dissent and then estimate the effect of that exogenous variable on repression. The second employs vector auto regressive (VAR) and vector error corrected (VEC) models to examine correlations between repression and dissent that would more directly test whether the state was forward-looking when deciding to engage in political repression.

To examine the robustness of these findings, the results were replicated using an instrumental-variables approach to control for the selection effects that may bias our results. Bias can result from the fact that the application of dissent is non-random. Dissent may be related to prior levels of repression that can simultaneously subsequent

levels of repression.¹⁷ As a result, the variable whose effect we are trying to determine (dissent) cannot be assumed to be unrelated to prior experiences with the dependent variable (repression). In such settings, non-random assignment of the treatment can lead to selection effects that may bias the results.

To generate unbiased estimates of how the state's responses to dissent influence repression, we must be able to identify exogenous variation in dissent. One method for doing so is instrumental variables regression (IV). IV uses a first stage assignment equation to separate out the selection of the independent variable from the presence of the dependent variable. A second stage equation then estimates the effects of dissent on repression. Crucially, independent variables in the assignment equation must be strongly correlated with dissent, but disassociated with subsequent repression (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The analyses below exploit the temporal disaggregation of the data used in this study to identify these first stage independent variables, which are often referred to as instruments.

As noted, one variable that has repeatedly been shown to influence dissent is prior values of repression. It is possible to use prior values of repression as an instrument for the first stage equation if those values can be successfully disentangled from repression at time t , our dependent variable. Such a move would break the endogenous cycle of conflict and repression thought to be biasing the results. To remove the link between the lagged measures of repression used as instruments in the first stage and the contemporary measure of repression used as the dependent variable in the second equation, it is necessary to include in the second equation measures of

¹⁷ This concern is what underlies the inclusion of the twice lagged repression control variable in Tables I and II. The IV approach adds a more nuanced examination of potential selection effects to concerns with omitted variables bias present in the first sets of models.

repression that are temporally located between the instruments and the dependent variable.

The first stage models instrument lagged dissent mobilization ($D_{i, t-1}$) as a function of levels of preparatory action and repressive action measured three and four periods prior ($R_{i, t-3}, R_{i, t-4}$). The second stage equation include measures of repression that exist between these prior periods and the dependent variable measured at time t . Including these variables ($R_{i, t-2}$) along with the instrumented measure of dissent in the second stage equation should effectively remove the endogenous selection processes that may bias our results. The strategy allows the model to identify exactly those levels of dissent inspired by previous levels of repressive and non-repressive policies, while extracting from those variables the endogenous relationship between prior acts of repression and current levels of repression (which are controlled for through the inclusion of $R_{i, t-2}$ in the second stage equation). For selection effects to persist in biasing our results there would have to be artifact influencing the conflict processes during the earlier periods of repression used as instruments and repression measured as the dependent variable, but not influencing the middle levels of repression employed as control variables in the second stage equation (compare Kocher et al. 2011; Porterba 1991).

Table II About Here

Results from the equations present further evidence supporting preemptive-response theory. When we examine the effects of mobilizing activities on preemptive and repression activities by first instrumenting exogenous variation in mobilizing activities, mobilizing activities again appear to be strong and robust predictors in the

AHPN data and produce null results in the newspaper data. When we look at the causes repression using the AHPN data, increasing the number of mobilizing activities by two standard deviation is expected to motivate the state to engage in six additional preparatory acts and one act of political repression the next period. This confirms that states do not simply act to repress their population in response to preexisting threats, but also commit repressive action to preemptively forestall future threats to the regime.

The evidence in Table II also provides further challenge to the newspaper data that have been used to test threat-response theory in the past. When the model is replicated using the newspaper data, we again observe insignificant results. In this model the predicted effect of mobilizing activities on repression is not statistically distinguishable from zero. If we were to solely use newspaper data in our analyses then it would appear as though state forces did not commit repression following nonviolent actions by dissidents.

A second robustness check employed in this paper is to estimate the integrated effects of dissent and repression. If states are anticipating dissident behavior in real time then modeling the effects of lagged dissent alone will not accurately capture this process (Moore 1995; Shellman 2006; Carey 2006). Two methods are employed below to generate more dynamic analysis—vector auto-regression (VAR) and vector-error corrected (VEC) models. For the time-series models, the spatial components of the data are ignored but the time components are further disaggregated into weekly event counts. VAR models are employed to identify the effects of repression and dissent in a system where both variables are responsive to one another. VAR models are retrospective in that they account only for the effects of prior trends in the two variables

on subsequent variables, but they allow the study to identify how dissident mobilization and collective action affect subsequent repression in more dynamic settings where both repression and dissent respond to one another. In other words, in a VAR model where both states and dissidents are reacting to one another's behavior.

Figure I Here

Figure I displays impulse response functions simulating the effects of a one standard deviation change in dissent on subsequent repressive action. Four models are displayed, each displaying one half of a different model.¹⁸ The first identifies the effects of dissident mobilization on repression using the AHPN data. In the model, mobilization has a positive and significant effect on ensuing repression. The second model displayed in Figure I replicates the analysis of mobilization and repression using the news data. As above, no significant effect is observed when we analyze the effects of mobilization on repression using data from the newspaper. The third and fourth graphs display the effects of collective action on repressive action. As above, both the AHPN data and the newspaper data display significant relations between collective action and subsequent repression.

While the VAR equations are common to the study of repression and dissent and produce insightful results, a better method for modeling a process by which rational states anticipate the actions of their adversaries before choosing to act is to use VEC models (Reeves et al. 2011). VEC models use maximum-likelihood techniques to estimate the cointegration of two or more variables with short-run dynamic properties and a long-run equilibrium (Johansen 1995). In other words, they allow the two

¹⁸ Each model estimated the mutual effects of repressive action and dissident mobilization or collective action using a third order lag, as suggested by the Dickie-Fuller method (Enders 2004)

variables to respond stochastically to one another while anticipating that they will converge into a stable relationship over time. In expectation, the two variables are cointegrated such that they should jointly produce a stationary time series (ibid.).

VEC regression produces parameters for three separate equations: a cointegration equation and two equations estimating repression and dissent. If states and dissidents employ prospective decision-making and anticipate one another's behavior before deciding when and where to act, then they can be expected to share a stationary long-run relationship.

Table III Here

Table III displays the results from the cointegration equations of four VEC regressions. Negative and statistically significant parameters indicate that the two actors are anticipating one another's behavior and adapting their own accordingly.¹⁹ Interestingly, all four models displayed in Table III show evidence of cointegration and suggest that the government is thinking prospectively and anticipating dissident actions when deciding when and where to commit repression. This is true both across data sources and across forms of dissident behavior. In the AHPN data as well as the newspaper data there is evidence of cointegration between repressive actions and both dissident mobilization and dissident collective action.

Summarizing the results, broad support was found for the contention that states engage in repression not just in response to existing threats to the regime but also in anticipation of future challenges. At the same time, large discrepancies were found when comparing the results of models estimated using data from government records to

¹⁹ As Reeves et al. (2011, 17) point out, "The sign will be negative because the constant has a positive sign. If the series have a cointegrated relationship, they should have opposite signs."

another set replicating the results using newspaper data. The police data provided robust evidence of preemptive repressive behavior, while the newspaper data generally failed to replicate such findings.

Conclusion

This study concerns the causes of political repression and the violation of human rights. It uses multiple data sources on political activity in Guatemala to examine one of the key tenants in the human rights literature—that repression occurs as states respond to dissident threats such as political protests and violence.

When the study analyzes the causes of political repression using data taken from newspaper reports, the picture that emerges is consistent with justifications for repressive activity regularly put forward by state elites. The newspaper data show that repression occurs in response to dissident collective action (i.e. protests and acts of dissident violence).

When these analyses are conducted using data gathered from the Guatemalan National Police Archive, the identified patterns of repression change dramatically. The police data show that repression was equally likely to occur following non-conflictual mobilizing actions. The paper argues that states are forward looking when deciding when and where to violate human rights. They repress mobilization out of concern that they might facilitate more threatening forms of dissent in the future.

There are a number of implications. For those interested in studying human rights, the study shows that the biases associated with newspapers commonly used to analyze the phenomena are sufficiently severe as to bias our conclusions. Generating

conclusions that are less afflicted with bias requires generating data that are more representative of the underlying distributions of dissident behavior and state repression.

For those interested in stopping state repression, it means that we must pay attention to the emergence of repressive activity even in settings where there has been little dissident conflict. Newspapers appear to cover repression only in the wake of collective action, but there appears to be additional repressive activity that goes on during periods of political mobilization. Stopping state repression requires the development of better tools to first track the repression of dissident mobilization.

Further research will be necessary to see if these results hold in more democratic and less violent contexts. But democratic regimes have been demonstrated to be strongly effective at constraining lethal forms of repressive activities but relatively ineffective at constraining non-violent forms of repression (Davenport 2007a). Non-lethal forms of repression, which commonly involve constraints placed on civil liberties, are forms of repressive action particularly suited to target mobilization.

Finally, for social movement activists, it means collective action is potentially even more challenging than previously imagined. As thought previously, social movements emerged, then governments repressed. Now it appears as though movement activists must content with repressive action from the get go. Social movement mobilization can only occur when the dissidents are able to adapt in the face of repression, and outpace their opponents (Davenport 2011; Sullivan and Davenport 2011). Dissident demise is likely to occur when the pace of tactical adaptation slows and state agents can preemptively attack the group and eliminate subsequent capacity for collective action.

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Table I: Evidence of the Causes of Repressive Action: Negative Binomial Regression Models

		AHPN Dataset				Newspaper Dataset			
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
		Preparatory Action		Repressive Action		Preparatory Action		Repressive Action	
			IRR		IRR		IRR		IRR
Dissent									
	Lagged Mobilization	0.037* 0.17	1.10	0.046* (0.022)	1.13	-1.573 (1.000)		0.371 (0.265)	
	Lagged Collective Action	0.309*** 0.069	1.28	0.168** (0.062)	1.14	0.206* (0.118)	1.17	0.111* (0.059)	1.03
Control									
	Twice Lagged Preparatory Action	0.128*** (0.036)	1.48	0.076** (0.032)	1.28	-13.96*** (0.632)	0.88	0.054 (0.071)	
	Twice Lagged Repressive Action	0.068 (0.053)		0.398*** (0.119)	1.38	-16.56*** (1.083)	0.25	-0.010 (0.266)	
	Campaigns	0.881*** (0.128)	1.39	0.562*** (0.166)	1.21	1.421*** (0.414)	1.87	0.086 (0.103)	
	Log of Population	0.412 (0.443)		0.354 (0.767)		0.970 (0.854)		1.350*** (0.386)	1.48
	% Indigenous	0.476 (0.468)		0.631 (0.731)		1.132 (0.851)		0.273 (0.578)	
	Polity	-0.297*** (0.039)	0.59	-0.238*** (0.067)	0.77	0.961*** (0.227)	2.61	0.573*** (0.075)	1.24
	Constant	-7.095 4.162		-8.673 (7.076)		-10.703 (8.258)		-12.776 (3.877)	
	N	2309		2309		2309		2309	

Departmental Clustered Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test)

Table II: Evidence of the Causes of Repressive Action: Instrumental Variables Models

		AHPN Dataset		Newspaper Dataset	
		Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
		Preparatory Action	Repressive Action	Preparatory Action	Repressive Action
Instrumented					
	Lagged Mobilization	1.271*** (0.095)	0.218*** (0.018)	-0.047 (0.028)	-0.348 (0.106)
Dissent					
	Lagged Collective Action	0.262*** 0.046	-0.011 (0.011)	0.005 (0.003)	0.781*** (0.013)
Control					
	Twice Lagged Preparatory Action	0.042 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.051*** (0.016)
	Twice Lagged Repressive Action	0.088* (0.047)	0.054*** (.119)	-0.011** (0.003)	-0.010 (0.266)
	Campaigns	1.102*** (0.068)	0.031 (0.021)	0.026 (0.021)	-0.047 (0.032)
	Log of Population	-0.003 (0.443)	-0.043* (0.024)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.077** (0.031)
	% Indigenous	0.085 (0.093)	0.079* (0.039)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.086* (0.045)
	Polity	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.011 (0.007)
	Constant	-0.142 0.615	-0.358 (0.214)	-0.003 (0.044)	0.639 (0.279)
	N	1848	1848	1848	1848
Departmental Clustered Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test) Instruments-Preparatory Action _{t-3} , Preparatory Action _{t-4} , Repressive Action _{t-3} , Repressive Action _{t-4}					

Table III: VEC Cointegration Equations

	AHPN Dataset		Newspaper Dataset	
	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Repressive Action	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Dissident Mobilization	-0.288*** (0.049)		-7.732*** (0.721)	
Dissident Collective Action		-0.099** (0.038)		-0.570*** (0.058)
<p>p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test) All models run with constants—constants omitted from presentation.</p>				

Figure I: Impulse Response Function Graphs of Dissent's Effects on Repressive Action

