

Relational Determinants of an Authoritarian State: The Case of the Emergency State in India, 1975-77

Abstract: My article examines changes in the political network and field positions of 553 Indian parliamentarians to explain an unexpected episode of authoritarianism in India (1975-77). My findings show that India's encounter with authoritarianism was a result of strategies employed by the ruling elite to resolve an apparent contradiction between their relational authority in their political network and field. My study of the Indian authoritarianism demonstrates the significance of simultaneously applying network analysis and Bourdieu's field theory to examine impact of political elites on the state form.

Key words: Network Analysis, Field Theory, Elites, Politics, India

Historical sociologists interested in state formation are increasingly applying network and field theory to examine the world of political elites. Among the classical examples of their applications of network analysis, we can recall the path-breaking work of Padgett and Ansell (1993) on the rise of the Medici and Gould's (1995) examination of relevant network ties among Parisian neighborhoods that shaped different phases of the French revolution. Among recent examples, we can think of McLean's (2004) study on the formation of the constitutional state in Poland. Field theory, however, is a relatively new entrant in the state formation debates. Gil Eyal's research on the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia (2005) and George Steinmetz's examination of the unique features of German colonialism (2007) can be viewed as its recent exemplars.

So far, historical sociologists have separately implemented these two theories to illustrate the history of elites in a particular country. But both theories, importantly, adhere to the basic principle of relational logic, according to which human practices are shaped by the flow of the structure of their relations, and not by their respective personalities or identities (see Emirbayer 1994, p. 286-291; Wellman 1988; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 15-19 and 224-235). But commonalities between these two theories end with their adherence to relational logic, for they respectively conceive of its operations in the social world in fundamentally different ways. For a network analyst the structure of relations refers to the structure of *social relations* among actors while for a field theorist it refers to structure of relations among actors' *field positions*. While network analysts and field theorists conceive of relational logic differently, I take their common adherence to it as an entry point into examining the surprising episode of Indian authoritarianism that occurred from 1975-77.

Since gaining independence in 1947 the Indian state had been steadily moving on the path of liberal democracy. But nearly three decades later, on June 26, 1975, Indira Gandhi, leader of the ruling party and prime minister of India, used constitutional provisions for the state of emergency to unleash a terrifying period of authoritarianism. During this two-year period, India, for the first time in its history as a free country, witnessed excesses associated with a typical authoritarian state (for discussions on the typical characteristics of authoritarian states, see O'Donnell 1973; Perlmutter 1981; Linz 2000).

Scholars of democracy worldwide have always seen India as a telling departure from the conventional argument that democracy is likely to survive only in countries with high economic development and low social diversity. But they have yet to give India's temporary descent into apparent totalitarianism the kind of attention they regularly give to the success of Indian democracy. When they do acknowledge the presence of an authoritarian state in India, they present it either as a historically insignificant moment or as another critical instance that demonstrates the eventual resilience of Indian democracy (see Linz and Stepan 1996; Dhal 1998; Sen 1999; Przeworski (et al) 2000; Diamond 2007; Tilly 2007). While emphasizing the success of Indian democracy might contribute to nationalist senses of pride or prop up India as a rare oasis of democracy in South Asia, such interpretations do little to help us understand why authoritarianism unexpectedly arose in the first place.

Before examining the reasons behind the Indian case of authoritarianism, we need to acknowledge a feature unique to it. Unlike other South Asian countries, where armed forces created authoritarian regimes (especially in Pakistan and Bangladesh), in India it

was the ruling political elites who played a significant role in shaping authoritarianism. In fact, the Indian case of party authoritarianism is a rare case among the more visible manifestations of military authoritarianism worldwide (for discussions of party and military authoritarianism, see Brooker 2000). When we juxtapose the elite participation in India's antidemocratic moment with the recent advancements made by historical sociologists, we can identify a starting point for investigating the case of Indian authoritarianism; Indian political elite.

Following my adoption of the synthetic notion of relational logic (a combination of network analysts' and field theorists' conception of relational logic), I conceive the structure of Indian political elites' world simultaneously as one of social relations among them and relations among their respective political field positions. I will conduct an in-depth examination of changes in network ties among 553 Indian political elites located at various political field positions during the 1971-75 period to explain the relational determinants of the Indian emergency state. My main finding is that in 1971 a clique of ruling elites, led by Indira Gandhi, commanded the top political field position. But its members were weakly embedded within the network structure of political elites. The kind of strategies that Gandhi employed to resolve this asymmetry during the next four years of her rule led to the state of emergency on June 26, 1975.

Theoretical Preliminaries: Relational Logic, Network Analysis and Field Theory

Network analysis and field theory adopted relational logic as a means to avoid the influence of categorical analysis in their respective conceptions of the social world. Briefly, categorical analysis refers to inherent characteristics or "essences" of human

beings to explain their behaviors. According to relational logic, the social world consists of actors regularly interacting with each other to exchange various relevant resources. As these ever-transforming exchange relations unfold, the very processes of unfolding can potentially change the relations' characteristics. Thus, relational logic attacks categorical analysis' essentializing core by postulating that actors' identities are malleable and are only a temporal manifestation of the role they play during a particular instance of exchange-relations among them (see Emirbayer 1994, p. 286-291; Wellman 1988; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 15-19 and 224-235).

Network Analysis

Network analysts have persistently argued that social relations involved in friendship, kinship, and neighborhoods vitally matter in our lives because they transmit qualities such as mutual obligations, trust, and other cultural expectations that significantly shape the practices of embedded actors. However, relations among actors are not always symmetrical; indeed, empirical studies of network ties have shown that there is rarely a perfect symmetry among social actors' relations. In most cases, an actor's perception of his relation with another actor—such as “he is my friend”—is usually not reciprocated, or at least not to the same degree. Furthermore, it is not necessary that social actors be tied with each other because they like each other; in fact, network analysts treat ties of dislike among nodes as one of a significant variety of social ties. Such ties of dislike play an important role in structuring the flow of resources among a network's members and thus play a significant role in network structures.

Two actors in a network not only can be directly related to one another, but can also be indirectly related through a direct tie with a common third actor (Wellman 1988, p. 41-42). Some network positions, such as those of gatekeepers and brokers, can provide their occupants a relatively higher degree of control over the amount of resources flowing in a network than can other positions (e.g., see Baker and Faulkner 1993; Fernandez and Gould 1994).

The presence of different varieties of ties in a network and the significance of certain network positions for its flow of resources ensure that there is almost always a differential distribution of resources among network members. Such constraints on a network's flow of resources lead to the development of a network hierarchy (for programmatic statements on network analysis, see Wellman 1988; Emirbayer 1994; Barabasi 2002; Breiger 2003).

Field Theory

Bourdieu envisages the modern social space as a conglomeration of many relatively autonomous fields. A field has two basic components: capital and habitus. Capital is a form of accumulated labor which exists in both material and embodied form, and which manifests itself in three generic varieties: economic, cultural, and social. Economic capital refers to wealth in the form of money or property rights; cultural capital refers to an actor's knowledge of skills required to become a member of a field, and which materially exists, for example, in the form of schools or educational institutes' certificates, diplomas, or degrees; social capital refers to the number and kind of people

one knows in a particular field, whose resources one can mobilize when required (Bourdieu 1986 [1983], p. 243, 248; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119).

Each of the three generic forms of capital acquires a specific form in a particular field. Though there are multiple capitals within a field, not every capital has equal value in it. From the point of view of particular actors located in a particular position in a particular field, some capitals have a higher value than others. Bourdieu defines the value of a capital from a subject's point of view as its symbolic value (Bourdieu 1986 [1983], p. 255n.3; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119). A position in a field is a depository of a particular volume and proportion of the specific material or objective form of each of the three generic capitals, whose values have been adjusted according to their respective symbolic value in a field.

Bourdieu argues that the structure of a field does not manifest itself as an external force on the social actors in it. He borrows the observation well illuminated by phenomenologists, especially by Merleau-Ponty, that social actors exist in a pre-reflexive mode of existence in which actors do not take the time to think consciously before they act (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 19-23; Bourdieu 2000 [1997], p. 211). Social actors can have such a mode of existence only when there is a perfect coherence between the structure of their subjectivity or habitus and the structure of the field. Such a relation between habitus and field is possible because habitus, which structures social actors' practices, is structured by the structures of a field. Now we are very close to stating field theory's relational logic: a social actor's habitus generates specific practices while simultaneously appreciating (or depreciating) her practices in relation to those of other actor in different field positions.

Importantly, the practices of those with higher deposits of symbolic capital have higher legitimacy than those with relatively lesser deposits at their respective field positions. Furthermore, their appreciation of all practices specific to that field has the highest legitimacy, granting them the highest authority in the field (see Bourdieu 2000 [1997], p. 150-159 and Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 94-104, 119, 115-140).

To summarize the above discussion, a field theorist considers relations among actors' field positions—defined by the deposited amount of the three generic capitals adjusted to their symbolic value at their respective positions—as the basic relational structure of the world. A network analyst conceives relational structures, meanwhile, as the structure of an actor's social relations, such as family, friends, enemies and so forth. In spite of their differences, however, both theories consider relations among social actors and not identities, personalities, or other essentialized characteristics as their primary object of analysis.

We would expect that network and field theorists' common theoretical lineage in relational logic would sufficiently warrant the beginnings of a dialogue between them. But such is not the case; indeed, network analysts seldom discuss Bourdieu's conception of relational logic or field theory, and when they do, they perceive its adherence to relational logic as apparently reason enough to ignore the manner in which it is implemented (see Emirbayer 1994, p. 287n.8, 292 and 304; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1992, p. 1426n3). Bourdieu, however, has not only clearly spelled out the distinction between the two conceptions of relational logic, but has argued that field theory's conception provides a more "objective" notion of actors' relations than does network analysis' conception (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 113-114).

To comprehend Bourdieu's polemical approach to a network-oriented conception of relational logic, we need to refer to his peculiar and controversial concept of exploitation, symbolic violence—the only concept in field theory in which he explicitly discusses the significance of social relations. According to Bourdieu, this “gentle” form of exploitation is neither realized as an explicit act of violence by those who inflict it nor experienced as violence by those who receive it. Symbolic violence is inflicted by an actor in a higher, dominant position on an actor in a lower, dominated one when the former profits from his relation with the latter by hiding from him signs of his social dominance. Immediate social relations which involve mutual trust, loyalty, and obligation—such as kinship relations, friendship, or patronage—are means employed to conceal differences in the structure of the relations among actors' field positions. Bourdieu has illustrated this peculiar form of violence by demonstrating how individuals in socially higher positions try to reach out to lowly-positioned actors and gain their support by socially relating with them in ways that make them appear as their equals or as somebody who is a part of their world. Particular examples Bourdieu cites include relations between political leaders and their socially underprivileged supporters (Bourdieu 1999 [1991], p.67-69), the modern corporate culture of “participatory management” (Bourdieu 2000 [1997], p. 204-205), and gender relations (Bourdieu 2001 [1998]).

By explicating the peculiar characteristics of symbolic violence, Bourdieu tries to reveal that the ultimate social reality is the structure of relations among field positions. But while emphasizing the softness of symbolic violence, he implicitly provides us with clues which tell us otherwise. Firstly, the fact that symbolic violence does take place tells

us that social relations do have an objective existence independent of the objective existence of relations among field positions. Secondly, the impact of social relations is so deep that, as Bourdieu himself admits, actors participating in it do not realize that they are participating in an exploitative relation. If immediate social relations among actors didn't have a reality of their own, then perhaps actors could see what Bourdieu, as a sociologist, sees, or asks all actors to see, that is, the structure of their relations among their field positions.

Now, of course, if we continue with this line of argument, we will open up a Pandora's Box of epistemological questions. Why do actors not know that they are being exploited? Why does a social scientist know when actors are being exploited? Can only social scientists identify the nature of "true" exploitation? Furthermore, one could ask whether Bourdieu is being overly myopic when he perceives social relations among differently positioned actors only as a means or opportunity for exploitation. While a thoroughgoing discussion of these questions and their potential ramifications lies beyond the scope of this article, Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence, unlike his arguments about social relations, shows that social relations have an objective existence which cannot be reduced to relations among field positions.

To debate which notion of relational structure is more objective would be an unproductive exercise, merely leading to unnecessary controversy and distracting us from the far worthier cause of refining the ways in which relational logic is implemented in sociological analysis. Suffice it to say that objective relational structures coexist in the forms of both interpersonal networks and field positions. I argue that if we perceive structural relations among a set of interacting actors both in terms of the social relations

among them and in terms of the relations among their respective field positions, we can gain vital insights into the relational determinants of their practices. My study of Indian political elites shows that the hierarchical relations among them simultaneously existed as relations among their political field position and as their popularity in political elite networks. The ruling elites' efforts to resolve the contradiction between their high field position and low popularity during their reign created conditions for the appearance of authoritarianism in India.

Methodological Concepts and Data Analysis

According to Bourdieu, among the three generic capitals (economic, social and cultural), a specific form of cultural capital—political capital—is the symbolic capital in the political field of countries that have adopted principles of a parliamentary democracy (Bourdieu 1999 [1991], p. 192). Political capital refers to a political actor's competency to mobilize masses in social space (Bourdieu 1999 [1991], p. 181). It exists in objectified form as the legitimate rights bestowed upon a political actor to access a government's resources. Various government ministries led by democratically elected political leaders could be seen as the examples of materialized forms of such legitimate rights.

The Indian state has adopted institutions and the ethos of a modern parliamentary democracy. Every citizen has the right to vote during the general elections, held every five years, to elect their representatives for the national parliament. The party that wins at least two-thirds of the seats in the parliament becomes eligible to wield majority control of the central government. The winning party's members nominate one of its elected

parliamentarians to the prime minister's office, whereupon the chosen prime minister selects her team of ministers amongst her party's parliamentarians.

There are three sets of hierarchically related ministers: Cabinet, State and Deputy Ministers. Cabinet ministers are the most senior government ministers; led by the prime minister, they head their respectively assigned ministerial offices. State ministers are expected to assist cabinet ministers in dispensing their work, and are usually given the charge of a particular department in a cabinet minister's office. Deputy ministers, in turn, are expected to assist state ministers in their work (Misra 1986). In other words, the central government ministers constitute the top elites among parliamentarians, and among them, the prime minister-led cabinet ministers rank at the top, followed by state and deputy ministers.

Indian political actors active in national politics in the 1970s usually implemented a combination of four ideal-typical logics of political practices—grassroots, party, movement and mass appeal politics—on their career paths towards the parliament, their penultimate end, and, ultimately, to one of the ministerial offices.

Grassroots politics consisted of implementing strategies of clientelistic politics to mobilize villagers during elections. A typical Indian village at the time had multiple landlords and hence multiple patrons. As a result, there were usually multiple factions in a village, each of whose leaders competed with one other to get elected to village or district-level state and party offices. To be successful in their pursuits, they often needed not only their faction members' support but also the support of members of other factions in their village. Thus, a faction leader's chances of successfully mobilizing the client population of his village for political ends were shaped by two constraints. He had to

ensure that his faction's members remained loyal to him while engineering splits in his rival factions (see Nicholas 1977; Brass 1965, 1995 [1990]; Weiner 1967). Any seasoned faction leader who politically mobilized the masses of a village by exploiting these two constraints gave rise to a style of practicing politics that I call the ideal-typical logic of *grassroots politics*.

A region's ruling party was usually divided into legislative and organizational wings. The legislative wing consisted of party members who successfully became ministers in the region's government. The organizational wing consisted of almost all the rivals of the legislative wing, including ruling party members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) not a part of the legislative wing, party office holders, and ordinary rank and file members not tied to members of the legislative wing (Weiner 1967; Kochanek 1968).

The political fortunes of both wings' members were dependent upon village and district-level faction leaders in members' respective constituencies. Members needed access to the state offices' resources to maintain their political bases, and if they could not successfully receive and distribute state-sponsored resources among their supporters at the village and district levels, they faced the prospect of losing their political bases. Strategies employed by the two wings' members to gain state resources comprised the *logic of party politics*.

Once a faction successfully gained entry into the state's ministerial offices, it needed the support of the organizational wing's assembly members to retain control of the regional government. The legislative wing solicited their support by promising them easy access to state resources while also attempting to weaken ties among members by promising them ministerial seats if future adjustments were made in the ministry. The

organizational wing's leaders gained some degree of authority over the legislative wing's members by getting members elected to party offices. Control over party offices empowered organizational wing members to decide whether currently elected assembly members were eligible to compete in the next general election, which, not coincidentally, would qualify political leaders to vie for a ministerial office.

While party leaders used the logic of party politics to reach national office, one difference remained between the use of party politics at the regional and national levels. A political leader needed to win election to the parliament, not an assembly, in order to become eligible to compete for a central government ministry, with the coveted post of prime minister at the top.

In addition to these three political logics, political actors also employed tactics of *movement politics* to mobilize masses. Owing to a rich history of nationalist movements during the colonial period, Indian political actors of the 1970s were greatly experienced with using social movement tactics to mobilize masses. Importantly, such movements occurred in a political context in which democratic means of protests were absent and, perhaps for this reason, movement participants never accepted the legitimacy of the colonial institutions against which they were agitating. Hence, anti-colonial movements of the period completely disregarded—and to an extent destroyed either by violence or non-violence—whatever institutional means were available for political change. During the postcolonial period, there was no serious pan-Indian social movement, at least until the mid-1970s. But there was no dearth of regional movements that tackled issues of language and cultural identity, and many leaders successfully deployed these movement tactics to form strong regional parties and win elections.

Political actors employed most of the above-mentioned political strategies within their primary regions of influence, whether their home towns or provinces or a community members' stronghold. But there were also few political actors whose ability to mobilize masses transcended all regional and communitarian boundaries, who could go to any corner of the country and rouse the people by simply appearing on the public platform. They might not belong to the local community but their speech elicited passionate response from them. Political actors identified such leaders among them as leaders who had '*mass appeal*.'

One could safely argue that the repeated occurrence of one of these strategies in a parliamentarian's political practices indicated the defining feature of her political habitus i.e., a practical sense of generating political practices. Habitus, we may recall, not only generates practices, but also simultaneously appreciates or depreciates one's own and other actors' practices, whose legitimacy, when interpreted mutually by the actor herself and others, indicates her political authority. The authority of a political actor's habitus determines how seriously his interpretation and appreciation of his own and other's political practices are taken by other political actors—the higher the authority, the more seriously he would be taken.

The ruling party politicians aiming to enter the world of top elites need to demonstrate the authority of their political habitus. The authority of an ordinary political actor's habitus is evaluated by how effectively her political practices mobilize masses, as measured by the increase or decrease of deposits of political capital in objectified forms (seats in legislative assemblies, ministerial offices, etc.) at her field position (Bourdieu 1999 [1991], p. 27-28 and 180-183). But the performance of an ambitious political actor

is evaluated not only through her personal victories but according to her ability to lead her party members to victory in general elections. In other words, the symbolic worth of her political habitus depends on her ability to mobilize masses for her party countrywide, and not only for herself. It is this ability that distinguishes her from an ordinary parliamentarian and makes her eligible to ascend the ranks of the top elites.

Studies implementing network analysis to examine elites' effect on state formation primarily use a relational methodology to locate top elites within their networks. This strategy proves useful because an examination of changes in the interrelationships among ordinary or top elites discloses vital state dynamics (for e.g., see Padgett and Ansell 1993; Adam 1994; McLean 2004). In this article, I examine the ties between the ruling party's top elites (i.e., ministers) and the ruling party's and opposition parties' parliamentarians by employing the network analytic concepts of 2-mode networks and two centrality measures, Freeman degree and betweenness.

Unlike conventional network analysis data, which consists of network ties among a set of actors, 2-mode network data consists of ties among a set of actors and events, from participation in social gatherings and memberships in a company board, to party offices and political committees. When a set of actors participate in a common event, they will possibly interact and develop enduring interpersonal ties. Following this idea, 2-mode networks have been widely used to study actors' network relations (for details, see Wasserman and Faust 1994; Nooy et al 2005; Breiger 2003).

Network analysts take a keen interest in the centrality of network actors. Instinctually, one could identify popular persons or "stars" in a network as its central actors, who by virtue of their popularity could play a vital role in shaping other actors'

practices. Freeman's degree and betweenness measures are two important quantitative means for evaluating the centrality of an actor. Degree refers to an actor's total number of neighbors or actors directly tied to him—a higher degree value means that she is well connected in the concerned network. Furthermore, if her neighbors do not have an equal number of ties, or if they are totally unconnected to one other, her prominence among them increases. Betweenness, meanwhile, measures an actor's number of in-between or brokerage position among non-adjacent actors. An actor with a higher value of betweenness will be in more of a brokerage position between multiple actors in a network, and thus will wield more influence overall (for details see Scott 1991; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Nooy et al 2006).

The memberships ruling party actors enjoy in small but powerful political offices—such as parliamentary committees, national level party offices, boards, councils, and the union ministries—play an important role in establishing political ties among them. More often than not, a select group of tightly tied ruling party elites or their most trustworthy allies, whether in politics or outside (friends, family members, or even personal staff), decide their nominations to most of the high political offices. Such parliamentarians, then, are likely to enjoy good personal relations with one or more of their party's elites or trustworthy allies. Perhaps this common positive relation with a third actor(s) increases their chances of having amicable ties with each other.

Parliamentarians' personal relations are not limited only to colleagues within their party, but extend to other parties' parliamentarians as well. Such interparty ties develop because of regular party splits, defections, and formations of new parties. The largest, the strongest, and the most-often ruling party since independence, the Congress Party exerted

a strong magnetic pull on opposition parties' members, some of whom defected from their parties to join Congress and later enjoyed high political offices. There were also instances of disgruntled Congress leaders defecting to opposition parties, however. The wear and tear of parliamentarians' shifting alliances perhaps created among them bittersweet ties, a sort of amalgamation of mutual like and dislike. Because a party's membership determines its strength, parliamentary democracy creates enough incentives for parliamentarians to manipulate the fuzziness of interparty ties to cause parliamentarians to defect from one party to another. We can identify this pull force, usually latent but active under the right conditions, as an important qualitative feature of parliamentarians' interparty ties.

Data Analysis

I will use *Who's Who of the Indian Parliament* to examine the relational history of Indian political elites. Each session's *Who's Who* provides the name and the year of all offices each parliamentarian ever occupied at grassroots, regional, and national levels. I personally computerized, coded, and analyzed data on parliamentarians elected for the 1971-75 parliamentary session—totaling 553—to infer their political habitus and political ties.

I will examine parliamentarians' political habitus, including that of parliamentarians who became ministers, by comparing the prevalence of one or more of the political logics—grassroots, party, social movement and mass appeal—in their practices by the time they reached the 1971-75 parliamentary session. The underlying assumption is that regular occurrence of a certain type of political logic in certain parliamentarians'

practices results from its pervasion of their political habitus. Political actors practically implement a particular type of political logic to gain entry into particular kinds of political offices: logic of grassroots politics for village and district offices, regional party politics for regional offices, national party politics for national offices, and social movement politics for movement organization offices. By comparing a parliamentarian's occupancy of various kinds of political offices, we can infer which kind of political logic regularly appeared in their political practices. For example, let's say that while examining the office occupancy of a parliamentarian during the 1971-75 session we note that she had been in a larger number of state and/or party offices at the regional level than at the grassroots level, national level, or social movement organization offices. We can then infer that the logic of regional party politics regularly appeared in her political practices, indicating that she has the political habitus of regional party politics.

During every significant period of Indian politics, there have been a select few political actors who could mobilize masses simply by their mass appeal. During the early two decades of post-liberation India, Nehru, one of the leaders of the nationalist movement and India's first prime minister, was recognized as a figure with tremendous mass appeal. In the 1970s, Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, and Jayaprakash Narayan, once Nehru's close political ally but later Gandhi's strongest political rival, were the only leaders known for their pan-Indian mass appeal.

To examine ministers' relational positions within the network of parliamentarians, I will first develop a 2-mode network of parliamentarian-to-office for Congress and opposition parliamentarians and separate ministers' 2-mode network from Congress parliamentarians' network. Using the UCINET software package, I will convert all 2-

mode networks of ministers and Congress party and opposition party parliamentarians into 1-mode networks (minister-to-minister, Congress parliamentarian-to-Congress parliamentarian, and opposition parliamentarian-to-opposition parliamentarian networks). Finally, these 1-mode matrices will be subjected to the UCINET software package to take a Freeman centrality measure of each cabinet, state, and deputy minister across political networks of all ministers, ruling parliamentarians, and opposition parliamentarians.

Ministers and Parliamentarians, 1971-75

The state of emergency was imposed during the tenure of the 1971-75 parliamentary sessions, during which there were 553 parliamentarians representing 32 different parties. Table 1 below depicts the respective party's strength in the parliament. We can note that the Congress party was the largest, with 372 members. There were 30 opposition parties, of which the twenty-five-member Communist Party of India was the largest. The smallest among them, eleven in total, had only one member each. In addition, there were 15 independent members, that is, parliamentarians unaffiliated with any party.

<Table 1: Party Strength in 1971-75 Parliamentary Sessions>

Though the Congress Party had been India's ruling party since the first general election in 1952, its grip over state power weakened during the first post-Nehruvian period elections, held in 1967. After a bitter struggle with incumbent elites, known as the syndicate, Gandhi secured firm control over the Congress party, leading it in the 1971 general elections. Under her leadership, there was an unprecedented improvement in the Congress Party's performance—it regained control over the central government after

winning twenty seven percent more parliamentary seats than in the previous session. In the assembly elections, held a year later, it won six percent more assembly seats than in the previous assembly elections, and gained control of twenty out of twenty-three regional governments in the country. By the early 1970s Gandhi was the undisputed leader of the Congress party, and under her prime ministership Congress came to possess a maximum amount of political capital. In turn, her political habitus, whose strategies led her party to its high field position, acquired a paramount political authority (for details on Gandhi's political trajectory see Author 2009).

Gandhi's ministerial council consisted of fourteen cabinet ministers (including Gandhi), twenty-two state ministers and sixteen deputy ministers. There were 320 Congress parliamentarians whom we can recognize as ordinary Congress parliamentarians. Figure 1 below depicts ministers' and ordinary Congress parliamentarians' relative office occupancy of grassroots, regional, national, and social movement offices during their entire careers, through the 1971-75 parliamentary sessions. We can note that Congress ordinary and minister-level parliamentarians were distant from social movement offices, perhaps a result of their being in power since independence. Ordinary Congress parliamentarians had relatively larger grassroots office occupancies. Both state and deputy ministers had held a comparatively larger number of regional offices, while cabinet ministers seem to have had the largest amount of national office experience. As we discussed earlier, parliamentarians' office occupancy indicated their political habitus. Hence, from figure 1 we can infer that during the 1971-75 parliamentary sessions, ordinary Congress parliamentarians had grassroots political

habitus, state and deputy ministers had regional party politics habitus, and cabinet ministers had national party politics habitus.

<Figure 1: Ministers' and Ordinary Congress Parliamentarians' Political habitus>

In figure 2 we take a closer look at each cabinet minister's office occupancy. We would note that one cabinet minister, Jagjiwan Ram, strikingly stands out. He exhibits the largest national level office occupancy (nearly 25 offices). Gandhi too exhibits fairly good number of national level office occupancy (nearly 15 offices). An interesting point to be noted is that Gandhi's national politics office experiences took place during her father's reign, Nehru. More than often she was either nominated or 'unanimously' elected to national level state and party offices (author 2009). To put it simply, Gandhi did not only have less national level office occupancy in quantitative terms, her qualitative experience of entering into such offices further downgraded her national party politics experiences. Furthermore, we can note that she never occupied regional, grassroots and social movement offices.

<Figure 2: Cabinet Ministers' Political Habitus>

Table 3 describes the centrality of cabinet ministers in the political networks of all ministers, ruling parliamentarians, and opposition parliamentarians. Gandhi had only eight degrees in all ministers' networks (52 members), forty-one degrees in Congress parliamentarians' networks (320 members), and three degrees in opposition parliamentarians' networks (181 members). Interestingly, all members of her cabinet, except Karan Singh, C. Subramaniam, Uma Dikshit and Raj Bahadur, had nearly three to four times higher degree scores in the all the ministers' networks (27 – 31 degrees). Among them, Jagjiwan Ram, Moinul Haque, and K. Hanumanthaiya had a much higher

degree score than Gandhi in Congress parliamentarians' network (47-62 degrees). And among these leaders, Ram had the highest degree score in the opposition parliamentarians' network (5 degrees). Furthermore, Ram had the highest betweenness scores in all three networks (ministers, Congress and opposition parliamentarians), making him the most central minister in Gandhi's cabinet.

<Table 3: Cabinet Ministers' Network Centrality Measures>

Table 4 describes state ministers' centrality scores in the three concerned networks. We can note that Gandhi was less central than the state ministers within the ministers' network, but was more central in the Congress and opposition parliamentarians' networks, except for Prakash Sethi and R. K. Khadilkar. We already know that Ram had higher degree and betweenness scores in all three networks than did Gandhi and other cabinet ministers. He also had higher degree and betweenness scores than all state ministers in all three networks, including Khadilkar. But he and Sethi had nearly same degree in all three networks. They had same betweenness in ministers' and opposition parliamentarians' network. But Ram had higher betweenness score than Sethi in the Congress parliamentarians' network, making him more central among Congress parliamentarians than Sethi.

<Table 4: State Ministers' Network Centrality Measures>

Table 5 describes the centrality measures of deputy ministers. Here, too, Gandhi's degree score exhibits a similar trend: a lower score in all ministers' networks and a higher score than deputy ministers in Congress and opposition parliamentarians' networks. We can also note that B. Shankaranand has only a marginally lower degree score, but a higher betweenness score than Gandhi in Congress parliamentarians'

network. If we compare Ram's and Sethi's scores with those of deputy ministers, we can note that here, too, they have higher degree and betweenness scores than the deputy ministers of all three networks.

<Table 5: Deputy Ministers' Network Centrality Measures>

Gandhi, among her ministers, had close personal relations with Kumramangalam, Ray, Dikshit, Subramaniam, Mishra, Satpathi, Gujaral and Mehta. They together formed Gandhi's inner circle, or what journalists used to call her "kitchen cabinet" (see Masani 1975, p.213; Malhotra 1991 [1989], p. 96-97, 116-117; Dhar 2000, p.113-124; Frank 2002, p.313-314).

On a quick review of all three tables on centrality measure we would notice that except for Kumramangalam, Ray and Subramaniam all of Gandhi's personal friends among ministers are isolates in all three networks. On a closer examination of Kumramangalam's, Ray's and Subramaniam's centrality measure we would note that their degree and betweenness measures in all three networks is among the lowest.

Figure 3, depicting all ministers' network ties, visually summarizes Gandhi's centrality, or lack of it, in the 1971-75 parliamentary session. Note that node sizes are adjusted according to their "betweenness" in the network. Gandhi is conspicuously visible by her position outside the densest part of the network, a result of her low degree score. Furthermore, her nodal size is among the smallest in the network. Among outsiders, Gandhi is tied to Hemwati Bahuguna and C. Subramaniam. Within the densest network, Gandhi is tied only with Jagjiwan Ram, Prakash Sethi, K. Hanumanthaiya, Moinul Haque, R. K. Khadilkar and Fakhruddin Ahmed. Notice each one of these ministers' nodal size, for they are the most central actors in the ministers' network.

Figure 3 was drawn by using the Netdraw software program (available in Ucinet 6) that by default depicts dichotomized network data. When we examine the network data of ministers, which depicts the number of ties among them, we can note that Gandhi had the largest number of ties with Ram and Sethi (five each) among all of her eight neighbors. In turn, these two had the greatest number of ties with each other in their respective networks (seven ties). Additionally, we know that these two ministers were also highly central in the networks of all ministers and ordinary Congress and opposition parliamentarians. In other words, they were both well-tied to each other and located in a strong brokerage position between Gandhi and all Congress parliamentarians.

<Figure 3: Ministers' Political Network>

Gandhi's Reign and the 1975 Crisis

Observers of the Gandhian regime have noted that she exhibited a propensity to override her ministers' assigned domains of authority when deciding government policies. She personally nominated party leaders to the most important regional government and party offices, without bothering to gauge the opinions of her regional ministers or concerned holders of regional-level Congress party offices. Her nepotism was unambiguous: her political favorites lacked experience and strong bases among the masses or within the party, and their main qualifications were either long relationships with her family or personal loyalty to her (For details on Gandhi's political strategies see Malhotra 1991 [1989], p. 142-148, Frank 2002, p. 330-347; Jayakar 1992 [1988], p. 165-183).

By the mid-1970s, a series of natural and political crises brought Gandhi face-to-face with the gravest political challenge she had faced so far. Severe drought, high inflation, and food scarcity that had grown since the early 1970s began sparking riots and strikes across the country (see Franda 1976, p. 3-6; Moraes 1980, p. 198-199; Frank 2002, p. 348; Malhotra 1991 [1989], p.154; Dhar 2000, p. 239-244). Until early 1974, such agitations were neither well organized nor necessarily interrelated. But by the year's end, they began to become clustered under the umbrella of what was known as the "JP movement." At the helm of the movement was Jayaprakash Narayan (or JP), a leader with a pan-India mass appeal and founder of the first socialist party in India, the Praja Socialist Party. Soon, leaders of the Communist Party (Marxist), Jan Sangh, Congress (O), Swatantra, Praja Socialist Party, and Samyukta Socialist Party began to openly support the JP movement. In a massive rally held in Delhi in March 1974, JP attacked Gandhi's government for failing to respond to the countrywide crisis (see Wood 1975; Jones and Jones 1976; Shah 1977).

All six opposition parties involved in the JP movement together had only 72 members in the 1971-75 parliamentary sessions (see table 1). Their united numbers did not pose any serious threat to Gandhi's government. But their interparty ties with Congress ministers and ordinary Congress parliamentarians must have been a matter of serious concern for her. Table 6 below depicts each of these parties' parliamentarians' centrality measure in their interparty ties with Congress parliamentarians. We should note that only Congress (O) leaders and one CPM leader had interparty political ties with Congress parliamentarians. Among Congress (O) leaders, Morarji Desai had the highest degree and highest centrality score among Congress ministers and ordinary

parliamentarians. Jayaprakash Narayan is absent from the table because he at the time was not a member of the parliament.

<Table 6: JP Movement Leaders' Ties with Congress Parliamentarians>

Figure 4 below depicts the Multi-Dimensional Scaling result of all JP movement leaders' ties with Congress party's ministers. We can immediately note that Desai, Ram and Sethi are not only at the center of the figure, they are also closest among all of them with each other. Their position in the figure indicates both their high centrality among ministers and high number of ties with each other. In other words, figure 4 shows that Desai, the leader of a rapidly proliferating movement against Gandhi's government, had close interparty ties with the most central ministers in Gandhi's ministerial council, Ram and Sethi.

<Figure 4: Ministers and JP Movement Leaders' Political Network>

While Gandhi was facing threats from the JP movement, a judicial judgment against her formally put a serious question mark on her political authority. On June 12, 1975, the Allahabad high court passed a judgment on a case filed against Gandhi by her parliamentary constituency rival, who had accused her of unfairly using state resources during the 1971 election campaign. The high court judge found her guilty, and Gandhi was banned from participating in parliamentary elections for the next eight years. She could neither vote nor draw her salary as a parliamentarian, though she was allowed to remain in office and retain her current membership in the parliament for the next six months. Gandhi's lawyers immediately filed an appeal at the Supreme Court challenging the Allahabad high court judgment. Gandhi called a meeting of all top Congress party office bearers and ministers on June 18th to discuss the crisis.

In the meanwhile, the JP movement leaders' clamor for her resignation reached a new height. They started sending feelers to important Congress leaders. Not surprisingly, Ram was one of their main targets. The following conversation between P. N. Singh, a confidante of a Congress leader sympathetic to JP movement, and Ram was reported in a Gandhi's biography:

Singh: You people must do something! Otherwise the (Congress) party will finish.

Ram: Age or health doesn't now permit me to, but if Chandrashekhar (Congress leader sympathetic to the JP movement) takes the lead, I'll support him (Vasudev 1977, p. 38).

In the June 18th meeting, Gandhi seriously discussed the possibility of resigning from office. She proposed the names of Swaran Singh and Siddharth Ray, both cabinet ministers, as her possible replacements in the prime minister's office. Though Ram dissuaded Gandhi from resigning and endorsed her leadership, he also suggested that in case of her resignation it was he—and not Singh or Ray—who deserved to become her successor (see Franda 1976, p. 8-10; Vasudev 1977, p. 38).

Six days after the meeting, on June 24th, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment that provided some relief to Gandhi without completely exonerating her from the Allahabad court's judgment. Two days later, on June 26th, 1975, Gandhi declared the state of emergency: all front row leaders of the JP movement were arrested, as were Congress parliamentarians suspected of harboring JP sympathies. Ram was spared jail time, but was brought under the vigorous surveillance of the Indian intelligence agencies. A parliamentary session was called in which new bills proposed changes in electoral

laws—the same laws that placed Gandhi in judicial trouble were now changed to absolve her of all charges of electoral malpractice.

Discussion

There is no doubt that Gandhi's role in the Congress party's triumphant victory in the 1971 general election demonstrated her adeptness in mobilizing the masses. Her political habitus generated unprecedented amounts of objectified political capital for the Congress party, and she won immense popularity. But during the most glorious moment in her political career, Gandhi was almost a loner among parliamentarians. Her mass appeal political habitus made her unique among ministers and ordinary Congress parliamentarians, and network analysis shows that neither she nor any one of her personal friends was a "star" among them.

These facts illustrate an oddity in Gandhi's political authority. She had the highest authority in the political field but not among ruling party's parliamentarians. During her reign she needed to be cautious of Congress parliamentarians, especially her ministers, most of whom had well-developed political habituses of party politics, and who were very well connected with each other and ordinary Congress and opposition parliamentarians, even if they lacked Gandhi's popularity.

When we closely examine political strategies that usually fall under the heading of party politics, we can note that they primarily consist of manipulating ties among political actors to increase the number of one's supporters and decrease those of one's rivals. Not only were parliamentary ministers in the Congress party expert in the logic of party politics, but they already enjoyed a much higher centrality than did Gandhi among

all Congress parliamentarians. They could have easily devised a way of cornering Gandhi even before the 1975 political crisis. But they did not, despite the shabby treatment they received at Gandhi's hands. The logical question, then, is, "Why didn't they disarm her when they had the chance?"

Gandhi's proven ability to take Congress to the highest field position reveals that her political habitus commanded the highest authority. Perhaps for this reason, ministers—in spite of having party politics, political habitus, and high centrality among parliamentarians—could not muster enough courage to corner Gandhi. But when the judiciary acknowledged that she had used illegitimate resources to win her parliamentary election, a nagging question arose regarding her political acumen: just how popular was Gandhi among the masses if she had to use extra-constitutional means to win her own parliamentary election?

The only way Gandhi could have begun to salvage her political career was by amending the very electoral laws that threatened her before any minister took advantage of her damaged political authority. Such electoral law amendments could have been carried out only in the parliament. Gandhi had two options. Her first option was to make constitutional amendments during the coming Monsoon session while remaining in office. With a meeting session of the current parliament only a few weeks away, the Congress party had more than the required number of parliamentarians to ensure that the requisite bills would have passed smoothly.

However, there was a high chance that Gandhi would not have had smooth sailing through the parliament. Her callous treatment of ministers and other powerful office bearers in the party since 1971 did little to elevate her already low centrality among

Congress party parliamentarians. To make matters worse, the euphoria of the JP movement had galvanized interparty ties between its top leaders and Congress parliamentarians. During the parliamentary session, all Congress and opposition parliamentarians would have come face-to-face with each other under a common roof, and opposition parliamentarians would have vigorously attempted to engineer the defection of their rivals in Congress.

Her second option was to resign, nominate one of her party loyalists to the prime minister's office, and get the requisite bills passed in the parliament. In the meantime, she could have taken over the reigns of the party, led it in the general election due the following year (1976), and capitalized on her long-standing mass appeal to reclaim the seat of power. This strategy, surely, would have taken the wind out of the JP movement's sails.

We know that Gandhi did indeed seriously explore this strategy. She suggested names of her possible replacements just a few days before imposing the state of emergency. But Ram's subtle objection to her nominees' qualifications must have made her more cautious about her decision to resign. The fact that she did not push a loyalist into the office—as she had been doing for the past four years—was Gandhi's implicit acknowledgement of her now uncertain political authority.

Had Gandhi somehow managed to advance one of her loyalists into office, disgruntled leaders would have found it easy to isolate her and her nominee. In such a scenario, she could have either ejected the rebel leaders from the Congress party, or the rebel leaders could have done the same to her and her supporters. In either case, a split in the Congress party would have been inevitable. Given the situation, it would not have

been too difficult for insurrectionary Congress leaders to join hands with opposition parties' parliamentarians and gain governmental control. After gaining entry in the seat of power, they would have seen to it that the Allahabad high court pronouncement was judiciously implemented.

When we closely examine all the political processes responsible that immediately threatened her position, we can pause to realize that these are actually features of everyday political life in a healthy democracy. JP movement leaders were using their freedoms of speech, free association, and mass-mobilization to voice masses' frustrations and provoke dissatisfied Congress parliamentarians. The judiciary had shown exemplary courage in upholding its autonomy from the political sphere by passing a judgment against high profile political elite. Political elites within the ruling party enacted the democratic process as they maneuvered and searched for a new candidate to replace a disgraced leader. Because Gandhi realized her relations with her ministers were beyond repair, she needed to suspend all these democratic procedures "temporarily" if she wanted to remain in office and survive politically. And hence she ended up imposing the state of emergency.

Conclusion

Historical sociologists are increasingly using network analysis and field theory to examine the impact of political elites on state dynamics. While these theories have been separately implemented to this point, they do share a common relational logic. This study of the Indian case of authoritarianism experimentally explores how simultaneous applications of field theory and network analysis could further advance the sociological

application of relational logic. It shows that political elites' authority is measured along two relational scales: positions in the field of politics and the strength of their embeddings in relevant networks of political ties.

Political elites who occupy higher field positions (i.e., those who hold a higher volume of political capital) and have stronger ties with ruling party parliamentarians are highly likely to have greater political authority than those with lower field positions (i.e., those who hold a lower volume of political capital) and weaker ties with ruling party parliamentarians. I call such a relationship among elites a *symmetrically aligned hierarchical relational structure*. When such an alignment among top elites develops, there is little that weaker elites can do to challenge stronger opponents during their tenure. Thus, a symmetrically aligned hierarchical structure among political elites encourages stability in the state.

Political significations are less clear, however, when political elites have higher field positions and weak ties with ruling party parliamentarians while their rivals have lower field positions and stronger ties with ruling party parliamentarians. I identify this sort of alignment as an asymmetrical hierarchical relational structure. The lack of clarity in the authority of top elites prompts them to use their respective authorities in one of the two dimensions of political authority to challenge one another. This indeed seems to be the case during the reign of Gandhi, who took advantage of her high political authority to devalue her ministers' and office bearers' political authority and ties. When Gandhi was faced with dim political prospects, one of her ministers, Ram, used his high network centrality among both Congress and opposition parliamentarians to threaten her position. Gandhi responded, however, by dramatically transforming India's democracy into an

authoritarian regime, demonstrating that asymmetries in elites' hierarchical relational structures can create higher chances for turbulent changes in a state's form.

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
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Figure 1: Ministers' and Ordinary Congress Parliamentarians' Political Habitus



	Grassroots	Party Politics (Regional)	Party Politics (National)	Social Movements
Cabinet Ministers	0.85	3.28	6.57	0.21
State Ministers	1	2.71	4.76	0.38
Deputy Ministers	0.83	2.58	4.16	0.33
Congress Parliamentarians	2.05	2.5	2.66	0.34

Figure 2: Cabinet Ministers' Political Habitus





Figure 3: Ministers' Political Network



Isolates

Uma Dikshit
Raj Bahadur
D Chattopadhyay
I. K. Gujaral
Shah Nawaj Khan

Om Mehta
L. N. Mishra
K Reddy
Nandani Satpathi
Nathuram Mirdha

Mohammed Qureshi
K. Ramaswamy
D. P. Yadav
Sushila Rohtagi
Kedar Singh

Surendra Singh
Balgovind Verma

Figure 4: JP Movement Leaders' and Ministers' Interparty Political Network




Table 1: All Parties' Parliamentarians, 1971-75 sessions

Party	Parliamentarians
Ruling Party	
Congress	372
Opposition parties	
Communist Party	25
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	25
Communist Party (Marxist)	24
Jan Sangh	23
Congress (O)	14
Telengana Praja Samiti	10
Swatantra Party	7
Janta Party	4
Kerela Congress	3
Revolutionary Socialist Party	3
Praja Socialist Party	2
Samyukta Socialist Party	2
All India Forward Block	2
All Party Hill Leaders' Conference	2
Jharkhand Party	2
Muslim League	2
United Interparliamentary Group	2
Utkal Congress	2
Akali Dal	1
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	1
Bangla Congress	1
Bhartiya Kranti Dal	1
Communist Party of India	1
Indian National Congress	1
Indian Union Muslim League	1
Nominated	1
Republican Party of India	1
Sikkim Sangram Parishad	1
United Goans	1
Vishal Haryana Party	1
Independent	15

Table 2: Gandhi's Council of Ministers

Prime Minister	Cabinet Ministers	Ministers of State	Deputy Ministers
Indira Gandhi	Fakhruddin Ahmed Jaggiwan Ram Moinul Haque H. Gokhale S. Kumramangalam Siddharth Ray C. Subramaniam Y. Chavan Swaran Singh Uma Dikshit K. Hanumanthaiya Raj Bahadur Karan Singh	H Bahuguna D. Chattopadhyay Nitiraj Chaudhary D. Chavan Mohan Dharia K. Ganesh I. K. Gujaral R. Khadilkar Shah Nawaj Khan Sarojini Mahishi Om Mehta L. N. Mishra Ghanshyam Oza Krishna Pant K. Rao K. Reddy Nandani Satpathi Prakash Chand Sethi Annasaheb Shinde Vidya Shukla Sher Singh Ram Mirdha	A. George A. Kisku Baijnath Kureel F. Mohsin Jagnnath Pahadia Mohammed Qureshi K. Ramaswamy D. P. Yadav Sushila Rohtagi B. Shankaranand Siddheshwar Prasad Dalbir Singh Dharam Sinha Kedar Singh Surendra Singh Balgovind Verma

Table 3: Cabinet Ministers' Network Centrality Measures

Cabinet Ministers	Ministers		Congress Parliamentarians		Opposition Parliamentarians	
	Degree	Betweenness	Degree	Betweenness	Degree	Betweenness
Average Score	19.85	3.96	26.71	70.06	2.78	1.71
Indira Gandhi (PM)	8	0.53	41	36.20	3	5
Jagjiwan Ram	31	18.1	62	385.69	5	7
Moinul Haque	30	14.1	50	251.09	4	5
K. Hanumanthaiya	30	14.1	47	188.64	4	5
Fakhruddin Ahmed	28	3.66	27	90.67	4	2
Swaran Singh	28	2.5	24	14.28	3	0
Yashwantrao Chavan	28	2.5	24	14.28	3	0
S. Kumramangalam	27	0	20	0	3	0
Siddhartha Ray	27	0	20	0	3	0
H. Gokhale	27	0	20	0	3	0
Karan Singh	8	0	10	0	3	0
C. Subramaniam	6	0	29	0	1	0
Uma Dikshit	0	0	0	0	0	0
Raj Bahadur	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 4: State Ministers' Network Centrality Measures

State Minister	Ministers		Congress Parliamentarians		Opposition Parliamentarians	
	Degree	Betweenness	Degree	Betweenness	Degree	Betweenness
Average Score	15.5	1.65	16.54	29.36	1.95	1.09
Prakash Sethi	31	18.1	61	356.57	5	7
R. Khadilkar	29	8.23	43	204.83	5	7
D. Chavan	28	2.5	24	14.28	3	0
K. Rao	28	2.5	24	14.28	3	0
Annasaheb Shinde	28	2.5	24	14.28	3	0
Vidya Shukla	28	2.5	24	14.28	3	0
K. Ganesh	27	0	23	17.83	3	0
Mohan Dharia	27	0	20	0	4	5
Nitiraj Chaudhary	27	0	20	0	3	0
Sarojini Mahishi	27	0	20	0	3	0
Ghanshyam Oza	27	0	20	0	3	0
Sher Singh	27	0	20	0	3	0
Hemwati Bahuguna	7	0.16	37	9.67	2	5
Krishna Pant	0	0	4	0	0	0
D. Chattopadhyay	0	0	0	0	0	0
I. K. Gujaral	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shah Khan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Om Mehta	0	0	0	0	0	0
L. N. Mishra	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Reddy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nandani Satpathi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ram Mirdha	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 5: Deputy Ministers' Network Centrality

Deputy Ministers	Ministers		Congress Parliamentarians		Opposition Parliamentarians	
	Degree	Betweenness	Degree	Betweenness	Degree	Betweenness
Average Score	11.81	0	9.62	28.56	1.43	0.31
B. Shankaranand	27	0	34	457.07	4	5
A. George	27	0	20	0	3	0
A. Kisku	27	0	20	0	3	0
F. Mohsin	27	0	20	0	3	0
Jagnath Pahadia	27	0	20	0	3	0
Dalbir Singh	27	0	20	0	3	0
Dharam Sinha	27	0	20	0	3	0
Kedar Singh	0	0	0	0	1	0
Mohammed Qureshi	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Ramaswamy	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. P. Yadav	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sushila Rohtagi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Baijnath Kureel	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siddheshwar Prasad	0	0	0	0	0	0
Surendra Singh	0	0	0	0	0	0
Balgovind Verma	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 6: JP Movement Leaders' Ties with Congress Parliamentarians

Opposition Parliamentarian	Party	Ministers' Network		Ordinary Congress Parliamentarians' Network	
		Degree	Betweenness	Degree	Betweenness
Morarji Desai	CNO	31	9.84	47	245.62
Digvijay Narayan Singh	CNO	8	0.143	33	2.37
Shyam Nandan Mishra	CNO	6	32.86	30	106.61
K. Kamraj	CNO	5	0	7	0
Khemchand Chavda	CNO	1	0	8	0
A. K. Gopalan	CPM	1	0	2	0
All Parliamentarians	JS	0	0	0	0
All Parliamentarians	SWA	0	0	0	0
All Parliamentarians	PSP	0	0	0	0
All Parliamentarians	SSP	0	0	0	0

CNO = Congress (O)
 CPM = Communist Party (Marxist)
 JS = Jan Sangh
 SWA = Swatantra
 PSP = Praja Socialist Party
 SSP = Samyukta Socialist Party