During the Great Depression

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April, 2010
The development of Western welfare states is a vast subject and by now there are a large number of important comparative analyses. Many comparative studies identify a single or limited number of models of welfare state development based on underlying structural factors. I Our analysis of the welfare state in England, France and the U.S. between 1870 and 1950 affirms the presence of structural factors; demographic change, a key element in our study, is often, though not always, a long slow process whose consequences manifest themselves over decades or even over centuries. II But we also identify political processes of democratization which, though of smaller scale and shorter duration, are just as important as demography in understanding the formation of welfare states. We look for patterns and meaningful processes but, as historians, we hope to remind readers that social policy is not simply the working out of long-term and enduring features of social and political life but is shaped by the particular hour and the special circumstance.

The Second Industrial Revolution, which marked the development of mass industrial production and the modern business institutions that supported it, provides the long-term context for our study. We have selected some key issues—income supports over the family cycle, the eradication of sweated labor and the spread of state sponsored schooling, a small handful of urban locations, and some critical time periods on which to focus. Unlike the First Industrial Revolution, the Second was transnational in character. We see the formation of the national welfare state and the characteristics of political coalitions as influenced by two main factors, demography and democratization, broadly defined. Demography refers to trends in fertility, mortality and migration in each country as well as transnationally. These characteristics shaped the nature of the industrial problem, the definition of the solution as well as the composition of reform coalitions. As representative governments, the welfare states in the three countries were shaped by political coalitions that came together to push for government legislation. Not all efforts were successful, however, either in terms of their ability to enact legislation or to ensure that governments enforced the law. Democratization includes differences in the pace of enfranchisement among large sections of the population, the balance of power between labor and capital, and the relative weight of elitist state structures. The democratization of state structures and the democratic mobilization of newly-enfranchised masses in mass political parties, which differed in the three countries, shaped the character of political coalitions, what problems would be addressed and what solutions tried. Finally, broad coalitions of workers and middle-class reformers succeeded when they could tap into widely held beliefs about the legitimate role of government.

In focusing on demography and the role of political coalitions, we hope to complicate those analyses that have relied heavily on the role of policy intellectuals and activists. Middle and upper class policy wonks have certainly played an important role in shaping welfare legislation, so it is important to understand both how activists in different countries conceive of problems and solutions in particular ways, just as it is important to
understand how government officials and academics borrowed from one another across national boundaries.iii But we argue that in devising legislation, policy wonks were in the driver seat only in so far as they help put together coalitions of those who could wield power by mobilizing others.

To illustrate this perspective we focus here on one aspect of state initiatives in the three countries at one particular moment of crisis, the Great Depression. How does our emphasis on the material—the demographics-- and the politics—help to explain the differing approaches to unemployment policy during the Great Depression? We begin with the United States, where the Depression hit first and hit hardest.. When FDR took office in 1933 unemployment stood at 25%, Historians have noted that among democracies, the most robust response to the Depression occurred in the US.iv In addition to implementing a national economic recovery plan that allowed major American industries to collude on the matter of prices, production levels and wages, FDR moved to address the unemployment crisis through massive aid to localities for direct relief as part of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, under the direction of Harry Hopkins. He also implemented a variety of work relief initiatives. Indeed, in historian Scott Smith’s words, the public works programs were “an extraordinary successful example of state sponsored economic development.”v Finally, the making of America’s permanent welfare state took a great leap forward in 1935 when the New Deal administration and their allies in Congress instituted a national plan of unemployment insurance, still in place today. Enacted as Title III of the Social Security Act, it involved state participation in insurance plans for categories of workers.

Why did this happen? In part, the decentralized nature of relief that had long characterized the US approach to welfare created pressures from the grassroots up to the national state. Local and state governments, in combination with private charities, could no longer handle the crisis and thus were clamoring for federal aid. vi But the expansion of American democracy was especially important. As a result of the economic crisis, newly mobilized social groups could exert political influence in the next five years. The mobilization from below occurred at the same time that the business community was very much on the defensive, given the collapse of financial institutions followed by massive layoffs.

The triumph of unemployment legislation was made possible partly because the American corporate community was also divided.vii For so long, one of the most important obstacles to state regulation of unemployment relief, the corporate community did not drop its opposition in the immediate aftermath of the Crash or the first waves of wage cuts and layoffs.viii But by the end of 1930 a number of corporate leaders were convinced that some sort of stabilization plan was required. Even some leaders active in the US Chamber of Commerce joined with such organizations as the National Industrial Conference Board in calling for plans along the lines of GE head, Gerald Swope. In 1930, he had instituted a program of unemployment insurance at his company and was now calling for a suspension of anti-trust laws so that, within trade associations, corporate leaders could develop industry mandated programs for stabilizing employment as well as production.ix The Rochester Unemployment Benefits plan developed under Marion Folsom of Kodak, which represented the agreement of 14 companies to fund an unemployment reserve, was hailed as a vanguard effort by business to create incentives for preventing unemployment.x
Some progressive industrialists were convinced that mandated reserve systems, favored by the activists of the University of Wisconsin “school” of industrial reform, would act as incentives to prevent unemployment. But by 1932, as the Depression deepened, corporate leaders, progressive and conservative, faced with the continuing problems of financing their own individual schemes, were anxious both to share the financial burden and to even the competition by mandating programs for all. The so-called New Emphasis businessmen, through their role on the Advisory Council to the Committee on Economic Security, the President’s group that drafted the Social Security Act, and their continuing access to important political leaders including FDR, continued to promote their interests in contributory unemployment insurance mandated through a national plan.

While the business community was in flux, the American labor movement, in the doldrums since the 1920’s, became active on behalf of the unemployed, with street demonstrations organized both by local labor councils and leftist political parties, putting pressure on local and state governments. From 1933-37, through massive organizing and important strikes, mass production unionism forged its place in the American polity. From the early days of the New Deal, organizations active in the unemployment campaigns along with the labor movement supported the implementation of massive public works programs. This was especially true of the AFL, particularly their members in the buildings trades. As for unemployment benefits, the AFL still looked to individual unions. At the 1930 convention, President William Green warned that any system of mandated unemployment insurance would force union members to take non-union jobs as a condition for eligibility in the program.

But the AFL leadership was not able to determine the activities of its constituent unions; on the local level, many were calling for greater public relief. As Thomas Dorrance has recently pointed out, we miss a great deal about the realities of craft unions relationship to state structures and government relief if we fail to appreciate the important role that state and local labor leaders played in demanding their share of state and local relief. In Illinois, the head of the state Federation of Labor argued against federal unemployment relief but was active in administrating state relief. Union activists involved in the Conference for Progressive Labor Action actively agitated for full-scale government insurance. By 1930, such traditional unions as the International Association of Machinists called for unemployment insurance, joining with a number of AFL unions--- the garment unions, the textile workers and the teachers calling for of endorsements of compulsory unemployment insurance. Local and state labor councils in New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Ohio also endorsed compulsory unemployment insurance. In Illinois, By 1935, thousands of labor locals and some thirty-three labor union councils, including Pittsburgh and Queens County, NY, had endorsed the bill proposed by leftist Congressman Ernest Lundeen of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party, which included national unemployment insurance for all workers and farmers. Pushed by its grassroots, the AFL leadership endorsed a lukewarm resolution in favor of unemployment insurance at its 1932 convention. And in 1934, William Green, as President of the AFL endorsed the Wagner-Lewis Bill pending in the House, that provided federal tax credits for companies complying with state unemployment insurance programs. More importantly, a new center of influence—the leadership I of unions of semiskilled and unskilled workers, soon to form the backbone of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, was emerging. Once the Depression hit, Sidney Hillman, one of the founders of the CIO, was making common cause with reformers of the AALL in pushing for state legislation on unemployment in New York. By 1932, he was serving as an advisor to Governor Roosevelt and State Labor Commissioner Frances Perkins regarding unemployment insurance in New York State.xxii

In 1934, when the New Deal government was ready to enact Social Security and take up the matter of unemployment insurance, the labor movement was already becoming well positioned to exert influence on the outcome of the legislation. Unions could provide new Americans with political rights i.e. to influence the outcome of the Social Security Act, because they represented the memberships of mass industrial unions that could organize to guarantee the delivery of large blocs of votes. The passage of the National Labor Relations Act, (NLRA) in the summer of 1935 ensuring labor’s right to organize was an important development in the history of American’s welfare state because it ensured that some working class Americans, those represented by labor unions, could exert at least some political pressure and gain some benefits in the emerging social legislation.xxiii

Understanding the political power of America’s white working class, at least in the 1930’s, requires an appreciation of the changing demographic characteristics of American labor force as well as its changing political power. So much of America’s new working class in the earlier part of the century were immigrants without voting rights. But since the 1920’s, national policy virtually cut off immigration from Europe. Thus, as the unemployment crisis deepened in the 1930’s, a large portion of working class, particularly the unionized working class were either naturalized citizens or children of immigrants.

That American workers of southern and eastern European descent, as citizens, had the potential to exert political power did not go unnoticed by those wishing to limit their participation in American public affairs. In the early post World War I years, many states, including New York, narrowed the electorate, minimizing participation of the foreign born and the poor by implementing literacy and intelligence tests as a condition of voting. But during the 1930’s, in the wake of widespread disenchantment with American business classes and growing sympathy towards the unemployed, efforts to maintain suffrage restrictions floundered. Opponents of the New Deal, for example, mounted a campaign to deny voting rights to all those accepting public unemployment relief, but were soundly defeated.xxiv In 1936, the newly empowered trade union movement rewarded FDR—at the last minute the President threw his support behind the NLRA making its way through Congress--by contributing to his massive reelection landslide and the building of the new Democratic majority. The President acknowledged the importance of the newly expanded electorate in a speech given on the eve of his resounding reelection. In contrast to an earlier time, he noted, “by midnight tomorrow . . . whatever the result is, it will definitely, clearly and conclusively be the will of the majority.” xxv

As the unemployment crisis deepened, the rights of citizenship became an increasingly important determinant of difference among America’s working class.xxvi During the Depression, many Americans grew increasingly intolerant of newly arrived immigrants and sought to address the unemployment problem through deportation and repatriation of aliens, most of whom were Mexican. The large influx of Mexicans in the 1920’s declined in the next decade not only because of a lack of work; policies of
deportation and repatriation resulted in the return of almost 20% of the Mexican population in the early days of the Depression. Mai Ngai shows, the policies of deportation and exclusion during the 1930’s worked mostly to the disadvantage of non-white immigrants, most especially Mexicans. While the influx certainly declined due to lack of work, explicit state policies also reduced Mexican immigration to the US. xxvii

By contrast, the newly-emerging group of American citizens among the European immigrants became participants in fashioning the American welfare state during the 1930’s. Sidney Hillman and others in FDR’s labor coalition, who cooperated with New Deal administrators, could influence both the implementation of public works programs and the construction of unemployment policy in the Social Security Act of 1935 because they now represented a new political power,-- the votes of many immigrants, especially of European background and their children who were now voting American citizens. xxviii

New Deal policies thus exemplify increasing democracy but also the limits of that citizenship, as Jill Quagdagno and Ira Katznelson have shown. Most African-Americans were Southerners and were not empowered to vote, but even enfranchised Americans (including many women, minorities and poor whites), not organized through to exert political power, were, in fact, left out of the guarantees to unemployment insurance and had less access to work relief projects. xxix

The growing power of the labor movement, the needs of the business community, and the cry of local and state governments whose relief sources were stretched to the limit, meant that the New Deal years provided a most opportune moment for American reformers long interested in government- mandated unemployment legislation. These reformers, as Daniel Rodgers has shown, had long absorbed the ideas about social insurance that had taken hold in Europe and were by the 1930’s influential in policy circles and academic departments in the US. xxx In shaping the outcome of the legislation, middle and upper class reformers in the United States were specifically committed to a system that emphasized insurance over entitlement, and to the rights of workers, specifically, rather than citizens more generally, but we ought not overemphasize the role of reformers in the enactment of unemployment insurance in 1935. xxxi When opportunity for successful unemployment insurance actually came in the Depression, reformers outside and inside government understood that, ultimately, a number of cherished beliefs would have to be abandoned. Like Rodgers, we note that policy “wonks” were in the driver's seat only in so far as they could help put together a coalition of those who were in a position to bargain--i.e. -those who could wield power by mobilizing others. xxxii

That policy reformers played only a limited role in determining outcomes became increasingly clear in the state wide campaigns for unemployment insurance, taking place in the early and mid-thirties. The first triumph of state unemployment insurance in occurred in Wisconsin in 1932, long known for its activism on behalf of labor legislation and income supports. The plan called for both employer/employee contributions and for the maintenance of individual corporate reserves, rather than a pooled fund. It reflected the commitment of a number of middle-class reformers such as John Andrews, Elizabeth Brandeis and her husband Paul Raushenbush; they strongly believed in both the importance of maintaining individual reserves as an incentive for corporations to limit laying off workers and the importance of making workers contribute to their unemployment fund. xxxiii In Wisconsin, they could mobilize opinion and fashion such an outcome. But, they were unable to replicate those basic elements in Ohio where, backed
by a strong Cleveland Federation of Labor, the bill embodied some of the most formidable challenges to the progressive business model of Wisconsin. In Ohio, contributions came solely from employers and, unlike Wisconsin with its emphasis on the individual corporation's ability to prevent unemployment, all reserves were pooled into one state fund, so that employer risks were spread out. In New York, a strong labor presence also insured that funds would be pooled and the bill, originally passed in 1935, required no employee contribution. And the strength of the labor movement in Pennsylvania was made clear in the provisions of their state unemployment insurance bill, passed in 1936, which provided for pooled funds, no employee contributions, relatively wide coverage and strong assurances for the rights of organized labor.\textsuperscript{xxxiv}

On the national level as well, the unemployment provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 were shaped by bargaining between agrarian, business, and labor interests; reformers either conformed to the parameters of the discussion or were left out of the process. In drafting the bill, Secretary of Labor and head of the CES, France Perkins consulted with allies from business and labor, but, from among her fellow middle class reformers, she excluded those on the left committed to a more universal approach that could not get through the U.S Congress.\textsuperscript{xxxv} On the right, Perkins also excluded Brandeis and Raushenbush, because they were unwilling to bend in their commitment to the Wisconsin plan of individual business reserves as the model for the whole nation.\textsuperscript{xxxvi} Perkins and her chief assistant for Social Security, Edwin Witte, knew that among other things organized labor would not stand for such a position.

In the end, the unemployment insurance feature of the Social Security Act became essentially a program of federal incentives for state-run unemployment insurance programs following general guidelines. The President did not want an exclusively federal program along the lines of the Old Age Insurance (OAI) provision of Social Security, Title I, and he made this abundantly clear early on in the deliberations of the CES.\textsuperscript{xxxvii} By allowing such decentralization, the bill was fashioned to meet the desires of important constituencies. The business community got a lot of what they wanted, i.e. the possibility that states could implement the more conservative Wisconsin, rather than the Ohio plan, and many exemptions in terms of coverage. Moreover, states were given very wide latitude to determine benefit rates, waiting periods, whether the states were to allow separate industry accounts or pooled funding.\textsuperscript{xxxviii}

But labor extracted something as well, because the final bill insured the possibility that some states could move to an Ohio plan. We know this represented a defeat for some of the corporate advisors. Folsom, for example, was dismayed to discover that in New York, Kodak would have to live under conditions closer to the Ohio scheme, rather than the more business-oriented Wisconsin plan.\textsuperscript{xxxix} And the business community failed to win other issues important to them. An important minority of the Advisory Council clearly wanted provisions for employee contributions mandated by the federal government. As the draft report noted, "employee contributions would cause the worker to regard the plan as partly his own and not as something as given to him as a gratuity, and thus operate to prevent malingering and similar abuses."\textsuperscript{xl} In somewhat less powerful language, the minority, consisting of Folsom, Lewisohn, Swope and Teagley, all corporate advisers, and Professor Raymond Moley, communicated their concerns in an official letter to Secretary Perkins in December, 1934.\textsuperscript{xli} FDR, himself, preferred a plan that mandated employee contributions. During the winter of 1934, when Congress was
debating the Wagner-Lewis Bill, FDR was at first reluctant to support the measure because it did not require employee contributions. But the final CES report of January 1935, approved by the President, recommended that states be given authority to design their own programs. Despite the desires of the President and a number of policy wonks, by 1940, only five of the forty-eight states, all with unemployment compensation programs, levied taxes on workers as well as employers.

Finally, political forces well beyond those represented by the President and the CES advisors representing business, labor and the reform community shaped the unemployment provisions of the Social Security Bill. Despite the fact that the CES, including the business advisors, had recommended unemployment coverage for “all employers who employ at least four workers for any 13 weeks of a taxable year”, the bill that made it through Congress showed the important power wielded by Southern Democrats and agricultural interests. Farm laborers, domestic servants (many of whom were women of color) seasonal and migrant workers all remained uncovered; indeed, those who needed it most ended up with less.

Like much of American welfare legislation, the federal government’s efforts to craft unemployment insurance were not only products of congressional and executive will, but judicial imperatives as well. The structure of American democracy provides a great deal of power for courts, which often acted to stymie the will of state executives and legislatures alike. Now, during the New Deal years, lawmakers were facing the same problems with respect to federal laws. But administrative officials could choose how to deal with Court imperatives; these choices were not inevitable and they were often shaped by political constraints of the particular historical moment. A look at the differing approaches taken by the CES to the constitutional questions with regard to the old insurance provision versus unemployment insurance, well illustrates the influence of political considerations, in particular the power of different constituencies.

While the CES worked on OAI legislation in late 1934, the Supreme Court struck down an earlier Railroad retirement bill on the grounds that the effort to regulate retirement of railroad workers on the basis of the interstate commerce clause was unconstitutional and thus an unwarranted usurpation of state power. The CES, concerned about the constitutionality of future old age legislation then shifted their focus. Increasingly, old age insurance was argued not on the basis of federal power to regulate the labor market, but rather, as the right of the federal government to use its taxing power to ensure the “security” of its people, in this case, the social security of its aged population. The CES however, never abandoned its commitment to a national, standardized approach to old age pensions, which was considered the most workable. Most important, all political factions involved in promoting the bill supported the national approach.

The unemployment provisions also had to be drafted with the Supreme Court decision in mind. However, while the CES was willing to test the constitutionality of national program with respect to OAI, Roosevelt, Witte, and the unemployment committee of the Technical Board never truly contemplated this possibility in the case of unemployment insurance. The CES also rejected an approach, favored by both the business representatives on the Advisory Council and by organized labor, which combined a federal and state system whereby the federal government collected and held the reserves, giving back to the states the funds to administer if they satisfied federal
standards specified in the act. Instead, the CES opted for a tax-offset plan, that is, a federal tax that would be waived to employees that participated in their state programs. Some advocates of the tax-offset plan argued that by giving the most control to the states, it would be most likely to survive a constitutional challenge. Moreover, they contended, if a federal law was struck down, the states that already had enacted unemployment insurance (there were 9 by then, with others pending) could continue their programs. But the staff members of CES as well as its advisory committee felt both the so-called subsidy plan and the tax offset plan would face similar constitutional challenges; moreover, both were more centered in state control than the national OAI program, already approved by the CES. The Attorney General weighed in with his belief that both the subsidy and tax-offset plan were constitutional. Why then, did the leadership, that is, the Cabinet members in control of the CES, as well as their Executive Director, Witte, opt for the tax-offset plan? Because, according to Witte, the offset plan gave more control to the states in terms of setting benefits and determining coverage. With maximum state option as to how to organize reserves and whether or not to tax employees, the offset approach would be most likely to make its way through a politically divided Congress. By contrast, the subsidy plan would have given the federal government greater control with respect to setting standards. As Witte himself noted, the CES decision was based on “political, not constitutional grounds.”

Like most social welfare legislation in the United States, today as well as in the past, the unemployment insurance benefit program satisfied no one committed to any sort of consistent vision. In assessing both the achievements and limitations of the New Deal, Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore have recently argued that we need to understand the strength, but mostly the weaknesses of liberal ideology. Like Dorrance, we believe paying attention to the “structural foundations of New Deal liberalism, rather than any ideological foundation is more important because in the end, “ Members of the New Deal coalition joined together in a working relationship, not an ideological relationship. This working relationship consisted of conflicts and compromises between diverse interests, at times held together by tenuous bonds, which ushered in the formation of a modern federalized state.” Unemployment Insurance emerged as it did in 1935 because it reflected the increased power of newly mobilized groups and political coalitions of middle activists and organized labor. Successful coalitions were made possible by an expansion of American democracy that accompanied new demographic realities for a nation of immigrants. But unemployment benefits remained a partial right because Americans of color and so many women who badly needed benefits either had no political rights, or having at least some political rights, very little political power.

While the U.S. during the 1930s constructed a federal system of unemployment insurance, France did not. The country would not possess unemployment insurance until 1945. Instead France created a powerful system of family allowance funds and pro-natalist incentives for fertility. Why did this happen? At least part of the reason is due to the strength of French employers that, after the stormy years immediately following World War I, remained largely unchallenged until the Popular Front of 1936 when employer power was shaken by the worker militancy. In the 1920s internal divisions with the labor movement, intransigent employer attitudes, and the paternalism of French employers gave French businessmen control over the everyday life of their workers and strengthened their power over labor. French social policies that had originated in private
enterprise in the 1900s and 1920s became models for national social policy in the 1930s but then underwent transformation in the wake of 1936.

Powerful corporate paternalism, at least as powerful in France as in the U.S., took distinctive forms, reflecting particular features of French life. Paternalism was strongest in the regulation of family life and the payment of family allowances. The regime of employer paternalism was built upon commonly-shared ideas. Pronatalism had long been an important current in French social thought. It found supporters both right and left: The French Catholic church was avidly pronatalist but so was the great anti-clerical novelist Emile Zola who dedicated a book, Fécondité, to the topic. Many French employers were convinced that France suffered from a crisis of labor supply. Put simply, French industry needed more workers. In the interwar years, associations promoting fertility and family allowances grew rapidly and employers played a leading role in the movement. Before the war the Groupe parlementaire pour la protection de la natalité was already the largest single parliamentary association and its number grew after 1919. Although founded in the 1896, the great triumphs of L’Alliance nationale pour l’accroissement de la population française came in the inter-war years. “No children today, no France tomorrow” was one of its slogans used in 1925. Efforts to promote fertility dramatically increased in the post-World War I period. Mothers of large families received medals. Households with large families received tax benefits. The Ministry of War allowed the group to send its propaganda to the troops. Teaching manuals spread the word to teachers (who often rejected such propaganda). Parents of large families received a discount in train fare, in admission to public events and in access to some public housing. Children from large families benefited from scholarships.

Increasingly in the 1920s, employers concerned with French population decline turned to family allowances as a public policy to increase popular fertility. Before World War I, individuals and networks of industrialists had developed family allowance schemes but in the 1920s these spread like wildfire in heavy industry. While many reasons led French men and women to support family allowances, industrial initiatives continually played the key role. Family allowance policies might start with a single firm but many firms banded together within industrial regions. Supported by both left and right the law brought the state four square into the area of family allowances. Establishing regional funds enabled individual employers who employed many workers with large families to avoid bearing a disproportionate burden. A study of the Catholic Employers’ Movement in 1932 by Pierre Henry listed their two chief purposes: “a more stable workforce and encouragement to support many children thus preparing a reserve of workers.” At the very least, workers usually lost any family allowances for the month in which they left their jobs, and it usually took a month of regular work before the eligibility began. But for workers with more than one child, family allowances could contribute significantly to family income. According to the group of metal and allied industries for the Parisian region in the mid twenties, the supplement paid to common workers with one child added four percent to the wages of the family head, ten percent for two children, and forty percent for five children.

The advent of Depression in France suddenly created too many workers in a society accustomed to too few. The dominant French assumption of the 1920s, that labor scarcity was a foremost problem, helps explain the lack of public interest in the unemployed and the cursory system of unemployment relief in France. When France
began to overhaul its social welfare laws in the early 1920s, a government committee interviewed a variety of people whom it felt might be affected by the law. An employer participating in a government subcommittee to rewrite the law, argued that unemployment should not be included. He noted that "...people have said that 'the French suffer least from unemployment' but in reality it is because France is less peopled [... 1 unemployment insurance is less necessary, less urgent in France than elsewhere". The government mandated departments and localities to take care of the unemployed, and helped subsidize the cost of local authorities as well as those few trade unions and trade organizations that provided unemployment benefits. The law provided leeway for local initiative but it mainly permitted local neglect.

If in America, both natives and newcomers shared in the unemployment crisis of the 1930's, the French Depression at first appeared to be a problem borne mostly by migrants. While the post-World War I years saw the US restricting migration, as Clifford Rosenberg, and Leslie Moch have pointed out, France was the leading country of immigration in the world. Long concerned about depopulation and now almost panicked in the wake of the World War I slaughter the French, in the 1920's, tried a variety of measures to increase their labor supply, such as recruiting workers from the empire, liberalizing citizenship laws, secretly obtaining foreign orphans, criminalizing abortions and birth control, and devising a guest worker program that would be widely imitated by Europe in the immediate post-WWII years.

The Great Depression put this whole migration machine into reverse. As the economic crisis deepened, France now expelled large numbers of workers recruited in good times. While there is currently debate over the subject, most analysis have suggested that French rates of unemployment do not compare with those of the U.K. and certainly not those of the U.S. or Germany. One of the reasons for France’s relatively low unemployment rate was that much of the burden was borne by expelling migrants. By 1931, 7.0% per cent of the French population were immigrants laboring in industries particularly vulnerable to unemployment; thus, 40 per cent of all coalminers, 35 per cent of all metalworkers, 26 per cent of all quarry workers and 24 per cent of all construction workers were emigrants. France, the pioneer in adopting a guest workers’ policy, now became a leader in elaborating policies that dealt with unemployment by expelling foreign workers recruited in good times.

One important political consequences of long-term labor shortage and the growing reliance of French industry on migrant labor was that, in times of economic downturn, citizenship could be invoked as a way of dealing with unemployment. Police policy facilitated this approach. The French effort to keep comprehensive and up-to-date files on migrants, while never totally successful, nonetheless greatly facilitated policies of deportation and repatriation. Thus, in France, citizenship served as an alternative to dealing with larger problems of structural change and the extension of social rights. During the Great Depression, appeals to citizenship brought together the nationalist right and elements of the republican socialist left.

As long as it was a question of single workers, particularly unskilled workers, French industrialists were usually sympathetic to nativist appeals and willing to dismiss single migrants. The right-center coalitions that governed France in the early
1930s sought to cure unemployment by repatriating all immigrants. In 1934, in a report from the département of the Loire, the Prefect noted that "industrialists prefer to employ French workers with families". The Prefect had already aided 1,400 foreign workers and their families to return to their countries of origin. An extensive study of French unemployment estimated that somewhere around 180,000 migrants left France between 1931 and 1935 with 60,000 of them leaving the Paris region alone.

As the Depression continued, the pressure on immigrants intensified. In 1932, conservative legislators introduced and secured the passage of a "Law for the Protection of National Labor", which gave the government the power to impose quotas on the hiring of immigrants in many industries. The law met with considerable resistance on the part of employers who hesitated to discharge skilled workers and, initially, had little impact on the national labor market. Nonetheless, individual administrators took the law as a signal to launch their own campaign. The Labor Ministry constituted a fund to pay the return of emigrants and chartered trains to return migrants to their homes. In key regions, such as the département of the Seine, the Prefect simply turned down a high proportion of all applications for the identity cards which were obligatory for all workers. In 1934 the conservative government of Pierre Flandin began applying the quotas more vigorously.

The right-wing campaign against migrants was facilitated because rightist initiatives met with little resistance, and sometimes active support, on the left. The largest French trade union, the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and the Socialist Party (SFIO), who both opposed forced repatriation, insisted increasingly on the better regulation of foreign labor which meant a closing off of foreign migration, and they began to favor hiring quotas. As unemployment deepened, confrontations between unemployed French workers and migrants became more common.

Even the Communist commitment to the migrants' cause, based supposedly on proletarian internationalism, wavered. The victory of the Popular Front in 1936 remembered by so many as a leftwing triumph, appeared differently to many immigrants who felt that campaigns against foreign workers were legitimized by Léon Blum's depiction of the Popular Front as a government of "republican defense". The emphasis on the centrality of the national community relegated non-nationals to a secondary status. Ralph Schor's study of French xenophobia demonstrates that, when the Communists turned to the Popular Front "they abandoned their old principles, and in order to appear more reassuring, they ceased systematically supporting foreigners". In the Longwy steel basin, Italian immigrants, many of whom were Communists fleeing Mussolini, were disturbed to see the red flag yielding to the tricolor in rallies and to find themselves urged to "die for France". In 1937 the local Communist Party held a rally around the theme of "France for the French".

The victory of the Popular Front in the 1936 elections was greeted with great hope by many Frenchmen and women. In 1935, the Front itself was preceded by a dramatic increase in labor solidarity, the merger of the two main French unions the CGT and the Confédération générale du travail unitaire (CGTU). The three chief left parties, the communists, socialist and Radical Socialists--- had, for the first time, joined together and they had won a substantial majority. However, a close look at the victory of the Popular Front in the elections of 1936 was not as promising for the left as it seemed. The left won 310 seats to the right’s 222 but 49.7% of the electorate had voted for the Popular Front
coalition compared with 42.7% for the conservatives. Relatively few Frenchmen had shifted their votes. Popular Front triumph depended on the willingness of the three left-parties to cooperate electorally. The results of the elections did not bode well for the coalition’s future. The Communists greatly increased their electoral representation, the socialists also gained but much of these gains came at the cost of the Radical Socialists who had less reason to embrace the coalition enthusiastically.

As important the terms of the coalition were not as broad as they seemed and many of the most difficult problems of radical coalition were addressed by plastering over differences, not solving them. While the Popular Front had fashioned a united program that included generous references to social reforms, including unemployment insurance, the real basis of the coalition, particularly for the Communist and Radical Socialist leaders was opposition to fascism. The lack of enthusiasm for major reform was not due to ignorance of economic alternatives. Léon Blum’s coterie of young intellectuals was familiar with Keynesian theories. Robert Marjolin, Georges Boris. Ad Jules Moch were all unorthodox economists, close to Léon Blum. They saw an increase in buying power as the way out of the depression. Unfortunately these economic advisors found themselves out-maneuvered by popular action. The strikes of May-June 1936. While some socialist leaders advocated radical reform, there was no political will for this among other Popular Front leaders who feared that worker radicalism would alienate prospective members of an anti-fascist coalition.

In the midst of deteriorating economic conditions came the great strike waves of 1936 that established a new framework for labor relations and brought great gains in the regulation of sweated labor. The strikes were the product of a rekindling of the labor movement. After fifteen years of division, the two largest French trade unions, the CGT and the CGTU The strike began within a few days of the sweeping electoral victory of the Popular Front coalition of socialists, Communists and Radical Socialists. At one point near the end of May one million workers may have been out on strike. In the face of this militancy employers seemed utterly helpless.

The newly-elected prime minister Léon Blum summoned representatives of labor and the employer to the prime minister’s official residence, the Hôtel Matignon, and negotiated a strike settlement which included large wage increases, the forty hour week, a two week vacation period and a new framework for labor relations based on elected delegates and arbitration. While the employers’ power collapsed in the factories, their influence in the corridors remained. It is now known that Blum had gone over some of the terms of the negotiations with employers on the eve of the meeting and worked out the major areas of discussion.

Certainly the increase in labor’s power affected the course of state building; the major social achievements during the Depression came as a result of a strike wave in 1936, which ended in an accord promising a 40 hour week, paid vacation and compulsory arbitration, but these May-June strike conquests were soon rescinded. Within only a couple of years French employers were once again on the offensive.

More long lasting reforms were changes in family allowances, the widely established funds that served as a keystone of French paternalism. In France, wide coalitions in favor of encouraging population growth had, for decades, resulted in important advances in the area of family allowances. This remained true during the Depression but as a result of labor’s resurgence the old system of family allowances was
shaped in new ways. Before 1936, companies had run family allowance programs as separate institutions, distinct from the factory administration and independent of trade union bargaining. But the once formidable patronal dragon, the French corporation and its allowance funds was defanged when, in response to the strike wave, the Popular Front government enacted compulsory labor arbitration. Among the first rulings of the labor arbitrators was to include family allowance programs in labor negotiations. Even after arbitration collapsed in 1937, family allowance remained on the bargaining table subject to union negotiations.

If popular action transformed family allowances during and after the Popular Front, the mass mobilization did relatively little for the unemployed. The xenophobic slogans found at Longwy should remind us that there was a native French working class that suffered greatly during the Depression for lack of unemployment provision; its fury would fuel the militancy of the Popular Front and sometimes the ranks of French fascism. In January 1935 *La Populaire*, the socialist newspaper demanded: “before even addressing unemployment the urgent, immediate task is to aid the unemployed. To aid them without exception, without distinction, We must repeat it indignantly and vehemently every day that there is not yet in France at the present time any national organization to aid the unemployed.”  

Workers backed up their demands through protest. Among the earliest and largest organizations of unemployed workers took place in the Stéphanois region. Already in 1930 the basic industries of the Stéphanois, coalmining and metalworking, were stagnating and the Depression brought disaster to an already precarious economy. In February 1931 a large public meeting of the unemployed turned into a confrontation with the police and workers. Demonstrators complained that municipal policy toward the unemployed was “worse than an insult.” In response, Stéphanois municipal authorities increased their distribution of bread but otherwise conditions remained unchanged.

Because provision for the unemployed was strictly a local or regional matter, it varied greatly from place to place. The consequences of French regional differences in unemployment policy became apparent as French authorities tried to meet the challenges of the Great Depression. As a result of donations and municipal subsidies, the Parisian welfare state offered aid to pregnant women, families with young children, consultations for wet-nurses, crèches to help working mothers, temporary refuge for children whose parents could not support them, and aid for families with many children. Some of these services were available in the Stéphanois but in that region they were as likely to be offered by companies as by the state. Too poor to comply with the law, the industrial villages that surrounded Saint-Etienne offered no aid whatsoever.

The inattention to the unemployment crisis exemplifies the impressive weight of history. France would not fully enact unemployment insurance until 1945. At a time when labor surplus actually dominated the French economy, when emigrants were expelled in mass and when French workers stood in soup lines, French politicians, remained as ever, preoccupied with falling fertility. The greatest contribution to the French welfare state in the 1930’s was large-scale intervention of the French government in the development of family allowances.

Beginning in 1914, Britain alone of our three nations had an unemployment insurance program in place. In the immediate years after World War I, under the pressure of revolutionary events, the unemployment insurance program expanded in the
direction of entitlements to all citizens. But the direction of British development was not sustained; during the height of the crisis in the Great Depression, the government inaugurated no new initiatives and actually cut back unemployment benefits. Why? One reason has to do with how nations framed demographic problems and solutions. In France the problem was seen as labor scarcity and the solution was popular fertility. In England the problem was seen as labor surplus, the solution, international migration. The second reason for the failure of unemployment benefit increases was the collapse of the Liberal/Labour coalition in 1931. This collapse opened the way for years of retrenchment and program cutting that were to enshrine the thirties in popular memory as a period of harsh social policies and insensitivity. Many scholars have argued that the political collapse occurred as a result of economic ignorance. If only Labor’s minister of the exchequer had read Keynes! Our analysis suggests the failure was due not so much to ignorance as to political circumstances and long-term political commitments that would make it difficult to adopt Keynesian ideas or to identify reliable partners for coalition formation.

The politics of migration had long played a role in the English approach to the problem of unemployment. The assumption that there were too many workers in the market was a tenet of Malthusian economics and indeed, after 1870, England did perennially suffer from rounds of serious unemployment, which helps explain why it was the first industrial nation in the world to introduce unemployment insurance (1911). Changing colonial labor requirements and the onset of agricultural depression in the 1920’s greatly lowered the Dominion’s need for labor but as the Great Depression set in, English politicians persisted in this fruitless effort to send laborers abroad. Before the Depression, government had encouraged migration, now government paid for it. But the welcome migrants found there was less enthusiastic than in the pre World War I period. Post World War I never reached the levels of the decade before 1914 when more than 350,000 people were migrating each year. Still between 1921 and 1931 about 25% of Great Britain’s natural increase, 667,000 people, were removed by migration, mostly to Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Despite renewed migration in the post-war years, conditions had changed. For Canada, part of the problem was that the growth of the migrant tide due to the limitation of US immigration quotas in 1921 and 1924 led many Eastern European migrants northward. Below the surface were even more formidable obstacles. Already before the war, the shift in favor of urban emigrants who were often unskilled had begun to give the dominions pause. In 1908, when the tide of emigration was at its height, a report to the Interior Department of the Canadian Government commented:

> the vastly populated and greatly congested East End of London can not be considered a favorable field for obtaining the class of emigrants which Canada needs, and that class of men who are at all likely to accommodate themselves to the conditions obtaining in Canada and through their own energy and determination build up homes for themselves.

More and more, the dominions found the new urban migrants to be "single, young, footloose, unskilled and had a high likelihood of returning home." In 1922, in an effort to promote migration as a solution to urban unemployment and, also, to better aid the "redistribution of the white population of the Empire", parliament passed an Empire
Settlement Act. Negotiated with the dominions, the Act committed the British government to select male industrial workers between 19 and 35 years of age and to train them for farm work before their migration. Another government committee was charged with recruiting women for emigration who would fill the "urgent and unlimited demand" for domestic servants in the dominions.\textsuperscript{1xxv} By the terms of the Act the dominions themselves would help finance British migrants.

Failing in the 1920s to reverse the trends, the Overseas Settlement Board blamed the decrease in migration on the differences between the social services available in Britain and that in the dominions. “Unemployment and health insurance, improved public assistance, contributory old age, widows’ and orphans’ pensions, improved educational and medical facilities, have all served to create a sense of social security and stability which in itself militates against the inclination to migrate.”\textsuperscript{1xxvi}

While the growth of the British welfare state may have diminished migration, the slowdown of migration certainly put enormous new pressures on the British welfare state. In the 1930s the first response of the British government to the growth of unemployment was to promote migration but the Depression ended emigration from Britain. Dominion governments sought to protect jobs for natives and suspended financial support for migration.\textsuperscript{1xxvii} In 1932 a Committee on migration presided over by Viscount Astor concluded that "...we are now confronted by a profound disharmony between the economic needs of Great Britain on the one hand and the dominions on the other in regard to migration. Now that it might suit us to send large numbers of our people to the dominions, it does not suit the dominions to receive them\textsuperscript{1xxviii} In 1931 for almost the first time in a century, leaving out the World War I years, more people migrated into the U.K. than left it and this trend continued until the outbreak of World War II.

The collapse of migration removed a safety valve for a surplus British population and now required policy makers to focus their activity on state policy. Regrettfully, the years between 1929-1931 witnessed the greatest political debacle in the history of the Labour Party and paved the way for a decade of Conservative dominance. The elections of May 1929 brought a Labour and Liberal coalition to power; for the first time Labour was the largest party in parliament. Unfortunately the Labour’s ascendancy occurred exactly at the beginning of a great world-wide depression that began the following Fall. Faced with the Depression public revenues declined and public expenditures increased. As deficits increased, the government turned to bankers for financial loans. Laissez-faire economists recommended budget cutting and financial tightening and continued loyalty to free trade. Eventually the growth of national debt brought a crisis of confidence among international bankers and a run on the pound. It should be added that international bankers had never had much confidence in a Labour government to begin with.

In August 1931 the decision of the Labour Prime Minister, J. Ramsay MacDonald and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, to cut unemployment benefits to avoid a growing debt led to political crisis.\textsuperscript{1xxix} Between 1929 and August 1931 as the debt grew, politicians and economists throughout the nation weighed in with views about what to do. From the moment of accession of the McDonald coalition the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the federation of British trade unions, had been disappointed by the failure to deal with issues of unemployment.\textsuperscript{xc} The TUC and Labour’s refusal to support unemployment benefit cuts brought the downfall of the
government in August 1931. But resignation did not end MacDonald’s rule. MacDonald and Snowden remained in power forming a new coalition, mainly with Conservatives but also with Liberals, known as the National Government. MacDonald had hoped to find some support within Labour. But the Party almost unanimously refused to participate in the government and the National Government was largely the Conservative Party with Liberal support. The elections of October 1931, almost wiped Labour out. Of 615 parliamentary seats the government won 556. In the years of Conservative hegemony that followed Neville Chamberlain emerged as the leading figure.

While Depression wreaked havoc within the Labour Party, the work of political scientists such as Theda Skocpol and Margaret Weir, and economists such as Timothy Hattan have viewed the onset of this crisis as a lost opportunity when new leaders might have assumed power and prevented economic catastrophe. Ignoring the mixed economy then growing in Sweden, leading Labour politicians, accepted the proposition that laissez-faire economics was capitalist economics; they believed that the Labour Party must follow its prescriptions because it did not possess a mandate to introduce socialistic measures. The fundamental reasons for Labour’s rejection of unorthodox economics, whether those of Keynes or Lloyd-George or Mosley, were not intellectual ignorance but Party tradition and party divisions. The Labour Party’s commitment to free trade, its fear of devaluation and its rejection of deficit financed public workers projects---so different from American labor attitudes towards public works---had deep roots in its practice and tradition.

Free trade was present at the foundation of the Labour Party. Labour’s first great electoral breakthrough had come with the elections of 1905 when it had allied with liberals on the key issue of supporting free trade. The laissez-faire attitudes of Philip Snowden during his time at the exchequer were not silly idiosyncrasies of a narrow minded man but the main channel of Labour Party thought for previous decades. Noel Thompson has described this creed as “negative Fabianism” and it was the lesson that the Fabian Society, so important in the intellectual development of the Labour Party had been teaching for decades, well absorbed by old Fabians such as Ramsay MacDonald. The Fabians were deeply suspicious of markets and believed that oligopolies and monopolies would simply absorb as profits any additional government money pumped into the economic system to provide employment. As early as 1909 in the celebrated Minority Report of the Poor Law Committee, Beatrice Webb had written that “the Government can do a great deal to regularize the demand for labor between one year and another” but the report had argued that this must involve “no artificial stimulus to demand”.” Noel Thompson concludes that “consistently with their critical analysis of the market the Fabians could not therefore advocate expansion of fiscal and monetary policies to tackle unemployment.”

More innovative thinkers had championed increased government spending and aggressive fiscal policies but were ignored or shunted aside. By 1929 financing public works had become part of the Liberal program and Lloyd George the wartime leader of a Conservative dominated coalition had refashioned himself as an advocate of public works policies; in 1929 he had campaigned on the theme of “We Can Conquer Unemployment.” In 1935 he would package these reforms as a British “New Deal.” Many groups within and outside the party were skeptical about laissez-faire policies. The powerful trade
union leader, Ernest Bevin, the Liberal faction led by David Lloyd George, the Liberal audience that followed John Maynard Keynes, the leftists in the Independent Labour Party and the Labour Party MP and future fascist, Oswald Mosley all offered alternatives. But in order to advance the cause of public spending as a solution for unemployment, it was necessary not simply to spread information but to wield leading politicians and intellectuals into an alliance. While many political groups offered somewhat different critiques, advocates of unorthodox strategies were unable to unite together because of past political relations. Although in favor of government intervention Earnest Bevin favored imperial preference while Lloyd George hailed debt-financed public works.

Moreover Labour remained deeply suspicious of Lloyd-George. Labour Party leaders saw him as the architect of the World War I coalition that had expelled Herbert Asquith and his Liberals from power in 1916, replacing the Liberal Asquith with a Conservative dominated wartime government. Even after the war Lloyd-George’s maneuvering had worked to split the Liberal Party and to ensure the Conservative ascendancy. Labour was thus deeply distrustful of his sudden swing to the left. But by shunning Lloyd-George, Labour critics of MacDonald’s social policies missed their best chance to implement innovative social policies. Other Labour leaders were more thorough going. Labour stalwart, George Lansbury, one of the principal leaders of the Party in the interwar years, even announced that “he would rather die “without seeing our triumph than see any arrangement, open or secret, made with the party has had as its leaders Lord Asquith, Winston Churchill and Lloyd George.”

Scholars focusing on policy alternatives often point to the ideas of Keynes as offering choices but Keynes offered so many alternatives that he hardly inspired confidence as an economic strategist. During the same period Keynes’s intellectual evolution which would finally produce *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936), continued but it involved him in a variety of twists and turns, supporting free trade, opposing it and then supporting it again. In 1931 Keynes, a famous defender of free trade, published an article entitled “proposals for a revenue tariff” in the *New Statesman*, a widely read Liberal journal. In discussing his shift, his biographer Peter Clarke added that the evidence on inconsistency is overwhelming: guilty as charged.

The British failure to act on the economic crisis by strengthening the existing welfare state suggests the difficulty in re-thinking both demographic problems and solutions in the light of new circumstances. In Britain, migration, a centuries old vehicle for solving the unemployment problem had disappeared completely in the thirties. The loss of this escape hatch put enormous new pressure on a set of existing welfare institutions that had just come into being before World War I. Yet for too long, British officials continued to rely on older strategy of migration that was no longer working in the 1920’s let alone the 1930’s. Even in light of emerging reality—that migration would no longer solve unemployment problems-----British progressives could not see their way to adapting new approaches. In part, because of unwillingness to abandon cherished beliefs. But that has to be understood in the context of deep distrust, borne of recent history among potential political allies. Such distrust made coalition formation impossible, and with it the compromise and adaptation of new ideas characteristic of the New Deal. Once British conservatives triumphed in 1931, the motivation for forming new coalition ceased, because they were the governing ruling party until World War II.
To borrow a well-known phrase, our study involves “big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons.” Some of our big structures are demographic structures but not all. In the case of France, the preoccupation with what they continued to see as a problem of under-population overshadowed efforts to provide unemployment relief; English officials reacted to the Depression by continuing their efforts to send surplus labor to the Dominions. In the US, the reach of unemployment benefits was limited, among other things, by the enduring power of white Southern congressmen and agricultural interests. But the possibilities of political coalition making in the moment also mattered—in the United States, newly-mobilized newly enfranchised white workers along with New Deal activists could make common cause on behalf of the first national system of unemployment insurance, in France the rise of the Popular Front coalition shifted control over family allowance funds to the state, in England progressives proved unable to create a coalition that would provide an alternative to established economic orthodoxy. The story of unemployment policies in our three countries exemplifies both the role of long-term structural processes, short-term political trends and historical contingencies.


iv See for example, Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, Chapter 3. For a recent discussion of the significance of the New Deal in American History, See Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore, ”The Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History; International Labor and Working Class History 74(Fall, 2008), 3-32 and the responses in the same issue. Salvatore and Cowie argue that the New Deal involved important realignment of American politics and class relations but that the nature of New Deal, its policies, structures and the fundamental tenets of New Deal liberalism were too weak to be sustained, that a conservative resurgence was “a matter of time.” (12). We would agree with Jennifer Klein, who argues that despite the “racial compromises, exclusions, and illiberalism” built into the core policies of the New Deal, ”its programs and structures were expanded through “steady pressure” and sometimes moments of heightened mobilization, to enhance equality for those originally excluded. See her response to Cowie and Salvatore, “A New Deal Restoration” (46).


See Thomas Ferguson, “The Coming of the New Deal”, in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, editors, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3-31. Ferguson argues that the capital intensive big business community where labor costs were secondary became key components of FDR’s New Deal coalition and some of its most important leaders key members of his advisory group on Social Security. These included such men as Walter Teagle of Standard Oil, Gerald Swope of General Electric, Thomas Watson of IBM, such retailers as Edward Filene as well as the Rockefeller interests. See also Craig Jenkins and Barbara G. Brents in “Social Protest, Hegemonic Competition and Social Reform: A Political Struggle Interpretation of the Origins of the American Welfare State,” American Sociological Review 54 (December, 1989), 891-909.


Ibid., pp.141-142; See also “‘General Electric’s Unemployment Insurance, President Gerald Swope Tells Six Hundred Pittsburgh Businessmen at Chamber What That Great Company Has Done to Protect Employees from Effects Of Business Depressions” Greater Pittsburgh, February 28,1931 (File on Pittsburgh Unemployment, 193-38, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, Pa.)

See ibid.p.143. See also Sanford Jacoby, "Employers and the Welfare State", 536.

See for example, the National Industrial Conference Board's endorsement of corporate schemes, and admonition against government programs in the 1931 report, Unemployment Benefits and Insurance, "Summary and Conclusions," 117-127.


 xvi Nelson, *Unemployment Insurance*, 155

 xvii Dorrance, “ Remaking an Old Deal,”, 70,80.


 xxii Fraser, *Labor Will Rule*, 273,274

 xxiii See Fraser, “The Labor Question,” Dubovsky, *The State and Labor in Modern America*. For a discussion of the both the role of the NLRA and militancy in sustaining the growth of union membership in the 1930’s see Nelson, “The Other New Deal and Labor: The Regulatory State and the Unions, 1933-1940” *Journal of Policy History* 13:3 (2001) 72. Nelson also shows that other New Deal legislation, outside the scope of this
paper, designed to decrease cutthroat competition were critical to building the strength of AFL unions.


xxv Keysarr, *The Right to Vote*, 244. FDR quoted.


xxxi Skocpol and Orloff have explained the failures of social insurance during the early decades of the century by focusing on the particular convictions of middle-class reformers, which did not mesh well with the American state structure. Reformers embraced the idea of government pensions only very slowly, because veterans’ pensions had become corrupted by their entanglement with political patronage so endemic to American politics. And reformers could not put into place a large government of professional civil servants to carry out reform, because the U.S. lacked a traditional state bureaucracy. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* especially Part 2 and the Conclusion See also Ann Orloff, *The Politics of Pensions*, Chps., 7, 9.

xxxii Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 442-446.


xxxv See Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, Chapter 9; Lubove, The Struggle, Conclusion. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 441.

xxxvi Nelson Unemployment Insurance, 209.


xl Report of the Advisory Council to the Committee on Economic Security, December 8, 1934 “Strictly Confidential” p.8 (found in the Vassar College Library, Poughkeepsie New York)

xli In their letter of December 15, 1934, the minority noted that if employees contributed to unemployment insurance the worker could then regard “the program as partly his own to which he has contributed and not looking upon it as something given to him as a gratuity.” See U. S. Congress, Senate, Economic Security Act, Hearings before the Committee on Finance on S. 1130, S. Doc. 116807, 74th Cong. first sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935), 326,

xlii Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, 201-202


Dorrance, “Remaking an Older Deal”, 90


Clifford Rosenberg and Leslie Page Moch


Ralph Schor, *Histoire de l’immigration en France*; Cross, *Immigrant Workers*, 160,
A distinguishing feature of French unemployment in the interwar period was its concentration among younger and older workers as French employers did everything that they could to retain adult males with families against the possibility of future labor shortages. In contrast to England and the United States, French employers discharged disproportionately large numbers of the elderly while seldom substituting younger (and more mobile) workers for mature adults. See Gabrille Letelier, Jean Perret, H.E. Zuber and A. Dauphin-Meunier, *le Chômage en France de 1930 à 1931*, tome 1 (Paris, 1938), 7179.

**lxv** ADL MsupSSO

**lxvi** Letelier *et al.*, *Le Chômage en France de 1930 à 1931*, tome 1, 130 and 137.

**lxvii** Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The origins of modern immigration control between the wars* and (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 200 Leslie Moch


**lxx** Schor, *L’ Opinion francaise*, 596.


**lxxiv** See Antoine Prost, *Autour de Front populaire: Aspects du movement social au XXe siècle* Seuil, l’univers historique, 2006 pp. 72-75,


Matt Perry, *Prisoners of Want: The experience and protest of the unemployed in France, 1921-45.*


Baines, Migration in a Mature Economy p.


Constantine, *Emigrants and Empire*, p. 115.


*Birmingham Post*, May 13, 1932.

see


